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Partisanship, political constraints and employment protection reforms in an era of austerity
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 11:59 authored by Sabina AvdagicWhy do some governments adopt unpopular reforms entailing far-reaching liberalization of the labour market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or even regulatory reforms? This paper explains the likelihood of different types of reform as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players. Combining the ‘blame avoidance’ and ‘veto players’ logics of politics, the paper argues that veto players have either a constraining or enabling effect depending on the partisan orientation of government. Correspondingly, liberalization is most likely to be adopted either by right parties facing few veto players, or by left parties in contexts with a high degree of power sharing. Regulatory reforms are most likely when left governments enjoy strong power concentration, but marginal regulation may be also adopted under external pressure by right governments facing many veto players. An analysis of employment protection reforms in 24 EU countries during 1990-2007 supports the argument that the effect of political constraints and opportunities on the choice of reforms is shaped by partisan differences
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Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Published version
Journal
European Political Science ReviewISSN
1755-7739Publisher
Cambridge University PressExternal DOI
Issue
3Volume
5Page range
431-455Department affiliated with
- Politics Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-11-23First Open Access (FOA) Date
2014-12-01First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2014-06-26Usage metrics
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