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‘Seeking the Bubble Reputation’
Continuities in combat motivation in
Western warfare during the twentieth
century with particular emphasis on the
Falklands War of 1982

David Charles Eyles
University of Sussex
PhD Thesis

December 2012
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature _____________________________________
Abstract
The subject of combat motivation continues to challenge historians, sociologists, psychiatrists and the military establishment. Despite a considerable body of research, the subject remains multifaceted and complex.

Combat motivation is a cyclical process within which motivations to fight before combat, during combat and after combat, are subject to significant changes. The impelling forces for the cycle have been the myths of popular culture. These have shaped how potential combatants understood war and provided the intrinsic motivation to enlist. These attitudes were extrinsically reshaped by training but not removed, and soldiers carried into combat ideas from popular culture that suggested appropriate behaviour; actual participation in combat rapidly reshaped these attitudes. Post-combat, a personal composure was sought to make sense of fighting experiences, and some memoirists extended this into the public sphere. A bifurcation of memoirs reveals not only the perpetuation of traditional myths, but also revelatory attempts to dispel them and thus reshape the popular culture of warfare; specifically, past commemoration and future imagining. Three substantive sections of this thesis will analyse each part of this motivational cycle. By drawing upon evidence from earlier wars it will be possible to demonstrate a continuity of combat motivation throughout the twentieth century. This will also reveal how media representations of the American experience of war have been subsumed into the British cultural template.

Research has tended to conflate motivation with morale, but they are different concepts. Motivation provided the reasons why combatants were prepared to fight; however, morale represented the spirit in which it was undertaken. This thesis will separately analyse the elements of morale as a hierarchy of personal needs.

A central theme of this thesis is that motivations were dependent upon a complex of interests that combined: the public and the state, military culture, and the core personal orientations of the individual combatant. As a campaign that sits on the transitional boundary of post-modern warfare, the Falklands War provides an opportunity to assess continuity and change within this complex as it has adapted to the impact of war.
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<td>AFC</td>
<td>Air Force Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFM</td>
<td>Air Force Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFOAC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Operational Awards Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOSB</td>
<td>Army Officer Selection Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEM</td>
<td>British Empire Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig.</td>
<td>Brigadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Career Transition Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBE</td>
<td>Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGC</td>
<td>Conspicuous Gallantry Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGM</td>
<td>Conspicuous Gallantry Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Company Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Distinguished Conduct Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFM</td>
<td>Distinguished Flying Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMS</td>
<td>Directly Moulded Sole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Distinguished Service Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN FAL</td>
<td><em>Fusil Automatique Léger</em> A self-loading assault rifle of 7.62 calibre manufactured by <em>Fabrique Nationale</em> of Belgium and used by Argentinian Forces during the Falklands War. British Troops used the semi-automatic SLR variant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBE</td>
<td>Knight Grand Cross of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPMG</td>
<td>General Purpose Machine Gun, a belt-fed light machine gun of 7.62 calibre used as an infantry assault weapon when fitted with a bipod and in a Sustained Fire (‘SF’) mode when fitted with a tripod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Service Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GST</td>
<td>Graduated Settlement Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCPAC</td>
<td>House of Commons Public Account Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFO</td>
<td>Job Finding Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNCO</td>
<td>Junior Non-Commissioned Officer - OR4 and below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Services Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBE</td>
<td>Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCL</td>
<td>King’s College London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.Cpl.</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>Landing Craft Utility capable of carrying 120 troops or four vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>Landing Platform Dock, an amphibious assault ship with a displacement of 17,000 tons (approx.) HMSs <em>Fearless</em> and <em>Intrepid</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSL</td>
<td>Landing Ship Logistic, a civilian manned ship operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary e.g. <em>Sir Galahad</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Col.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Gen.</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj.Gen.</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBE</td>
<td>Member of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCTC</td>
<td>Military Corrective Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiD</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dispatches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Military Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>Medical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODSHC</td>
<td>MoD Honours Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM</td>
<td>Meritorious Service Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBE</td>
<td>Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Officer Commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMC</td>
<td>Royal Army Medical Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Regimental Aid Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBL</td>
<td>Royal British Legion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCB</td>
<td>Regular Commissions Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMO</td>
<td>Regimental Medical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>Regimental Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMA 82</td>
<td>South Atlantic Medal Association 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>Service Forces Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLR</td>
<td>Self Loading Rifle (see FN FAL) occasionally referred to by British troops as a ‘slur’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNAFU</td>
<td>Situation Normal All Fucked Up. Originally coined by American troops during the Second World War its has been adopted within the British military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCO</td>
<td>Senior Non-Commissioned Officer - OR5 and above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Sum Selection Grading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUFT</td>
<td>Ships Taken Up From Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUS</td>
<td>Service Personnel Under Sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Victoria Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOSB</td>
<td>War Office Selection Board</td>
</tr>
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Introduction

The title to this thesis alludes to the Shakespearian definition of a soldier (As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII) and posits two challenges. Firstly, to reveal the extent to which combatants have been motivated by cultural myths to strive against almost insuperable odds to seek fragile, overinflated, and arguably illusory reputations. Secondly, to seek out an objective understanding of why these myths have been so powerful. The structure of this thesis is predicated on the argument that combat motivation is a cycle within which motivations to fight; before combat, during combat, and after combat are subject to significant changes. This cycle has been driven by the myths of popular culture. These have shaped how potential recruits understood war and were motivated to enlist. These attitudes were only partially reshaped by training, and soldiers carried into combat ideas from popular culture that suggested appropriate behaviour; the experience of fighting rapidly reshaped these attitudes. Post-combat, personal composure were sought to make sense of fighting experiences; some of these extended into the public sphere, often with an intention to dispel traditional myths and reshape popular understandings of warfare. Britain entered the last quarter of the twentieth century with a robust cultural template of war and military endeavour. Whilst this had been founded on the efforts of the home nations and the Empire, it had been richly augmented by media representations of the American experience. It is impossible to understand motivations to fight during the Falklands War without a context of how the combatants incorporated this cultural legacy. Therefore, substantive arguments will draw not only upon sources related to the Falklands campaign, but also experiences and understandings of other wars of the past century that indicate continuity or (rather more rarely) a shift in attitudes.

The Falklands conflict arrived in 1982 like a bolas from the blue. It not only entangled Britain diplomatically and politically but also militarily. The British armed forces were looking towards the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe whilst mired in the unforgiving task of gendarmerie activity in Ulster. Consequently, the Falklands were effectively unprotected with only a token garrison of eighty Royal Marines.¹ The

Falklands campaign as it played out, provides a fascinating insight into Britain in the early 1980s, particularly how attitudes towards war had evolved since 1945. Except for the Admirals \(^2\) who ran the Falklands campaign from London, none of the British forces had seen action during the Second World War. Therefore, their mindset had been shaped around the significant cultural changes, increased economic prosperity, liberalisation within society and the erosion of deference that characterised post-war Britain. An increased public antipathy towards matters military \(^3\) can in part be explained by the role of Britain’s armed forces in peacekeeping, extraction from empire and the hegemony of the American military-industrial complex that had emasculated Britain during the Suez crisis and subsequently placed it as a front-line outpost of U.S. nuclear deterrence capability. Therefore, the embryonic questions relate not only to how the British armed forces were motivated to go to war in the South Atlantic and achieve a decisive military victory, but also the extent to which veterans reshaped public understandings of warfare. Before 1982, few people knew that the Falkland Islands were in the South Atlantic. Anecdotally many thought they were somewhere off Scotland.\(^4\) The realisation that they were thousands of miles away would arguably have suggested to the most junior combatants that the logistics of fighting an expenditure-constrained war so far from home would be problematic. A concern no doubt exacerbated as the ragtag STUFT armada of warships, cruise liners, and North Sea ferries set sail with stores plundered from the dustiest corners of the MoD inventory.

Developing the research framework first sets out to establish if there is such a thing as a template for the motivated combatant and if so, is it universal as to time and place? It is a subject that enjoys a wide-ranging and long-reaching secondary literature with many contested views. Primary testimony from published sources and oral archives can be used beyond the boundaries set by its initial formulation; therefore, it becomes possible to build an understanding of how memories inform combat motivation, and combat motivation informs memories.

\(^2\) Sir John Fieldhouse, Sir Henry Leach, Sir Terrence Lewin


Fear of injury has been a consistent de-motivator throughout the twentieth century. During the Great War, Norman Demuth was ‘never as afraid of dying […] as I was of being maimed. I was scared stiff of being maimed’. 5 Testimony from the Falklands War will echo this concern and reveal the extent to which a combatant’s immediate comrades assuaged this fear. The primacy of the cohesive combat group featured strongly in twentieth century commentary, but it was the Greek general Onasander who wrote, in the first century CE, that military leaders should station ‘brothers in rank beside brothers; friends beside friends; and lovers beside their favourites’. 6 ‘Greek love’ did not of course accord with the sensibilities of the twentieth century military and yet, despite draconian penalties, occasional primary references to its continued, albeit limited, appeal can be found. Of more significance has been the continued soldierly obsession with heterosexual sex. However, this has been rather glossed over in the construction of a heroic warrior myth acceptable for public consumption, and both orientations are discussed in Chapter 4.5. More broadly this chapter draws a distinction between matters of morale and issues of motivation, which are often erroneously conflated. Although primary group theories have become a mantra since 1945, other components revealed themselves as essential to understand why men were prepared to fight in warfare. These included: the role of ideology and the influence of a modern state to co-opt its citizens into a fighting force; the coercive power of the armed forces; the cynosure of leadership and hierarchy; the regimental tradition and professional induction into an ‘elite’ brotherhood; recognition, reward and status; and, rebarbatively, the pleasure of being able to kill. The passage of millennia has in no way diminished the topicality of this work. As the military historian Sir John Keegan put it:

I think rightly, in the search for an answer to the question how human reason influences human instinct in the awful business of combat, we are entitled to ask why? 7

It will become evident from the literary review that there are a number of constantly developing access points to asking this question; however, what seems most

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undeveloped in the secondary literature is a sense of how motivations adapted according to the position of the participant in a combat cycle. Rather than arguing for the sentence of say primary group theory over ideology or vice versa, it is more rounded to assert that motivational influences were nuanced according to whether a fighter was anticipating combat, participating in it, or winding down from it. Combat motivation was actually a cycle where previous experience of combat would inform the possibility of future action. Developing this argument and positioning sources within the analytical framework that follows is, therefore, a key intervention.

The twentieth century had a distinct periodisation that distinguished it as an area for research. The military sociologist Charles Moskos categorised the period 1914-1989 as comprising a modern/late-modern period. This eventually gave way, following the collapse of the Warsaw pact, into a post-modern period shaped around multinational peacekeeping. For Britain, both world wars started with small volunteer armies designed for imperial policing and minor campaigns. Of necessity, the modern period was characterised by mass conscription, the concepts of total war, and the ideology of national survival. In an environment where the Fourth Estate was integrated into the war effort, public support was garnered and maintained, despite often staggeringly high casualty rates. The impact of military service was felt through the whole of society. The late-modern period saw a reversion to a volunteer forces (National Service ended by 1963) and the military resorting to its historical practice of recruiting the rank-and-file from disadvantaged working-class backgrounds. Set against a background of potential nuclear Armageddon, the attitude of the public towards the Cold War became one of increasing detachment and indifference. The Falklands campaign embraced a paradox: it contained many of the features of the Great War, yet was sustained by an 8,000 mile logistics link. It was arguably not only the last example for Britain undertaking a campaign during this particular epoch but was also to define British warfare during the early post-modern era. The Government was able to espouse Churchillian rhetoric and imperial thunder as a rationale for fighting it and yet an arguably consequence was to restore war as a legitimate policy, subsequently played out

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in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reflecting on his Falklands experience Lt. Gen. John Kiszely suggested that the Falklands War was indeed a throwback to the world wars, symmetrically fought by infantry with fixed bayonets against identifiable opponents, uncluttered by rules of engagement, or allied interference:

So was the Falklands an archetypal example of combat, the very simplicity of which lends itself to a model that can be transferred to future times and places? Or does it appear to be a throwback to a bygone imperial era [...] It seems to me that there are certainly aspects of the Falklands War, particularly at the lower tactical level, that have relevance to the future, and that therefore reward some study.⁹

To take up the Keegan and Kiszely challenges, it is necessary is to provide a research context derived from the extant literature and then apply it to an analytical framework. It is a truism that military activity drew succour from prevailing cultural attitudes, anxieties and aspirations. In this regard, a modern/post-modern periodisation reflects several stages of evolution. These are the building blocks that situate motivations to fight during the Falklands War. The following milestones, developed for this thesis, are intended only to provide a general context, rather than establish an analytical or theoretical framework.

‘Southborough’ - the Southborough Report (1922) was officialdom’s first formal investigation into shell shock, but it failed to reconcile opposing views. Rivers (of Craiglockhart fame) and Moran perceived stress reaction to being an inevitable and individual response to sustained attrition. By contrast, Lord Gort VC saw collapse as cowardice, for which the protection was service within an elite fighting group. It might be argued that the cultural output and sources of the inter-war period reflects this dichotomy.

‘Cold War’ - emerged from Second World War sociological research, which was distilled from participant interviews, the template was laid for increased bureaucracy and professionalism within the armed forces as a response to the possibility of nuclear warfare. One by-product of this reshaping was the

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emergence of the technocratic career officer, short on charismatic leadership skills but educated to the hilt.

‘Cultural Revolution’ - marked the demise of deference during the 1960s with its shift to the rights of the individual. This was laid bare in the swathes of protest against the Vietnam War and fuelled a widespread antimilitarism during the 1970s. In Britain, many schools projected an antipathy towards the military, insofar as many barred Army careers advisors. Attitudes towards the role of the army in Ulster were equivocal, and responses to public war commemorations were often tokenistic.

‘Falklands Bounce’ - The British victory in the Falklands in 1982 restored a lustre to the military and began the renaissance of the warrior-hero. As in 1945, it became acceptable to celebrate a morally justifiable victory in war over a fascist opponent. The Falklands War has produced a plethora of resource material. Interestingly primary sources have shown a shift away from those of the officer and commander and increasingly reveal the perspective of the rank-and-file. Much of this can be grounded in a response to, and a rationalisation of, post-traumatic stress.

“Desert Sands’ - Although mired in political controversy the contribution of the fighting forces in the Gulf War, Iraq and latterly Afghanistan continues to retain widespread public support. The emergence of beaux sabreurs from these campaigns has augmented the rationale for the public to re-establish its relationship with heroes of the past. Public commemoration of, and engagement with, war sacrifice has arguably not been stronger since the end of the Second World War. This interest is reflected in the expansion of relevant scholarship and the revival of interest in matters socio-military throughout the educational system.

To set some realistic boundaries for the scope of this research, I will prioritise research around the role of the infantry combatant. There are good reasons for this: the twentieth century saw the comprehensive development of industrialised warfare with
the possibility of using technology to take the fight to the enemy from extensive
distances. However, for the infantry soldier evolution has been much slower. During the
Falklands War, the role was still fulfilled by foxholes, foot-slogging and fixing
bayonets. Combat for the infantryman remained an up close and personal business.
Where appropriate, evidence will be drawn from other branches of the armed forces.
Although this research is intended to focus on the British, it will draw on relevant
sources and scholarship that have informed the western way of warfare during the
twentieth century. Consequently, the Falklands War can be used as a benchmark not
only to illuminate continuities and change in the theory and application of combat
motivations, but also the broader agency of warfare as a driver of historical trends.
Using Oral Histories and Memoirs

Much of the primary evidence used in this thesis makes use of published combatant memoirs, oral history recordings held at the IWM, and interviews from the broadcast media. There are four issues that arise from drawing on these sources and working across them:

1. The validity of oral sources generally.
2. Challenges posed by using published memoirs.
3. Concepts of composure that are implicit within both types of source.
4. The validity of reusing such sources, beyond their primary interlocution, or intent.

Oral history has had to fight a battle for acceptance against a traditional view that documents are the ‘proper’ source for historical research because oral testimony has been deemed so unreliable. Summerfield pointed out that Hobsbawm ‘dismissed oral history because it was a ‘remarkably slippery medium’.10 The reality has been rather more nuanced; as Thomson asserted, documentary sources could reflect precisely the same characteristics.11 However, the most powerful argument for oral evidence has lain in its ‘powerful recovery role’ because it has rescued testimony that would have never found its way into written sources.12 This emerged strongly from oral histories of the Falklands War. Many of the interviewees, particularly from the lower ranks, have had to be coaxed into providing the ‘raw’ testimony that ‘gives it authority’.13 Because raw testimony was often lacking in introspection, the narration of memory has been dependent upon the relationship between the interviewee and audience. Formal interviews have been particularly sensitive to the status of the interviewer and have determined the extent and manner in which a story may have been revealed.14 Whilst conducting his doctoral research Thomson found that prospective interviewees were

11 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, (Melbourne, OUP, 1995), p.227
12 Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure’, p. 66
14 Summerfield, ‘Culture and Composure’, p. 69
more biddable if he boosted his credentials as a ‘university tutor’ rather than a research student. The same has applied to Falklands research. Students have not garnered the same degree of access that established entities such as the IWM or TV production companies have enjoyed, or the degree of empathy that war-veteran interviewers such as Hugh McManners have been able to leverage. Using secondhand sources has meant that the plural researcher could not ask specific research questions; instead these have had to be framed around extant narrative. A compelling example of how this can work is revealed by the Falklands testimony of Cpl. Lou Armour (Chapter 3.9). In answer to a general question about Argentine casualties, his gradual breakdown in front of the camera revealed a raw uncomposed testimony that signalled not only of suppressed trauma but also an absence of demonisation (Chapter 2.5), ‘I just don’t see them as enemy’. Essentially, oral testators were passive participants; by contrast, writers of published memoirs were powerfully pro-active.

Samuel Hynes applied Hobsbawm’s critique of oral history to war memoirists, ‘they are unsatisfactory, restricted, biased, afflicted by emotion, and full of errors’. The reason being that, ‘they stand too close to the centre of the war’s values […] they act out mottoes on the flags and slogans on the posters’. However, all sources (oral and memoir) need to be weighted and judged, and ‘triangulation’ with a range of sources is ultimately the way subjectively to mitigate inaccuracies (there is no singular accuracy). Clearly it is essential to recognise that memoirs have to satisfy a dual purpose. Not only do they have to represent the needs of the author, but also the commercial demands of the publisher. As Lucy Robinson has pointed out, since 1997, Falklands memoirs have seen a shift from top-down analyses to bottom-up descriptions of the war. Arguably, there are two reasons for the 1997 transition. Firstly; as Yuval Noah Harari has pointed out, although the traditional image of the romantic warrior

15 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 230
16 Falklands War: The Untold Story, Prods. Michael Bilton & Peter Kominsky, Yorkshire TV - Castle Communications, (1987), [on VHS]
18 Ibid, p. 28
hero still persists, public awareness of PTSD has increasingly legitimated the combatant as a victim and a survivor. Because PTSD only entered the medical canon in 1980, Falklands memoirists were the first who were able to use it to redefine the combat experience. Secondly; although Vincent Bramley’s *Excursion into Hell* (1991) paved the way, commercially successful accounts of the SAS during the first Gulf War (1991) underpinned the demand for ‘rank-and-file’ memoirs. These were specifically from members of elite fighting units and elided gritty realism with survivor testimony. Therefore, it might be argued that this commercial development of the genre threw up a salute to the literary form of the Byronic hero. For the historical researcher, there are some important caveats that relate to the use of memoirs as primary sources. The majority of Falklands memoirs are presented explicitly as acts of commemoration, memorialisation, and/or a cathartic response to PTSD. However, the memoirs reveal a tendency to cross reference and cite other testators as a means of asserting validity; consequently, Robinson asserted that memoirs should be understood as ‘[…] an ongoing negotiation of the competing claims and structuring effects of other narratives and other claims to the truth’. Since 1996, the MoD has exercised its displeasure of ‘elite forces’ memoirs. It has not only been able directly to control the activities of serving personnel, but also extend its influence over retired veterans through their regimental connections. Some successful memoirs have been repackaged as second editions; therefore, when using them as evidence, researchers should be aware that their recomposition often reflected these external influences.

Oral histories and memoirs have been constructed ‘through the perspective of the present’; consequently, memories may have developed as more meaningful from the

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21 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War’, p. 569


23 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War’, p. 571

24 Ibid, p. 584

point when they were created.\textsuperscript{26} The process by which memories have been created has been termed ‘composure’ and this implicitly embraced a dual meaning. Firstly it described the process by which an individual achieved a sense of relative comfort with their past; secondly the public language of metaphors and cultural forms through which such past could be expressed.\textsuperscript{27} Public language has been subdivided into ‘general’ forms which would be understood by the public collective, and ‘particular’ forms, which would emerge from discreet groups such as a platoon, company, battalion, regiment, etc. Ultimately ‘composure’ emerged from a complex relationship between all these factors.\textsuperscript{28} As close-knit groups, (cohesion is discussed in Chapter 2.1) the military has been well placed to formulate common memories. As Ben-Ari has pointed out, the genesis of its particular memory has been based upon ‘[…] cultural or folk understandings of military life’.\textsuperscript{29} For the British military, the ‘idealised masculinity’ of the ‘soldier hero’ has provided an effective catalyst.\textsuperscript{30} The downside is that such a model as interpreted by a particular group, has introduced a pressure to conform to the ideal whilst suppressing alternative narratives and failings.\textsuperscript{31} The challenge for historians has been to find ingress into what has often been a closed shop; reanalysing oral interviews and memoirs for the specific purpose of this research has revealed plurality within the evidence that has allowed access, and both sources stand up well to alternative readings. Analysis of Falklands testimony has revealed a continuum of composure in both substance and style. At one end of the scale, an oral interviewee such as David Cooper testified at length without hesitation, deviation or repetition.\textsuperscript{32} By comparison, Jim Mitchell lacked any meaningful sense of rehearsed memory.\textsuperscript{33} Within memoirs,\textsuperscript{26} Lucy Noakes, \textit{War and the British: Gender and National Identity, 1939-91}, (London, I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 80-81

\textsuperscript{27} Thomson, \textit{Anzac Memories}, p. 8

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid}, p. 9

\textsuperscript{29} Eyal Ben-Ari, \textit{Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit}, (New York, Berghahn, 1998), pp. 33-34


\textsuperscript{31} Dawson, \textit{Soldier Heroes}, pp. 22-24; Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, \textit{The Politics of War Memory}, p. 18

\textsuperscript{32} Imperial War Museum Archive (henceforth ‘IWM’) 13419, Cooper, (1993) [on audiotape]; IWM 17145, Cooper, (1996) [on audiotape]

\textsuperscript{33} IWM 13020 - Mitchell, (1992), [on audiotape]
Bramley’s *Excursion to Hell* (1991) was presented for popular consumption in the earthy language of a common soldier, whilst Lukowiak’s *A Soldiers’ Song* (1999) was styled for the *Guardian*’s readership.\(^3\)

By reusing testimony beyond the boundaries set by the initial interview or the intentions of the memoirist, it becomes possible to build an understanding of how memories inform combat motivation, and combat motivation informs memories. In the context of military memory, the essential point that emerges from using both types of source is that composure that has emerged from a ‘particular’ group may not tell the precise truth, but enough of it to sustain robust analysis.

\(^3\) Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War’, p. 572
Surveying the Literature

This review will provide an overview of how the understanding and modelling of combat motivation has been addressed; it will reveal a multi-disciplinary approach, and categorise the published resources as potential sources. Some are historiographical; others are clearly not, but together they constitute a broad context for the work. To provide an analytical framework, a number of different ‘schools’ conceptualised for this review will be briefly examined. To establish a relevant historiography, this review not only draws upon the milestones set out in the introduction, but also the range of different access points provided by contemporary sources. Such sources embrace sociology, medicine, personal testimonies, and the nuanced arguments of historians.

The American Sociologists

Since the late 1940s, and emerging from scientific analysis of experiences in World War II and Korea by Stouffer and Marshall, a growing body of researchers have assumed an arguably dominant position with their didactic focus on primary group theory. According to their arguments, groups empowered and protected, this was necessary because it was an inescapable fact that participation in warfare was a desperately frightening business, and its participants were very young men, often teenagers. They did not have emotional maturity, and instead often replaced it with bravado when part of a group, timidity when not.35 Whilst this was manifestly true of civilian as well as military life, it has been asserted that, despite training and its inculcation of a group ethos of discipline and co-operation, military culture created a dependency and thus an immaturity that was more pronounced than in civilian life.36

Marshall discovered that only twenty-five percent of soldiers were active participants, the remainder would avoid fighting.\(^{37}\) To him primary group theory held the key.\(^ {38}\)

The work of Stouffer et al. has been held up as a benchmark for understanding how primary groups functioned. His conclusion was that groups fulfilled two main functions in combat motivation: to set standards of group behaviour, and protect the individual from stress.\(^ {39}\) In essence, he argued that when the need of the individual soldier were met by the small group of which he was a member, and in turn, the interests of this group were congruent with the wider requirements of the military leadership, then the group would risk personal death or injury to protect its members and achieve the required objective.\(^ {40}\) Psychiatrists Grinker and Spiegel concluded from their investigation of Second World War US airforce crews, 'The men seem to be fighting more for someone than against somebody'.\(^ {41}\) However, group loyalty did not exist in a vacuum, and it was essential that it be sustained by sound and impartial leadership:

> The principal factor governing [the spirit of group loyalty] is the quality of the leadership […] Certainly as important as [the leader's] technical ability is his personality, upon which, in the final analysis, depends his capacity to influence morale […] The attitude of more remote elements both in the army and on the home front are also significant.\(^ {42}\)

Group cohesion and effective leadership (despite occasional failings) were decisive factors in the outcome of the Falklands War. The Argentinian forces were at least as well armed as the British troops and they outnumbered them, but they lacked a group outlook and a tolerant, self-sacrificing leadership. Clear evidence of this is revealed by the fact that following their surrender, Argentinian officers were allowed to


\(^{38}\) *Ibid*, p. 42

\(^{39}\) Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, p. 99


\(^{42}\) Grinker and Spiegel, *Men Under Stress*, pp. 46-48
keep their pistols to protect them against their own men. As late as 1994, Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, the official historian of the Falklands War, remained strongly aligned to the Stouffer/Marshall thesis, ‘What keeps men in battle are ties of friendship, affection, good humour, machismo, sense of honour, or sportsman like behaviour’. This is an oversimplification that does not take full account of either the Vietnam experience or extant scholarship. Moskos and others have commented on how the US policy in Vietnam of rotating men in and out of combat each for their twelve-month tour of duty inhibited group cohesion. Such an environment meant each soldier was ticking the days off his personal calendar, and thus the war became a matter of individual survival and motivation. The influence of a powerful national ideology has been presented as a counter to group theory, and public responses to the Vietnam experience exposed deep flaws in its salience. However, individual self-interest, as well as an often inchoate ideology, may have combined with, rather than contradicted, group theory. According to Moskos:

[...] primary groups maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system for which he is fighting. This commitment need not be formally articulated, nor even perhaps consciously recognised. But he must at some level accept, if not the specific purposes of the war, then at least the broader rectitude of the social system of which he is a member.

The limitations of primary-group theory are revealed by comparing the different performance of armies, ostensibly with similar standards of training and equipment. Wesbrook argued that, ‘The basic problem is that the soldier must not only respond to the demands of his peers while fighting but also the demands of the nation and the military organisation to fight’.

The issue of motivation being sustained by an underlying ideology, whether inchoate or more fully developed, emerged in the research conducted by Shils and Janowitz. This was undertaken in the aftermath of the Second World War and studied

43 William Henderson, Cohesion, pp. 1-2
the combat motivation of German soldiers. Whilst acknowledging the presence of a
general but low-level belief in Nazi ideology, they placed their emphasis on motivation
as emerging from the primary group. In 1986, Bartov re-ignited the ideological
argument. In essence, his argument was that, because primary groups were constantly
broken up and re-formed, motivation had no chance to form within a primary group;
therefore, it had to have been ideologically based. This was not so much an attachment
to Nazism, but the more emotional appeal of a better world that would arise from
victory.47

Primary group theory has retained its topicality notwithstanding the shift
through the modern and post-modern phases of scholarship (see above). During 2006, a
vigorous debate surrounding combat motivation during the Iraq War was played out
between Wong and MacCoun. Professor Robert Wong’s research group, based at the
U.S. War College, asserted the persistence of the traditional arguments, arguing in
favour of motivation being rooted in the emotional support provided by a primary
group. It also identified an emergent ideological presence because: soldiers were better
educated than their forebears; were better informed because of extensive media
coverage; and, importantly, had exercised a personal choice to volunteer.48 Professor
Robert MacCoun’s research group criticised Wong’s for not addressing the distinction
between social cohesion (emotional support) and task cohesion (goal sharing) as
catalysts for primary group formation. Their critique was evidence based, asserting that
whilst there is a reliable correlation between task cohesion and combat performance, it
was absent with social cohesion.49

47 Stephen G. Fritz, ‘ “We are trying ... To Change the Face of the World” - Ideology and Motivation in
the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below’ in Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No.4
(Oct 1996), pp. 683-710

48 Leonard Wong, Thomas Kolditz, Raymond Millen & Terrence Potter, ‘Combat Motivation in Today’s
Soldiers: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute’ in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.4,
(2006), pp. 659-663

49 Robert MacCoun, Elizabeth Kier & Aaron Belkin A, ‘Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in
Combat?: An Old Question with an Old Answer’ in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No.4, (July 2006),
pp. 646-654
The Regimental Tradition

The implicit focus of the ‘sociological school’ on American armed forces has been its great weakness. The reason being that the US Army has had a much weaker regimental tradition than the British Army. Along with the emotional and morale factors of group formation, Newsome placed emphasis on human relationships ‘extrinsically derived’ when combat units were created as part of a functioning managerial hierarchy. An essential difference between the American experience and the British was that the US tended to manage individuals centrally, whereas the British regimental system meant that this responsibility was decentralised and delegated. Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond the primary group towards a more layered structure to reveal aspects of motivation in the British Army.

The regimental tradition remains shrouded in mythology; the army that went to war in 1914 and existed in 1982 mutatis mutandis emerged from the Cardwell-Childers reforms of the 1870s, which initiated a wide-scale reorganisation and amalgamation. As well as inheriting the mess-silver and ancient battle honours of superannuated regiments it made necessary a continued ‘reinvention of “tradition” with a vengeance’. The whole purpose of tradition was to inculcate its members with a strong regimental loyalty and to promote a sense of superiority over others. For recruits, there was a right of passage that had to be earned. As the military historian Richard Holmes observed:

The conclusion of basic training is marked by a passing-out ceremony, designed to emphasise the change of tribal status from youth to warrior […] Red or green berets, arm patches, lanyards: the marks of the fighting caste vary […] they form part of a ritual designed to demonstrate that the recruit is no longer an object of scorn […] he is a man, a comrade and a soldier.

Therefore, each regiment differentiated itself with its own symbols, rituals and peculiarities of dress, often minor, but emotionally significant. Once this hegemonic

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control had been implemented, it enabled a regiment to legitimate its use of discipline and control over its members. John Baynes’ research revealed:

[...] all the other ranks in the battalion were caught up, whatever their origins, in the powerful grasp of the Regiment. By the time they had lived for two or three years in the atmosphere of the Regimental tradition [...] had been constantly reminded of their duty to it, the Regiment could claim them as its own.53

Whilst the Coldstream Guards was raised in 1650, and the Parachute Regiment formed in 1941, both demonstrate that no matter how quickly or slowly myths and traditions are manufactured they remain equally powerful. Elements of this tradition include, recruitment, discipline, and access to resources. The first of these requires discussion of the social gulf between officers and men. In 1914, officers were almost exclusively ‘gentlemen’ recruited from the reformed public schools who required a private income to maintain themselves to the required standard. By contrast, the rank-and-file were recruited from the most deprived parts of society.54

During the World Wars it became necessary for the British Army to recruit officers, disparagingly referred to as ‘temporary gentlemen’, from lower down the social pecking order. In peacetime, they tended to revert to their traditional sources. By the time of the Falklands War, improved social mobility had resulted in some company commanders (in some regiments) being promoted from the ranks. However, it was evident that all from CO upwards had been educated at elite public schools. By 1982, recruitment of ‘other-ranks’ had substantially reverted to being from amongst the socially disadvantaged, so a disempowering and hierarchical social gulf still existed. Two embedded Falklands journalists noted that:

The officers treated their men well, but with a paternalism that bordered on contempt. ‘They have everything done for them,’ was a frequent complaint. ‘If there’s something wrong with the chips in the mess they come and tell us’.55

To suggest, as the authorities did, that throughout the ‘cultural revolution’ its officer cadre had become meritocratic, falls short of the truth. Until the early 1980s, public schools remained the most fecund recruiting ground for officer cadets. According to the

54 French, Military Identities, p. 32
military historian Anthony Beevor, ‘they made up about half the entry, although representing only 6 percent of their age group’.\textsuperscript{56} During the Falklands War, the class system, with all its insidious cliquishness and rivalry was rooted in Army culture.

The regiment worked effectively in the enforcement of discipline. The increasing technology of warfare during the twentieth century had caused a shift from reliance on dominance and submission, such as the practice of imposing field punishments during the Great War, to a wider use of manipulation through incentives, persuasion and goal-setting;\textsuperscript{57} in other words, an outcome of Cold War professionalism. However, this must be placed in context, because a breach of any leniency within the regimental code would rapidly result in a reassertion of ascriptive control. As the military historian John Ellis commented:

\begin{quote}
The basis of any army is discipline, unquestioning obedience of the orders of one’s superiors […] and any signs of democratic thinking or individualism that might threaten such a response must be ruthlessly stamped out […] as far as their inferiors are concerned, officers are omnipotent.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

The regimental tradition could undermine morale among the common soldiery when it limited the availability of basic resources and equipment. The Government has never been lavish in its allocation of budgets, and the MoD has occasionally been exposed for sublime incompetence and stultifying procrastination in its procurement practices, but the armed forces have been their own worst enemy. According to Beevor:

\begin{quote}
Its tribal intricacies, based on regimental and arm loyalties, and the byzantine rivalries in the Ministry of Defence between the Services turn the process into a three dimensional game of noughts and crosses with the players trying to block each other and save themselves.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

Good commanders and their regiments have also had to know how to win political battles to sustain their subordinates.

\textsuperscript{57} Janowitz, \textit{Sociology and the Military Establishment}, p. 43
\textsuperscript{59} Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}, p. xii
British Pragmatists

A consequence of the cultural revolution was a demonisation of the armed forces. As a counter-blast, some historians sought to provide a human face to the complex and adaptive nature of soldering. They have examined the broad sweep of factors that influence morale, motivation and effectiveness. The study of motivation and morale is complex not least because military hierarchies often confused them. Effectiveness has had to take account of a whole range of material and situational factors. Euphemistically (a linguistic technique embedded in military culture) this may be called the ‘fog of war’ others may more harshly refer to it as incompetence. It is only by examining how the authorities provided for the basic requirements of service and the fundamentals of life, as perceived by testosterone-fuelled young men, that combat motivation in the round can be understood. The cliché states that an army marches on its stomach, but it also marches on its feet. Trench foot is synonymous with the First World War, but it has longer legs. Describing the winter of 1914-1915 Captain Ferrers commented that:

[…] this constant immersion in icy cold water played havoc with the feet, and made them swell to such an extent that at times it was agony to keep on one’s boots. To take them off, however, to gain relief would have been fatal, as it would have been impossible to pull them on again […].

Twenty-five years later, nothing much had changed. According to Captain John Graham of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 'We had in two or three months the same experience as the infantry in the First World War endured for years. Some people got trench foot […]'. L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley revealed that the same sad story was manifestly evident during the Falklands War:

An old complaint suffered by troops during many wars was afflicting us in a modern war: trench foot. Our boots, badly and cheaply made, coupled with our old-fashioned socks with puttees, caused this condition.

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61 Baynes, Morale, p. 56
This false economy was, as Ellis asserted, an example of the parsimony the authorities adopted when considering the wellbeing of the troops. Everything was stripped back to the essentials. So whilst food has always provided the calories necessary to do the job it has often proved repetitive and unappetising. Soldiers have never been well paid and in its provision of ‘the little vices of life’ such as drink, tobacco and sex, the authorities have consistently proved tokenistic and prurient.64 Holmes believed soldiers had an almost ‘universal preoccupation with sex’, and cited Baynes’ comment that most Great War soldiers ‘were ready to have sexual intercourse with almost any woman whenever they could’.65 The authorities did at least make provision with ‘blue lights’ for officers and ‘red lights’ for other ranks; however, during the Second World War a greater degree of discretion was required. Of the other two vices, the appeal of tobacco has remained consistently strong. Cigarettes were equally important in the Falklands as in the First World War; Holmes cites Ferguson’s assertion that they literally ‘saved men’s lives’.66 During the First World War, divisional commanders had the discretion whether to issue a rum ration. For those who received it, ‘It was a precious thing, and serving it out was almost like a religious ceremonial […]’.67 The continuing role of alcohol in military culture is demonstrated by the ‘booze cruise’ enthusiasm of the Task Force en-route to the Falklands. As one veteran recalled, ‘We were all restricted to two cans per man per night but no one took any notice of this and the bar was soon drunk dry. An extra shipload of booze had to be sent for’.68

**Deal Makers**

Not all soldiers were inherently attack-minded aggressors. The ‘Deal Makers’ have identified the propensity of soldiers to form an accommodation with their enemies. During the Great War a ‘live and let live’ system emerged whereby one set of trench-

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64 Ellis, *The Sharp End of War*, p. 272
66 *Ibid*, p. 129
68 Mark Eyles-Thomas, *Sod That for a Game of Soldiers*, (Sevenoaks, Kenton, 2007), p. 103
fighters identified to their opponents their desire to maintain a peaceful lifestyle. The simplest way of achieving this was inertia. The principle being, we will remain passive unless you are aggressive, in which case we will retaliate.\textsuperscript{69} Sometimes actual communication took place between sentries, and at other times a ritualistic form of combat took place. Clearly, such behaviour was in direct opposition to official policy and its assumption that all men are innately aggressive. Ashworth's research revealed that the military authorities responded by increasingly reducing the ability of local commanders to determine the level of aggression, and by 1916 had instigated ‘an impersonal, centralised control [that] constrained trench fighters to violence’.\textsuperscript{70}

One of the main reasons that men kept fighting during both world wars was that they had limited alternatives; assuming they did not want to risk desertion or suffer from self-inflicted wounds, the only realistic opt-out was to surrender.\textsuperscript{71} Such activity was fraught with risk, and evidently, despite public mythology to the contrary, both sides in both world wars were enthusiastic executioners of prisoners. Because this was tacitly approved at the highest levels, there was no lack of awareness of its dangers, and Ferguson argued that it ‘was one of the most important reasons why men kept fighting even when they found themselves in dangerous, if not hopeless, positions’.\textsuperscript{72} Ferguson, with his predilection for economics, has extended the economic game-theory approach to prisoner taking and prisoner killing. The essence of the Ferguson model was that surrender resolved into a cost/benefit analysis of six factors: The risk of death or injury by continuing to fight, the risk of punishment from his own side if caught, the likelihood of being killed by the enemy, the quality of life as a PoW, the coercive effects of military discipline against surrender, and finally, the cultural aversion to surrender.\textsuperscript{73} Such a formulaic model, which applied logic rather than emotion to the business of fear


\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid}, p. 77

\textsuperscript{71} Niall Ferguson, \textit{The Pity of War}, (London, Allen Lane, 1998), p. 367

\textsuperscript{72} Ferguson, \textit{The Pity of War}, pp. 369-370

and killing, does not sit comfortably, but provides an insight to juxtapose with chivalric notions of combat and surrender.

**Killers**

By drawing evidence from primary testimony and relating it to psychoanalysis, the ‘Killers’ explored the idea that a motivation to combat was the pleasure of killing. Whilst this idea contradicted the norms of actual behaviour in British society, the fiction of violence in literature and film has retained a compelling leisure interest. As the historian Joanna Bourke pointed out:

> Did actual combat dent the pleasures of imaginative violence? For most combatants the answer must be ‘no’. Time and time again, in the writings of combatants from all three wars [Great War, Second World War and Vietnam], we read of men's (and women's) enjoyment of killing.  

Gray sought to validate this process by reference to Freud’s identification of the thanatos (death) instinct, which is in perpetual challenge with the conflicting instinct for order and preservation. The rather bleak outlook is that because pleasure of destruction is so implicit within the human condition, warfare will continue to develop upon its long tradition. Ferguson adopted a similar view by challenging the perception that the Great War was an experience of dogged stoic with the notion that, ‘men wanted to keep fighting’. They found killing an easy business, and more men suffered nervous breakdowns because they were not allowed to kill rather than being forced to do it.

The psychiatrist, Theodore Nadelson, asserted the view that ordinary men can become transformed:

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The true killers in Vietnam were ‘ordinary men’ before enlistment [...] soldiers became addicted to the excitement and sense of freedom created by the licence to kill. While the act itself could assume the quality of a sexual arousal [...].

Bourke also conflated the urge to destroy and sex. ‘Killing was intrinsically “glamorous”. It was like “getting screwed for the first time” and gave men “an ache as profound as the ache of orgasm”’. Keegan shared the view that ‘men can behave disgustingly in combat’. Combatants may have become wrapped in a frenzied fantasy that could manifest an extreme form of cruelty where the prospect of killing became unbounded. Aspects of military training, such as the bayonet fetish, could act as a catalyst for frenzy because they sought to inculcate aggressive behaviour underpinned by a ‘kill or be killed’ ethos. However, there was a distinction between theory and practice. Keegan identified a leviathan figure that he called the ‘big man’:

This is a combatant ‘who has the ability to project a dominant presence on the battlefield, often but not necessarily a senior officer. They are usually not nice [...] while they quite often instigate disaster [...] they have power over other men nonetheless.’

Men inexperienced in battle needed an example to follow, and they may have fallen under the influence of a ‘big man’, a natural leader who was also a killer.

Cultural Analysts

There is a symbiosis between warfare and public attitudes and this encapsulates not only literature and film but also the business of commemoration and the manner in which they can be exploited as political tools. Writers such as Henty and Kipling shaped the traditional language of warfare that sent troops to fight in 1914 and Newbolt’s Vitaï Lampada is often cited as the apotheosis of this tradition. According to Fussell, it was not a language that could be sustained following the Great War. Whilst this may have been true of mature literature, the nature of boys’ literature and comics during the inter-

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78 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p. 20
80 Ibid
81 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory, p. 37
war period espoused the traditional imperialistic values. Winter argued that it was the Second World War rather than the First that acted as a cultural watershed in attitudes towards war, but this was challenged by Dawson:

The soldier hero has proved to be one of the most durable and powerful forms of idealised masculinity [...] Celebrated as a hero in adventure stories telling of his dangerous and daring exploits, the soldier has become a quintessential figure of masculinity [...].

It was a robust image that was exploited and reflected in the massive popularity of books, television, and films with a war theme, that had ingrained itself within popular culture at the time of the Falklands War and remains with us today, not least because it is an image that is robustly exploited by the Armed Services and the state. It strongly suggests a hegemonic construct that provides the public with a distorted and idealistic vision of army life. This is certainly reflected in the attitudes of many recruits who still have an entirely unrealistic view of military service, often believing that they will live in a holiday camp atmosphere whilst at the same time being transmuted overnight into Ramboesque avengers.

The manner in which the state celebrated war provided a cultural affirmation of the high status of combatants. Ashplant et al. have sought to demonstrate how politics has been central to the business of war commemoration. They cited Hobsbawm and Ranger's assertion in *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) that an official version of the past, sustained by invented tradition and symbols, is necessary not only to reinforce common culture but also to cement social cohesion and legitimise authority. Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983) asserted the centrality of a monument, such as the Cenotaph, as symbolising how national elites may persuade citizens to die for the nation as the price of belonging to the national community. Kevin Foster concluded that the essence of commemoration was (and is) not only to expunge the visceral realities of war

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82 Dawson, *Soldier Heroes*, p. 14
83 *Ibid*, pp. 3-4
84 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 12
85 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, pp. 7-8
but also present it as orderly, meaningful and heroic, ‘[…] Establishment remembrance tends to accuse the post-war present of mediocre survival […]’.  

Popular representations of war and commemoration, pervasive throughout the post-war period and entrenched within the national psyche, were essential to the mythical web woven by the Conservative government in 1982. They evoked powerful images of British stoicism and heroism built around the centrality of the soldier hero. These myths enabled Thatcher: to present herself as embodying the spirit of Churchill, to restore a sense of national pride, and project a sense of utter rightness in pursuing the war. The government took rigorous steps to maintain absolute control of their narrative ‘by endeavouring to discredit the views of dissenters, where possible harassing them into silence’. Typical was the treatment meted out to Lawrence and Bramley whose role in the historiography is touched upon below.

**Men in White Coats**

Attitudes towards combat stress have significantly changed the relationship of the public towards the business of soldiering. In 1914, there was no recognition of ‘shell-shock’ having a psychological cause, it was either physically induced or arose from a fundamental lack of ‘moral fibre’; therefore, a justification for executing cowards. Since the Vietnam War and the identification of PTSD as a legitimate psychological injury, there has been much greater opportunity for a collaborative approach towards the historiography of the combat mindset. In British society, a growing cynicism of Establishment institutions has shifted social values away from collective obligation towards the rights of the individual. Psychologists Jones and Wessely asserted that:

> Recent decades have seen a major shift in our sense of self and what is right and proper as regards our emotions […] from a position of advocating or admiring resilience and/or

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87 Dawson, *Soldier Heroes*, p. 14; Foster, *Fighting Fictions*, p. 82

88 *Ibid*, p. 150
reticence, western values have shifted to encouraging and valuing emotional display or vulnerability.\textsuperscript{89}

In his analysis of the Great War experience, Lord Moran was a trailblazer. His concept of a ‘reservoir’ of courage suggested that every soldier had only a limited capacity of courage that needed to be topped up:

Even prodigal youth had to husband its resources […] A man's willpower was his capital and he was always spending so that wise […] Officers watched the expenditure of every penny lest their men went bankrupt.\textsuperscript{90}

His evidence to the \textit{Southborough Committee} (1922) was largely ignored, and by the start of the Second World War the army had only made a token investment in psychiatric provision. As a result of the growing body of evidence emerging from both World Wars and post-war campaigns, it became evident not only was Moran substantially correct, but also the rate at which the reservoir was expended could be constrained by such factors as effective training, good leadership and a strong group commitment. From studies of the wars that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, Belenky concluded that individual personality was not a determining factor in assessing a propensity towards PTSD. Individuals existed on a continuum that ranged from the heroic to being a casualty. The course of travel along such a continuum would inevitably be determined by the circumstances of battle together with primary group factors. The psychologist Jon Shaw explained that, ‘Particularly potent in inducing shock and demoralisation is surprise, whether at the strategic, operational or tactical level’.\textsuperscript{91}

The initial view that emerged from the Falklands was that psychological casualties were negligible at only two percent of all casualties. Further research increased this estimate to eight percent. One premature conclusion was that the presence of elite units, such as the Paras and the Royal Marines, kept this figure down, ignoring the possibility that such units perhaps had a tendency to play down anything that undermined their self-image. A study conducted ten years after the war suggested that

\textsuperscript{89} Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, \textit{From Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War}, (Hove, Psychology Press, 2005), p. 73

\textsuperscript{90} Lord Moran, \textit{Anatomy of Courage}, (New York, Avery, 1987), pp. 63-64

\textsuperscript{91} Belenky, \textit{Contemporary Studies}, p.5; Jon Shaw ‘Psychodynamic Considerations in the Adaption to Combat’ in Belenky, \textit{Contemporary Studies}, pp.119-120
50% of combatants had partial symptoms of PTSD, whilst twenty-two percent suffered the full disorder. The official recognition of PTSD as a defined psychiatric illness is relatively recent. As Wessely pointed out, it was not enjoined within the psychiatric canon until 1980. Old attitudes tend to die hard, and there remains a persistence of the view that combat stress is generally a short-lived condition; however, if it becomes chronic then it must have been caused by pre-war events. Wessely also argued that the recognition of PTSD has caused a slow fissure with established military academic teaching. The military mind has struggled to accommodate the idea of PTSD as an individual response to combat because their dogma emphasised the protection of the primary group and the palliative of leadership. Military training and culture continues to be centred on group formation and loyalty. Traditional views remain strongly garrisoned, and the ‘most powerful discourse in military teaching’ is that emotional breakdown is the polar opposite of motivation. Compassion might be awarded for demonstrable courage, but anything less will receive little understanding. Consequently, the authorities have yet to offer effective treatment.

The psychology of leadership feeds into motivation. Dixon identified that a significant cause of incompetent leadership resulted from an authoritarian personality. This manifested itself in a number of ways, but most notably in an obsession with status and the pecking order, asocial behaviour, and reactionary and straight-jacket thinking. Such personality traits were, in his view, the product of childhood socialisation, ‘The author is only too well aware that to suggest that a general’s personality may […] bear the hallmark of his “potty-training” reduces some people to nervous giggles’. It is an inescapable fact that many officers with this form of ‘achievement motivation’ found the armed forces offered a natural environment until they were challenged beyond their capabilities. Fortunately, others possessed a ‘needs motivation’ that was focussed on task completion, necessarily challenging the hierarchy in the process. When motivating the troops such leaders were most likely to communicate the common touch. During the

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92 Jones & Wessely, *From Shell Shock to PTSD*, p. 136


Falklands War, Brig. Julian Thompson emerged as an abundant possessor of these qualities.

**Quest Narrators**

Modern warfare produced an abundance of personal testimony. Fussell cited Auerbach as demonstrating how many of these narratives shared the characteristics of a mediaeval romance quest, ‘of the sort written in France by Chrétien de Troyes […] and in England by Sir Thomas Malory’.\(^{(95)}\) The essence of a quest narration is to unravel an individual journey through unfamiliar territory. The narrator will face numerous tests and mysteries, gain experience and skills necessary to overcome strange enemies, be sustained by organisational rituals and emerge from all the trials encountered into, ‘a community of the elect’.\(^{(96)}\)

Narratives of the Falklands War reveal a difference in style between officers and other-ranks. Lt. Col. Nick Vaux of 42 Commando described his experiences in *March to the South Atlantic* (2007). Whilst this was a colourful and insightful account, it did not get under the skin of the combat experience. Any criticism was muted, and it essentially served as a panegyric. There was no risk of this book rocking the Establishment boat and Vaux retired in 1990 as a Major General. By comparison, Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly was prepared to criticise; there is considerable evidence from him that the medical provision was inadequate and that success in treating so many casualties, without loss of life, was the result of professionalism and improvisation.\(^{(97)}\) Jolly was the only combatant decorated by both sides, and he continues to be a committed advocate of support for PTSD sufferers. Until 1997, two-thirds of Falklands written testimony was produced by officers; after 1997 the same proportion came from the rank-and-file. The shift in the ratio also marked a shift from an explanation of decision making to the

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\(^{(95)}\) Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, p. 135

\(^{(96)}\) Ibid

The nature of the books written from the ‘rank-and-file’ tended to be much more critical, often possessing a cathartic quality that related feelings of disempowerment, the somewhat cosy interpretation of officer-man relations made by senior ranks, and the struggle to come to terms with the visceral death of friends. Mark Eyles-Thomas, a junior soldier, commented:

[…] the events of the Falklands in general and Mount Longdon in particular have shaped my life, for both good and bad. The one overriding factor for me has always been the motivation to achieve for myself the things that my friends were unable to. There is not a day goes by when I do not think of them.99

Most of them underwent life-changing events whilst very young; Eyles-Thomas was only seventeen, too young to serve in Northern Ireland.

There is no doubt that personal survivor testimony exerted a powerful and often raw view of the combat experience and this certainly chimed with the current ‘Desert Sands’ view of warfare and its focus upon the individual.100 They provide a unique means to shape an understanding of combat. However, these testimonies require a careful interrogation as potential research sources. Narratives are not constructed in a vacuum; they are written to serve a purpose, often as a marketable commodity, and the view they project may be distinctly refracted because of the manner in which they are collectively ‘composed and recomposed’.101

**Evangelists**

These link ‘quest narrators’, who wished to reveal the reality of combat, with more academically focussed work, both of which sought to expose official fabulation. Perhaps as a result of the standards of adult literacy, much of this work has, in earlier decades, tended to come from the officer class. Not so in reflections of the Falklands War; Bramley has written several books, and his most notorious revelation of the

98 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories’, p. 571
99 Eyles-Thomas, *Sod That*, p. 296
100 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, pp. 47-48
101 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories’, p. 570
murder of PoWs invoked the wrath of the authorities, instigated an official enquiry and placed him under threat of prosecution:

Suddenly we heard screaming […] A dull shot was heard and we saw an Argentinian fall over the cliff. There was more screaming […] Below the cliff line a party of our lads were burying the ‘battle-dead’ Argies who had been centralised for this purpose. I tried to see more but Captain Mason shouted for Johnny and me to come over. ‘Forget that. The OC will deal with the bastards […] We left the ‘topping’ to follow his instructions.102

Whilst there appeared to be a solid core of truth in this allegation (discussed in Chapter 3.7), the evidence suggested it was exaggerated in scale. Robert Lawrence, an officer in the Scots Guards who was seriously wounded during the Falklands War, was critical of the official response to his injuries. The army has always advertised itself as being strong on pastoral care; however, army support following injury appeared to be uncompromising. It required those who needed support to accept it on the Army’s terms and not their own. According to Lawrence, ‘[…] all I ever wanted was for the Scots Guards to […] Be the family they had always claimed to be […] Instead I think I just became an embarrassment to them’.103 The film *Tumbledown* (1988) based on his book provoked a number of *ad hominem* attacks on Lawrence. Anecdotally, these seem to have been semi-official in nature and conspired in the officers’ mess of the Scots Guards.

Fitz-Gibbon has deconstructed the Falklands War Battle of Goose Green, and the role of Lieutenant-Colonel ‘H’ Jones VC; whilst Wilsey has also undertaken a character analysis of Jones. There is no doubting Jones’s personal bravery, and what official mythology demands of its warrior heroes; however, whether Jones was deserving of Britain’s highest gallantry award ahead of many others is debatable. What is more certain is that the media demanded a hero, and they lobbied furiously on behalf of Jones. Fitz-Gibbon commented on Jones’ VC citation that, ‘The idea that the devastating display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined [the Argentinian] will to “fight further” is pure fantasy’.104 In the moments leading up to this

102 Bramley, *Excursion to Hell*, p. 144


event, ‘There is considerable evidence that Colonel Jones was becoming irritable with the OC ‘A’ Company. Estimates […] range to assertions that the Colonel had effectively sacked Major Farrar-Hockley’.\textsuperscript{105} From Farrar-Hockley’s perspective, ‘it cannot be said that H’s courageous sorties […] Inspired the soldiers […] Few, if any, were aware of what he was doing’\textsuperscript{106} Farrar-Hockley went on to win the MC and retired as a Major General; he is yet to publish a memoir and is seldom quoted.

The institutional motivation of awards will be discussed in Chapter Three (part 1). The issue of awards by the British has always been parsimonious and weighted in favour of the senior ranks. The apparent lottery system of the reward system provoked much disquiet and occasional outrage because of its failings, notably in the case of Cpl. Stewart McLaughlin.\textsuperscript{107} McLaughlin featured regularly in Falklands narratives of the Battle of Mount Longdon, and his case study is discussed in Chapter 3.7. Decorations could also become devalued if they were dispensed too freely. According to Cincinnatus, during the Vietnam War the Americans issued over 1.2 million bravery medals:

[An] indication that the Vietnam-era army had difficulties can be seen in its willingness to present awards and decorations to men for doing no more than what they were being paid to do.\textsuperscript{108}

Cincinnatus exposed the fact that whilst General William C.Westmoreland was prepared to present Vietnam as a military success that failed because of a lack of social and political will power, leadership was the real failing.\textsuperscript{109}

A revealing aspect of the desire to evangelise was pointed out by Dixon. He asserted that the armed forces have consistently fostered a culture of anti-intellectualism. It certainly seems that the limited publications of serving officers have


\textsuperscript{106} Fitz-Gibbon, \textit{Not Mentioned in Dispatches}, p. 107

\textsuperscript{107} Bramley, \textit{Excursion to Hell}, p. 217


\textsuperscript{109} Cincinnatus, \textit{Self Destruction}, p. 62
tended towards an anodyne and formulaic narrative. It is only when the shackles were off, and the pension secured that there was a tendency to cut loose. The saddest feature of anti-intellectualism was that it often reflected actual suppression of intellectual activity rather than any lack of ability. This is suggested by the rapidity with which so many military men rushed into print soon after retirement. The use of such testimony raises a challenge for the researcher that must be confronted head on. There is a raft of opinion that military experience is a prerequisite for embarking upon a study of this kind. Diana Henderson asserted an argument for caution:

We as historians are asking in a sense, what it was like to be there? I believe we should be asking what might it have been like to be there? […] Many of [us] have never ‘worn a red coat’ and therefore I advocate that we take great care when expounding upon ‘the soldier's experience’. Nonetheless, it is essential to get beyond the myopia of distinctly personal experiences and the tendency to close ranks around the overly perfected image of the warrior-hero. Often published accounts are nuanced to satisfy the demands of the reader, they are after-all a commercial commodity. However, an un-badged historian has the potential to bring a generous helping of objectivity, a pinch of cynicism and hopefully a dollop of empathy to the process. As Robinson observed:

Falklands Veterans who wrote memoirs [have] […] defined how combat is understood. As such they are uniquely positioned to illuminate the changing relationship between memoir, memory and war in the twentieth century.

**Primary Source Collators**

This final category has a highly qualified value as a literary evidence and is subject to the important caveat that sources seldom speak for themselves. However, it does signpost sources for more thorough analysis as an aid to methodology. This genre has tapped into the archival sound resources available at *inter alia* the Imperial War Museum. Bereft of analysis, sources are chopped up into tasty morsels and bundled together into somewhat arbitrary categories. Two issues emerge from their use. Firstly, it

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112 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories’, p. 569
is preferable to get the full sense of a combat experience by analysing it as a continuous narrative. Secondly, it may be wise to follow Thomson’s counsel of unpeeling the layers of selected and rehearsed memory that have often been developed as ‘strategies of containment’. Engaging with the original sources is vital to this process as two examples reveal. Ulrich Burke (Devonshire Regiment) and Richard Tobin (Hood Battalion, Royal Naval Division) crop up frequently as Great War narrators. The tapes suggest that Tobin delivered a well-rehearsed and frequently refined account, whilst Burke responded to his interlocutor with an immediacy and freshness.

It is evident from the diversity of sources that understanding combat motivation remains a contested field for historians. The challenge was acknowledged by Keegan, ‘[…] you may even […] push us a shade further to a convincing theory of combat motivation […]’. An imperative in attempting to answer the question of why men fight is to envisage how the various factors can combine. Compliance theory asserts that the exercise of power can take one of three forms; coercive, remunerative or normative (i.e. persuasive). Those upon whom such power is imposed can respond in either an alienative, calculative or a morally engaged manner; consequently, there are a diverse range of compliance relationships. It has been argued that, during the twentieth century, only a normative power/moral response relationship has been an effective motivator. A further argument suggested that motivation could be boiled down to the combined effects of four factors: submission, fear, loyalty and self-pride. The fact remains that there have been few historians’ theses produced since 1970 that have researched this question, and most pertinently considered combat motivation as a process comprising a before, during and after. From a medical perspective, it has been argued that ‘It is

113 Thomson, Anzac Memories, p. 237
114 Arthur, Great War, passim; Joshua Levine, Forgotten Voices of the Somme, (London, Ebury, 2008), passim
115 IWM 4243 - Tobin, (1964), [on audiotape]; IWM 569 - Burke, (1975), [on audiotape]
116 Keegan ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’, p. 11
helpful to conceptualise the stressors of war along the following time line: pre-deployment, deployment, sustainment, hostilities, reunion and reintegration’.\(^{119}\)

There has been a tendency in this field of research to take a top down, functional and homogenised approach to the fighting soldier, echoing the Clausewitz view that:

The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained […] The whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place at the right time.\(^{120}\)

Current scholarship is more reflective of Desert Sands and is oriented towards the means of recruitment and service rather than its ends. By taking a ‘bottom-up’ view, it will be possible to establish that motivation does not resolve into a few simple tropes. At different times, different forces come into play. Therefore, the substantive chapters of the research process will integrate the historiography with the analytical structure that follows.

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Research Framework

The range of evidential sources set out above have to be placed within a coherent research framework. Following the publication of the *Face of Battle* (1976) Keegan felt that he had stumbled upon a universal theory of combat motivation, ‘inducement, coercion and narcosis’, until it was pointed out to him that this triumvirate could equally apply to running a university department, or marriage.\(^{121}\) Nonetheless, it does contain essential truths that are integrated within the research framework for this thesis. A pictogram is attached as Appendix 1, and this requires explanation. The model comprises three elements: Morale Factors; Personal Orientations; and Cyclical Motivations, which reflect the Before, During, and After of combat.

**Morale**

The expressions morale and motivation, although often used interchangeably, are not the same thing. In essence, they reflect the interplay between the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of combat. The ‘what’ factors of morale are facilitators of the spirit with which the serviceman embarked upon combat. The ‘why’ refers to the means by which participants justified their action. Therefore, it was possible for a combatant to have high morale/esprit but low fighting motivation and vice versa. As such, morale served as an aid or an inhibitor to motivation. Because morale is essentially an expression of how human needs are met, then the impact of morale on motivation can be considered in hierarchical terms. For this reason aspects of morale are separated from motivational forces, are discussed separately, and are positioned within the hierarchy of needs deficiencies first theorised by Abraham Maslow in 1943.

**Personal Orientations**

Motivation and morale factors impact upon individuals in different ways depending upon each personal orientation towards combat. Extant research reveals that

\(^{121}\) Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’, pp. 7-8
there are three inter-linking personal motivations towards military service and the prospect of combat. These are universal constructions that have been applied throughout this research. The constructions are: needs versus achievement, intrinsic versus extrinsic, and existentialist warrior commitment versus jobseeker.

According to Dixon, the needs-motivated soldier was primarily driven by self-determined standards of excellence. By contrast, those who were achievement-motivated were driven by the desire for the approval of others. At its worst, achievement-motivation lead to the development of an authoritarian personality that was obsessed with atychiphobia (fear of failure):

 [...] those sorts of behaviour - conformity, obedience, and physical bravery - which earn social approval and increased self-esteem are the very ones rewarded by steady advancement in military organisations. Conversely, many of the traits associated with the more entrepreneurial aspects of need-achievement - unconventionality and scant regard for the approval of others - are not welcomed in military circles.  

It does not require a leap of imagination to envisage the appeal of honours to the achievement-motivated; however, it is important to distinguish the authoritarian from the autocrat because these terms have also often been interchanged. Both types of personality, in a leadership role, could tend towards either the martinet or the avuncular. An autocratic leader may have been hard on his subordinates but was more likely to be concerned for their welfare and recognition because of his identification with task completion. By contrast, an authoritarian may have courted popularity from his followers, but this was only a veneer because self-enrichment was their driving force. Lt. Col. ‘H’ Jones, arguably the most iconic figure of the Falklands War, has been described by one of his officers as, ‘Not hysterically authoritarian, but not far off it’. However, it may be argued that he was a needs-motivated autocrat, although not necessarily an entirely competent one for the role he fulfilled during the campaign.

The evaluation of intrinsic versus extrinsic combat motivations remains a contested field. The terms themselves are controversial and require a definition. Sociologically, they have often been applied as absolutes; however, for this research

122 Dixon, Military Incompetence, p. 254
123 Fitz-Gibbon, Not Mentioned in Dispatches, p. 21
they are used as heuristic devices that should be envisaged as existing on a continuum. Intrinsic motivation is closely allied to needs-motivation because it ‘is valued for its own sake and appears to be self sustained’.\textsuperscript{124} It embraces ideas of nationalism, ideology, rationality, public service and role fulfilment within a military framework. This demands that a serviceman could find a sense of satisfaction and self-actualisation within a military context, even though military hierarchies have not been entirely conducive to independence of spirit. Bartov and Fritz were advocates of ideological motivation; based upon studies of the German Army during the Second World War they argued for the intrinsic motivation of \textit{Volksgemeinschaft}.*\textsuperscript{125} By contrast, extrinsic motivation relied upon the application of indirect forces. At its crudest level it was coercive, but applied with more subtlety inculcated a modified set of values through training and the formulation of group identities. In the commercial world, it has been argued that the ideal extrinsic motivator has been ‘strict pay for performance’.\textsuperscript{126} However, this accorded with neither the traditional generosity of the Government nor military sensibilities, according to Beevor:

\begin{quote}
One thing is certain: an army, to mix a paraphrase, does not march on its pay scales alone. ‘If you turn us into a monetary organisation’ said a major from the Parachute Regiment, ‘you get a monetary mentality’.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

The services have developed their own carrots and sticks built around adoption within the regimental tradition and its primary groups, where status partially substituted for salary, and coercion produced normative behaviour. It has been argued by Bruce Newsome that intrinsic motivation has no significant purchase, and its effects are exaggerated; intrinsic motivations may have encouraged recruitment but were irrelevant to the act of combat:

\begin{quote}
[…] the literature, particularly the American literature, exaggerates intrinsic motivations. Motivations to serve, which are intrinsic, are not completely transitive with combat motivations, which are largely extrinsic. An emphasis on intrinsic
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{125} Fritz, p. 700

\textsuperscript{126} Osterloh & Frey, ‘Motivation’, p. 539

\textsuperscript{127} Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}; p. 196
motivations can even be counter-productive, encouraging, at best, myopia and, at worst, atrocities.\textsuperscript{128}

This disregards the orientation of existential commitment, which makes a stronger case for individual agency. The argument for the existence of an existential warrior commitment establishes the difference between the motivation to undertake a soldierly career in which participation in combat was perceived as an unlikely and/or unwelcome necessity, compared with the desire of a natural warrior actively to seek out combat. Rune Henriksen asserted:

There is such a thing as a ‘natural soldier’: the kind who derives his greatest satisfaction from male companionship, from excitement, and from the conquering of physical obstacles. He doesn’t want to kill people as such, but he will have no objections if it occurs within a moral framework that gives him justification.\textsuperscript{129}

Based upon his methodologically disputed research,\textsuperscript{130} S.L.A. Marshall concluded that only 25\% of ‘well-trained and campaigned season troops’ will actually fire on the enemy.\textsuperscript{131} CPO Sam Bishop, who served on HMS \textit{Antelope} during the Falklands War, joined the Royal Navy as a jobseeker rather than an existentialist-warrior:

I’ve always said, years ago, if ever there is a war breaks out I’m swimming back to Belfast. I didn’t join for war; I didn’t want to go but I thought well I’ve got to go. The taxpayers have been paying my wages for all these years […]\textsuperscript{132}

Henriksen argued that existentialist-warrior motivation moved beyond the sense of normative behaviour expected by the public collective:

[...] the essence of the difference between a soldier and a warrior [...] Sacrificing one’s life is a gift, not a duty, and the willingness to consistently pursue life-threatening situations is antithetic to instrumental gains.\textsuperscript{133}

It was argued by Professor (and Second World War veteran) Jesse Gray, that a sizeable minority of soldiers were captivated by a strong warrior impulse for the opportunity to kill and destroy:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{128} Newsome, ‘The Myth’, p. 24  
\textsuperscript{131} Marshall, \textit{Men Against Fire}, p. 50  
\textsuperscript{132} Falklands War: The Untold Story, [on VHS]  
\textsuperscript{133} Henriksen , ‘The Myth’, p. 201
\end{flushleft}
Danger provides a certain spice to experience […] Its origin appears to be sexual, if we understand sex in the widest sense given to it by Freud. The increased vitality we feel where danger is incidental is due to awareness of mastery over the environment. It is an individualist, not a communal drive.\textsuperscript{134}

This concept of frenzy, which embraced the desire to kill and the propensity to commit atrocity, fed into motivations relating to recognition and reward. Although existentialist warriors were less motivated by honours, they were arguably the most likely to be considered for them provided that they were a low embarrassment risk. For the Falklands War Cpl. McLaughlin is a relevant case study that reveals a strong warrior ethos mired by accusations of atrocity.

Arguments regarding these orientations remain topical. MacCoun \textit{et al.} asserted that concepts of motivation enshrined within group theories of social cohesion were largely irrelevant to military performance, because what mattered was a commitment to task completion and meeting shared professional goals.\textsuperscript{135} Whilst acknowledging that motivations evolved during the transition into combat, Wong \textit{et al.} continued to maintain the critical power of strong emotional bonds.\textsuperscript{136}

\textbf{The Motivation Cycle}

The history of combat motivation is the history of relationships: the compact individuals made with themselves, the symbiosis between the combatant and the social collective, adaption to the military hierarchy and its culture, participation in primary groups, membership of the regimental tradition, leading and being led. The historiography reveals that each of these categories has had its advocates. The purpose of this thesis is to establish how all of these factors were relevant, but shifted in relative importance to the individual according to circumstance. Therefore, answering the key question of why the British armed forces were motivated to combat during the Falklands war, envisions as a cycle comprising three interdependent phases.

\textsuperscript{134} Gray, \textit{The Warriors}, pp. 41-43
\textsuperscript{135} MacCoun, Keir & Belkin, ‘Social Cohesion’, p. 652
\textsuperscript{136} Wong, Kolditz, Millen & Potter, ‘Combat Motivation’, p. 23
Chapter One - will analyse the time before combat when a volunteer shaped a personal motivation to enlist. This chapter will investigate the power of a popular culture and ideology to shape intrinsic motivations, particularly through books and film. It will examine recruitment policy, and how extrinsic factors such as training, discipline and conformity have been used to create a modified set of intrinsic values built around membership of functional groups.

Chapter Two - describes the experience of combat. It will assess the effect of functional groups; the primary group, and the broader regimental tradition, the role of formal and informal leadership and how this has informed officer-man relations. The chapter will conclude by considering frenzy. The extent to which combatants have been motivated to set aside societal norms of behaviour will be considered.

Chapter Three - will deal with post combat experience and comprises two parts. It is during this phase that a combatant will either leave the armed forces with a reshaped set of attitudes or will stay in the forces where their experiences will be adapted into military culture, potentially to be called upon in another combat situation. The first part will consider the relationship between the combatant, the military establishment and society in the provision of medals and honours. The Second part will consider broader issues of resolving the immediate after-effects of combat, the response of the public and the demands of ceremonial, and what efforts the authorities have made to reintegrate combatants back into the armed services or assist them into civilian life. Finally this chapter will consider the emotional fallout of combat and the responses to combat trauma.

What is needed to test this approach is a tidy symmetrical little war; fought along traditional lines, with a beginning a middle and an end; uncluttered by complications of peacekeeping, guerrilla warfare, American hegemony and religion. The Falklands War meets these criteria, and it is from this conflict as influenced by previous wars of the twentieth century, that sources will be applied to develop some relevant case studies and answer the following research questions: why did soldiers join
the army and how were they conditioned for combat; how did they cope with the business of combat; what were their reactions to post-combat recognition and rehabilitation; and finally, what were the ‘fog of war’ morale factors that supported or inhibited these events?
Chapter 1 - Before Combat

The aim of this chapter is to understand the enlistment motivations of those who served in the Falklands War, and it is necessary to situate their attitudes and experiences within the evolving perspective of the twentieth century. In it, I will argue for a cyclical relationship between the individual, collective social attitudes, and the armed forces. The evidence for this cycle will reveal how nascent individual attitudes of the young have been shaped by a powerful collective outlook, how the military selected recruits and reshaped their attitudes and how these then fed back into civilian life through narratives of motivation and combat and developed the collective outlook. The analytical substance of this chapter will comprise two sections. The first will examine the cultural environment where intrinsic and existentialist motivations have been shaped and will examine the role of books and film in underpinning cultural formation. The second section will begin by examining how such motivations have been extrinsically adapted through recruitment policy and training to create a reformed set of intrinsic values. The extent to which pay has been a significant motivator will be examined, and the chapter will conclude by investigating the changing manner in which discipline, and conformity with military culture, has been enforced both officially and unofficially. So that this analysis can be properly framed and provide a context for the Falklands War, the following introduction will provide a context to the way British society has adapted and reacted to participation in warfare during the twentieth century.

A sizeable chunk of contemporary British social history can be examined through the lens of preparation for, participation in, and recovery from, total war. Total war is often a loosely used and abused term, frequently employed in a limited sense to explain the more barbarous concomitants of warfare. Whilst the Falklands War of 1982 cannot be described in any objective sense as a total war, the motivations of the service personnel who fought in it were shaped by the national experiences of what had gone on before. There has been a significant shift in cultural attitudes towards war during the twentieth century.

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twentieth century, and the extent to which chivalric notions of war have been consigned to the myth-recycling bin of history has been extensively researched. Consequently, it is widely understood that demonisation processes, encouraged by all powers, made little distinction between combatant and civilian as legitimate targets in pursuit of outcomes and solutions. However, this is only one part of a three part model of total war. Geographical reach is the second (albeit outside the scope of this chapter), and the third part measures the extent to which governments have garnered the available economic resources of their states to meet their aims. It is in this third part that shifts in the relationship between the citizen and the state can be found. War is expensive, and the opportunity-cost sacrifices required of the national collective may be substantial. In times of crisis, governments effectively have to sell the notion that ‘we are all in this together’ and that future benefits outweigh present-day hardships.

The first two years of the First World War continued the British tradition of voluntary military service. This ended in 1916 with the introduction of conscription, which lasted until the end of the war. The government learned an important lesson about resource utilisation and in 1938 did not procrastinate. Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, conscription was reintroduced and subsequently augmented. The effect of the Conscription Act (18 December 1941) was to raise the maximum call up age for men from 41 to 50 and conscript unmarried women aged between 20 and 30 into non-combatant roles. Although women were released from conscripted service at the end of the war, compulsory national service for young men aged between 17 and 21 continued until 1961. Some important factors emerge from compulsory service that reshaped the relationship between citizens, soldiers, and government. A consequence of

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4 Military Service Act - 2 March 1916

5 Emergency Powers Defence Act - August 1938

6 Military Training Act - April 1939

7 Until 1950 for 18 months followed by four years on reserve, as a result of the Korean War this was extended to two years but with six months deducted from reserve service.
conscription was to draw into military service middle-class and skilled working-class recruits who, as a matter of personal preference, had historically avoided it. Not only was the military awash with talent but also developed a symbiosis, created out of necessity, with wider society. Military service became the accepted norm.\(^8\) According to military historian Anthony Kellett, this development upset much of the received wisdom within the military elite that envisaged the erosion of ‘traditional military virtues’ through ‘excessive individualism, inadequate discipline and […] unpatriotic working-class politics’.\(^9\) The Government discovered that democracy increased its legitimacy to nationalise the lives of its citizens in the service of the modern state.\(^10\)

During a period spanning fifty-five years, the public, government, and military formed a nexus unique in modern British history; it has not lasted. Over the past thirty years, the public attitude towards the armed forces has been shaped largely by controlled media coverage of events in the Falklands, Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Phillip Knightly:

> It is now clear that in the wars of our time, Vietnam was an aberration […] the Falklands provided a model of how to make certain that government policy is not undermined by the way a war is reported. The rules [are]: […] control access to the fighting; exclude neutral correspondents; censor your own; and muster support, both on the field and at home, in the name of patriotism, labelling any dissenters as traitors.\(^11\)

News of casualties continues to be carefully managed. In 1982, ‘sombre’ BBC reports of ‘hysteria’ during the Sir Galahad disaster were suppressed, whilst ITN reports of ‘extraordinary heroism’ made it past the censor. Film of the attack was not broadcast until the war was won.\(^12\) As is widely reported, between 2001 and 31 December 2011, 404 British service personnel died in Afghanistan. However, publicly available data from the MoD of non-fatal injuries is incomplete, although for the same period they

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10 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, p. 35


have been estimated at 11,341.\textsuperscript{13} Because the public are denied any meaningful context of combat, not only in terms of casualties but also how combatants respond to them, fighting troops all tend to be reified by the public as heroes in a non-discriminatory manner; however, as the spouse of a long-service Parachute Regiment SNCO put it:

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\ldots \text{she knew of only two types of men within the regiment [...] there were the ones who were just stupid little boys and the ones who were just nasty little men [...] one of the things that the stupid little boys and the nasty little men had in common was that, deep down, they were both cowards.}\textsuperscript{14}
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As Richard Holmes observed, the truth lies somewhere in between, ‘A thick brand of decency is folded around the darker strands of self-indulgence [...]’.\textsuperscript{15} The military has had its paladins and its passengers, it cavaliers and cowards, just as in every other occupational group. These are often revealed by the fundamental personal orientations that led to enlistment, moral courage being arguably rarer than its physical concomitant.

Given that the last national servicemen are now reaching their 70s, the experience of military service, that once diffused the nation, is now a much weaker force. Attitudes towards, and understanding of, service life are shaped not so much by intimate testimony as by media representations. For this reason, it might be argued that the general public now has a substantially unrealistic view of service life, effectively a reversion to 1914. A generation previously, members of the Falklands Task Force had a clearer view of these realities, good and bad. The important distinction is of course that they, unlike their post-1916 forebear informants, were all volunteers. However, if they had shaped their expectations on the reminiscences of friends and family, wise counsel would advise that nostalgic composure tends to gild the good and eschew the bad. Professor David French considered that:

\textit{The great majority of soldiers regarded the [Second World] war as an unpleasant but necessary job that had to be completed so that they could then return to their everyday civilian lives.}\textsuperscript{16}


\textsuperscript{14} Ken Lukowiak, \textit{A Soldier’s Song: True Stories from the Falklands}, (London, Phoenix, 1999), p. 89


Many National Servicemen were also keen to get back into ‘mufti’ without delay, and there have always been plenty of vacancies in the armed forces for recruits. Wisdom is of course not a notable characteristic of youth.

Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the linkages between personal outlook and public opinion that have motivated young men to volunteer for the armed forces with the implicit risk that their service will have put them in a combat situation. The motivations of the pre-1916 volunteers have been summarised by Ferguson into five categories:

1. Successful recruitment techniques - military bands, posters, rousing speeches, etc.
2. Female Pressure - overtly handing out white feathers, more subtly questioning masculinity.
3. Peer Group Pressure - joining up with ‘pals’.
4. Economic Motives - unemployment, pressure from employers to enlist.
5. Impulse - i.e. none of the above.  

Jumping forward to the present day four similar groups emerge:

i. Altruistic Motives - duty, service, patriotism, etc.
ii. Self-improvement - self esteem, skills and training, discipline.
iii. Experience - adventure, rites of passage, romance & the warrior myth.

There can be little doubt as to the essential truth of these categories. However, what they fail to nail is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, how they interact with each other, and how they have developed and shifted according to circumstance and experience. A demonstration of how youth can rapidly synthesise external pressure into an internalized impulse is illustrated by the experience of Norman Demuth during the First World War:

I was given a white feather when I was sixteen, just after I had left school […] I was so astonished I did not know what to do about it […] I thought this must give me some added bounce because I must look the part, so I went round to the recruiting offices with renewed zeal.

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However, the existence of intrinsic motivation in all but a minor sense has been disputed by Newsome:

Intrinsic motivations to serve may be strong, but just a short exposure to the realities of combat usually destroys a soldier’s prior motivations. Bravado in the calm of peacetime is quickly forgotten upon the shock of combat.\textsuperscript{20}

Newsome also validly asserted the difference between those who enlisted for a job rather than the prospect of fighting. However, to reduce intrinsic motivation to bravado is to accord it less than its full measure. Chapter Two will examine the predominant motivators during combat such as leadership, warrior spirit, and group theories. It is of the essence of this thesis that these factors did not arise in isolation; motivation has been a cyclical process and factors that were most relevant during combat have been inextricably linked with what goes on before and after. Evidence will emerge of soldiers who enlisted merely to serve yet developed an intrinsic motivation to fight. It has been argued that ideology sustained the will to fight in Hitler’s army.\textsuperscript{21} This argument can be extended in a moderated British form, ‘Political ideology cements the armed forces to civilian society and validates the strains and sacrifices of the soldier’.\textsuperscript{22} It is a truism to state that ideological motivation did not emerge from a battlefield epiphany. It was from the melting pot of civilian attitudes, myths, prejudices and cultural references towards military service that a potential volunteer intrinsically developed sufficient motivation to enlist. Graham Dawson’s research revealed that:

Of particular interest […] was the intense fascination and excitement generated for men and boys by the military side of the war. This was evident across a wide range of contemporary cultural forms: from the massive popularity of war adventure stories as bestselling fiction, comics, films and television series, to the use of war themes by the tourism and leisure industries, and by the military themselves, in museums, open days, historic sites and spectacles such as the Royal Tournament[…].\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{21} Stephen G. Fritz, ‘“We are trying ... To Change the Face of the World” - Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below’ in \textit{Journal of Military History}, Vol. 60, No.4 (Oct 1996), pp. 684-685


\textsuperscript{23} Graham Dawson, \textit{Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinity}, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 3-4
Persuasive arguments have been made, based upon Kleinian psychology, of how this cultural exposure interacted with the psyche of certain individuals.\textsuperscript{24} Through a process of introjection and projection, selected influences from the social world were absorbed, and an investment in them was made. According to Klein, individuals created and constantly developed internal phantasy (\textit{sic}) figures or ‘imagos’ that acted out narratives in their imaginations.\textsuperscript{25} Clearly such narratives, constantly reinforced, acted as strong intrinsic motivators. The issue for motivation is how realistic and sustainable they proved to be once they collided with reality. According to Moskos, ‘Like other stereotypes, popular portrayals of enlisted men, such as the heroic fighting man or the happy-go-lucky garrison soldier, distort as much as they reveal’.\textsuperscript{26}

The concomitant of an individual wish to enlist was the desire of the authorities to recruit. It is revealing to understand how both have changed over time and military historian Hew Strachan pointed out that:

> The pre-1914 armed forces recruited their other ranks and ratings predominantly from unskilled labour […] in the big cities, and from the unemployed. In 2000 the armed forces still fished in the same pool. In 1914 the working class as a whole constituted about 80 per cent of the nation’s population, but by 2000 those who earned their living in manual occupations were a minority.\textsuperscript{27}

At the start of the twentieth century, the social gap between officers and other ranks was vast. Because leadership emerges as such a significant motivator, this chapter will not only analyse recruitment of the rank-and-file but also continuity and change within officer recruitment. Obvious areas of difference are the greater alternatives potential officers still have to express personal ideals through participation in the voluntary sector, experience adventure and travel at modest cost, and access greater career choice with a university degree.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24} Melanie Klein (1882–1960) was a psychoanalyst and adherent of Freud who developed Object Relations Theory. This analyses the development of the human mind in relation to other people.

\textsuperscript{25} Dawson, \textit{Soldier Heroes}, pp. 31-33


\textsuperscript{27} Strachan, ‘The Civil-Military “Gap”, p. 46

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid}
Nonetheless, the argument that military service offered compelling economic, status and career rewards remains to be discussed. Ben-Ari pointed out the ‘classic’ debate between Huntingdon and Janowitz that has argued over the civilianisation of the armed forces since the Second World War.\textsuperscript{29} Huntingdon has asserted the continuing dominance of the warrior ideology with its implicit embrace of hierarchy, discipline and authoritarianism. By contrast, the sociologist Maurice Janowitz advised that as a career choice:

There has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The organisational revolution which pervades contemporary society, and which implies management by means of persuasion, explanation and expertise, is also to be found in the military.\textsuperscript{30}

Clearly one of the big changes the military has also been forced come to terms with is the influence of the family. Military historian Anthony Beevor pointed out that it was no longer realistic to expect soldiers to remain unmarried despite the instability this potentially created for military organisation:

The change of view which has taken place was not entirely altruistic: something had to be done because the dissatisfaction of wives was persuading so many of the Army’s best officers and NCOs to leave.\textsuperscript{31}

In other respects there has been a continuity in the desire for maintaining a tight control. Professor Richard Holmes concluded that:

The sheer size of human waring groups has brought with it problems of motivation and control; and military training, therefore, needs to include devices which, in Dixon’s words [\textit{On the Psychology of Military Incompetence}] ensure cohesion, incite hostility, enforce obedience and suppress mutiny.\textsuperscript{32}

Therefore, this chapter will examine the extent to which the coercive nature of extrinsic motivation has changed.

\textsuperscript{29} Eyal Ben-Ari, \textit{Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit}, (New York, Berghahn, 1998), pp. 18-19

\textsuperscript{30} Janowitz, \textit{The Professional Soldier}, p. 8


1.1 Cultural Hegemony

Received wisdom argues that Britain has never been a militaristic society perhaps because militarism is antithetical to liberal democratic principles. Whilst the modern military has never assumed a dominant role in government, it may be asserted that some features of militarism have maintained a strong hold. At the macro level: Britain continues to apply high status to military endeavour, there is a commitment to maintaining a comprehensive military capability, and a consistently broad political consensus that it may be aggressively deployed in the national interest. At the micro level, Maurice Janowitz asserted the persistence of the view that military service is; ‘a kind of preparatory school for life, for “making a man” out of a recruit’, and acting as, ‘a reformatory for youthful delinquency’. This particular canard emerges from the media almost every time groups of young people are portrayed as behaving badly or illegally. If militarism within a society can be expressed as a continuum, then British society has tended to view outright pacifism through a long lens and has, according to Edgerton, ‘[…] pioneered a distinctly modern militarism’. The purpose of this section is to analyse a sense of the national attitude and memory towards military service and warfare, and how these have nurtured military ‘imagos’ for potential recruits. The national view must of course be qualified; as Winter concluded, ‘collective memory is not the same as national memory […] Nations do not remember, groups of people do’.

34 A uniformed monarchy and the approbation accorded to decorated war heroes being two examples.
35 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (‘SIPRI), in 2010 Britain ranked 4th in total defence expenditure Behind the US, China and France at $57.4 Bn ( 2.7% of GDP).
36 Inter alia, two world wars, Korea, Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya, Aden, Northern Ireland, Falklands, Iraq x 2 & Afghanistan.
A key argument is that there exists a sufficiently strong collective that has formed, and continues to maintain, a positive association with, and powerful influence over, matters military. The roots of this collective can be found in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the conscious invention by the ruling elite, of traditions designed to cement the populace with new bonds of loyalty to the state. Conscious invention succeeded mainly by broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was ready to tune in. 41 This collective view does not embrace a shared political ideology, but it does encapsulate the long reach of history, fable and tradition embodied within the idea of the nation and, importantly, fear for the continuity of the nation. It is arguably no coincidence that the invention of military accoutered royal ceremonial reflects the fact that Britain’s previously unassailable world dominance, was from the late nineteenth century, under threat. Strategically, Wilhelmine Germany was only the first bête noire in an emergent series; it was a foundation upon which other more sentient values were built. The essential components of this collective view included a sense of moral justification and national superiority, unselfconsciously eliding between the benefits of hierarchy and status on one hand and the desirability of egalitarianism on the other, according to time and place. When it came to fighting hard and winning honourably (as the collective still requires that Britain does) the collective did not just rely on male spokesmen. 42

As one Vietnam War novel succinctly put it in 1967; there was ‘no more bloodthirsty creature on the face of the globe than a well-educated young woman with liberal convictions’. 43

The only difference between the sexes is that, for most of the twentieth century, women have had to rely on male agency to conduct the actual fighting, being constrained to a, ‘“feminine”, supportive role’. 44 To reflect 130 years of social change, not least a dilution

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42 Issuing white feathers during WW1 is an early example, the actress Joanna Lumley’s Gurkha Justice Campaign (2006-2010) more recent.


of hubris and a shift to postmodern imperialism under the aegis of the United States, rebranding the collective as ‘Jingo Lite’ may be appropriate.

Books and film have been both a powerful means to shape positive attitudes towards combat, and represented a subtle and long term investment in culture formation. This was because they often had a multigenerational lifespan that adapted to changes in outlook. According to Falklands historian David Monaghan:

An awareness of the [...] great moments in the nation’s heavily mythologized military past had been so thoroughly instilled in the consciousness of the British public by [...] popular culture that, in moments of national crisis, the barest reference is sufficient to arouse a surge of patriotic feeling […] such references are all the more effective when couched in the quasi-chivalric language developed in the nineteenth century to elevate British militarism above the realm of national debate.45

Such attitudes to combat can be separated into two parts: firstly, the sensitising of malleable minds to the possibility of recruitment; secondly, the shaping of attitudes of servicemen to the imminent prospect of combat.

Popular Culture and Potential Recruits

Whilst recognising the tremendous growth in newspaper readership from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards; it may be argued that books and films tend to be structural, whilst the media avers to the transitory, the polemic, and the didactic. In 1927, The Times captured the view of the political elite, ‘The modern democratic world contains so many […] very slightly educated minds that it is more important than ever before to prevent them being led astray by ill-chosen ideas [...]’.46 This was particularly the case for the young, and the manner in which they engaged with the collective.

There has been a relationship that linked popular culture and propaganda with recruitment. Dominant fantasies of combat literature have fuelled the desire to emulate heroes ‘read about since infancy’, despite the existence of the ‘literature of

46 Tony Aldgate and Arthur Marwick, Between Two Wars, (Milton Keynes, Open University, 2001), p. 165
disillusionment’ oeuvre. Dixon considered that the popularity of books and films developed the martial spirit during periods of peace, ‘like that of pornography following an age of sexual repression [providing] vicarious satisfaction of hitherto frustrated drives’. Winter, despite his cautionary thoughts about national identity and memory, believed that ‘film does indeed have power in projecting national stereotypes and narratives’. These of course may have served to validate individual fantasies. Kellett observed that febrile imaginings were often detached from reality; they may not only have intrinsically encouraged recruitment, but also sown the seeds of future disassociations that may have required robust extrinsic measures:

A soldier’s preconceptions regarding the risks, hardships, duration, and so on, of combat are an important part of his mental preparation for battle. They are shaped by popular conceptions of war (through films, books, and so forth) […] There is therefore, a marked potential for demoralization if the battle […] differs substantially from the soldier’s mental image of it.

Education has been the key to unlocking the contemporary impact of popular culture and propaganda. The growth in its provision during the Victorian era culminated with the ‘watershed’ of Forster’s Education Act 1870. This had the significant consequence of extending literacy, which affirmed the benefits of status hierarchies, and encouraged an autodidactic embrace of the heroic role models found in literature. Military historian Gary Sheffield revealed that:

Even in 1935, a classical scholar who had grown to manhood in the nineteenth century could write that, ‘There are worse ways of educating a boy than to familiarize his mind from childhood with great tales of splendid tales and heroic men’.

The Boy’s Own Paper, published between 1879 and 1967, has remained in the public consciousness as an exemplar, conflating Britishness, character and adventure. There were 72 imperial campaigns during the Victorian era, which the British public, far from the fighting, found profoundly important, entertaining and exciting. The J.K. Rowling

47 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 5-8


49 Winter, ‘Matrix of Memory’, p. 861

50 Kellett, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Belenky, Contemporary Studies, p. 220


of his day, and master of the imperial potboiler was G.A. Henty. His output was prodigious, with over 120 books published during a 40-year career.\textsuperscript{54} Invariably his young heroes exuded qualities of intelligence, loyalty, modesty and ‘pluck’. According to Ferguson his sales, up to the 1950s, exceeded 25 million. That they are still in print, and available as e-books, attests to his enduring popularity. Herbert Wootton was:

\textquote{Very keen on becoming a soldier. I had two uncles, both regulars who had served through the South African War of 1899-1902. As a youngster I was thrilled with their stories. I became a keen reader of G.A. Henty’s books on the war [ …].}\textsuperscript{55}

Not only did the volunteers of 1914 sign up with Henty in their heads and hearts but also the conflation of sport and war. It is a cliché to cite Newbolt’s \textit{Vitaï Lampada} with its stirring evocation of cricket, dead colonels and endorsement to ‘Play up! play up! and play the game’.\textsuperscript{56} However, it was a metaphor that elided into the Great War recruiting effort. One 1914 recruiting poster urged ‘young men of Britain […] play the greater game on the field of honour’.\textsuperscript{57} Another from 1915, ‘Rugby union footballers are doing their duty […] British athletes will you follow this glorious example?’\textsuperscript{58} The implicit theme of war as fun was not restricted to literature, as evidenced by the growth in war toys. By 1905, the firm of Britain’s Ltd was annually manufacturing over five million lead-cast toy soldiers, and diverse manufacturers, from soap to cigarettes, comfortably exploited a brand of full-fat imperialism. It all served to feed an illusion of ignorance because practically no one had the first idea of what total war was really like. The soldiers who volunteered in 1914 anticipated an ‘adventure’\textsuperscript{59} and ‘imagined it would be an affair of great marches and great battles quickly decided’.\textsuperscript{60} As Sergeant Jim Davies of the Royal Fusiliers put it:

\textsuperscript{54} When he died in 1902 he had a backlog of 16, all published by 1906.


\textsuperscript{56} Sir Henry Newbolt, \textit{Vitaï Lampada} (‘the torch of life’) (1892)

\textsuperscript{57} National Army Museum, Accession No. 1977-06-81-47

\textsuperscript{58} National Army Museum, Accession No. 1977-06-81-32

\textsuperscript{59} Dawson, \textit{Soldier Heroes}, p. 56

\textsuperscript{60} Paul Fussell, \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory}, (New York, OUP, 1989), p. 21
On the day war was declared [...] We were full of enthusiasm [...] I was young and stupid, full of patriotism and the Boy’s Own Paper. That’s what my childhood was based on. I couldn’t get into the army quick enough.61

Before the introduction of conscription in 1916 it is evident, not least from the carrot and stick nature of recruiting posters, that some potential volunteers required a nudge, ‘Modern mass wars require in their early stages a definitive work of popular literature demonstrating how much wholesome fun is to be had at the training camp’. According to Fussell, Ian Hay’s First Hundred Thousand was a ‘a classic in this genre’.62 During the Second World War, film rather than literature emerged as the medium of choice to assuage the doubts of conscripts who had learned from their fathers not to be so willing to respond to service life with unquestioning deference and obedience. The Way Ahead (1944) was originally released as an army training film, the New Lot (1943). Whilst its characters found basic training unpleasant, by the end of the film, they emerged as a dedicated and cohesive band of brothers. The implicit messages of the film concerned the sympathetic nature of army life, the leavening of social class, and the effectiveness of good officer-man relations. The film met Fussell’s criterion by being a popular and critical success.63

During the First World War, actual combat experience was subject to so much censorship, not only by the government but by the troops themselves,64 that the public were left with their traditional references; augmented by febrile demonisations as typically published in Horatio Bottomley’s John Bull magazine. According to Fussell, it was during the inter-war period that the language of war fundamentally and irrevocably changed because of its failure to cope with the consequences of industrialised warfare. However, Fussell’s research was built around ‘high-culture’ that had shifted the representation of war ‘from epic to ironic, euphemistic to realistic, heroic to disenchanted’.65 Ashplant et al. emphasised the alternative view put forward by Winter

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62 Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p. 28
64 Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p. 87
that the Great War reinvigorated the traditional narrative, and it survived until the end of the Second World War. Evidence for this may be found in the way the story of the ‘pals battalions’ worked its way into cultural memory. They are remembered as a ‘genuinely popular mass movement’, coming from ‘a time of intense, almost mystical patriotism and of the inarticulate elitism of an imperial power’s working-class […]’.

The inter-war period reflected a broadly based antiwar sentiment as evidenced by the popularity of Dick Sheppard’s Peace Pledge Union. However, whilst disillusionment theory has its place in the lexicon of war and memory, it is more assuredly the influence of popular culture that has constantly reinvigorated the heroic narrative. As Historian Gary Sheffield argued, ‘The First World War exercised a terrible fascination for men who had not been old enough to serve in the war’, particularly as survivor narratives tended to focus on the more positive and rewarding aspects of their service.

Each generation could augment the pantheon of past heroes with modern ones of its own. Young men were influenced strongly by the nature and style of boys literature and comics published during the inter-war period. Biggles’ first rotation was in the White Fokker (1932), and it was the development of flying as a combat technology that inspired the image of a ‘knight of the air’. Films such as Things to Come (1936) may have exploited public fears of aerial bombing but the fighter pilot was a heroic defender. It was an image that was to become engrained in the public consciousness as a result of the Battle of Britain. In the meantime, the youth of Britain had to be hegemonised; according to historian Owen Dudley Edwards, ‘The Battle of Britain was won on the playing-fields of Greyfriars’. The point of course was that Greyfriars was a fictional public school invented by the publishers of Magnet, one of the most popular boy’s comics of the period. Magnet was under the ownership of the Tory grandee Lord

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68 Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 279

Camrose. The Magnet inculcated its readers with the ideas that would motivate them to fight if the time came. They were instructed on the relationship to authority, how to cope with injustice, and the importance of camaraderie. Most importantly they had to be confident of victory. The historian Brian Bond suggested that:

Magnet readers fought the Battle of Britain with a stock of ideas and attitudes which would stand them in good stead [...] their training deprived them of the means of envisaging defeat. Lord Camrose had killed them all on the eve of the Battle of Britain. So they went out and won it.  

The influence of British cinema during the inter-war period was minimal. The enormous expansion of cinema as a mass entertainment was fuelled by Hollywood, with the British contribution largely limited to the ‘quota quickie’. That during this period, the heroic Boy’s Own narrative remained pickled in imperial aspic, is indicated by the fact that one of the few big budget movies, The Four Feathers (1939), was a tale of conformity, courage, redemption, and putting the natives in their place. It was in the post-war era that the British war movie emerged as a powerful genre. In addition to Winter’s assertion of a new national narrative, the Second World war experience:

[...] entered British cultural memory as a narrative of popular democratic accomplishment [...] greater material security and rising living standards remained sutured to the political values of common sacrifice, egalitarianism, and democratic expectation [...]  

The important point to make is that culture is a constantly propagating hybrid. It may take on new forms but still retain essential characteristics of the old. A consequence of the First World War may have been a cultural desire for change; nonetheless, ‘the ‘heady experience’ of the Second World War ‘generated a massive nostalgia’ that lasted until the mid 1980s, and manifested in large film and TV audiences. Some of the more highbrow newspaper critics ‘professed amazement’ at this demand, and the film critic of

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70 With his brother, Lord Kemsley, he owned inter alia the: Sunday Chronicle, Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times, Financial Times, Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic

71 Brian Bond, ‘introduction’ in Addison & Crang, The Burning Blue, p. 8

72 Based on a play by A. E. W. Mason the film has been produced 6 times between 1915 and 2002. Anecdotally, the Welsh Guards who were used in the 1939 version loaded with live ammunition in case the ‘Dervish’ extras got carried away!


the *News Chronicle* described it as a ‘baffling attribute of the British picture goer’. Others, such as William Whitebait of the *New Statesman*, realised this was much more a reflection of the persistence of the collective ideal:

> A dozen years after World War II we find ourselves in the really quite desperate situation of not being sick of war, but hideously in love with it […] The more we lose face in the world’s counsels, the grander, in our excessively modest way, we swell in this illusory mirror held up by the screen.  

Defining a ‘war film’ is potentially problematic because of the occasional blurring between content and context. Nonetheless, Nicholas Pronay identified 85 British films set during the Second World War, made between 1945 and 1960. Similarly, Ramsden noted around 100 made between 1946 and 1965. These were of course additional to the rich crop of American war films with their implicitly heroic narrative, largely absent from inter-war productions. British films were immensely popular, and ‘were the first or second top-grossing British films in almost every year between 1955 and 1960’. Amongst the most popular were the PoW movies, perhaps because they so comfortably captured the public school ethos of dealing with institutionalised authoritarianism whilst accommodating the Camrosian ideals, in essence Greyfriars with jackboots. Less widely acknowledged is the debt that nearly every PoW film owed to Jean Renoir’s classic ‘disillusionment’ film *La Grande Illusion* (1937). These films almost exclusively portrayed officers in leading roles, thus it was the male officer class that was stereotyped as heroic, cementing the notion of hierarchy and aspiration to status within the collective. As Penny Summerfield observed, these films were explicitly male, and offered ‘comforting versions of national identity, conservative representations of social class, and accounts of gender in which war encourages male bonding and enhances masculinity’. The arrival of television vastly extended their shelf life, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s they were constantly repeated. With only three TV channels there was little alternative for school-holiday and Sunday post-prandial viewing. The

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75 Tony Aldgate, ‘The Battle of Britain on Film’ in Addison & Crang, *The Burning Blue*, pp. 212-213


77 Ramsden, ‘Refocusing’, p. 42


79 *The Great Escape* (1963) has entered folklore as an Xmas TV perennial
consequence was that the collective cultural template was consistently reinforced by new inductees from the post-war generation. In essence, they served, in Henry Rousso’s construction, as ‘vectors of memory’, an explicitly commemorative and apparently truthful development of the national narrative.\textsuperscript{80} Despite the social revolution of the 1960s, the appeal of war had plenty of fight left in it. New ‘big-budget’ films not only reprised the World War Two narrative, but also began to include an American take on the warrior-hero, as shaped by the Vietnam experience.\textsuperscript{81} During the 1970s, despite growing opposition, boys remained fascinated by war. It seems that the experiences of the World War Two generation did little to ameliorate the attitudes of the baby-boomers. In response to criticism of the comic \textit{Valiant}, the editorial director of IPC Magazines commented:

\begin{quote}
It’s an irrefutable fact that the second world war is today the most popular feature in boys’ comics […] If I could do anything to change this trend within the commercial structures by which I have to abide, I would. In fact I do that as far as possible, but if your readers are constantly clamouring for something, what else can you do?.\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}

\textbf{Popular Culture and the Combatants}

The important point is that films, books and comics, no matter how well made, were fiction and could never reflect the full reality of war. They distorted as much as they informed and, according to Beevor, this had significant implications when intrinsic motivations unravelled as a result of extrinsic realities:

\begin{quote}
According to both officers and NCOs, recruits have ‘some very peculiar views of what the Army’s like’. More could certainly be done to disabuse them of some of their misconceptions, yet the extent of the latest generation’s video view of the world is deeply disturbing. Sergeant instructors are continually astonished by their lack of touch with reality.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

However, a cultural reference and/or a dominant imago has proven to be remarkably resistant, and evidence from the Falklands War emerges to substantiate this. The

\textsuperscript{80} Summerfield, ‘Public Memory or Public Amnesia?’, pp. 938 - 939

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Inter alia} - \textit{The Longest Day} (1962), \textit{Battle of the Bulge} (1965), \textit{Anzio} (1968), \textit{The Green Berets} (1968), \textit{Battle of Britain} (1969), \textit{A Bridge Too Far} (1977), \textit{The Deer Hunter} (1978), \textit{Apocalypse Now} (1979)

\textsuperscript{82} Dawson, \textit{Soldier Heroes}, p. 238

\textsuperscript{83} Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}, p. 12
persistence of the heroic narrative wrapped in glamour and excitement can be evidenced in aspects of public celebration at the outset of the Falklands War. On board SS Canberra, a marine sergeant had an *in vino veritas* epiphany declaring:

“This is the best thing that’s ever happened to me. I’ve been in twenty years and I’d given up hope that I’d ever see a shot fired in anger in a proper war.”

The fleet had set sail for the South Atlantic against a backdrop of bands, bunting and bellicose well-wishers. It might easily have been mistaken for 1914 save for the modern innovation of some young ladies baring their chests in morale-boosting anticipation of derring-do to come. In Chapter 3.7 the role of Cpl. McLaughlin as an existentialist warrior will be discussed. In the context of susceptibility to the influence of books and film, McLaughlin was the member of a small group within ‘B’ Company of 3 Para known as the ‘green-eyed boys’. Historians Jennings and Weale revealed that this clique developed a series of behaviours that owed ‘[…] loyalty to their fantasy ideal of the “airborne warrior”’. Their group ethos was not only derived from regimental heroes, but also the fictional exploits of German soldiers during the Second World War in books by Sven Pederson and Charles Whiting. The Danish author Pederson wrote under the *nom-de-plume* Sven Hassell. He claimed his books were ‘strictly anti-military’ and intended as a more grisly version of *All Quiet on the Western Front*. In his obituary published on 2 October 2012, *The Guardian* described his books as crude and brutal war comics without the pictures, devoured especially by teenage boys. Any nuance of anti-militarism cannot be laid at the door of Whiting, whose books, published under the pseudonym Leo Kessler, were overtly violence and sex-drenched money-spinners, exploiting the sub-genre created by Pederson. Films such as *The Deerhunter* (1978) and *Apocalypse Now* (1979) were also formative. Embedded journalists, expressed considerable surprise at the way books, comics and films had shaped the attitudes and language of soldiers. They cited the example of an ‘indignant’ Blues and Royals officer,

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86 ‘Sven Hassell Obituary’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/oct/02/sven-hassel


88 Jennings & Weale, *Green-Eyed Boys*, pp. 29-30
‘The swine have gone and blown up my tank’, and asserted, ‘They really did [use clichéd sporting metaphors] “We’re going to knock the Argies for six”’. “it’s just like *Apocalypse Now*” said a marine in awe watching the tracer crackle over the side of Mount Harriet’.\(^89\) In summary, the power of popular culture to influence military behaviour was summed up by Robert Lawrence, ‘[…] people going to war find themselves acting as they have seen people act in the films about people going to war’.\(^90\) The blurring of fiction and reality has a persistence that is embedded to this day within military culture. Hennessey commented on his officer training that:

> Sandhurst relies on scenes from war movies for roughly 57% of the course teaching material, and there was barely a lecture we attended that didn’t make use of one of the stock Sandhurst war films [e.g. *Gladiator* (2000), *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), *A Bridge to Far* (1977)] for an element of instruction.\(^91\)

The fundamental problem is that fiction occludes reality. The collective narrative still wants stories of victory and heroes, it wants to be entertained and sated, it wants assonance with its core beliefs. However, the actual experience of war has often been life changing, according to a Falklands veteran:

> I’ve seen many films and read many books describing war and its spoils but it is not what it seems. Other might feel differently but I thought it was a con. There is no glory in killing.\(^92\)

**The Impact of Ideology**

Because government legitimacy was a rationale for recruitment, it is important to consider the role of political ideology as an intrinsic motivator. Received wisdom suggested that British armed forces were conservative by nature and political conviction. Contemporaneously with the Falklands War, Major David Jenkins a serving officer in the Royal Anglian Regiment, commented:

> I suppose I’m finding more and more that the people in the Army are becoming increasingly right wing: or perhaps I’m becoming increasingly left wing, and they just

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\(^89\) Bishop & Witherow, *Winter War*, pp. 20-21

\(^90\) John Lawrence & Robert Lawrence, *When the Fighting is Over*, (London, Bloomsbury, 1988), p. 15


\(^92\) Bramley, *Excursion to Hell*, p. 136
seem like that to me. But there’s certainly a kind of unthinking Toryism which is on the increase […]. 93

He explained how idealism and a heroic imago, ‘There never was a knight like the young Lochinvar’, were his incentives to join-up, but he also expressed strong disagreement with the decision to go to war. This poses two extremely important questions: How effective has a political ideology been as a motivation to enlist, and to what extent has the government shaped it?

In the western democracies, commitment has been to societal values and not to a narrow political mindset. If service personnel did become politically conservative, then it resulted from subsequent extrinsic conditioning. Moskos’ view of the American serviceman could substantially be applied to the British soldier when he stated that:

Quite consistently, the American combat soldier displays a profound scepticism of political and ideological appeals. Somewhat paradoxically, then, anti-ideology itself is a recurrent and integral part of the soldiers’ belief system. 94

Despite ideological indifference, the American soldier was elementally a nationalist believing that, ‘the United States is the best country in the world […]’. 95 This argument was further developed by William Henderson, former commander of the U.S. Army Research Institute:

American societal characteristics beyond those required for nationalism provide additional sources of motivation to the American soldier […] usually based on a soldier's vague but often firmly held belief that the system that put him in the Army and that he is ‘defending’ is probably the best political and social system possible. 96

From a British perspective, the rush of assertive imperialism in 1914 did not last beyond 1916. Contextualised around the Second World War, Holmes referred to the ‘underlying belief in the validity of the struggle’ and juxtaposed the opinions of Montgomery, who believed soldiers were motivated (often passively) by the democratic of the rightness of

93 Tony Parker, Soldier, Soldier, (London, Heinemann, 1985), pp. 100-101
94 Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, p. 148
95 Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, pp. 150-152
the cause; with Slim, who emphasised the spiritual element of ‘faith in a cause’ as an intrinsic motivation.97

Although the lack of a political ideology as a motivation to enlist is a strand of continuity that stretches from 1914 to the present day, one of the great changes has been in the relationship with the government. Whilst the collective retains its essential characteristics it is far more discriminating, and the correctness of a political policy has to fit within it. During the Great War, the Reverend Leonard Andrew of the Royal Fusiliers, was able to comment, ‘Half of the men I’m sure, had no idea what they were fighting for. But they went and gave their lives’.98 However, by the turn of the twentieth century Wong et al. concluded, ‘Soldiers who are educated, comfortable discussing ideological topics, and volunteers are more apt to fight for the cause’.99 This suggests that, by the time of the Falklands War, the collective view had significantly evolved. Calder argued that the traditional upper class imperialist myth (for God, King and Empire) that sustained propaganda during the First World War was, as a result of Dunkirk and the Blitz, transformed into one of communitarianism.100 It was the case that the economic realities of the post-war world transformed Britain from paternalistic benefactor to reluctant supplicant as it slipped down the pecking order of nations. However, the loss of Empire was undoubtedly a dent to the collective pride. As a British diplomat expressed it to the Labour politician Dennis Healey, ‘When the British Empire finally sank […] it would leave only two monuments, one was the game of Association Football, the other was the expression “Fuck Off”’.101

In 1982, Argentina was much better at football, leaving Britain buttressed only by its Ozymandian pedestal of vulgar belligerence. Historiography reveals how successfully Thatcher’s Conservative government were able to tap into the robust

97 Richard Holmes, Acts of War, p. 277
98 Levine, Somme, p. 262
100 Angus Calder, Myth of the Blitz, (London, Pimlico, 1992), p. 204
101 Ferguson, Empire, p. 365
Anglo-Saxon aspect of collective imperialist memory that was not extinct but merely latent. As Philip Smith argued, ‘Falklands rhetoric is founded upon cultural structures with a long tradition’.  

David Monaghan asserted that the government ‘encouraged a view of the Falklands War as a key moment in the British national myth’. This, as Gilbran concluded, ‘[...] awakened the warrior spirit of the British people, a people who thought this spirit had died with the end of empire’. Consequently, as Foster summarised:

The war in the Falklands consecrated the soldier hero as both the agent of the nation’s return to its ‘rightful and necessary identity’ and as the embodiment of that identity, a reification of the ‘national essence’.

The rhetoric did not fit comfortably with the facts. As eloquently explained by Tony Benn in the House of Commons: Britain had been prepared to negotiate a hand-over of the islands, had a long record of arms sales to the ‘dictators’ and, under the terms of the 1981 Nationality Act, planned to deny the rights of the Falkland Islanders to automatic British citizenship. Nonetheless, the Conservative government garnered significant public support. Subject to the caveat that a self-selecting group can only provide an indicator of public opinion, a Mass-Observation survey, conducted during the voyage of the Task Force, revealed that 52% of respondents advocated war rather than a negotiated settlement.

Rhetoric, which translated into victory, was an effective recruiting sergeant. Applications to enlist enjoyed a surge following the Falklands War, no doubt assisted by the timely (and sanitised) broadcast in November 1982 of a seven-part BBC documentary about Parachute Regiment recruit training. It is the final aspect of

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103 Monaghan, The Falklands War, p. 15


105 Kevin Foster, Fighting Fictions: War, Narrative and National Identity, (London, Pluto Press, 1999), p. 82

106 Mass Observation Archive (University of Sussex) Replies to Special Directive 5, The Falkland Islands Crisis 1982 - my analysis

107 ‘The Paras’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00hjtl0 [accessed 26 October 2012]
propaganda which deserves a mention, not least because it leads into the next section of this chapter dealing with recruitment and its extrinsic concomitants. ‘Join the Army and see the world’, as the strap-line to years of army recruitment campaigns, has become a cliché. The emphasis on postings to sunny climes, skiing trips, sports and other adventures is a benignly dissimulative tradition. It has failed its own stated objective of, ‘giving the public full and fair information on the advantages and disadvantages of a service career’. The Sandhurst brochure was described by Hennessey as offering a, ‘kind of CentreParcs with more guns and less cycling’. However, the reality of his training in leadership, character and intellect that the brochure ‘enticingly’ offered was, ‘best developed by MARCHING, IRONING and SHOUTING’.109

The impetus to enlist was not primarily driven by political ideals even though, during the twentieth century, governments have been remarkably successful indenturing the populace to their purpose. It is reasonable to assume that soldiers fighting in the Falklands War had drawn upon family memories from fathers and uncles who fought in the Second World War and grandfathers in the First. Often these family memories will have been adapted, over time, to emphasise the positive aspects of military service. The careful cultivation of national myths and traditions through education, literature and film, etc., have shifted the prospect of military service from the fringes of respectable society into the mainstream. However, these are essentially works of fiction that distort the realities of military life, often leading to unrealistic expectations from potential recruits.

1.2 Education and Enlistment

To provide a context for army recruitment it will be helpful to examine the numbers. Information provided by the MoD in answer to Parliamentary questions seemed more concerned with form rather than substance. In response to a question about the percentage of army leavers with combat experience (a significant question in

108 Beevor, Inside the British Army, pp. 8-9

109 Hennessey, Reading Club, pp. 36-37
the context of motivation and skill retention) the Defence Secretary commented that such information, ‘[…] is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost’.\textsuperscript{110} As at January 2009 the army was only marginally below strength with a total compliment of 101,910. Of this number, 14.5\% were officers. The infantry component was 21.75\% approx. By comparison, in 1905 the strength of the regular army (excluding colonial and native troops) was 195,000.\textsuperscript{111} Between 2003 and 2007 the average turnover was 12,820 (reflecting an overall reduction of about 5,000 during the period). These numbers indicate an average length of service of just under eight years. Significantly, for the Infantry (those with the most combat experience) this reduces to about five and a half years.\textsuperscript{112} It should be noted that full resettlement provision for army leavers only kicks in after six years service.\textsuperscript{113}

Although the state co-opted its older citizens into the armed forces during the major wars of the twentieth century, the forces still preferred young recruits aged between seventeen and twenty-six. This was not only because they were fitter, but also because they were more biddable and prepared to take risks.\textsuperscript{114} It is noteworthy that the average age of the twenty-two soldiers killed during the Battle of Mount Longdon, in 1982, was just over twenty-two.\textsuperscript{115} Since the ending of conscription, those who entered military service perceived it not so much as a ‘hiatus in the transition to adulthood’ but an experiential phase between adolescence and adulthood. As the statistics suggest that few enlisted for a long-term career, the role of education as a conditioner of hearts and minds for potential military service, has to be investigated as the first step in a process of extrinsic motivation that managed the expectations of service volunteers.

\textsuperscript{110}Hansard 18 May 2009: C1168W
\textsuperscript{111}‘Army Strength’, http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listing/10086.html
\textsuperscript{112}Hansard, 16 Oct 2008: C1400W
\textsuperscript{115}The oldest was Sgt. Ian McKay (29) and included seven teenagers, two of whom were 17
It is impossible to avoid linkage to the taxonomies of social class and the persistent gulf between recruitment of officers and other-ranks. When recruiting the rank-and-file the military has never, except for certain specialisms, demanded any formal academic attainment. The impact of the 1870 Forster reforms was not only to give the working classes a basic grasp of literacy and numeracy, but also to foment enthusiasm for empire and sacrificial warrior-hood. Education inculcated ‘Habits of order, obedience, sobriety, and respect for the established social structure’. As a schools’ inspector from the Great War era stated:

The schoolchild had his spirit broken by ‘severity and constraint; this reduced the child to ‘a state of mental and moral serfdom’; once this was achieved, ‘the time has come for the system of education through mechanical obedience to be applied to him in all its rigours’.

Baynes was rather more scathing of pre-Great War volunteers:

Most recruits from the real lower classes came into the Army with a mental age of about ten. Their training and instruction as soldiers would raise this to about twelve or thirteen, but few of them ever developed a truly adult approach to life […].

Baynes considered this an advantage because the simple mind was resilient and easily encouraged to optimism. At the end of the twentieth century, education still did not count for much. A recruit who enlisted in 2002 observed that:

By and large they were streetwise kids from poor or working-class backgrounds. They might not have much upstairs academically, but most were […] in possession of a different kind of brightness than found in a classroom. In other words, just the kind of lads that have been serving the infantry for hundreds of years.

A significant change in recruiting for the rank-and-file has been the shift from fulsome to lacklustre support within the state education system. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was an anti-militarist tendency in some schools and education authorities not to allow access to Army recruiting teams. It is a viewpoint that is still current; commenting on recruitment activity in Hackney during 2009, Labour councillor Angus

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117 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p. 69


119 Steve McLaughlin, Squaddie - A Soldier’s Story, (Edinburgh, Mainstream, 2007), pp. 47-48

120 Beevor, Inside the British Army, pp. 8-9
Mulready-Jones said, ‘It seems that the government’s response to recruitment problems is to target younger and younger people from more and more disadvantaged areas’. It is a fair point because in 2010 29.8% of Armed Forces recruits were aged under eighteen. Consequently, it can be argued that recruits from disadvantaged backgrounds joined up in spite of their formal education, not because of it. Journalists Bishop and Witherow described the army that went to war in the Falklands:

> Many of the men were from Britain’s economic wastelands […] and they had better experience than anyone else in the country of its imperfections and injustices. They joined up in many cases because there was nothing else to do. The war was not won on the playing fields of Eton but on the tarmac playground of a Glasgow comprehensive.

Whilst some of these soldiers were undoubtedly attracted by imaginings of adventure and action, the majority had the gumption to do so because of the opportunity to learn a trade, get off the dole, and/or escape a dysfunctional family existence; the opportunities for adventure being a subordinate and self-justifying consideration. The point to emphasise is that, in the economic context, it is a false dichotomy to separate intrinsic and extrinsic factors as absolutes. As Private Graham Carter MM put it:

> I don’t care who you are. I think you don’t particularly join the army these days to actually go to war […] Most people don’t particularly want to go to war […] So I really wasn’t looking forward to the prospect of going down to the Falklands […]

For its rank-and-file, the armed forces have necessarily placed a premium on physical fitness over intellect. During the First World War, this extended into a theory that combat effectiveness and motivation to fight was dependent upon body type. The capacity of a recruit to display valourousness was effectively disconnected from the mind and instead emphasis was placed upon sexual development and hairiness. This led to an assumption that men whose distribution of body fat or shape of hip approximated to the feminine would make less effective soldiers. During the Second World War, physical inspection began to be augmented by personality tests. However, it must be argued that, consistently within military culture and the collective ideology, the image

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122 Hansard, HL Deb, 6 Jul 2011, c.303
123 Bishop & Witherow, Winter War, p. 19
124 Imperial War Museum Archive (henceforth ‘IWM’) 13004 - Carter, 1992 [on audio-tape]
125 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p. 98
of the ideal soldier is constructed around overtly masculine physical characteristics. According to Jary, a veteran of the savage bocage fighting during 1944, this was a myth:

None of the NCOs or soldiers who made [my] Platoon what it was resembled the characters portrayed in most books and films about war. All were quiet, sensible and unassuming men and some, by any standard, were heroes. If I now had to select a team for a dangerous mission and my choice was restricted to stars of the sports field or poets. I would unhesitatingly recruit from the latter.126

The generation of soldiers that went to war in the Falklands were, as potential recruits, subjected to a range of tests known as the SSG. The system remains in place today and the outcome is to grade each recruit from 1 to 5. SSG1 roughly equates to ‘A’ level standard and thus offers the pick of the jobs. SSG5 means that the recruit is virtually illiterate and is only fit for the infantry.127 According to Major ‘W’, a recruiting officer for the Royal Anglian Regiment, the SSG4s and 5s were, ‘too thick even to be a soldier’. He did not warm to SSG1s as:

They were the sort who were possibly going to question and argue too much […] We liked best the 2s and 3s; most of all the 3s, they were what you’d call ideal other-ranks material.128

The perception that most of the army had about intelligence levels within the Parachute Regiment was misplaced as the Paras only took down to SSG3.129 Not so for other regiments, Falklands veteran Simon Weston described a recruitment test:

[...] you would be confronted with two round shapes and one square one, and have to say which was the odd one out [...] Unbelievably, people actually failed. If brains were made of chocolate, the people who fail the infantry test wouldn’t fill a Smartie with theirs.130

The overall failure rate during recruit selection runs at around 40%.

For potential officers, the desirability of a lifetime military career with its concomitants of success can be seen as a powerful motivator, even though for most, particularly in the last decades of the twentieth century, careers have been much shorter.


127 Beevor, Inside the British Army, p. 6

128 Parker, Soldier, Soldier, p. 153


130 Simon Weston, Walking Tall, (London, Bloomsbury, 1989), pp. 36-37
The desire for adventure is of course highly relevant, but in more practical terms such a career offered the chance to:

- be part of a prestigious organisation,
- exhibit symbols of personal status,
- exercise management control at an early age, and
- be part of a profession that has low academic standards of entry.

Janowitz’s theory was that aspiration to the superior position of the commissioned officer arose because ‘An officer’s conception of honour, purpose and human nature lead him to assume that he is the standard bearer who embodies the superior virtues of men’.  

However, for much of the twentieth century, the size of the volunteer forces meant that the number of officer vacancies was limited, and the military establishment maintained its role as a self-appointed arbiter of these superior virtues. Therefore, it follows that the army has got what it wanted, not necessarily what it needed, to meet the motivational necessities of leadership.

The beating heart of the officer recruitment process was embodied within the public school tradition. With the end of the purchase of commissions following the Cardwell-Childers reforms, the British public school system set about preparing the officers and administrators of empire with a vengeance. It has been the public schools that have provided a common ideology around which the officer corps defined itself.  

Janowitz asserted, ‘Authority was ascribed, in that persons were born into the officer class or they were excluded. Seldom could they earn such a position through personal performance’.  

This ‘stultifying’ preparation must be responsible in part for the weaknesses within the British military command system. According to military veteran and psychologist Norman Dixon, there are two main reasons why the public school system has traditionally trained officers to lead but not to think:

The first resides in the belief that enforced application to unpleasant, boring tasks develops ‘character’, and the second that any truly intellectual exercise, by which is meant the cultivation of independent thinking as opposed to rote-learning, harms that

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132 Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, pp. 27-29
fine sense of loyalty and obedience which such schools strive to inculcate. To think is to question and to question is to have doubts.\textsuperscript{133}

Mosse overtly linked ‘character’ with the concepts of manliness, patriotism and physical courage implicit within an elite education and endorsed by popular literature.\textsuperscript{134} It is this notion of ‘character’ which has shown a remarkable continuity amongst the qualities required of officers recruited during the past 130 years. There is also evidence suggesting that military culture has always been suspicious of intellectualism. Whatever the admixture between the practical and the academic, picking the ‘right sort of chap’ has remained of paramount importance. Family tradition, son following father into the forces, with the implication that ‘character’ is an inherited characteristic, has played a powerful role.

From the 1870s onwards, entrance into the fee-paying Royal Military Colleges at Sandhurst and Woolwich was determined by competitive examination. However, this flattered to deceive, as attendance at a crammer ‘virtually guaranteed’ an exam pass and acceptance for the right sort of candidate.\textsuperscript{135} The recruitment requirements of the First World War delivered a jolt to the system; 247,061 new commissions into the British Army were made, and just under 100,000 of these were to officers who came from the lower-middle or working classes.\textsuperscript{136} Although these officers were required to maintain pre-war class distinctions, they never achieved a seamless integration with their ‘regular’ counterparts.\textsuperscript{137} Widely referred to as ‘temporary gentlemen’ they were often subject to overt discrimination, for example, being assigned to separate officers messes. This suggests a fear that officer motivation was dependent upon social class boundaries being maintained and not diluted. Equilibrium was re-established during the inter-war years. 80% of officer cadets had attended a public school and this dominant influence

\textsuperscript{133} Dixon, \textit{Military Incompetence}, pp. 289-290

\textsuperscript{134} George Mosse, \textit{Fallen Soldiers}, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 60-61

\textsuperscript{135} Dixon, \textit{Military Incompetence}, p.158

\textsuperscript{136} Alexander Watson, \textit{Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies 1914-1918}, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 121

\textsuperscript{137} Anthony Clayton, \textit{The British Officer - Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present}, (Harlow, Pearson, 2007), p. 165
had only slightly waned by the mid 1960s. During the inter-war years, there was a shortfall of officers recruits from the usual sources. Despite attempts to free-up the system, military culture remained resolute. General Sir Walter Kirke linked class purity and the motivation to serve, it was:

[...] important not to take any drastic measures to attract a new class of officer, whose entry in any considerable numbers would probably have the effect of curtailing the existing supply from the superior classes.

There have been a very few cases where soldiers have joined in the ranks and made it to the upper echelons. Famously only William ‘Wully’ Robertson made it all the way from the bottom to the top. Mostly, the few who made the leap into the officers’ mess, were commissioned into non-combatant and socially marginal roles, such as the quartermaster or riding master. During the inter-war years, a small number of rankers were inducted into Woolwich and Sandhurst, but as ‘army cadets’ rather than ‘gentlemen cadets’. Almost inevitably they were commissioned into the support arms rather than the elite infantry or cavalry regiments. Military historian Anthony Clayton revealed that, within the fighting regiments, a subtle pecking order was maintained:

[...] officers of the Guards looked down on everyone else, within the cavalry Dragoons looked down on Lancers, in the Infantry, the Rifle and Light Infantry regiments claimed a social cachet, and within a county or region, one of several regiments would have a particular social status [...] One or two regiments became known for their willingness to accept a Jewish officer who otherwise met the regiment’s professional and social requirement [...] .

The custom was reinvigorated for the post-war volunteer army and remains active, with regiments maintaining a ‘table of social prestige’. Getting into Sandhurst is still only the first stage in being accepted into a regiment. In a highly competitive process, regiments undertake their own selection process from the pool of cadets. Fitting in socially and economically as well as militarily remain important considerations. It

138 French, Military Identities, p. 32
139 Jeremy Crang, The British Army and the People’s War 1939-1945, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 21-22
140 Joined as a private in 1877, promoted Field Marshal in 1920
141 French, Military Identities, p. 32
142 Clayton, The British Officer, pp. 193-197
143 Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 79
144 Hennessey, Reading Club, pp. 83-85
might be argued that membership of a nepotistic self-selecting group, where blue-blooded officer status juxtaposes with a working-class rank-and-file, has sustained a cultural investment in the ‘lions led by donkeys’ myth.\textsuperscript{145}

During the Second World War the armed forces eventually had to expand the pool for officer recruitment. By the spring of 1941, only 24% of officers were drawn from the public schools. However, this was not evidence of a nascent meritocracy. The process ‘concealed a system of preferences’.\textsuperscript{146} Recruiters, denied the ability to take on public school or Oxbridge alumni, took the next best available from grammar schools and red-bricks, provided that they looked the part. Although the effect of post-war national service leavened the social polarisation between officers and the rank-and-file, its influence must not be overrated. Many national servicemen did not accept commissions because they could not afford them. The wealthier regiments maintained a hidden ‘means test’ to remain socially exclusive.\textsuperscript{147} In 1947, Woolwich and Sandhurst amalgamated into the Royal Military Academy (non-fee-paying). Entrance was initially determined by passing the WOSB although this was replaced by the RCB.\textsuperscript{148} The battery of practical tests to which officer candidates were (and still are) exposed was primarily looking for the ability to fit in.\textsuperscript{149} It was through the ability to perform well in such practical tests that a candidate could demonstrate ‘character’. This was confirmed by research conducted in 1987, by City University Business School, who concluded that the RCB officers did not grade candidates on potential, but on how their senior peer group would judge them.\textsuperscript{150} According to Hennessey, who was accepted into Sandhurst in 2003:

The unlucky ones were deemed to lack some elusive quality which couldn’t be taught at Sandhurst, and to this day I’m not sure what that is. I’ve served with a number of men who struggled so severely to learn fundamental lessons that even to pass them out of Sandhurst was highly questionable and to select them over other, far better, men who

\textsuperscript{145} BBC’s hugely popular \textit{Blackadder Goes Forth} (1989) should be set against revisionist scholarship, \textit{inter alia} Gary Sheffield

\textsuperscript{146} Crang, \textit{The British Army}, pp. 28-29

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid}, p. 39

\textsuperscript{148} Now renamed the AOSB

\textsuperscript{149} Clayton, \textit{The British Officer}, pp. 237-241

\textsuperscript{150} Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, pp. 76-77
never even got there is only to see how early in the process the Army can get things strangely wrong.\textsuperscript{151}

No great requirement for academic achievement formed part of the philosophy; the 1957 War Office \textit{Grigg Report} commented that:

\begin{quote}
There was an implication that the services are a career for the ‘duller’ boy’, based on the assumption that junior officers obey senior officers as a duty, and that, because the senior officer was always right, there was no need for the junior officer to doubt or hesitate […] The moderating official line was that, ‘there was also room, too, for officers who are not specially “good at their books, but who have common sense and […] imagination”’.\textsuperscript{152}
\end{quote}

Given that the entry requirements for Sandhurst were well below those required for university,\textsuperscript{153} it is no surprise that, in 1966, a proposal to make Sandhurst a degree-awarding institution, was turned down as unnecessary. It was during the 1960s that many of the officers who served in the Falklands were culturally assimilated into the armed forces. Until 1972 they were still legally ‘gentlemen’,\textsuperscript{154} and throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, public school boys made up 50\% of the Sandhurst entry, despite representing only 6\% of their age group.\textsuperscript{155} During the last two decades of the twentieth century, British officers were more professional than ever before, and yet their materialistic lifestyles were more redolent of the eighteenth century than the present.\textsuperscript{156} This was borne out by the comments of Tim Spicer,\textsuperscript{157} who in 1982 was operations officer in the Scots Guards:

\begin{quote}
The battalion was completely unprepared for going to war. We’d been doing public duties from Chelsea Barracks for five years, and were exhausted by it […] We could shoot straight and were fit, but our tactics were very rusty. Some of our officers were uninterested in military matters, used to coming in at ten in the morning, leaving at three in the afternoon, living the old-fashioned guards officer lifestyle. They had become social soldiers […].\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\textsuperscript{151} & Hennessey, \textit{Reading Club}, p. 34 \\
\textsuperscript{152} & Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, pp. 72-73 \\
\textsuperscript{153} & 2 x ‘A’ level passes for regular service commissions, 5 x ‘O’ level passes for short-service commissions \\
\textsuperscript{154} & Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 70 \\
\textsuperscript{155} & Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}, p. 88 \\
\textsuperscript{156} & Clayton. \textit{The British Officer}, p. 243 \\
\textsuperscript{157} & As a manager of Sandline International and Aegis International, Spicer has been unflatteringly described as a world-leading mercenary general \\
\end{tabular}
Falklands veteran Hugh McManners, in a lengthy and astringent critique of class culture, commented that, ‘Inside the British Army, the effect of institutionalised snobbery is insidious and widespread’. According to Spicer (educated at Sherborne):

> The public-school boy tends to be better at the sort of leadership required by the British Army because he has been practising it throughout his school life. Although other sorts of school might also provide individuals who happen to be good leaders, they do not give them the same tremendous advantage […]

These remarks contain a strong sense of self-justification and by extension could apply to any career requiring management skill. The fact that a huge number of effective leaders in many organisations, public and commercial, uniformed and otherwise, have been educated by the state, would perhaps suggest the latter.

### 1.3 Remuneration

The question of pay does not feature highly in the literature of military service, fighting purely for pay has been antithetical to the collective view. In recruitment advertising, money was subordinate to the positive benefits of army life. A recruit did not realistically join the services expecting to become wealthy. In his considerations of the motivations to enlist, along with coercion and normative control (i.e. moral commitment combined with group values), Henderson identified ‘utilitarian control’, which is predicated on the assumption that service personnel can be motivated economically. In a utilitarian world, ‘no job is worth getting killed for […]’. Mercenary armies of the past, the ‘security specialists’ who worked for Aegis and the respondents to advertisements in Soldier of Fortune magazine, would suggest that the risk versus reward equation was rather more nuanced. Nonetheless, conventional soldiering has a long history of poor pay and conditions, which has ‘compounded the

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159 *Ibid*, p. 25
160 *Ibid*, pp. 25-26
161 William Henderson, *Cohesion*, pp. 22-23
moral ambiguities inherent in the trade of war to push soldiers to the fringe of respectable society’.\(^\text{162}\)

During the First World War, ordinary soldiers were paid one shilling a day. Relative to average earnings in 1914 this equates to about £5,850 (p.a.) today.\(^\text{163}\) This was substantially less than Dominion soldiers who were paid more than five times as much, hence the acrimonious soubriquet of ‘fuckin’ five bobbers’.\(^\text{164}\) It was even more demoralising to be confronted with the spending power of their officers on morale enhancers.\(^\text{165}\) A subaltern was paid 7s 6d. per day, currently equivalent to about £44,000 (p.a.); however, lodging and field allowances would lift this to an equivalent of around £70,000. For regular officers, there was the additional requirement for a private income. A modest regiment such as the Cameronians recommended an annual minimum of £200, the Coldstream Guards expected at least £400, and some cavalry regiments £1,000.\(^\text{166}\) This highlights the massive social gulf between officers and other ranks and the huge barriers to entry for those of humble means. The inter-war period saw officer recruitment substantially revert to being class based. The consequence was that during the Second World War pay became an inhibitor to expansion of the officer cadre. As Adam, The Adjutant-General, put it:

> It is still clear, from the mass of evidence, that the low rate of pay of a Second-Lieutenant, and the inevitable increased expenses that an officer’s status involves, are holding back many suitable candidates, especially those with families or those that have to support their relatives.\(^\text{167}\)

During the latter part of the twentieth century there was a much greater expectation that officers should be expected to live off their pay, although this had arguably still not permeated the elite regiments. For the rank-and-file, official parsimony is still evident. The present generation of soldiers expect to have a family life; however, the quality of


\(^{163}\) ‘Purchasing Power’, http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk - n.b. Comparisons are not made on the basis of inflation but based upon an equivalence to average earnings.

\(^{164}\) The pre-decimal nickname for a shilling (5p) was ‘a bob’.

\(^{165}\) Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 343

\(^{166}\) Baynes, Morale, pp. 29-30

\(^{167}\) Crang, The British Army, p. 25
housing has been a persistent problem. Complaints about married quarters were often trivialised by the authorities, and this could have been ‘deeply demoralising’.\textsuperscript{168} According to a Falklands veteran:

Home was in army quarters provided by those bloodsuckers at the Ministry of Defence. Scores of Paras and their families were stuffed into a block of flats called Williams Park which would have been OK had the dump not been condemned years earlier by the council as unfit for habitation.\textsuperscript{169}

British Army pay scales for 2009-2010\textsuperscript{170} revealed a substantial erosion of relative differentials over the past 100 years.\textsuperscript{171} However, junior ranks within the police and fire service were better off than their service counterparts. After basic training, a private soldier earned £16,681 (p.a.) compared with £22,700 (approx. plus overtime) for police constables and firemen. The maximum pay for a WO1 was £45,836, which was £1,000 below the starting pay for a Major. Currently, the maximum pay for a subaltern is about the same as a corporal. It is only the pay scale for a senior Lieutenant-Colonel (£65,717-£76,095) that exceeds that of a police Chief Superintendent. Higher pay and generous pensions were naturally the preserve of the long-serving, and turnover statistics suggested that most recruits never got the chance to move up the pay-scales.\textsuperscript{172} Considered in isolation Henderson was right; pay by itself was not worth dying for, and the extent to which other rewards may have altered the balance will be discussed in Chapter three.

1.4 Training and Discipline

The new recruit/officer cadet has had to be inculcated with the values that military culture required. Mastering the basic technical skills of the job was essential, but the imperative was to ensure that the serviceman always followed orders and always

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{168}] Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}, p.68
  \item[\textsuperscript{169}] John Geddes, \textit{Spearhead Assault}, (London, Arrow, 2007), p.35
  \item[\textsuperscript{170}] ‘Army Pay Rates’, http://www.hmforces.co.uk/content/army_pay_rates_2009
  \item[\textsuperscript{171}] Between 1982 and 2010 the starting pay scale differential between a Private and a Lt-Col increased by 16%, however this was mitigated by a change in allowances
  \item[\textsuperscript{172}] Those aged over 40 with 18 years service can claim an immediate pension and tax-free lump sum, with a second lump sum at 65.
\end{itemize}
fought. The most desirable outcome of training was to take intrinsic motivation in its raw form and, through systematic extrinsic processing, produce a refined set of normative and intrinsic values that were agreeable to the military palate. If the adapted intrinsic motivation that impelled a soldier to fight started to fade, then stringent extrinsics took over. Soldiers could not be made fearless, but they could be coerced by the knowledge that the consequences of avoidance might have been worse than the risks of fighting.\(^{173}\) Therefore, this section will investigate how training has operated, how approaches to formal discipline have developed, and finally, how unofficial methods of coercion and control have maintained an unsavoury presence.

Embarking upon basic training has, for many recruits, had a profound impact, and the experience of the first few weeks meant that life would never be quite the same ever again. Research by Stouffer et al. revealed that:

The sheer coercive power of Army authority [is] a factor in combat motivation which must not be forgotten simply because it is easy to take for granted. It was omnipresent and its existence had been impressed on the soldier from his first days in the Army […]\(^{174}\)

This factor remained consistent, and there were a number of aims implicit within basic training. The most immediate of these was to dispossess the recruit of his civilian sensibilities and initiate the process of ‘undermining the recruit’s self-image’. This was achieved by immediately proscribing freedom of movement and the ability to make personal choices, initiating a collective existence by denying privacy, and imposing a ubiquity of appearance (i.e. uniform and haircut).\(^{175}\) The purpose of this was to initiate the process of group identification and loyalty. Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance suggested that the harshness of training led to increased cohesiveness, because through shared privations membership of a group was earned. The more difficult this was, the greater likelihood that the recruit would exaggerate the positive aspects of group membership, whilst downplaying those that were unpleasant.\(^{176}\)


\(^{176}\) Holmes, *Acts of War*, pp. 47-48
Uniforms were of course symbolic of power, and the lack of any badges on those of the recruits served to ‘emphasise the hierarchical structure of armies and encourage deference’.177 The next step was to bring the weight of this hierarchical authority structure to bear. By volunteering for military service, the recruit had accepted the contractual legitimacy of enlistment, even though the precise conditions of the agreement reflected the superior bargaining power of the military. The first and essential condition required instant and unquestioning obedience.178 Any indication of individualism or questioning was dealt with ruthlessly, because ‘without discipline there was little chance of persuading men to stoically accept all the horrors of modern warfare’.179 The recruit was required to obey the myriad of rules and regulations whilst tired, hungry and dirty, even when they were applied arbitrarily or vicariously. It has been a universal approach, ‘We see in all armies a harsh and often bullying or brutal process for breaking in recruits’.180 Curtis reflected on his induction into the Parachute Regiment in September 1980:

From day one I got screamed at, humiliated and belittled but […] the abuse was psychological rather than physical: we were all worthless shits and how dare we even consider ourselves worthy of becoming paratroopers.181

Physical intimidation has been effectively (and illegally) deployed at the discretion of the training staff. However, the purpose of the breaking down process was not generally about individual persecution. It was the playing out of long-established rituals that have been proven to provide ‘a comprehensive framework of behaviour designed to serve, inter alia, as a precaution against disorder and a defence against the randomness of battle’.182 Mileham offered a similar analysis and cited Weber. The inculcation of obedience, required because of the deterministic nature of warfare, was:

182 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 237
The consequently rationalized, schematically trained and accurate execution of received orders – without giving expression of personal criticism – and the constant inner submission to that objective.¹⁸³

Recruits are still inducted into a regiment, not generally into the army, and each regiment has its own traditions and ethos. They are motivated to become the current torch bearers of a timeless tradition (even if it is largely inherited and invented). It is a vital part of the bonding process and a palliative to the unpleasant aspects of soldiering (if they could do it so can you). The physical manifestations of this difference are to be found in the subtle variations of uniform. These are often possessed of a symbolic value far more than their material worth.¹⁸⁴ The Royal Marines, Parachute Regiment (and others) award their coloured berets for successful completion of training phases, thus turning a cheap bit of cloth into an object of desire and marker of a rite of passage, to be coveted and protected.¹⁸⁵ Military practice has been to reward conformity by easing up on the relationship between stick and carrot, and it would be unfair to categorise training as unremittingly draconian. Sensible training staff have always known that a word of praise, no matter how sparingly given, could be a tremendous motivator because it validated the earning of a place in the organisation. As one Falklands veteran put it:

Many say that the Paras are ‘brainwashed’, and to some extent this may be true, certainly it is not difficult to convince recruits that they have joined the best regiment in the army – because that is want they want to believe.¹⁸⁶

A key aspect of the conditioning process was categorised as ‘bull’. Whilst the vulgarism ‘bullshit’ enjoys widespread contemporary usage, anecdotally the etymology traces back to Australian soldiers of the Great War who, not renowned for their compliant behaviour, used it to describe the arcane methods by which military culture sought to imbue organisation, discipline and obedience. Obsessive cleaning, polishing, and marching, have in certain situations become self-sustaining rituals that have had an impact on military efficiency, as in cases where equipment has been cleaned to the point of destruction. From a recruit’s perspective, it may also have seemed to be entirely

¹⁸³ Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 73
¹⁸⁴ French, Military Identities, pp. 84-85
¹⁸⁵ Holmes, Acts of War, p. 56
¹⁸⁶ IWM 1182 - Private Papers of G. Colbeck, 1982 [mss]
pointless and almost certainly stultifyingly boring. However, there have been some apparent positives, at least from the military perspective, “bull” made its effect by constraints upon the “creativity” of thought.\(^{187}\) Despite what Jary may have thought, and what the military might continue to say about the use of ‘initiative’, the reality is that anything approaching independence of thought and action has been the preserve of the most senior commissioned ranks. Perhaps not even then; McManners argued that the purpose of Staff Training\(^ {188} \) has been ‘to eliminate individualism and produce reliable staff officers free of idiosyncrasy’.\(^ {189} \) Parade ground drill skills not only presented an image of discipline and efficiency, but also were taught because ‘it [was] the quickest way to teach “instant, unhesitating, and exact obedience to orders”’.\(^ {190} \) MacCurdy considered the downside of tradition, but concluded that drill was psychologically essential to ‘inculcate the habit of automatic obedience’.\(^ {191} \) Montgomery considered drill skills to be integral to collective discipline because they ‘developed an instinctive obedience to orders’.\(^ {192} \) In this sense, such discipline was hegemonic rather than self-actualising, ‘perhaps the most important feature of “bull” is its capacity to allay anxiety’.\(^ {193} \) Recruits did not have to worry about making choices, because not only were they made for them, but also they did not have the time to reflect upon the alternatives. That bull may, in extremis, have fuelled obsessive-compulsive behaviour should, in the context of this thesis, merely be noted.

In the post-war period the regime at Sandhurst offered up no special rules or favours for officer cadets. They were required to ‘adopt a schizophrenic style and

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\(^{188}\) Attendance at Staff College is the preserve of experienced officers with the potential to achieve senior command roles

\(^{189}\) McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 224

\(^{190}\) French, *Raising Churchill’s Army*, p. 44

\(^{191}\) J. MacCurdy, *The Structure of Morale*, (Cambridge CUP, 1943), p. 38

\(^{192}\) Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, pp. 92-93

\(^{193}\) Dixon, *Military Incompetence*, p. 182
manner, behaving as quasi-officers while role-playing the “squaddie”.

An officer commissioned in 1951 described the experience:

At Sandhurst I had drilled into me duty, loyalty, integrity, [. . . .] I was trained to think and behave as an officer and leader. Any deviation from the laid down standards and requirements was decisively punished and, if necessary, a cadet would be returned to his unit as unsuitable officer material.

Independence of thought was not encouraged, and officer cadets were made to absorb service culture through a process of ‘intensive indoctrination’. Finlan described military academies, such as Dartmouth and Sandhurst, as ‘enormous disk drives into which officer cadets were inserted. The formatting procedure was comprehensive in scope to alter norms, values, beliefs and appearances radically’. Following his appointment in 1991, Maj.Gen. Timothy Toyne-Sewell sought to alter the nature of Sandhurst, when he announced, ‘the modern officer does not benefit from being harangued by impeccably turned out colour sergeants. I want cadets to enjoy the place. It is something they haven’t done for years’. However, it would seem that his ideas did not achieve much purchase. During the initial stages of training, Sandhurst cadets still receive the full measure of military beasting. Hennessey noted in a diary extract from January 2004 entitled ‘Bugger’:

Ours is a day to day struggle for survival, the priority being not to do anything which might upset the malign despot who rules our waking (and sleeping) hours […] Daily the misdemeanours which incur his wrath change so we can never be sure when we might be pleasing him or not […] the crap here is so extreme and unrelenting that the pauses in it seem like paradise […]

The point is that, during the obedience-conditioning phase of basic training, those in authority would exercise it by finding fault with anything. At the micro level, there was no logic to this process, what was right one day was wrong the next. It only began to become rational when recruits realised that it was part of a greater game of inculcating

194 Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 74
195 Ibid
196 The Britannia Royal Naval College
198 Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 75
199 Hennessey, Reading Club, pp. 39-40
compliance, and of winnowing out those who could not take the pressure or motivationally accommodate themselves to the bigger picture. Many recruits, officer cadet or otherwise, realised it was possible to win the occasional minor victory by manufacturing a small attention-drawing fault that distracted from a larger one.200 Falklands veteran Simon Weston realised:

The strictness and severity had to be maintained as a way of getting people to say, “OK, I want out,” because the Army has to have a good reason to throw someone out. It’s much easier if they can get the undesirables to go voluntarily. In those circumstances a certain amount of harshness and ill-treatment is necessary, as part of the weeding-out process.201

The downside to the basic training regimes was that each lacked any heuristic quality, so in many respects, rather than assisting the transition from adolescence to adulthood (as the collective believed), it had a regressive effect. Many newly qualified soldiers had little idea how to manage money, immediately racking up debt on consumer electronics and similar objects of desire.202 Falklands veteran Philip Williams spoke from personal experience:

You never have to make up your own mind about anything; they do that for you. And they provide everything: clothes, bedding, food. So in a way, your mind stops working, and that’s pretty dangerous when you come to think of it.203

Such danger may have become manifest because the essence of hierarchical systems, predicated upon command and control, has been the expectation of a willing response to superior orders that ‘foregoes critical judgement in the selection of alternatives’. Orders retain the automatic presumption of legitimacy; therefore, so do any sanctions for failure to obey. Consequently, ‘obedience to orders has become a normative expectation’ and as such the subordinate may have suspended moral judgment and felt absolved from any responsibility. In essence, it is the doctrine of respondeat superior.204

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200 Hockey, Squaddies, p. 44
201 Weston, Walking Tall, p. 45
202 Beevor, Inside the British Army, pp. 40-42
Two examples from the Falklands War reveal the positive and negative aspects such normative behaviour. During the preparations for the attack on Mount Longdon L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley considered that:

The Platoon sergeant was an incredible pain to us all […] we had all served long enough to respect and obey without question but the guy acted like a wet fart.205

Clearly in such a situation soldiers are required to suppress any subjective personal judgements. Of more concern during the same battle was the hesitation of some of the Paras to start shooting. According to Jennings and Weale, ‘They were so conditioned by their experience on the ranges and in Ulster that they were scared to open fire without a direct order from an officer or NCO’.206

The nadir of respondeat superior is found in the prosecution of war crimes. The suspension of moral judgment and the motivational empowerment of ‘frenzy’ will be discussed in the following chapter, suffice to say that in the midst of battle, much has gone on that would shock the sensibilities of the collective. The important point is that it did not require a distorted ideology or a psychopathic personality to commit an atrocity.

Therefore, it may be asserted that fear was the binding agent of ensuring normative behaviour. Fear of letting down the regiment, contempt of colleagues, the impact on career prospects and ultimately of punishment. Robert Lawrence emerged from the Falklands War as a seriously injured hero, yet his postwar experiences broke the normative spell, ‘I […] just couldn’t stop reacting against the whole army set-up […] I had lost my fear of it’.207 How the armed forces fear-motivate through formal punishment will now be discussed.


206 Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, p. 129

207 Lawrence & Lawrence, When the Fighting is Over, p. 93
1.5 Punishment and the Blind-Eye

Stouffer et al. concluded that the ‘best predictor of combat behaviour is the simple fact of institutionalised role’.\(^{208}\) ‘The soldier had a simple extrinsic choice, fight when ordered or face the consequences. However, life was never so simple, and the reality was that enforcement of military discipline contained an inherent paradox. Because the giving of orders was very much a top down process, there was the need for a ‘tacit consensus’ to avoid orders being wilfully misconstrued or ignored entirely. Holmes asserted that ‘Wise leaders know that nothing is so destructive of cooperation as the giving of orders that cannot or will not be obeyed’.\(^{209}\) The most ‘obstreperous’ interpreters of orders tended to be the ‘better and more warlike’ fighting units.\(^{210}\) These analyses tend to be borne out by the fact that at an organised level, during the twentieth century, the British army has only suffered three mutinies of any note. The first of these occurred at the notorious Étaples training base in 1917. The contemporary description of it by Corporal Andrews is informative:

> All of us going to Étaples had combat experience. But when we got there we found the discipline was literally Prussian. After three years of war the troops were in no mood to be messed around by base wallahs of all ranks and regiments.\(^{211}\)

The mutiny started when a military policeman shot and killed a regular army corporal for crossing a bridge to go into the town.\(^{212}\) The cause of mutinies mostly resolved into a sense that the military contract had been broken.\(^{213}\) At Étaples, it was the belief that experienced troops were entitled not to be treated like recruits. At Shoreham Demobilisation camp in 1919, it was because the authorities procrastinated over the demobilisation process whilst the troops were usefully employed on labouring duties.\(^{214}\) In 1943, the ‘Salerno Mutiny’ occurred when 196 experienced soldiers from the 50th


\(^{211}\) Arthur, *Forgotten Voices of the Great War*, p. 226

\(^{212}\) Ferguson, *The Pity of War*, p. 345


\(^{214}\) French, *Military Identities*, pp. 198-199
and 51st divisions refused to be deployed as reinforcements for the 46th Division, insisting, in a display of group loyalty, that they be sent back to their own units to continue fighting. The authorities imposed draconian prison sentences and the death penalty for the three sergeants involved. Sentences were suspended on condition that the mutineers fight with new units, which they all did. The root cause of each of these three mutinies was not a refusal to fight but a failure of leadership to recognise the ‘tacit consensus’.

The institutional imperative to react to disobedience with savage punishment of the hanging and flogging variety enjoys a long tradition. Flogging in the army was abolished on active service in 1881. Denied the lash, the military responded by introducing Field Punishment No.1. which involved forfeiture of pay, up to two hours a day fettered to a fixed object, and hard labour. This sanction was handed down on 60,210 occasions during the First World War. Clearly such punishments were only for the rank and file. Officers and gentlemen were not immune from disgrace, according to Lieutenant Norman Collins:

I can remember the battalion being paraded, and this officer stood out in the middle while his badges of rank were cut off, and he was marched away to join the regiment as a private […]

Inevitably it was the rank and file who received the strictest discipline. According to John Brophy:

The possibility of severe punishment hung perpetually over the private soldier and indeed some regular NCOs boasted that if they really wished to they could make sure that any man under them would be sent to military prison.

Baynes’ analysis suggested that soldiers were not averse to heavy discipline, because ‘to allow a soldier to disobey orders is really to insult him’. Even allowing for present day sensibilities this seems a bit rich, but at least Baynes acknowledged that

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216 Retained in military prisons until 1907

217 Holmes, Tommy, p. 558

218 Levine, Somme, pp. 152-153

219 Baynes, Morale, p. 190

220 Ibid, p. 185-186
punishments were occasionally excessive. With exemplary punishments, publicly administered, the essence of military discipline becomes clear, *pour encourager les autres*. It is a philosophy that continues to apply. The aspect of punishment and deterrence that troubles so many present day attitudes is the use and abuse of the Death Penalty during the Great War. Hugh McManners argued that:

> The use of the death sentence to motivate troops is the ultimate essence of how military law functions in combat conditions. Fear of an inglorious, sordid and shameful death was thought to keep men at their posts […]\(^{221}\)

The number of death sentences imposed increased during the run up to a major offensive.\(^{222}\) Charles Carrington reflected on sitting in judgment during courts-martial:

> A memory that disturbs me is the hint or warning that came down from above. That morale needed a sharp jolt, or that a few severe sentences might have a good effect. It was expedient that some man who had deserted his post under fire was shot to encourage the others.\(^{223}\)

Rifleman Henry Williamson described his experience of being in a firing squad and how afterwards, ‘[…] the deserter’s name was read out on three successive parades as a warning’.\(^{224}\) Though the threat was real it is important to retain a sense of proportion; around 5.7 million men served during the Great War, of these 3,082 received death sentences, of which all but 346 (including 3 officers) were commuted.\(^{225}\) However, there is a caveat because there is evidence of men being shot expeditiously. Lance Sergeant Charles Quinnell’s account is informative:

> We had a sergeant […] a very regimental type of man. His first day in the trenches, two […] miners slummocked along the front line […] Anyway this sergeant didn't know who they were and he yelled out, 'Halt!' […] but when they didn't obey he brought up his rifle, and bang he shot the first man through the head. Then he did exactly the same with the other man […] He was later court-martialed and reduced to corporal.\(^{226}\)

It is a fascinating insight into how the demands of a rigid command structure can determine that an act, tantamount to murder, even by the standards of the time, should be judged to be an over-zealous misdemeanour.

\(^{221}\) McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 79

\(^{222}\) French, *Military Identities*, p. 190

\(^{223}\) Holmes, *Tommy*, p. 562

\(^{224}\) Arthur, *Forgotten Voices of the Great War*, p. 89


\(^{226}\) Arthur, *Forgotten Voices of the Great War*, p. 150
In 1930, the Death Penalty for desertion was abolished in the teeth of great opposition, but during the Second World War, General Auchinleck, whilst Commander of the North African campaign, formally asked for the death penalty to be fully restored as an incentive to discourage false claims of psychological collapse. He was turned down for reasons of expediency and not morality.\(^{227}\) In Italy, Field Marshal Alexander was ‘itching to reintroduce the death penalty’ to discourage the estimated 30,000 British deserters.\(^{228}\) Although the ‘civilian’ death penalty was abolished in Britain in the 1960s; for the Armed Forces, it remained on the Statue Book until the Human Rights Act 1998 Sec. 21(5) passed into law. This was not the result of an anachronistic oversight, and in 1982, it remained as a serious and intended deterrent. In 1983, a Select Committee reported:

> Retention of the death penalty is necessary as a deterrent given that a potential offender on the battlefield, where death may result from disobeying orders, is unlikely to be deterred from assisting the enemy by no more than the possibility of imprisonment.\(^{229}\)

In 1991, in a free vote, the House of Commons decided by a margin of 228 to 124 not to abolish the death penalty for six military offences:

- Serious misconduct in action.
- Communicating with the enemy.
- Furnishing supplies or aiding the enemy having been captured.
- Obstructing operations.
- Giving false air signals.
- Mutiny, incitement to mutiny or failing to suppress a mutiny.\(^{230}\)

These definitions are so vague as to allow any courts-martial considerable latitude of interpretation. Whilst the retention of the death penalty has proven to be theoretical, it is such latitude that continues to underpin the approach to more mundane military crimes and misdemeanours.

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\(^{229}\) Hansard, HC Deb, 14 July 1983, Vol. 45, cc. 1072-81

\(^{230}\) McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 97
Military law remains complex, wide-ranging and reflective of a hierarchical command system. Guidance is currently enshrined within JSP 830 - *The Manual of Service Law*, Version 2.10, MoD, 31 Jan 2011. It sets out Section 19 of the Armed Forces Act 2006. This contains arguably the most sweeping provision of military law, which can be interpreted so widely as to fill in the gaps where other parts of the legislation cannot be made to stick:

Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline
(1) A person subject to service law commits an offence if he does an act that is prejudicial to good order and service discipline.
(2) In this section “act” includes an omission and the reference to the doing of an act is to be read accordingly.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to any punishment mentioned in the Table in section 164, but any sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of the offence must not exceed two years.

Essentially this is an update of Section 69 of the Army Act 1955, which applied during the Falklands War. It can be used in summary judgment on an offender (i.e without the need for a formal court-martial), and the guidance document makes it clear that the terms ‘prejudice’, ‘good order’, and ‘discipline’ can be interpreted widely. It suggests a conflict with civilian law which rests on the principle of *ignorantia juris non excusat*. 231

Whilst a civilian cannot claim ignorance of the law as a defence, intentions and actions are permissible unless it can be proven that they are specifically proscribed by law. Section 19 turns this principle on its head. Those subject to service law can, in effect, be prosecuted *ex post-facto*, 232 and their defence will substantially depend on the quality of the advocacy. As Section 19 is widely used for low grade ‘offences’, this may be effectively non-existent. A CO has a wide range of sanctions up to and including 28 days imprisonment. 233 Short terms are often served in the garrison guardhouse under the aegis of the regimental police; detainees will not be allowed a sedentary incarceration. Such a punishment was awarded to the hapless bugler whose failure to strike the right notes on a cold day embarrassed his attendant CO at a post-Falklands funeral. 234 Perhaps not the first occurrence of a ‘prejudicial’ embouchure?

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231 Ignorance of the law is no excuse

232 From after the action


According to Holmes, ‘The Army operates its own prison “glasshouses” where the ethos is still substantially “retribution and deterrence”’. There remains only one ‘glasshouse’ in the United Kingdom although, in line with the service predilection for euphemism, it is not called a prison, rather the MCTC and is located in Colchester. SUS are detained for between fourteen days and two years. Training programmes are geared around remedial military skills for those who will be returned to their units, and basic vocational skills for those who are to be dishonourably discharged. Bad behaviour is not an easy way out of the forces. As with conventional training the system works through a system of earned privileges for good behaviour. These include: the degree of confinement, the amount of ‘bull’, different identification badges, and access to telephone and the media. Effectively a SUS is kept under closer confinement and subject to a more stringent regime than a civilian inmate in an open prison. The military may eschew the term prison for the MCTC, but it is manifestly a place of incarceration. That the majority of COs are not despots, and manage their subordinates with a wise touch, is borne out by the fact that the capacity of the MCTC is only 314 inmates (about 0.16% of regular service personnel). Regrettably, the imprisonment statistics for ex-service personnel are not so encouraging.

The final area of overt deterrence used by the MoD is relevant to the research community because it concerns the efforts made to suppress books and publications by Special Forces personnel. Since 1996, the MoD has made extensive use of gagging contracts and the Official Secrets Act to prevent publication by former personnel. For those still serving the strictures of ‘conduct prejudicial […]’ are likely to be applied with vigour.

According to Stewart, ‘Those who neither understand nor want to understand the military, view all militaries as rigid, authoritarian and brutal organisations built on fear

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235 Holmes, The Oxford Companion to Military History, p. 745
and punishment’. Whilst there is an essential truth in this statement it must be qualified. Military organisations are hierarchical and can easily tend towards authoritarianism. They rely on extrinsic measures such as coercion as part of the conditioning process, and a framework of law biased heavily in favour of the authorities. However, because a strong sense of contract underpins the relationship between the rank and file and the command structure, a brutal and institutionalised despotism may historically have been threatened, but has never been fully played out. During the Second World War, an experiment to toughen up recruits with ‘hate’ training was introduced by the War Office. Attempts to inculcate brute aggression involved visits to slaughterhouses and the liberal use of animal blood during training exercises. It was unsuccessful and soon abandoned. Some American commanders in Vietnam deliberately humiliated and degraded their soldiers to ‘inflame their fighting spirit’; however, this also failed. This theory of ‘displaced rage’ may still have its advocates but is in reality a manifest failure of leadership.

However, there has been a subculture within the armed forces of brutality and violence that operated below the official radar screen. This took two forms: firstly, the use of violence by junior commanders who, for personal reasons of control or rage displacement, stepped beyond the bounds; secondly, the use of casual violence amongst the rank and file themselves. During the Great War, given the official punishment regime described above, it is perhaps no surprise that Bill Sugden declared:

> Our sergeant major is an absolute pig […] He swears and strikes the men […] It is a cowardly thing to do as he knows the men dare not strike back […] They seem to forget we have all given up our jobs to do our best for the country, and do not expect to be treated like a lot of riffraff.

A strand of continuity is revealed by jumping forward to the Falklands generation; McNally described punishment parades, held during his basic training, that were awarded for the most minor of transgressions:

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238 Nora Kinzer Stewart, *Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War*, (New York, Brassey’s, 1991), p. 113

239 Ellis, *The Sharp End of War*, p. 17


241 Holmes, *Tommy*, p. 158
Punishment parade consisted of standing to attention on one leg for as long as humanly possible under the watchful gaze of our Drill Sergeant Major, a Scot’s Guardsman [...] the most frightening man I had ever encountered in all my years on this planet [...] On seeing this foot touch down, he would break into convulsions, like a psychopath [...] Weaker soldiers who collapsed were kicked and punched and struck over the head with a pace stick.242

This does not seem to be an isolated case; according to a Parachute Regiment recruit (training in 1981), recruits suffered so many instances of gratuitous violence that they became almost inured to it. Describing the methods applied by a training sergeant to impose silence during a pay parade (spirits were understandably high), ‘The sergeant strode up to me, with his face millimetres from mine [...] I tensed but said nothing, expecting his first punch at any time’.243

Steve McLaughlin provided evidence of a disturbing continuity into the present century. He enlisted in the Royal Green Jackets in 2002 at the age of 30. Being a decade older than his peer group, he had a mature perspective. He suggested that most sergeants did not use casual violence but identified a small group:

 [...] who take a great pride in their ability to give someone a dig or ‘a jab’. The problem is, the jabs are often for the most minor misdemeanours. Certain individuals in the Regiment deliberately cultivated and revelled in the hard-man image. As a grown man of a similar age and background I found it pathetic and disturbing [...].244

He explained how instructors set out to ‘completely dominate’ recruits and that the use of physical intimidation should not necessarily be regarded as bullying because for many years it had been used as ‘a proven system of training rough and ready lads’.245

More recently, instructors have had to be careful not to get caught by leaving incriminating marks on their victims and many instructors, no doubt through experience and received wisdom, looked back nostalgically on the 1970s and 1980s as a time when ‘[...] it was considered fairly routine to hit a failing recruit - or at least rough him up a bit’.246 Part of the process of training service personnel was to redefine their sense of identity, For some, particularly members of the infantry, aggression was required as a

243 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, p. 53
244 Steve McLaughlin, Squaddie, p. 117
245 Ibid, p. 48
246 Ibid, p. 44
dominant trait. Inevitably, amongst young men with a taste for beer and a superfluity of testosterone, this spilt out into casual violence. Simon Weston described a posting to Berlin in 1978:

There were some rough times […] but that is only to be expected […] you have that sort of wild-boy attitude and lots of money to spend, lots of cheap beer to drink. There was always somebody getting beaten up […] I got duffed up when I first joined, by a gang of lads from the Welsh Guards. It was no big deal.247

Much of the violence was built around a sense of group identity, which acted as an easy excuse to defend the honour of the most appropriate group to the circumstances (platoon, regiment, etc.). One perspective was that aggression was supposed to be controlled, ‘so that you only fight when the brass say so […]’.248 However, the reality revealed something of the Nelson touch. Because of the benefits of reinforcing a group loyalty and encouraging aggression, officers and NCOs of the Falklands generation were often sanguine about turning a blind-eye:

Officer: you expect them to behave like soldiers, to get involved in fights and to get drunk and so on. In a way you are disappointed if some of them don’t, but of course you can’t acknowledge it, or inform them.
Corporal: Soldiers should be young and fit, rough and ready, not powder-puffs!249

In the post-Falklands Parachute Regiment, a company commander thought it had proved invaluable that the Paras were ‘good gutter fighters’, and a L.Cpl. stated, ‘the lads are all scrappers anyway’.250 Such behaviour does not fit with the image of officership, so there is a certain novelty value in the following account of an event on board MV Norland returning from the Falklands in 1982:

[…] the best ruck I witnessed was when one of their Majors [Scots Guards] removed the crowns from his lapels and laid out a rather inebriated Jock guard […] That’s something you don’t see every day.251

Normally, officers have acted through the agency of others in matters of unofficial discipline. Following an Army investigation in Germany in 1948, it became apparent that officers were conniving in the beating up of soldiers held in custody in the

247 Weston, Walking Tall, p. 65
248 McNally, Watching Men Burn, pp. 22-23
249 Hockey, Squaddies, p. 34
250 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 48-49
251 McNally, Watching Men Burn, pp. 148-149
guardroom. One commented it was ‘the only way of keeping down the toughs’.\textsuperscript{252} It is evident from a number of sources that the turning of a blind-eye was not an uncommon practice when it came to the rank and file imposing their own rough hewn sanctions on each other. During basic training, and because of the imposition of vicarious punishments, recruits perceived to be letting the team down were often given rough treatment by their peers.\textsuperscript{253} Chris Phelan described his experience of the Parachute Depot in 1971 following some pilfering amongst the recruits:

> Of course they had a kangaroo court - when the corporals weren’t there - and they broke his hand, broke his fingers, you know [and] somebody got stabbed in the neck with a bayonet […] It was a very nervy time, very apprehensive.\textsuperscript{254}

On first posting from the training depot, newcomers had to earn their place in the group. According to Beevor, this may have involved bizarre and occasionally degrading initiation practices:

> The group rationale is to try to drive out weaker members who may let them down […]. Some junior ranks privately continue to justify their treatment of newcomers: ‘fucking up deserves a thump,’ They say with an air of knowing understatement.\textsuperscript{255}

Because of the way that aggression and a resort to fighting could become so normative and ingrained within military culture, it could emerge under the most bizarre of circumstances and certainly not when the authorities, who may have encouraged it, actually wanted it. It exposes the fragility of primary group motivation when it is largely sustained by internecine aggression. During the Falklands War, in the midst of the Battle for Mount Longdon, Vince Bramley was operating a GPMG and fulfilling a vital role of providing fire support. He fell into an argument and:

> We started fighting, there and then, fists flying, half rolling about the hillside, trying to kill each other as if it were a Saturday-night brawl. Lieutenant Oliver rolled down beside us and quickly pulled us apart […] ‘The fucking enemy is that way, not here,’ he said, pointing towards Stanley.\textsuperscript{256}

During the battle, taking any disciplinary measures would have been virtually impossible; in its aftermath, given all the casualties and controversies, largely irrelevant.

\textsuperscript{252} French, \textit{Military Identities}, p. 191
\textsuperscript{253} McLaughlin, \textit{Squaddie}, p. 57
\textsuperscript{254} Jennings \& Weale, \textit{Green-Eyed Boys}, p. 26
\textsuperscript{255} Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}, p. 30
\textsuperscript{256} Bramley, \textit{Excursion to Hell}, p. 111
1.6 Summary

The essence of this chapter has been to assert the significance of intrinsic motivation as a means of attracting volunteer recruits and to validate the role of conscripts denied the choice to enlist. Popular culture rather than political ideology formed the nucleus of intrinsic motivation and this has consistently sustained an idealised image of warriors and warfare upon impressionable young men. By contrast, the disillusionment oeuvre that emerged from the Great War onwards has achieved relatively little purchase.

Officer recruitment has relied heavily upon the public school ethos, except in times of mass mobilisation, and this continuity was only slowly eroding at the close of the twentieth century; not so for the rank-and-file. At the turn of the century, education sutured working-class children to the obligations of empire, but by the 1970s this had broken down as antimilitarism swept through the state education sector. Nevertheless recruits from disadvantaged backgrounds successfully continued to be sought. Whilst potential officers had career choices, economic disadvantage continued to shape hearts and minds for many of the rest.

The purpose of basic training was to apply vigorous extrinsic motivations that reshaped the mindset of recruits. Stripping away civilian sensibilities enabled the armed forces to recalibrate their recruits with an augmented set of intrinsic motivations built around professional competence, group loyalties and obedience to legitimate authority. These implanted values were ring-fenced by the formal coercive sanctions of military law and the informal strictures of military culture.
Chapter 2 - During Combat

In the previous chapter, the role of culture in its various guises was identified as an intrinsic motivator of recruitment for both officers and the rank-and-file. The manner in which these motivations were extrinsically adapted through training, organisational indoctrination and hierarchical control was then discussed. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and develop the arguments that translate peacetime motivations into the actuality of combat. The changing nature of warfare during the twentieth century means that attempting to resolve combat into simple ideas of loyalty and ideology does not come close to explaining the gallimaufry of factors that determine why combatants do not run away and are able to kill.¹

The analysis within this chapter, of motivation during combat, comprises five linked elements. The first three sections will discuss group cohesion, the British regimental system, and formal concepts of leadership. This triumvirate provides a sense of the top-down perspective of combat motivation. The main arguments that will emerge from this analysis will be firstly to identify and draw evidence-based conclusions from the four pillars of group theories: social cohesion, task (or situational) cohesion, ideology, and coercion. Secondly, an analysis of the British regimental tradition will demonstrate how it emerged as a unique system that acted as a filter between primary groups and the upper reaches of the command structure. The limited effectiveness of the regimental role in sustaining combatants will be evaluated. Thirdly, the impact of formal leadership will be discussed, and it will be shown that the characteristics required of leaders in combat differ from the skills required by senior commanders. Formal leadership derives from the regimental tradition and its hierarchy but has performed a subtle role in binding primary groups to official goals. Evidence from both leaders and led will show that different notions of what has been expected from a leader still persist and can have a deleterious effect on motivation. The last two sections will assume a bottom-up perspective. The fourth section will analyse the role of informal leaders, ‘big men’ or ‘leviathans’, who sometimes emerged during combat and

had the personal power to usurp formal leadership structures. They had the charisma to inspire and motivate others and make decisive interventions in battle; however, their contributions were finely balanced because they may have unwittingly undermined formal objectives. The final section will investigate the role of frenzy. It will analyse what has made so many combatants behave brutally in combat: from institutional demands that are wrapped in the euphemism of aggression, the pleasures of killing, through to the desire for revenge, and the cultural demonisation of opponents.

In the context of the Falklands War, although the Argentinian forces outnumbered the British and were at least as well equipped, they lacked ‘the will to prevail’. Leadership and cohesion were decisive factors. During the Falklands War, when Lt. Alistair Mitchell of the Scots Guards briefed subordinates before the Battle of Mount Tumbledown, he emphasised the importance of these factors:

In the end this is going to disintegrate into utter chaos. It is going to be a case of little groups of guardsmen having the courage to keep going forward. And that is what happened [...].

By drawing upon evidence from across twentieth century warfare, organised around the five themes set out above, this chapter will attempt to advance the arguments why Mitchell’s junior Scots Guardsmen, and their contemporaries fought as they did.

2.1 The Primary Group

According to the military sociologist, William Henderson, ‘For the key to what makes men fight […] we must look hard at military groups and the bonds that link men within them’. The mid nineteenth century military theorist, Ardant du Picq, captured the essence of the primary group before it became the subject of sociological theory:

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Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.\textsuperscript{5}

The optimum size of a primary group was established two millennia earlier, by the Chinese military strategist Wu Qi, as two groups of five men formed into a section.\textsuperscript{6} In essence, it survives to this day amongst British ground forces. An eight-man section, comprising two fire teams under the command of a corporal, is the smallest operational unit. Arguably the Great War was the genesis of primary group theory, which began to emerge from the nostalgic recollections of the ‘front experience’.\textsuperscript{7} These recollections are necessarily tangled with the myth of the ‘pals’ battalions with existing social structures transplanted into khaki. Psychopathologist John MacCurdy made an early attempt to unravel myth from reality; he asserted that soldiers are intrinsically and compulsively ‘herd animals’ that are ‘happy, secure and efficient’ when part of a social group, ‘disquieted, timid and ineffective’, when not.\textsuperscript{8} MacCurdy’s observations smack of the intuitive, and this is also a charge that has been levelled at the military sociologist, S.L.A. Marshall. Much controversy has surrounded the accuracy of his data and yet his instinctive conclusions, derived from the Second World War and the Korean War, are compelling:\textsuperscript{9}

I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade.\textsuperscript{10}

MacCurdy and Marshall have fed into the caucus of work into primary group theories that emerged at the end of the Second World War, which has subsequently exercised a powerful grasp over military organisation and extrinsic motivation training. Stouffer \textit{et al.} surveyed over half a million soldiers and provided a robust foundation for all that has followed:

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\textsuperscript{5} Lawrence Freedman (ed), \textit{War}, (Oxford, OUP, 1994), p. 144


\textsuperscript{7} Niall Ferguson, \textit{The Pity of War}, (London, Allen Lane, 1998), p. 354

\textsuperscript{8} J. MacCurdy, \textit{The Structure of Morale}, (Cambridge CUP, 1943), pp. 58-59

\textsuperscript{9} Jordan, ‘Right for the Wrong Reasons’, p. 162

The group in its informal character, with its close interpersonal ties, served two principal functions in combat motivation: it set and enforced group standards of behaviour, and it supported and sustained the individual in stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand. These are related functions: the group enforced its standards principally offering or withholding recognition, respect, and approval, which were among the supports it had to offer, while the subjective reward of following an internalised group code enhanced an individual’s resources for dealing with the situation […].

Work that followed sought to deconstruct elements of this conclusion *inter alia*, the meaning of social ties and ideological fit with higher organisational goals. Much of the emphasis of research into Second World War U.S. aircrews, undertaken by Grinker and Spiegel, was focussed on the powerful emotional bonds that form within primary groups, ‘[…] they are brothers-in-arms in more than a figurative sense. They actually feel towards each other as if they were brothers’. This sense of familial loyalty and obligation is of ‘the highest significance’ to effective motivation. Whilst a group was in training, and combat was theoretical, the group had the luxury of time to develop strong social bonds (or antipathies) and exposure to combat, resulting in death or injury, could have had deleterious effects on group cohesion. It was an argument against group theory also made by Bartov. Loyalty, ‘[…] cannot be lightly transferred to new and untried men […].’ Out of combat it may have taken some time for new inductees to be accepted as proven members of the group. However, whilst fighting, the overwhelming need to unite and protect the group meant that although a group was thrown together by chance, ‘[…] they rapidly become united to each other by the strongest bonds […].’ Therefore, primary groups were social or situational (i.e. task oriented) or a combination of both. Henderson was an advocate of the elision between social and situational cohesion inferring that the greater the threat to the group, the more intense the mutual affection; therefore, the more effective the response to hardship and danger. A contrasting assertion was that social cohesion was of limited significance in

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13 *Ibid*, pp. 38-41
14 *Ibid*, p. 124
15 *Ibid*, p. 22
encouraging men to fight, but when the shooting started the necessity of survival meant, ‘it can be argued that strong primary-group bonds are not a cause of combat motivation, but are a direct response to the experience’.  

Military ethos remains ‘corporative in spirit’; therefore, the individual has been expected to subordinate personal interests to the interests of the group, which in turn has been expected to submit to the will of the hierarchy of command. A major element of recruit training has been to strip away individuality, and through discipline, loss of privacy and physical stress imbue a spirit collectivised through shared hardship. However, this set up the possibility of conflict if the interests of the group diverged or divorced from the national political and military interests. Reflecting on social cohesion, sociologist Maurice Janowitz maintained that the value of interpersonal relationships, ‘lies precisely in their independence of formal organisation’. For this reason, such a group may have protected itself by not integrating with the hierarchy. Moskos took this argument further, asserting that a primary group was only effective in combat when it had at least some form of commitment to its national cultural foundations, even if inchoate or unconscious; however, he went on to counsel against misty-eyed notions of camaraderie. Using the Hobbesian metaphor of self-interest he asserted that a primary group in combat was ‘better understood as pragmatic and situational […]’. The experience of the Korean War indicated that the longer a primary group was in combat the more it tended to focus on its own interests rather than those of the military hierarchy. This sense of detachment became explicit during the Vietnam War when, as military historian Hew Strachan commented, there

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23 Ibid, p. 156
was a widespread experience of primary groups in open dissent and ‘refusing to perform according to institutional norms’. The political backdrop to Vietnam was of course increasingly divisive. By contrast, the ideology of Nazi Germany was uncompromising. It is from research into Eastern Front fighting during the Second World War that an alternative argument to the motivational power of group cohesion was developed. Initial research by Shils and Janowitz, conducted shortly after the war, suggested that National Socialism was a relatively insignificant motivator compared to primary group cohesion. However, this was challenged in 1991 by Omar Bartov. His assertion was that the high casualty rates meant that groups were rapidly destroyed, and that cohesion was maintained because the German army was fully committed to political ideology. Such commitment also validated the committing of atrocities. Historian, Professor Stephen Fritz, also asserted the primacy of ideology, ‘The extraordinary resilience of the German soldier thus also demanded the celebration of a positive ideal’. In his construction, this ideal was the ‘seductive’ promise of a harmonious, integrated and classless Volksgemeinschaft. The idea that ideology was the dominant motivator in combat starts to break down when one considers evidence in the round. During periods of heavy fighting and casualties on the Eastern Front or the Normandy bocage, reinforcements were not individually drip-fed into combat but were despatched as cohesive units that had trained together and were socially bonded. The pressures of fighting suggest that these implants situationally cohered with the reinforced and with great rapidity. The impact of coercion is also relevant; primary groups were forced to cohere and fight as a protection against punishment. The German Army executed at least 15,000 soldiers during the Second World War and the British forces, denied the death penalty some generals demanded, still threatened draconian punishments.

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27 Fritz, ‘Ideology and Motivation’, p. 700

28 National community

four main pillars of: social cohesion, task cohesion, ideology and coercion remain topical, as is evidenced by a testy spat worked through in the journal *Armed Forces & Society* during 2006. In 2003, under the aegis of the U.S. Army War College, Professor Leonard Wong and three academic colonels produced a study into combat motivation during the Iraq War. The conclusion that Iraqi regular forces were motivated by fear of retribution against them and their families is not a point of contention, nor is the assertion of what may be described as a second phase ideology. This is the notion that whilst first phase ideology may often have been inchoate and framed around patriotism and national ideals, second phase ideology was a reaction to positive outcomes of war aims. As one Gulf War soldier commented, ‘There were good times when we see the people […] How we liberated them […] That lifted us up. We knew we were doing a positive thing’. The gauntlet was thrown down by the assertion that:

> […] cohesion, or the strong emotional bonds between soldiers, continues to be a critical factor in combat motivation […] attempting to dissect cohesion into social or task cohesion […] is best left to the antiseptic experiments of academia.

Responding in 2006, MacCoun *et al.* challenged Wong *et al.* to explain the deficiency in extant research that had established, ‘task cohesion has a modest but reliable correlation with group performance’; whereas, social cohesion had no such correlation, and may have served to undermine motivation. They further asserted that whilst many soldiers ‘[…] firmly believe that social cohesion is an important motivation in combat […] they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection’. Many of the notions of social cohesion they claimed were based upon intrinsic absorption of popular culture within which emotional bonds in fighting units were thematically exploited. Although MacCoun *et al.* did not cite Professor Jesse Gray, his observations that soldiers confuse friendship and comradeship tend to support their arguments:

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31 *Ibid*, pp. 18-19
32 *Ibid*, p. 23
34 *Ibid*, p. 649
The essential difference [...] it seems to me, in a heightened awareness of the self in friendship and the suppression of self-awareness in comradeship. Friends do not seek to lose their identity, as comrades and erotic lovers do.\(^\text{35}\)

Gray and MacCoun agreed that the intensity of comradeship was as transient as the shared experiences which formed it. Some combatants formed lifelong friendships, but the majority did not. For this reason MacCoun et al. concluded that, ‘All of the evidence indicates that military performance depends on whether service members are committed to the same professional goals, not on whether they like one another’.\(^\text{36}\) Subsequent rebuttals by Kolditz and Wong asserted the validity of their arguments but did little to move the debate forward.

Therefore, a key intervention is the extent to which the four pillars of group theories can be evidenced during the Falklands War. The easiest to deal with is coercion; as historian Kevin Foster has asserted, ‘Motivation is a complicated business in which sticks and carrots are wielded simultaneously’.\(^\text{37}\) However, these were not just the sticks of hierarchical sanction, but the group codes interpreted by the leader and accepted by his subordinates. Whilst there is plenty of evidence for effective leadership, no primary or secondary evidence emerges to suggest men had to be forced to fight, even amongst those who had enlisted as jobseekers. There is also an absence of evidence suggesting ideology was a motivator. A trawl through the primary sources finds the occasional acknowledgement that the war was the right thing to do, even if the personal outcome was less than satisfactory.\(^\text{38}\) According to David Cooper, the war was justified because of the liberation of the islanders, but when the Task Force set sail most soldiers were ambivalent about what seemed to be a government adventure.\(^\text{39}\) Junior soldier Nigel Ely thought that:


\(^{36}\) MacCoun, Keir & Belkin, ‘Social Cohesion’, p. 652


\(^{38}\) Vincent Bramley *Excursion to Hell: Mount Longdon a Universal Story of Battle*, (London, Bloomsbury, 1991), pp. 210-211

\(^{39}\) Imperial War Museum Archive (henceforth ‘IWM’) 13419, Cooper, (1993) [on audiotape]
The passion and the aggression which we all had for getting on and finishing the job
did not come from a loyalty to Queen and country or to the politicians who had sent us
here, or from the thought of another power taking over a part of the United Kingdom.
The officers might have thought about this Queen and country bollocks, but we blokes
didn’t. We were doing this for ourselves and for the Regiment. 40

There were few hearts and minds to win amongst the local population. This attitude is
borne out by the survey conducted by Falklands veteran Lt. Col. Peter Bates. Following
an enquiry via the IWM and subsequent conversations, Lt.Col. Bates kindly provided
me with a copy of his unpublished Masters dissertation. This revealed that only 29.4%
of respondents thought that the soldiers were concerned about the moral justification of
the war and only 18.8% were concerned about letting the country down. By contrast,
88.2% were concerned about letting their colleagues down. 41

In the context of the social versus task cohesion debate, Falklands veteran Hugh
McManners observed that, ‘The units that fought in the Falklands War were very close-
knit, with strong personal bonds between their members. The closeness turned
casualties and deaths into deeply personal events […]’. 42 This is borne out by the
reaction of Mark Eyles-Thomas. Throughout basic training, he had forged strong
friendships with three men killed during the Falklands War on Mount Longdon. Their
deaths resolved into a tremendous sense of guilt and responsibility for a perceived
breach of trust. 43 The argument that social groups operated in opposition to official
goals is not strongly evidenced. Military historians Jennings and Weale have discussed
the clique that formed within ‘B’ Company of 3 Para prior to the war, ‘eschewing the
letter of military law in favour of a free-wheeling, earthy lifestyle […]’. 44 In the event,
this group (which included Stuart McLaughlin and Dominic Gray 45) made a decisive
contribution during the battle. The most extreme cases of consistent social opposition

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41 Peter Bates, ‘An Investigation into whether religion has a place on the battlefield and whether it has
any influences on the British soldier’, (unpublished masters dissertation, Cranfield University, Royal
Military College of Science School of Defence Management, 1995), p. A2-8


44 Christopher Jennings and Adrian Weale, *Green-Eyed Boys: 3 Para and the Battle of Mount Longdon*,

45 Passim
probably relate to the killing of superiors. Lt. Ulrich Burke provided very credible testimony from the Great War:

We had an officer who I am very sorry to say, was an absolute pig to his men [...] He was warned again and again don’t do it, they’ll shoot you [...] Later on we went over on an attack and [...] my platoon was behind his. As I passed I saw him dead [...] his chest was blown out. All the bullets had come in his back. He’d been shot by his own men. You could not be a bully there.46

The nadir of such leader retribution probably occurred during the Vietnam War in 1971, with 333 confirmed incidents of the ‘fragging’ of unpopular leaders.47 The sentiment, if not the actuality, emerged during the Falklands War. Embedded journalists reported of the challenging relationship that some Paras had with their leaders, leading on one occasion, to some discussion about ‘fragging’ a particular officer who had risen from the ranks.48 L.Cpl. Bramley recalled a particular platoon Sergeant:

He was nasty and vicious in his orders [...] His name is known and so is his back. He turned out to be one of the small group who spent the night [...] Hiding from a group of lads who had sworn to kill him in battle.49

There is no evidence to suggest that either threat extended beyond bravado.

The evidence for the salience of task cohesion rather than social cohesion is more compelling, and the outward signs of comradeship can be misleading. Whilst it may have reflected true friendships, it was also a ‘carapace’ that served to shield antagonisms and rivalries.50 As one Falklands veteran put it, ‘We really had to get along, to trust each other with our lives, even if we hated each other’s guts [...]’.51 In similar vein, a wounded Para on board the hospital ship SS Uganda recalled, ‘When we heard that Steve Hope had died, the sigh of relief went right around the ship: no more getting your chinky nicked or being filled-in in the scoff queue’.52 Clearly an aggressive culture

46IWM 569 - Burke, (1975), [on audiotape]
47 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 329 - Derived from the practice of rolling a fragmentation grenade into the tent of an unpopular leader.
49 Hugh Bicheno, Razor’s Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, (London, Phoenix, 2007), pp. 268-269
52 Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, pp. 174-175
and informal pecking order were antithetical to friendships. There was also a distinction between friendship, and comradeship fomented by the regimental tradition. Falklands veteran John Geddes commented:

> I've heard it said that 2 Para is a family, but that’s a view that suits the officers to put forward. To me it’s quite clear that we were a brotherhood and what bound us together in a solid fraternity was our initiation into the Regiment. It’s a horrible test of guts, stamina and determination called P Company and it’s the only membership card there is to the Airborne Club.\(^{53}\)

Further evidence from the Falklands reveals not only that entry to this brotherhood was founded upon skills not sociability, but also the rapidity with which task cohesion formed in combat. As a new member of his platoon in 1982, Mark Eyles Thomas recalled:

> I can see other members of the section slightly ahead of me to my right […] a far better place to seek safety than the place I'm in. They are older, more experienced soldiers and I dare not presume I can join them. With the enemy fire continuing in my direction, they seem to appreciate my predicament and gesture towards me. Within seconds I am with them, unified, accepted as a comrade.\(^{54}\)

It becomes evident that the regimental system was a key adjunct to primary group formation. Therefore, the next stage in this research process is to investigate the manner in which British regiments have managed the four pillars of combat cohesion.

### 2.2 The Regimental Tradition

The regiment has defined the British army since the seventeenth century. Except in times of mass conscription, soldiers have been recruited into a regiment (or a corps), not directly the army *per se*. For the majority of time servers, their entire military service will have been defined within this one formation. There has never been such an entity as an officer corps, and officers are still commissioned into a regiment, not the army. According to army veteran and military historian Patrick Mileham, ‘Officers identify themselves in this way to this day’.\(^{55}\) Falklands veteran Simon Weston suggests it has been similar for the rank-and-file, ‘Although every soldier swears an oath of

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\(^{54}\) Eyles-Thomas, *Sod That*, p. 3  

allegiance to the Crown when he signs up, traditionally it is his regiment that he fights - and, if necessary, dies - for’. 56

The genesis of the regimental tradition can be found during the English Civil War, and it officially dates from the restoration of Charles II in 1660; for the subsequent 350 years each regiment has attempted to distinguish itself from its contemporaries. Nuances of appearance, custom, and practice have been jealously guarded and augmented over time, most often with the intention of maintaining a sense of prestige. According to Brig. Shelford Bidwell, ‘[…] the sharper and more numerous the distinctions from other regiments are, the stronger the esprit de corps’ 57 Since the seventeenth century, regiments have been renamed and merged and yet have sought to maintain a narrative of unbroken continuity with the past, often with the sense that past glories are guarantors of future triumphs. As a case in point, the largest regiment in the British Army is currently The Rifles. Taking just one of its genetic strands, between 1685 and 1959, the Somerset Light Infantry underwent around fifteen name changes and evolutions. In 1959, it was merged into the Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry, in 1968 into the Light Infantry, and finally in 2007 into The Rifles. It can claim ancestry from twenty-two regiments from which it can pick the best bits to rework its future narrative. According to McManners, the tendency to look backwards means that, ‘through its regimental system, the British Army [particularly the officers who are its custodians] perpetuates an obsolescent dream of English upper-middle class life’. 58

Bidwell asserted that, ‘The Regiment is an entirely artificial creation […] The creation of a regiment is a technique based on a sound empirical knowledge of psychology’. 59 An essential part of which has been to indoctrinate recruits with ‘a love of regiment’, and to establish the regiment as a legitimate source of discipline and

58 McManners, The Scars of War, p. 24
59 Bidwell, Modern Warfare, p. 99
authority.\footnote{David French, \textit{Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British People 1870-2000}, (Oxford, OUP, 2005), pp. 77-79} Overtly extrinsic in its initial application, the aim has been to achieve a psychological osmosis so that being part of the regiment became an intrinsic belief system. Therefore, the regiment has had to project an attractive institutional power and get its recruits while they were young enough not to have developed alternative loyalties. It might be argued that the appeal to working-class recruits, bereft of any personal sense of family history beyond living memory, has been that becoming part of a successful dynastic construct provided them, at least in part, with a timeless personal heritage. According to General Sir John Hackett:

> Once you have established an awareness of difference, or otherness, you are some way to creating a feeling of betterness, and if you can develop that in your group, your unit, you can jack up your standards. ‘This may be good enough,’ you can say, ‘for those Queens Park Rangers or the Loamshire Fusiliers but it simply will not do in the Fortieth Foot and Mouth’, or the Royal Death Watch, or whatever it happens to be.\footnote{French, \textit{Military Identities}, p. 2}

This was borne out by the taciturn testimony of Jim Mitchell who fought with the Scots Guards at Mount Tumbledown during the Falklands War. He expressed great pride in having been a guardsman and had no doubt that they would win the battle because of the regimental tradition, ‘Pride in the battalion was drummed into you. Running away is “not the done thing” even if it means your life’.\footnote{IWM 13020 - Mitchell, (1992), [on audiotape]} The advantage of having a long tradition to draw upon meant that those regiments more recently lacking any particular distinguishing achievements could always bolster themselves with myths from the past. According to Kellett, whilst many of these myths embraced victories and battle honours, an important subtext was that they also reflected ‘[…] a tradition of sacrifice within a brotherhood […] heroic though hopeless last stands […]’.\footnote{Kellett, \textit{Combat Motivation}, pp. 50-52} Less edifying performances were of course excised from the myth narrative. From the notion of sacrifice can be detected the elision of regimental tradition into group loyalties. The Parachute Regiment was formed in 1941 and is an exemplar of how myths can be quickly formed.\footnote{Nora Kinzer Stewart, \textit{Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War}, (New York, Brassey’s, 1991), pp. 100-101} In his study of the regiment, John Parker concluded that before 1982,
the Paras defined themselves through the myth of Arnhem, ‘It was magnificent only in
the effort, courage and sheer bloody-minded spirit of the men involved. Everything else
was a disaster […]’.  

\[65\] Although the Arnhem story, the quintessence of a heroic last-stand, established a reputation and tradition for the Parachute Regiment, the point must be made that the men who originally volunteered for the new regiment in 1941 did not have any traditions as reference points. They joined on trust, often in opposition to the wishes their COs, who had to be instructed not to block any applications.\[66\] This suggests that, for those with a professional and/or warrior ethos, tradition is rather less efficient as a motivator than the opportunity to be part of a skilled elite with strong task cohesion. Those with a long term investment made in the regiment were arguably more prepared to cosset themselves in the comfort blanket of mythology. According to Falklands veteran Chris Keeble:

> The philosophy of our soldiers - whether it is our regiment or any other regiment - is that we are a body of people welded together by our traditions, by our regiment, by a feeling of togetherness.\[67\]

Senior officers were among the first to consider their regiments in such tribal terms, and this permeated the rank structure. Tribalism when in combat was coercive insofar as the fear of shaming the regiment was greater than the fear of the enemy.\[68\] Fitz-Gibbon's research revealed that this sense of shame extended to covering up controversial incidents that did not reflect well on the Regiment:

> One witness to a controversial incident during the [Falklands] war told me that when he was being interviewed by a senior officer, the tape recorder was switched off at a certain point so the discussion of the sensitive issue would not go on tape. Another says he has often told half-truths to journalists and researchers […] Others admit to having lied. And a senior officer admitted to me that since 1982 he has participated in the propagation of a myth about one of the battles in order to avoid discrediting his unit.\[69\]

Similarly, the prisoner-killing revelations made by Bramley and discussed in Chapter 3.7, initiated a Scotland Yard investigation on the Falklands by Detective


\[66\] *Ibid*, p. 22

\[67\] Bilton & Kominsky, *Speaking Out*, p. 148

\[68\] Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 299 & p. 308

Superintendent Alec Edwards and Detective Inspector David Shipperlee. Having extensively interviewed veterans of the Battle of Mount Longdon they concluded there was no case to answer, 70 arguably a case of 3 Para putting up a barrier as impenetrable as a redcoat infantry square. The issue of how misplaced esteem was a significant factor in the events surrounding the sinking of Sir Galahad in 1982 are discussed in Chapter 4.2.

The regimental system retains powerful advocates, counterbalanced by those who hold a more nuanced view that errs towards primary groups. 18 Platoon featured on the Sandhurst required reading list; its author, reflecting on his experience as a subaltern in Normandy in 1944, commented:

To me that is the essence of good teamwork and the jewel in the crown of the British Army, the regimental system, is the strong foundation upon which we all, knowingly or unknowingly, relied. 71

In his influential study of motivation during the Great War (albeit he did not distinguish between morale and motivation), Baynes (a Lieutenant-Colonel) also gave top-billing to the regiment:

First I would place Regimental loyalty; the pride in belonging to a good battalion, in knowing other people well and being known by them; in having strong roots in a well-loved community. 72

Along with Robert Graves, Baynes concluded that regimental spirit was a far more significant motivator than ideology during the First World War. 73 Patriotism may have encouraged volunteers to the recruiting office but was ineffective at sustaining men in combat. Both Jary and Baynes evinced a sense of sentimentality that requires moderation. During both world wars, the regimental system was infinitely capable of expansion as additional battalions were added to the regiment. However, during the First World War many recruits were re-badged into new regiments, as they passed through the bullring at Étaples, according to operational requirements. According to

70 Parker, *The Paras*, p. 327
Alan Hanbury-Sparrow (a regular officer), ‘The value of the regimental system diminished as the war went on […] the casualty lists put an enormous strain on these traditions […] I became increasingly cynical about their value’.\textsuperscript{74} During the inter-war period, a small army was able to restore its traditions, but in 1939, the rapid expansion of the forces caused a collapse in the regimental system. By July 1942, men were recruited directly into the GSC where they were individually screened for suitable military roles. The improvement in morale was significant as men were able to perform to their capabilities, and by 1943, a process of retrospective redeployment was underway.\textsuperscript{75} According to Professor David French, for war time conscripts, ‘[…] abstractions like the regiment were only of secondary concern’, far more important was the cohesion of the primary group.\textsuperscript{76} As Richard Holmes (former TA Brigadier and Colonel-in-Chief of the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment) put it:

\begin{quote}
We must not get too misty-eyed about the pulling-power of the regiment. In a sense the system has always worked best when it was needed least, in peacetime or small wars.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

The fighting forces in the Falklands revealed a continuity that fits comfortably into this construction.\textsuperscript{78} This idea is further developed by Kinzer-Stewart, whose research provided a sense of the linkage between a cohesive primary peer group and the hierarchy in which it was placed:

\begin{quote}
British troops have fostered horizontal and vertical bonding through the regimental system. Thus we see, in the case of British troops in the Falklands, that an open organizational climate, the officer’s credo of caring for his men, serving as an example and sharing training and discomfort, leads to strong positive relationships up and down the vertical dimensions of the command structure from private to regimental commander.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

The downside of strong relationships occurred when close colleagues were killed or injured. According to a Company Commander in 2 Para, soldiers were ‘sustained by the


\textsuperscript{75} Jeremy Crang, \textit{The British Army and the People’s War 1939-1945}, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 9

\textsuperscript{76} David French, \textit{Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany}, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 122-123


\textsuperscript{78} McManners, \textit{The Scars of War}, p. 331

\textsuperscript{79} Stewart, \textit{Mates & Muchachos}, p. 131
desire not to let their comrades down or be seen to fail’, and this ‘created a powerful anxiety on the eve of the landings’.\textsuperscript{80} It might be argued that such intense pressure to maintain the prestige of the regiment sowed the seeds of the stress reactions so many encountered after the war. In understanding the effectiveness of the regiment, it is instructive to make a comparison with the United States. Newsome asserted that Regimental systems ‘assume that strong and persistent group relationships are necessary combat motivations’. By contrast, the centralised system used by the US forces, ‘must rely on prior motivations to serve and extensive material rewards’.\textsuperscript{81} This can be challenged. The Americans remain strongly focussed on primary group processes but have paid relatively little attention to regimental esprit. By contrast, the British have always considered the primary group as embedded within the regimental tradition;\textsuperscript{82} as Watson asserted, ‘The internalisation of organisational goals is […] the most effective of motive patterns’.\textsuperscript{83} Thus extrinsic methods have been used to recalibrate intrinsic motivations. Therefore, the question arises as to the necessity of the regiment in the link between high command and primary group. At its worst, the regiment has been hostile, reactionary and self-interested: undermining the interests of its members, the greater military organisation, and wider society in its battle for a share of privilege and resources.\textsuperscript{84} By contrast, it has been extremely efficient in imposing normative controls on primary groups ensuring they aligned with organisational requirements. It should be noted that the absence of a regimental filter often allowed primary groups in Vietnam to operate in opposition to ‘institutional norms’.\textsuperscript{85} According to Field Marshal Montgomery, ‘most men do not fight well because their ancestors fought well at the Battle of Minden two centuries ago […] it is devotion to the comrades who are with them […]’.\textsuperscript{86} The essential truth is that task oriented primary group ties are fundamental

\textsuperscript{80} Holmes, \textit{Acts of War}, p. 142

\textsuperscript{81} Newsome, ‘The Myth’, pp. 24-25

\textsuperscript{82} Kellett, \textit{Combat Motivation}, p. 46

\textsuperscript{83} Alexander Watson, \textit{Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies 1914-1918}, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 62

\textsuperscript{84} Beevor, \textit{Inside the British Army}, p.310; Bidwell, \textit{Modern Warfare}, p. 103

\textsuperscript{85} Kellett, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Belenky, p. 212

\textsuperscript{86} French, \textit{Military Identities}, p. 289
to effective combat motivation whilst regimental loyalty may be a useful augmentation; as Holmes asserted, ‘inefficient, illogical and, at times, irritating though it is, the regimental system makes its own unique contribution to the valour of simple men’.\textsuperscript{87} The experience of the twentieth century was that substantial numbers of worldly wise conscripts were motivated to combat and although many young recruits were naive, they learned quickly. The empty minded pre-industrial ‘yoke’ soldier had become an anachronism by the end of the Great War.\textsuperscript{88}


\subsection*{2.3 Leadership}

Interpreting the pull of regimental myths and using them as an adjunct to task cohesion required the intervention of effective leaders. The regimental ideal espoused by Baynes was, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, central to the ‘Serve to Lead’\textsuperscript{89} philosophy taught at Sandhurst\textsuperscript{90} and its essence was defined by Field Marshal Slim. ‘To serve’ meant applying the following priorities; firstly country and regiment, second welfare of subordinates, lastly self-interest. ‘To lead’ meant:

\begin{quote}
[...] whether you command ten men or ten million men, the essentials of leadership are the same. Leadership is that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion which makes men do what you want them to do. If I were asked to define leadership I should say it is the Projection of Personality.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

However, post Second World War research has suggested that there is a clear difference between leadership of a small fighting unit and of a battle group. Professor Ian Beckett made the distinction between the leadership of junior officers and NCOs, and command exercised by senior officers.\textsuperscript{92} The requirements of senior command demanded a ‘managerial and strategic emphasis’, whilst leaders of small fighting groups required ‘a degree of charisma - not glibness’. The problem was that the skills junior leaders

\textsuperscript{87} Holmes, Acts of War, p. 315

\textsuperscript{88} Lord Moran, Anatomy of Courage, (New York, Avery, 1987), p. 4

\textsuperscript{89} It remains the motto of the Royal Military Academy

\textsuperscript{90} Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 78

\textsuperscript{91} William Slim, Courage and Other Broadcasts, (London, Cassell, 1957), pp. 37-38

\textsuperscript{92} Geoffrey Regan, Great Military Blunders, (London, 4 Books, 2000), p. 17
possessed were not necessarily congruent with the demands of roles to which they may have been promoted.\textsuperscript{93} The roles of ‘heroic’ leader, military manager and technocrat, politician, public relations man, father-figure and psychotherapist remain incompatible.\textsuperscript{94} In this regard, the highly celebrated ‘H’ Jones of Falklands fame emerges as an example of conflicted leadership. A junior soldier observed that:

\begin{quote}
H was fired up and he was calling on his troops to follow him into the attack. At the same time he was calling into question their manhood as he tried to galvanise A Company and rally them to his side with a taunt.

‘Follow me!’ he yelled.

‘Guess what? They didn’t.

A Company were in no mood for public-school gestures or bullshit rallying cries from the pages of \textit{Commando} comic.\textsuperscript{95}
\end{quote}

Jones’ character and combat orientations will be discussed in Chapter 3.7. By contrast, his superior officer Brig. Julian Thompson, emerged as a senior commander who could walk with kings and still retain the common touch. Not only was he personally acquainted with most of his officers and many of his ‘other-ranks’, but also had the moral courage to delegate trust.\textsuperscript{96} The essence of the relationship between combat motivation and leadership was that it had to work at a primary level and seamlessly elide into the higher command structure. In the military context, it must also be noted that, because lives were on the line, leadership had no direct civilian comparison. ‘The central skill is perhaps best summed up in Harold Laswell’s phrase, “The management of violence”’.\textsuperscript{97} Changes in the style of command since the Second World War have been the subject of a ‘classic debate’ between Janowitz and Huntingdon. Whilst Huntingdon asserted the persistence of a traditional ‘heroic warrior’ ethos; Janowitz has argued that social changes, not least the desire for career success, have emphasised managerial and technical skills. Military professionals have increasingly benchmarked themselves against corporate professionals.\textsuperscript{98} It has been argued by Gabriel and Savage that the pervasiveness of ‘managerial careerism’ and its implicit focus on political self

\textsuperscript{93} William Henderson, \textit{Cohesion}, p. 109
\textsuperscript{95} Geddes, \textit{Spearhead Assault}, p. 249
\textsuperscript{96} McManners, \textit{The Scars of War}, p. 225
\textsuperscript{97} Huntingdon, \textit{The Soldier and the State}, p. 11
\textsuperscript{98} Eyal Ben-Ari, \textit{Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit}, (New York, Berghahn, 1998), pp. 18-19
interest was a significant factor in the failure of the US army in Vietnam. General William Westmoreland, who commanded US Military Operations in Vietnam (1964-1968), has been cited by Cincinnatus as an exemplar of the type:

He was a manager, a technician, a bureaucrat, rather than a troop leader. He was a ‘Big Corporate Military Executive’ […] Vietnam was an ideal milieu for him, for it afforded the opportunity to manage a war by statistics and computer […].

Analysis of the Vietnam experience has done little to extirpate the worst implications of careerism amongst ‘command’ officers and these have included *inter alia*:

1. Unwillingness to express dissent about poor policies,
2. Disinclination to resign over policies that they later criticise,
3. Reliance on, and wilful misinterpretation of, statistics,
4. Attempted cover ups of incompetent and/or illegal acts by subordinates,
5. Misuse of annual officer reports,
6. Failure to consider alternative options,
7. Suppression of advice that does not chime with existing policy,
8. Persecution of whistle-blowers.

That these failings have impacted upon the combat motivation of front line soldiers is emphatically borne out by Hauser:

No one wants to be the ‘last man to die’ in any war, but to accept orders to risk death […] from officers whose authority has been eroded by an aura of careerism and dishonesty, was too much to ask.

Attempts substantively to distinguish between American and British practice in the business of career building should be disabused. British officers who aspired to command were subject to the same pressures and risked the same consequences. David French argued that ‘Officers who saw battle as a stepping-stone towards their own advancement were bitterly resented by their own men, who feared that they would

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99 Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, in Belenky, p. 216


101 Cincinnatus, *Self Destruction,* p. 173

sacrifice them to further their own ambition’. Similarly, Jary ‘[…] discovered just how much soldiers resent and fear a young officer who sees battle as a means to win his spurs, possibly at the cost of their lives’. It is a consequence of the shrinking post-war British army that opportunities for command promotion have continued to be increasingly limited. It is current practice that the army produces the annual Pink List which provisionally names officers selected for the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. It has been necessary to have ‘a flawless pattern of [annual] reports. Simply being very good is not generally good enough’.

Whilst serving in Northern Ireland a CO commented:

> We’ve become so worried about our careers that nobody dares let their deputies have their heads. We’re afraid they will make mistakes, and we’ll lose out come confidential report time […] This fear of making mistakes only saves them up for the future.

With such pressure to conform, it has not been surprising that the armed forces have produced so few ‘self-actualising’ commanders (see Chapter 4.1), and instead arguably encouraged the more destructive aspects of political schadenfreude.

If command was the preserve of senior officers, then leadership was required of junior commissioned officers and NCOs. According to Richardson, it was the most important factor for motivation and morale, ‘with good leadership all other factors are taken care of instinctively’. This view was shared by Moran, ‘Once men are satisfied that their leader has it in him to build for victory they no more question his will, but gladly commit their lives to his keeping’.

These opinions call out to be deconstructed, to identify the facets of good leaders and the means by which these have satisfied their subordinates.

In 1927, F.C.Bartlett defined three categories of military leader and the manner in which they maintained their position:

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103 French, *Raising Churchill’s Army*, p. 77

104 Jary, *18 Platoon*, p. 76


106 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 151


In Sheffield’s determination, the best leaders used ‘personal and expert power’; however, those who coerced and relied on the position power of their office were the weakest.\(^{109}\) This analysis needs to be developed further. The historiography is replete with lists, and amongst these Henderson, Marshall, and Kellett are persuasive.\(^{110}\) Based upon an amalgam of these sources, it emerges that effective combat leadership required the effective and combined application of the following four characteristics:

**Rank power** - This moved beyond notions of social prestige and imbued the holder with a sense of legitimacy. The orders they issued carried the weight of authority down the hierarchical chain of command, and they were legitimate because they accorded with the cultural values that had been internalised by their subordinates. The leader was also expected to be an expert and apply superior knowledge and ability to any given circumstance.

**Reward Power** - Besides using coercion and punishment to dominate subordinates, it required the effective distribution of rewards, not only in terms of formal awards and promotions but also basic welfare needs. These must all have been applied with a resolute sense of fairness and justice. Reward was also knowing when it was appropriate to invest trust and delegate tasks (without abrogating responsibility) or when close supervision and control was more appropriate.

**Consistency** - Additional to ensuring that the leader did not expect more of his subordinates than he was prepared to accept for himself, i.e. physical fitness, courage,

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endurance, discomfort, etc., it also meant eschewing the protean in terms of behaviour and being predictable in problem-solving, demeanour and standards. Maintaining an innate respect for subordinates was as important as avoiding short term expediencies that compromised long-term goals.

Charisma - The influence of personality was the glue that bound the above elements together and the catalyst that impelled them. According to Popper, ‘Leadership must be based upon personal relationships between leaders and soldiers, rather than upon an impersonal managerial style’.  

Because charismatic leadership was based upon the emotions rather than the logic of followers the ‘personal power to command’ may have displaced established customs, laws procedures and hierarchies. Therefore, such leadership had to be grounded in the values of the military organisation. The role of charismatic leaders was to transform the self-interests of their followers not only to the collective organisational interests but also to make personal sacrifices ‘above and beyond the call of duty’. Rather than over reliance on material rewards or coercion, it was the essence of task cohesion that this was achieved by infusing a sense of meaningfulness, self-esteem, commitment and moral purpose. Essentially a negotiation between leader and follower based upon inspirational persuasion towards a distal vision. It has been asserted that one of the benefits of charismatic leadership was to elevate the needs deficiencies of subordinates within the Maslow hierarchy (Chapter 4).

It is ‘a fundamental truth’ that a leader would not succeed unless he risked leading from the front and subordinates expected to be inspired by confident

111 William Henderson, Cohesion, p. 11
113 Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star & Cottrell, The American Soldier, p. 117
114 Hockey, Squaddies, p. 141
116 Ibid, p. 579
117 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 341
behaviour.\textsuperscript{118} Falklands veteran Eyles-Thomas gave the example of a platoon commander who had experienced at first hand the Warrenpoint attack in Ulster, ‘This experience seemed to provide a hidden motivation deep within him and gave him a determined and vengeful manner’\textsuperscript{119}. Leadership from the front might have been an innate characteristic, but a charismatic leader, better aware of the risks, also had to be something of an actor. Sydney Jary, a Second World War subaltern, thought that:

Before battle the commander must exude confidence and enthusiasm, whatever fears his private thoughts may hold. Just how thin a line divides this from deliberate deception? I call it the commander’s dilemma.\textsuperscript{120}

It is a measure of the ‘lead from the front’ ethos that, during the Falklands War, 50% of the 177 soldiers killed during the land campaign were officers and NCOs.\textsuperscript{121} John Crosland OC ‘B’ Company, 2 Para during the Battle of Goose Green recognised that, because of his time with the SAS, he was the most experienced fighter. He claimed to have been honest with his men about the risks and consequences of death and injury.\textsuperscript{122} Crosland’s leadership abilities were endorsed by his subordinates. Cpl. Martin Margerison, a veteran of Warrenpoint, believed one must lead from the front but command from the rear. Crosland was the biggest factor in minimising casualties; he was always willing to delegate and support, and was a good person to emulate.\textsuperscript{123} Curtis was more succinct, ‘Our OC, Major Johnny Crosland was a tough little bastard. He loved rugby and was an inspirational leader’.\textsuperscript{124} Philip Neame, the commander of ‘D’ Company professed a more arcane method of sinew stiffening and blood summoning leadership, ‘[…] with me and everyone else shouting their head off - probably all gibberish, but it all got the adrenaline going again and off we went’.\textsuperscript{125} Neame did himself an injustice because choosing the wrong words can be counterproductive.


\textsuperscript{119} Eyles-Thomas, \textit{Sod That}, p.35 - On 27 August 1979 the IRA bombed a 2 Para convoy, killing 18 and wounding 4. On the same day the IRA assassinated Lord Louis Mountbatten.

\textsuperscript{120} Jary, \textit{18 Platoon}, p. 81

\textsuperscript{121} Bicheno, \textit{Razor’s Edge}, p. 102

\textsuperscript{122} IWM 17140 - Crosland, (1996), [on audiotape]

\textsuperscript{123} IWM 17147 - Margerison, (1996), [on audiotape]

\textsuperscript{124} Mike Curtis, \textit{CQB: Close Quarter Battle}, (London, Corgi, 1998), p. 67

\textsuperscript{125} Hugh McManners, \textit{Forgotten Voices of the Falklands}, (London, Ebury Press, 2008), p. 411
Commando Ken Oakley recalled that just before the D-Day landings an officer advised, ‘Don't worry if all the first wave of you are killed. We shall simply pass over your bodies with more and more men’. Contemporaneously, the captain of HMS *Danae* advised his crew that they ‘[…] had the honour to be expendable’, swiftly earning the rejoinder, ‘fuck that for a lark’, from amongst the ranks. It should be noted that in his final charge ‘H’ Jones also failed to get the tone right.

Once leaders had established themselves in the eyes of their subordinates it became something of a perversity when official hierarchies and the perils of the Pink List (see above) upset the apple cart. Such was the case in the Falklands during the Battle of Goose Green. Following the death of Lt-Col Jones, command of 2 Para devolved to Maj. Chris Keeble. As one junior soldier commented, ‘[…] a good man who was more in touch with the blokes’. Keeble manufactured victory with guile and bravado at a time when the battalion was a substantially spent force. He was not allowed, even temporarily, to retain the command he had earned. Lt. Col. David Chaundler was parachuted in (literally) from the UK to take over, and this did not sit well with Keeble. Chaundler recalled a ‘serious talk […] where Keeble told me the honourable thing for me to do was to fly back to *Fearless* and stay there for the rest of the campaign’. When Chaundler took over it undermined the motivation of the rank-and-file because, as one junior soldier noted:

> He looked so clean and sterile and so out of place. A lot of the guys thought it was a really bad move to demote our acting CO […] The new CO was probably just as capable, but was it right, most of us wondered.

Failures of leadership from company officers did occur during the Falklands War, and the death of Jones was the apparent cause of one of them. One platoon commander was in tears. According to one of his subordinates, it was ‘Hardly awe-inspiring to know that the man you have been trained to respect, the man who would lead you into battle,

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128 Curtis, *CQB*, p. 150

129 McManners, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands*, p. 300

130 Ely, *For Queen and Country*, p. 221
decides to break down when the “going” hasn’t even started’.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 171-172} More concerning were failures that unravelled for ‘B’ Company of 3 Para during the Battle of Mount Longdon. Lieutenants Bickerdike and Cox were reliant on good platoon sergeants\footnote{Bickerdike’s was Ian McKay VC} and a strong CSM (John Weeks).\footnote{IWM 28301 - Pettinger, (2002), [on audiotape]} It is asserted that Weeks did not enjoy a good relationship with the OC of ‘B’ Company, Maj. Mike Argue. Despite being promoted from the ranks, Argue was unpopular amongst the enlisted men.\footnote{Jennings & Weale, \textit{Green-Eyed Boys}, p. 39} Following an injury to Bickerdike, Weeks ‘shed any pretence of respect for Argue’ and countermanded his orders regarding the replacement platoon commander.\footnote{Bicheno, \textit{Razor’s Edge}, p. 221} In his own account Weeks speaks disparagingly of Lt. Cox, believing he did not have the necessary commitment and the battle was too fierce for him, ‘He needed a bit of encouragement and he got it!’.\footnote{IWM 20696 - Weeks, (1996), [on audiotape]} The encouragement was a punch in the face, and thereafter Cox was ignored by his subordinates.\footnote{Jennings & Weale, \textit{Green-Eyed Boys}, p. 221} Cox tried to reassert his authority but was loudly countermanded by Cpl. McLaughlin. Cox’s emotional response to being usurped was witnessed by ‘A’ Company from whose ranks Corporal Sturge counselled Cox, ‘Come on sir, we don’t want to see our young officers not keeping it together’. Thereafter ‘A’ Company was kept clear of ‘B’ Company, ‘to avoid contagion’.\footnote{Bicheno, \textit{Razor’s Edge}, p. 272}

It is hard to imagine such behaviour being tolerated during the First World War with its much greater emphasis on institutional leadership and roles delineated by social class. An interesting take on the relative importance of leadership emerges from the post Second World War Stouffer research. In answer to the question what keeps men fighting? Officers placed most importance on leadership and discipline (19%) but only 1% of enlisted men agreed. Their most important motivation (39%) was ‘ending the
A notable change has been the gradual increase in informality that has defined the relationship between leaders and led. One might envisage a greater consensus had the survey been repeated in 1982. However, a fundamental problem has remained. According to Strachan:

For all the talk of meritocracy in […] Britain, little attention has been given to the ending of a system which has two points of entry – one for officers and another for private soldiers. The forces themselves fear that the consequences […] [and] leave them unpersuaded of the virtues of all-through promotion.

Whilst some soldiers of Falklands vintage might have echoed the view of L. Cpl. Douglas Gibson of the Royal Anglian Regiment who defined officers as:

[…] the well-spoken people who have got a lot of book learning and which gives them the know-how to be officers. These are hand-picked men and are likely to be of the very best sort.

More from the same generation were likely to share the view of an unnamed Sergeant-Major who, when considering whether to apply for a late-entry commission, concluded:

We call them ‘Ruperts’, those young officers: and when you see the way they behave, or at least some of them do, in the mess, you think to yourself ‘I don’t want to mix in with that lot’.

During the 1980s, the bifurcation of officers and other-ranks still resolved into very different notions of behaviour and leadership. Nigel Ely’s Platoon commander was one of the few who actively sought the advice of his subordinates and thus, ‘[…] won our respect within a very short time and made the Platoon what it became […] A very rare officer’.

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140 Mileham, ‘Retrospective’, p. 83
143 *Ibid*, p. 150
144 Ely, *For Queen and Country*, p. 97
2.4 Leviathans

Alongside the formal command hierarchy, a significant aspect of leadership was the informal emergence of leviathan figures. Each of these was a ‘big man’, who was ‘capable of energising the raw human material […]’, and acted as a dominating and inspirational exemplar on the battlefield. It is from this caucus that existentialist warriors can be found, although not all leviathans were natural warriors. There is arguably a presumption that such figures emerged from the upper reaches of the rank-structure. The American, Maj. Gen. William Garrison, who led a task force in Mogadishu in 1993, was clearly capable of command leadership. According to Henriksen, Garrison was also a charismatic leader and an existentialist warrior:

[...] who avoided the pomp and pretence of upper-echelon military life. Soldiering was about fighting. It was about killing people before they killed you [...] He embraced its cruelty [...] Nothing pleased Garrison more than a well-executed hit [...] Why be a soldier if you couldn’t exult in a heart-pounding, balls-out gunfight? 146

The important point to note is that leviathan figures emerged regardless of rank. Falklands veteran John Weeks fell into this category. He and his predecessor Sammy Doherty, both ‘tough men with sharp minds’, were the subject of a personality cult, and regarded as ‘real soldiers’ by their subordinates; McLaughlin was similarly reified.147 There is a deficiency in the study of combat motivation because of ‘the reluctance to account for individual difference between soldiers in units’.148 The tendency to apply the term ‘hero’ to all combatants from whose ranks a few receive awards for acts of valourousness has been blatant in the media and a comfortable myth within military culture. However, the truth remains that most soldiers are not natural warriors. In 1943, a War Office observer in Italy commented:

Every platoon can be analysed as follows: six gut-full men who will go anywhere and do anything, twelve ‘sheep’ who will follow a short distance behind if they are well led,


147 Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, pp. 15-16

148 Henriksen, ‘The Myth, p. 195
and from four to six ineffective men who have not got what it takes in them ever to be really effective soldiers.\textsuperscript{149}

These numbers are of course subjective. Henriksen assessed that out of a platoon of soldiers only a couple are ‘genuine killers’, usually the platoon commander and his sergeant.\textsuperscript{150} Keegan inferred that, within a section of six or seven men, it may often have been that a ‘natural stronger character was looked to for leadership’.\textsuperscript{151} A Korean War survey suggested warriors and passengers accounted for 15 to 20\%, ‘at either end of a fighter continuum’.\textsuperscript{152} Cpl. Kelly of 2 Para recalled the Battle of Mount Longdon during the Falklands War, ‘Platoons get mixed together in battle, and the guy with the strongest personality ends up taking over - regardless of rank’.\textsuperscript{153} This evidence all endorses the conclusions of S.L.A, Marshall.\textsuperscript{154} Whilst many leviathans will have constructed a warrior ethos as a justification for recruitment, others will have discovered an intrinsic appetite for it once in combat. Moran described this characteristic which arises initially from a sense of military competence and then, ‘He discovers he is less frightened, that he gains a kudos and in a sort of taken for granted fashion is held up as a pattern for others’.\textsuperscript{155} Marshall made a similar observation, ‘[…] there were a number of private soldiers whose earlier service had been lusterless, but who became pivots of strength to the entire line when fire and movement were needed […]’.\textsuperscript{156} The same Korean War survey revealed the essential personal characteristics of leviathans, ‘[…] ‘fighters’ were found to be more intelligent, more masculine, more socially mature [and] showed greater emotional stability’.\textsuperscript{157} The positive aspects of this are revealed by Commander Ian Inskip of HMS \textit{Glamorgan} during the Falklands War:

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Holmes, \textit{Soldiers}, p. 391
\item Henriksen, ‘The Myth’, p. 196
\item John Keegan, \textit{The Face of Battle}, (London, Cape, 1976), pp. 52-53
\item Kellett, \textit{Combat Motivation}, p. 291
\item McManners, \textit{The Scars of War}, p. 256
\item Marshall, \textit{Men Against Fire}, pp. 48-49
\item Moran, \textit{Anatomy of Courage}, p. 106
\item Marshall, \textit{Men Against Fire}, p. 61
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
Our master gunner, Brian Lister, was the only man on board who's seen action before, at Suez [...] he rubbed his hands together and said: ‘This is great, I haven't done this for a long time.’ Knowing that Brian thought it was alright had a very calming effect on everybody else.\textsuperscript{158}

Whilst they may have encouraged task cohesion, there was also an implicit menace attached to leviathans. Their construction of personality invested them with personal power and their actions an inspirational charisma; however, they were often not only unpleasant, but also ill-equipped with the balanced skills of combat leadership.\textsuperscript{159}

During the Great War, according to Lt. Brockman, ‘There were some incredible people who I think liked [combat]. People with no fear at all, and they were an absolute menace to everybody else’.\textsuperscript{160} A more scathing and consistent analysis by Jesse Gray concludes:

Little do they have to recommend them as friends or comrades. As a rule, they are vain and empty, contemptuous of all who are not like themselves [...] If their vitality and their will are admirable in themselves, there is little that is specifically human about their whole mentality. They hardly recognize other men as such and are capable of walking over bodies, living or dead, without a qualm. In their secret hearts they despise friend and foe equally, these supreme egoists.\textsuperscript{161}

There was a side of this behaviour which elided into authoritarianism and the desire for recognition. CSM Desmond Lynch DCM, was an undoubted ‘big man’. Whilst an instructor at Sandhurst he responded badly for several weeks to a published account of the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid in Tunisia in 1943, ‘I was the star of that battle, the star’.\textsuperscript{162}

A leviathan figure invested with formal authority can do great damage and ‘H’ Jones was an example of the type. According to Holmes, his death ‘[...] highlights an inescapable question mark which hangs over such behaviour’. A leader who exposed himself to danger, rather than necessarily having the imagined motivational effect, not only frayed the nerves of his subordinates, but also risked getting killed in the process, with potentially disastrous consequences for tactical leadership.\textsuperscript{163} Ultimately the franchise owned by a leviathan figure may have contained the elements of its own

\textsuperscript{158} McManners, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands*, p. 140
\textsuperscript{159} Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’, p. 9
\textsuperscript{160} Joshua Levine, *Forgotten Voices of the Somme*, (London, Ebury, 2008), p. 155
\textsuperscript{161} Gray, *The Warriors*, pp. 109-110
\textsuperscript{162} Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’, p. 9
\textsuperscript{163} Holmes, *Acts of War*, p. 347
destruction. Some fighters became progressively unwilling to face risks;\textsuperscript{164} this was compounded when the ‘big man’ had to cope with the great expectations of his superiors and subordinates, whilst knowing he was well past his best.\textsuperscript{165}

2.5 Frenzy

Frenzy and atrocity have not been universal characteristics of the existentialist warrior although, as will be demonstrated in the McLaughlin case study, they have coexisted. In his analysis of the Second World War Fussell concluded that:

[War required] a unique context of public credulity and idealism […] [it] required the enemy to be totally evil, it required the allies to be totally good - all of them. The opposition between this black and this white was clear and uncomplicated, untroubled by subtlety or nuance […]'.\textsuperscript{166}

This construction emerged in the role of the RAF fighter pilot. According to Richard Hillary, ‘The fighter pilot’s emotions are those of the duellist - cool, precise, impersonal. He is privileged to kill well […] it should be done with dignity’.\textsuperscript{167} This notion of tac-au-tac combat fits comfortably into the national myth of bravery with honour. However, there is a thick strand of visceral brutality that has sustained British combatants through the generations up to and including the Falklands War. According to Keegan, Combat, ‘[…] plumbs deeper into the realms of cruelty, frenzy and fantasy, which feed and are fed by each other’. He further asserted that ‘men can behave disgustingly in combat, killing everything that moves […]’.\textsuperscript{168} This was endorsed by Gray:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Baynes, \textit{Morale}, p. 101
\item \textsuperscript{165} Holmes, \textit{Acts of War}, pp. 218-219
\item \textsuperscript{168} Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’, p. 10
\end{itemize}
In mortal danger numerous soldiers enter into a dazed condition in which all sharpness of consciousness is lost. When in this state they can be caught up into the fire of communal ecstasy and forget about death by losing their individuality.\textsuperscript{169}

According to the sociologist, Professor Kirson Weinberg, ‘Fear, tension and apprehension […] are normal responses in an abnormal situation’. Intensification of aggression was a desperate attempt to overcome danger by destroying the enemy before the psychological pressures became overwhelming. In this state of desperate aggression, many heroic deeds were performed.\textsuperscript{170} Another dimension draws upon Freudian theory and examines the paradox between pleasure and guilt. Modern man has retained the ambivalence of his prehistoric ancestor to killing potential opponents and the guilt of having done so. According to David Smith it remains the case that, ‘The essence of war is to expose and amplify these unconscious desires […] to see strangers as enemies and to seek their destruction’.\textsuperscript{171} With an assemblage of powerful instinctive forces it is not surprising that the ability of a combatant to rationalise has been impaired. Rationalisation and restraint are cognitively linked, and without restraint a combatant in a state of frenzy has been reduced to a single destructive focus.\textsuperscript{172} However, it is not enough to ascribe frenzy (by which it is meant the berserk state and the capacity to commit atrocities) purely to the instinctual. The purpose of this section is to consider their more subjective aspects and these include: the manner of which institutionalised frenzy has been initiated, the elision of institutional frenzy into the bayonet fetish that remains embedded within military culture, the manner in which the pleasure aspects of killing have been rationalised and fed into the desire for revenge, and finally how cultural demonisation of the enemy has acted as a justification.

The capacity of institutional authority to validate frenzy has been a powerful force. The electric shock experiments conducted by Milgram in 1961 were in part initiated by the trial of Adolf Eichmann.\textsuperscript{173} Milgram concluded that most people, despite

\textsuperscript{169}Gray, \textit{The Warriors,} pp. 102-103
\textsuperscript{170}Weinberg, ‘The Combat Neuroses’, pp. 471-472
\textsuperscript{171}David Smith, ‘The Freudian Trap’, pp. 193-194
\textsuperscript{172}Jonathan Shay, \textit{Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character,} (New York, Atheneum, 1994), p. 86
\textsuperscript{173}A pivotal figure in the logistics of the ‘Final Solution’.
moral qualms, were not equipped to resist the demands of authority.\textsuperscript{174} Received wisdom of the British myth is that only foreigners behave in such a manner; however, the evidence suggests otherwise. The experience of the Great War left a legacy of an endemic addiction for violence. Throughout the Empire, notably in Ireland and the Middle East, civilian insubordination was suppressed by extreme violence. The pre-Dunkirk army of 1940 was obsessed with spies and fifth columnists. Many innocent civilians were swept up under suspicion and subjected to summary justice. One source recalls, ‘[…] the divisional provost officer [was] responsible for firing squads for anyone deemed guilty. His notion of justice was “teutonic” and there was no appeal against his decision’.\textsuperscript{175} With the post-war liberalisation of public attitudes, it might be expected that the worst excesses of institutional frenzy would have been mitigated; however, it has been asserted that ‘today’s all-volunteer army’ is not representative of public attitudes ‘toward moral and legal issues in combat, despite formal training in accordance with the rules of warfare’\textsuperscript{176}. In the British experience, the most controversial example of this occurred on ‘Bloody Sunday’ in January 1972,\textsuperscript{177} when Support Company of 1 Para ignored the ‘yellow card’ rules.\textsuperscript{178} It was responsible for firing over 100 rounds, shooting twenty-six innocent civilians and killing thirteen of them. Thirty-eight years after the event the measured summary of the \textit{Saville Report} implicitly criticised Maj. Gen. Ford for being inappropriately bellicose, and explicitly criticised Lt. Col. Wilford of 1 Para for disobeying orders.\textsuperscript{179} During the 1973 inquest the coroner, Maj. Hubert O’Neill, was emphatically frank:

\begin{quote}
It was quite unnecessary. […] the army ran amok that day and shot without thinking what they were doing. They were shooting innocent people. These people may have been taking part in a march that was banned but that does not justify the troops coming
\end{quote}

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\textsuperscript{175} Brian Bond, The British Field Force in France and Belgium 1939-1940’, in Paul Addison & Angus Calder (eds), \textit{Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West}, (London, Pimlico, 1997), p. 43
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{176} Cockerham & Cohen, ‘Obedience to Orders’, p. 1286
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\textsuperscript{177} This occurred during a Northern Ireland Civil Right Association March held in the Bogside district of Londonderry.
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\textsuperscript{178} Issued to all troops setting out the basis upon which lethal force could be used
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\textsuperscript{179} The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman),The Hon William Hoyt OC, The Hon John Toohey AC, \textit{Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry}, Vol. 1 Ch. 4, (22 Mar 2010), Paras 4.1 & 4.24
\end{flushright}
in and firing live rounds indiscriminately. I would say without hesitation that it was sheer, unadulterated murder.\textsuperscript{180}

It should be noted that these examples relate to the treatment of civilians who have often been treated contemptuously as enemies out of uniform and thus a lesser opponent. In Hillary’s construction of the ‘warrior code’, death to a fellow combatant should be administered with dignity; clearly this should extend to the dignity of prisoners and not killing them. However, as the psychologist Edgar Jones has observed:

There is a fundamental difference between killing in combat and shooting prisoners of war […] The scale of this form of killing remains unknown and as such has become part of the mythology of warfare.\textsuperscript{181}

The historiography is replete with primary source evidence of prisoner killing by British troops, sustaining the myth from the First World War to the Falklands War. An issue is the extent to which such actions have been validated by a higher authority. Joe Murray of the Hood Battalion provided a telling example from the Great War:

The whole battalion were on parade […] and Major-General Shute inspected us […] He said, ‘I’m going to tell you this much. You know what you have got to do! The more prisoners you take, the less food you’ll get - because we have to feed them out of your rations’.\textsuperscript{182}

The defence of \textit{Respondeat Superior},\textsuperscript{183} unequivocally rebutted during the Nuremberg Trials, has subsequently challenged the ability of lawyers to distinguish one case from another. There is no settled law on the issue, and for or the combatant, Walzer observed that legal subtleties are largely irrelevant:

When combatants are ordered to take no prisoners or to kill the ones they take […] Then it is not their own murderousness that is at issue but that of their officers’.\textsuperscript{184}

In August 1916, a GCHQ order bluntly stated:

Until it is beyond all doubt that these have not only ceased all resistance, but […] That they have definitely and finally abandoned all hope or intention of resisting further. In the case of apparent surrender, it lies with the enemy to prove his intention beyond the possibility of misunderstanding, before the surrender can be accepted as genuine.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{180} John Parker, \textit{The Paras}, p. 255


\textsuperscript{182} Levine, \textit{Forgotten Voices of the Somme}, p. 246

\textsuperscript{183} Superior Orders - ‘Let the Master Answer’ (lit)

\textsuperscript{184} Michael Walzer, \textit{Just and Unjust Wars}, (New York, Basic, 2000), p. 309

\textsuperscript{185} Holmes, \textit{Acts of War}, p. 384
It begs the question what, in the febrile atmosphere of close combat, constituted ‘beyond all doubt’. Revealing a continuity with their Great War antecedents, the troops that fought in the Falklands were clearly not minded to make such subjective judgements. Captain Adrian Freer of 3 Para advised that, ‘On Longdon, while we were fighting, no quarter was given’.  

186 For Maj. John Crosland:

We'd come across a trench in the darkness; it was impossible to tell if the Argentinians were willing to fight, and I would suggest very strongly that we were not in the game of tapping on the door and asking them.  

Following the shooting of a downed Gazelle Helicopter crew, McManners and his immediate group ‘resolved not to take so much trouble over surrenders’. Geddes provided similar testimony, ‘We took no prisoners [...] We didn’t shoot anyone with their hands up under white flags. They just didn’t have time to get their hands up’. Ely provided a graphic example of the realities of trench clearing and the niceties of interpreting surrender whilst in a state of hyper-aggression:

[...] I just started to head-butt the twat with my para helmet [...] He kept screaming at me in Spanish and calling out for his Mama. I had pinned him to the bottom of the trench... I just kept head-butting. Six, seven [...] Twenty times, I can’t really remember [...] I was frenzied. I wanted to kill him as quickly as possible [...] I guess at some stage his head cracked [...] I grabbed hold of the Slur and fired a couple of rounds into him. Then it was over.

The extent to which wounded opponents were able to clarify an intention to surrender clearly tests the subjectivity of ‘beyond all doubt’. Both Lukowiak and Bramley recalled incidents, which at the time seemed acceptable, but have later proved to be traumatic. Lukowiak recalled trying to treat a wounded Argentinian, only to be moved aside by a sergeant who finished off the prisoner with a burst of machine gun fire. Similarly Bramley recalled that:

A wounded Argentinian lay to my right [...] He had been hit in the chest and screamed as he held the wound. A lad from B Company ran across the clearing at him and ran his

186 IWM 20255 - Freer, (2002), [on audiotape]
187 McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, p. 248
189 Geddes, Spearhead Assault, p. 284
190 Ely, For Queen and Country, p. 16
bayonet through him […] [and] walked back to his seat among the rocks, as if nothing had happened.\textsuperscript{192}

The use of the bayonet featured strongly in Falklands narratives. It has long maintained an institutional role as a totem of aggression that arguably extends to a bayonet fetish. In popular culture, the antics of Lance-Corporal Jones in BBC TV’s \textit{Dad’s Army} may have served to render the ‘cold steel’ as a humorous anachronism; however, such an impression remains misleading. Ian Beckett has argued that ‘The use of bayonet, lance and sabre’ has been retained in the armed forces because they are so richly symbolic of traditional virtues of glory and gallantry, which risk being devalued by ‘technology and professionalism’\textsuperscript{,193} Joanna Bourke commented that, during the First World War and inter-war years, ‘the bayonet fight represented the highest achievement of the warrior culture which was strongly represented within popular culture as ‘a central motif in war stories’.\textsuperscript{194} As Jones pointed out, ‘There was [and is] a considerable difference between shooting a man at 400 yards and bayoneting him in the guts’,\textsuperscript{195} and for this reason bayonet training was a technique to, ‘arouse the pugnacity of the men’.\textsuperscript{196} It was standard practice for the Falklands troops, and remains so to this day. According to Pat Butler of 3 Para, ‘Bayonet fitting is standard. It is symbolic because it reinforces intent in the mind of the soldier’.\textsuperscript{197} During the Falklands War, it was the intention of CSM John Weeks to build up psychological motivation in the moments before the Battle of Mount Longdon started.\textsuperscript{198} However, one of his subordinates, Kevin Connery, did not make the connection between the abstract of training and the reality of combat:

\begin{quote}
I can’t tell you how fucking shocked and surprised I was when we were at the base of Longdon […] I couldn’t help thinking some bastard was on drugs and that they had turned back the clock and we should be lined up in red tunics. And when I heard ‘fix bayonets’ that was it. I knew we were in a lunatic asylum.\textsuperscript{199}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[192]{Bramley, \textit{Excursion to Hell}, p. 115}
\footnotetext[194]{Joanna Bourke, \textit{An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare}, (London, Granta, 1999), p. 41}
\footnotetext[195]{Jones, ‘The Psychology of Killing’, p. 237}
\footnotetext[196]{\textit{Ibid}, p. 233}
\footnotetext[197]{IWM 28300 - Butler, (2002), [on audiotape]}
\footnotetext[198]{IWM 20696 - Weeks,}
\footnotetext[199]{Bicheno, \textit{Razor’s Edge}, p. 221}
\end{footnotes}
In the event Connery, along with his colleagues Denzil Connick and Dominic Gray, displayed a degree of courage that bears comparison with McKay and McLaughlin. However, ‘One does not have to look too deeply to establish why they were not decorated’\textsuperscript{200} because of the vigour with which they used the bayonet whilst in a state of frenzy. According to Gray, the most effective way to bayonet an opponent was, through the eye, then turn and pull it out. It went straight into the brain like that’.\textsuperscript{201} The three Paras are not isolated cases, according to Falklands veteran Robert Lawrence, ‘It was absolutely horrific. Stabbing a man to death is not a clean way to kill somebody […] At one point he started saying, ‘Please […]’ in English to me’.\textsuperscript{202} Lawrence acknowledged he used his bayonet unnecessarily, and it was a decision he regretted.\textsuperscript{203} Given the traumatic consequences once the power of frenzy has dissipated, the question has to be asked why, in each case, the combatants choose to use their bayonets rather than their rifles? There is no evidence to suggest they were short of ammunition. It is a question that Weeks failed to answer satisfactorily, and he insisted rather unconvincingly that ‘none of the lads liked killing’ and they did it for survival.\textsuperscript{204} His testimony reinforces the need to ask the unsavoury but necessary question, to what extent is the pleasure of killing a combat motivation?

Grinker and Spiegel concluded that few combatants ‘anticipate pleasure from destruction or killing’.\textsuperscript{205} However, their research was primarily conducted into the motivation of Second World War aircrews who were inevitably distanced from the consequences of their actions. One also has to consider Marshall’s assertion that 75% of combatants ‘may face danger but they will not fight’.\textsuperscript{206} Holmes and Keegan are more measured, recognising that some soldiers find killing pleasurable. Field Marshal Slim

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid, p.266; Gray and Connery each received a MiD.

\textsuperscript{201} Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, pp. 134-135

\textsuperscript{202} John Lawrence & Robert Lawrence, When the Fighting is Over, (London, Bloomsbury, 1988), p. 32

\textsuperscript{203} Max Arthur, Above all Courage: Personal Stories of the Falklands War, (London, Cassell, 2002), p. 410

\textsuperscript{204} IWM 20696 - Weeks

\textsuperscript{205} Grinker & Spiegel, Men Under Stress, p. 43

\textsuperscript{206} Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 50
recalled his delight at shooting a Turkish soldier during the First World War, ‘I suppose it was brutal but I had the feeling of most intense satisfaction as that wretched Turk went spinning down’. Recent historiography has been more revisionist; Jones cited Ferguson’s assertion of Freudian theory for why many men found pleasure in killing, ‘men kept fighting [during the First World War] because they wanted to’. Freud’s concept of a Thanatos instinct means that, in a combat situation, ‘men are in one part of their being in love with death’ and during a combat situation this impulse overwhelms their Eros (life) instinct. Furthermore, the Thanatos instinct lurks within most people, which is why it is ‘hard to escape the conclusion that there is a delight in destruction’. The Psychiatrist, Thomas Nadelson, who treated Vietnam veterans, was of the view that once ‘ordinary men’ had been trained to overcome their resistance to killing, they ‘became addicted to the excitement and sense of freedom created by the licence to kill’. Bourke asserted that more men broke down in war because they were not allowed to kill, rather than under the strain of killing. In her detailed analysis of primary testimony, she discovered that men and women derived an enjoyment from killing. Evidence from the Falklands tends to be rather nuanced, but there is enough of it to conclude the existence of a strong degree of continuity. Much of the killing was undertaken with unhesitating gusto, framed around a euphemistic narrative of aggression. Captain Stewart Russell (a 2 Para corporal in 1982) was an exemplar:

You’ve got to be meaner, badder and uglier and you’ve just got to be more vicious than the person you’re fighting. If you’re not prepared to be more vicious you shouldn’t be there and if you can’t be more vicious then you’re going to lose.

However, the prima facie case for ubiquitous pleasure remains to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt.

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211 Ibid, p. 299

212 Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing*, p. 18

What is more certain and consistent is that revenge elided into frenzy; confronted with blatant atrocity, reaction was likely to be uncompromising. Such was the case when Belsen was liberated in 1945. Captain Richard Smith recalled, ‘It was the most extraordinary few hours […]’ with male and female camp guards being savagely beaten with rifle butts. The British commander admitted, ‘I have no control over my troops’. Research into Vietnam narratives reveals mutilation and abuse by the enemy was a profound cause of berserk behaviour. Other factors included a failure of leadership that manifested in insult or humiliation and, pertinently, the wounding or death of comrades. During the Falklands War and following the death of his friend, the seventeen year old Jason Burt, Mark Eyles-Thomas admitted, ‘I wanted to kill everything and everyone still inside the enemy’s position’. There is no evidence to suggest that the British forces had demonised the Argentine forces. Whilst ‘Argie-bashing’ was a media trope, most of the British forces regarded the Argentinians as ‘ciphers’. However, this did not extend to breaking the rules of war. A feature of the Gazelle incident was that the crew had been shot in the water whilst trying to swim ashore. As news of the incident spread anger was palpable; according to Vincent Bramley, ‘I personally felt that if we had caught those responsible we would have killed them for the cowardly act’. The controversial shooting of Lt. Jim Barry at the Goose Green schoolhouse evinced a similar response. Barry was killed under a white-flag whilst attempting to negotiate Argentine surrender. His death provoked an enraged response to such ‘treachery’ and no enemy survivors emerged from the schoolhouse. According to Eyles-Thomas, word of the incident spread to 3 Para, and ‘[…] enraged us […] The war was now personal’. An official briefing by the company intelligence officer, which strongly implied no prisoner taking, simply affirmed the view that had

214 Arthur, Lest We Forget: Forgotten Voices 1914-1945, p. 157
215 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, pp. 79-80
216 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, p. 166
217 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 371
218 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, p. 37
220 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, pp. 138-139
already formed amongst the troops. Regardless of orders, ‘no one was keen to accept the enemy’s word anymore’.\textsuperscript{221}

The components of demonisation rest within Fussell’s polarised construction of ‘totally evil’ versus ‘totally good’ and demonisation exists as a component of total war. The Falklands War was not ‘total’ in any sense, and little evidence exists that Argentine forces were demonised, except in the hysterical effluvia of the tabloid press. At the heart of demonisation was an explicit racism. Propagandists have regularly attempted to ascribe national characteristics to allied forces to encourage demoralising, ‘phantasy fears’ amongst the enemy. Since Culloden, the berserk Highlander has been unequivocally British, whilst the role of the fighting Irishman has become more nuanced.\textsuperscript{222} It remains speculative whether the role of the Scots Guards and the Gurkhas during the Falklands War, at least in part, intentionally sustained this myth. The reverse was also true because, in total war, the enemy became hollowed-out ciphers of total evil. As an assertion of continuity, Gray considered that ‘Most soldiers are able to kill and be killed more easily in warfare if they possess an image of the enemy sufficiently evil to inspire hatred and repugnance’.\textsuperscript{223} It may be that the enemy was constructed as a subhuman, bereft of all humanity; or a superhuman where exquisite evil juxtaposed with Christian morality.\textsuperscript{224} Whatever the image, such constructions may, according to Jones, have rendered killing as, ‘[…] merely a game […] commonly dehumanising opposing troops […] as a way of bypassing inhibitions about killing.’,\textsuperscript{225} Japanese atrocities during the Second World War are still living histories. Maj. John Winstanley was a typical memoirist, ‘They had renounced any right to be regarded as human and we thought of them as vermin to be exterminated. That was important. We were aroused and fought well’,\textsuperscript{226} The nadir of demonising a racially distinct and non-Christian group arguably occurred during the Vietnam War. Many American servicemen admitted that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} Bramley, \textit{Excursion to Hell}, p. 78
\item \textsuperscript{222} Bourke, \textit{An Intimate History of Killing}, p. 105
\item \textsuperscript{223} Gray, \textit{The Warriors}, p. 133
\item \textsuperscript{224} \textit{Ibid}, p. 153
\item \textsuperscript{225} Jones, ‘The Psychology of Killing’, p. 244
\item \textsuperscript{226} Arthur, \textit{Forgotten Voices of the Second World War}, p. 386
\end{itemize}
they had not only been given an ‘official’ sanction by their army instructors to rape local women, but also detailed advice on how to kill them afterwards. The symbolic event of the war was the *My Lai* massacre where between 300 and 507 innocent civilians were massacred by a platoon of soldiers under the command of Lt. William Calley. Although the massacre was covered up for over sixteen months, eventually Calley was solely convicted of the murders and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour in military prison. Following mass public protest, President Nixon commuted the sentence to house arrest, and eventually Calley only served three and a half years in comparative comfort. Calley’s defence was that he was only obeying the orders of his superior, Captain Stanley Medina. Medina was also prosecuted but acquitted, and now lends his name to the ‘Medina Standard’ which asserts that a commanding officer is responsible for the actions of his subordinates if he fails to prevent the commission of war crimes. The relevance of *My Lai* to the issue of motivation is the likelihood of a similar recurrence. In 1980, Cockerham and Cohen concluded that those who enter the services intent on a career are less likely to carry out illegal orders. However, in the absence of robust training, there remains ‘[…] enough ambiguity and disagreement among American soldiers on the subject of immoral and illegal orders that it remains quite possible that an incident like *My Lai* can happen again’. Such ambiguities are not confined to American soldiers and the risks easily extend to include British Forces. Bellicose leadership and the demonisation of Irish peace protestors into terrorists are examples of potential catalysts.

### 2.6 Summary

Since the Second World War, group theories have been central to an understanding of motivation during combat. The argument of this chapter is that the evidence is rather more nuanced because motivation has been a relationship between

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227 Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing*, p. 179


229 Cockerham & Cohen, ‘Obedience to Orders’, p. 1287
group loyalty, regimental traditions, and leadership; with frenzied behaviour thrown into the mix.

Four pillars are integral to understanding primary groups: ideology, coercion, social bonding, and task cohesion. The influence of any robust ideology has at best transient and more realistically manifested in an inchoate sense that the outcome of combat was justified because of the integrity of the national collective view. Membership of primary groups was conditional, and acceptance within them, meeting professional standards and performing to cultural norms, was implicitly coercive. More controversial was whether the basis of group cohesion was social or task based. Although combatants could form intense personal bonds, these were often expedient and short-term. The essence of primary group motivation remains a commitment to shared goals.

The regiment persists as a corporatised primary group and its centrality to combat motivation has been powerfully advocated. However, the evidence suggests that whilst regiments have instilled a sense of belonging and notions of professional competence, combatants did not fight to sustain myths and traditions. The regimental system has been more powerful for officers as it has shaped their approach to leadership. Command and leadership have been different concepts: commanders fulfilled a strategic role, whereas leaders were responsible for task completion. Effective leadership has required the charismatic exercise of expert position power, impartial reward and censure, and consistency. An ineffective leader risked being supplanted by a leviathan figure who had the personal power to take charge according to his own lights and limitations. Formal training inculcated combatants with a spirit of aggression; however, during close combat this often elided into frenzy where ordinary men behaved out of character. It was the role of leadership to prevent frenzy from becoming atrocity with its consequences on the post-combat psychological well-being of the participants.
Chapter 3 - After Combat

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact of post-combat events on the motivation to fight. It comprises two parts:

Part one will initially consider self-enrichment through plunder and then investigate the attempts to replace it through the development and implementation of the British awards system. Medals and awards are central to the way society understands heroism, the manner in which combatants understand recognition, and essential to the manner in which service culture frames its identity. Case studies of Lt.Col ‘H’ Jones and Cpl.s McLaughlin and Sturge will reveal the paradox in the expectations of these groups.

Part two sets out the journey along which combatants develop a sense of composure around their participation in combat. For some, this may mean repeating the process, for all, there comes a time when it is necessary to reintegrate back into civil society.

The central argument within this chapter is that post-combat motivation depends upon a constellation of three distinct groups; the individual, society, and the military, each with their own set of needs. Therefore, it will seek to identify the conflict of expectation that arises between: what the individual combatant expects, what society and the Establishment want, and what military culture is prepared to sanction.

Part 1

3.1 Enrichment, Medals and Awards

Medals, decorations and awards have served a paradoxical purpose, and it will be argued that their motivational power has been over-rated. On one hand they represented a meritorious award to an individual, but on the other, they have had an arguably greater symbolic and commemorative public purpose in binding the collective view to the state. To borrow loosely from Voltaire, if heroes did not exist it would be necessary to invent them. Enduring popularity and cohesive celebration is accorded to
national heroes regardless of whether they win Oscars, Nobel Prizes or sporting majors. War-winners and life-savers fit comfortably into this pantheon. Official forces’ doctrine for the distribution of honours and awards is set out in JSP 761. This was last updated in May 2008; however, the tenor of the document does not suggest that there has been a sea-change in official attitudes since 1982. Excepting the reforms in 1993, the philosophy and ethos that underpins this document remains rooted in traditional custom.

JSP 761 sets out its stall with Churchillian rhetoric:

> The object of giving medals, stars and ribbons is to give pride and pleasure to those who have deserved them. At the same time a distinction is something which everybody does not possess. If all have it, it is of less value. There must, therefore, be heart-burnings and disappointments on the borderline. A medal glitters, but it also casts a shadow. The task of drawing up regulations for such awards is one which does not admit of a perfect solution. It is not possible to satisfy everybody without running the risk of satisfying nobody. All that is possible is to give the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number and to hurt the feelings of the fewest.

It is necessary properly to understand the last sentence. The most reasonable interpretation suggests ‘the greatest number’ means a combination of both the military and the broader public. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how these apparently egalitarian principles have remained rooted in mythology, and consider some examples and case studies from the Falklands War.

The decision making process to grant an award has often fallen short of the Churchillian standards, both before and after he articulated them. Subjectively, I suggest that there are four basic outcomes following consideration for an award:

1. Deserved and Awarded.
2. Deserved and Not Awarded.
3. Not Deserved and Awarded.
4. Not Deserved and Not Awarded.

Because of the heroism/identity paradox that exists between military culture and the expectations of the public collective, the number of possible outcomes increases to seven (i.e. the public want an award and the military disagree, and vice versa), this is

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1 These ended many of the distinctions between Gallantry and Distinguished Conduct awards for commissioned officers and for other ranks.


3 Abols, Jones, Sturge & McLaughlin
further increased to fifteen because there are four levels of award\(^4\) and the possibility arises that the public and military may disagree over the grade of award. For an award to satisfy the greatest number, the awards’ committees have to be confident that their decision can be justified to the public. In substance, this means that the ‘borderline’ remains a huge gulf, the ‘shadow’ impenetrably black, and the ‘hurt feelings’ manifest. The consequence is that rather than acting as a motivational reward, the iniquities of a flawed system have the reverse effect. It can be argued that the award of a medal for meritorious conduct has had at least a short term benefit for the recipient, his peer group, and the regiment. However, it has also been argued that the inherent unfairness in the way awards have been decided, often nothing more than a lottery, has been much more effective at demotivating soldiers. This is because of the consistent failure to reward those who are perceived by their comrades as being the most deserving. As a First World War soldier put it:

> I have known good men eat their hearts out through want of recognition. How petty this sounds. Yet a ribbon is the only prize in war for the ordinary soldier. It is the outward proof to bring home to his people that he has done his job well. And say what you may, a man’s prowess will be assessed by the number of his ribbons.\(^5\)

In the aftermath of the Falklands War, these sentiments have resonated clearly in many primary testimonies. Evidently some of the veterans felt that they and/or their colleagues did not get what they deserved. Therefore, it will be argued that the distribution of rewards was primarily determined by the Establishment to cement the role of the Establishment in the minds of the public as the agents of victory. By wrapping the Falklands campaign within a framework of restored national pride, they were used to preserve and justify hierarchies. Acts of gallantry did not necessarily fit into this construction so recipients of awards had to be carefully vetted and quotas maintained so that the heroism was spread around fairly. It was not enough to be a hero; it was necessary to be the right sort of hero, satisfying to the national collective. This meant one who would not cause embarrassment to the carefully constructed myth that reinforces particularly British notions of what makes a hero. Most significantly, heroes had to be graded to ensure that the status quo was preserved. The government generally

\(^4\) See Appendix 6

and the MoD in particular had the bureaucratic mechanisms in place to ensure this happened. The outcome of their winnowing, purifying and rationing, was to ensure that a sanitised pastiche of heroes was presented for public consumption.

To develop the arguments that substantiate these assertions, four stages of analysis will be pursued:

1. To provide a sense of alignment of personal combat orientations to rewards that will frame the propensity of individuals to respond to their motivational power.
2. To outline the development of the current awards system. It will be demonstrated that it is rooted in feudal principles of hierarchy and status, and show how this manifested itself in the distribution of awards following the Falklands War. An analysis of the 182 Victoria Crosses awarded during the Second World War will provide an informative benchmark. Unlike other awards, the full citation for a Victoria Cross award is published in the \textit{London Gazette}. Not only does this reveal interesting aspects of rank and demographic distribution, but also insights into the orientation of heroism that led to an award.
3. To understand the processes that go into the making of an award. At its heart, the award of an honour should be motivational not only for the individual recipient but also to his peer group. Unfortunately, the system has too often demonstrated the reverse effect, so rather than reinforcing the positive aspects of reward it was undermined.
4. To consider the relationship of the public to heroes and the honoured as projected through the lens of the government. The evidence suggests that the authorities have been careful to induct only the right sort of heroes into the community of the elect. This will be explored by considering some case studies, which will take a measure of the possible outcomes referred to above.

All potential recipients of honours were flawed; some substantially so, by the essential personal orientations that carried them into a combat environment. As First World War veteran Cpl. Hawtin Munday put it:
I’ve seen chaps - many times - who did things they should have got a Victoria Cross for, and I’ve seen the same chaps later on, worried, crying, depressed. Had they been seen on either occasion they’d either have had a medal or a court martial.⁶

The issue of medals from a motivational perspective has been overrated. As Newsome observed, they served a greater purpose of integrating heroism within the collective:

Material awards serve more to rationalize good performance for observers ex post than to encourage good performance by soldiers ex ante. Veterans are less impressed with awards for combat service than outside observers appear to be, with only one-third of World War II medal winners claiming their medals, for instance. Award inflation and corruption are common causes for their discreditation.⁷

Bourke commented on the lack of take up of Second World War medals with a nuanced analysis:

Only service women and sailors, that is, people unlikely to have seen active combat, showed a little more interest in collecting these mementoes [...] In part this lack of interest in medals was a reflection of the application of civilian values to a combat situation: many servicemen recognised that the hero was the most effective killer - and not something they thought should be lauded.⁸

Although existentialist warriors were less impelled to seek out honours; they were arguably the most likely to be considered for them, provided that they were not likely to become an embarrassment. For the Falklands war, Cpl. McLaughlin is a relevant case study that will be discussed below. However, time-serving soldiers did step up a gear when the circumstances demanded. Cpl. Dave Abols was awarded the DCM for his decisive intervention at Goose Green, and soldierly scuttlebutt contended he should have received the VC in preference to Jones.⁹ Abols professed no ideology and comfortably accepted that ‘You join the army and follow orders. That’s what soldiers should do’. On being asked what made him go over the top he commented, ‘Pass! Just my job, I was a full screw [...] it’s your job to lead them men’.¹⁰ An interesting suggestion of intrinsic motivation emerged from the fact that Abols’ Latvian father was awarded the Iron Cross on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.¹¹

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⁸ Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare, (London, Granta, 1999), pp. 120-121
¹⁰ Imperial War Museum Archive (henceforth ‘IWM’) 17146 - Abols, 1996, [on audio-tape]
¹¹ Geddes, Spearhead Assault, p. 266
Abols emerges as a soldier who deserved an award and got a level 2. Whether or not he deserved the superstar status of a VC was dependent upon a range of impenetrably subjective factors and these may have included his father’s association with Nazism.

3.2 Plunder

It is a truism to say that the motivation of soldiers has had little to do with altruism and the prospect of loot and self-enrichment has always been relevant.\textsuperscript{12} It was a self-justified entitlement that may on occasions have enjoyed tacit approval, it remains particularly relevant given that the basic pay for soldiering has always reflected the parsimony of necessity. It was during the nineteenth century that measures were introduced to replace booty with institutional rewards. Despite efforts to instil a culture of political correctness, the real-politick of the barrack-room meant that the practice of scouring the battlefield for souvenirs and booty retained a consistent and occasionally grotesque appeal. Holmes noted that during the First World War:

The hunt for souvenirs was universal […] And prisoners and the fallen were routinely pillaged of cash and collectibles. Those, British and Germans, who knew the rules ensured that watches and other valuables were easy of access at the moment of capture […] one British officer was told that his men had been ‘given’ watches by their prisoners out of sheer gratitude, but was realistic enough to wonder.\textsuperscript{13}

The practice had not changed during the Falklands War, except for the fact that officers were perhaps a little more in tune with their men. According to L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley:

We had gone only thirty metres when the OC tripped and nearly fell over an enemy corpse […] Nobody took any notice, except TP, who murmured, ‘I wonder if he’s been looted?’ This brought a grin to everyone's face. Greed for the spoils of war had begun to creep into all of us.\textsuperscript{14}

This may have been opportunistic, and there is evidence to suggest that British soldiers not only looted for personal gain but also to replace or enhance their equipment, boots being a particular favourite. However, there is also evidence of calculated intent.


\textsuperscript{13} Holmes, \textit{Tommy}, p. 546

\textsuperscript{14} Vincent Bramley \textit{Excursion to Hell: Mount Longdon a Universal Story of Battle}, (London, Bloomsbury, 1991), p. 165
Geddes recalled vigorously admonishing a colleague for using secateurs to remove ring fingers from Argentinian corpses, similar another junior soldier observed that:

He [a senior soldier in 2 PARA] was in his late thirties and yet remained a private. From his equipment he pulled out [...] two pairs of dental pliers. I asked why he was carrying such things. He replied: ‘to acquire gold’.  

It was also an unfortunate feature of the Falklands War that soldiers were not above stealing from each other. According to Major Ian Winfield on board HMS Fearless:

We discovered to our disgust that while the Welsh Guards were in the Tank Deck yesterday some of them took the opportunity to go through the kit that was stored there. Thank goodness I had mine in a steel ‘ammo’ box [...] not a very happy situation.

The collection of souvenirs without any intrinsic value is the macabre flip-side of self-enrichment. Anecdotally, Kitchener earned royal opprobrium for having the Mahdi’s skull disinterred and fashioned into an inkwell. President Roosevelt declined the gift of a paper knife made from the bone of a Japanese soldier. During the twentieth century, Joanna Bourke’s research revealed that:

The tendency to collect human trophies escalated during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam when the bodily parts most favored were ears, teeth and fingers, but the collection of heads, penises, hands and toes were all reported [...] Souvenirs conveyed immense power on the servicemen. The combat paratrooper Arthur E. ‘Gene’ Woodley, Jr. collected about fourteen ears and fingers which he strung around his neck. ‘[...] It symbolized that I’m a killer. And it was, so to speak, a symbol of combat-type manhood.

There is an aspect of Woodley’s construction of combat masculinity, developed in Vietnam, that clearly finds a parallel during the Falklands War, and this will be discussed in the McLaughlin case study in Chapter 3.7.

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15 Geddes, Spearhead Assault, pp. 293-294

16 Ken Lukowiak, A Soldier’s Song: True Stories from the Falklands, (London, Phoenix, 1999), p. 39

17 IWM 1267, MSS, Private Papers of Major Ian Winfield, The Posties Went to War: The story of the Postal & Courier Service in the Falklands War


19 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 28-29
3.3 Development of the Awards Culture

The national honours culture remains rooted in a feudal tradition. According to current doctrine, ‘The United Kingdom Honours System relies on the concept that, “The Sovereign is the fount of all honour”’.\(^{20}\) Furthermore, ‘[…] though restrictions may be imposed, any state award appropriate to the rank and status of the individual may be recommended’.\(^{21}\) The important point to make is the distinction between rank and status. It was ever thus that the spoils of success were garnered by the commanders of victory (until 1815), with one exception. During the Interregnum, Parliament awarded a medal for participation in the Battle of Dunbar (1650), although the precise nature of the medal was graded according to rank. This dichotomy between the ordinary soldiers and their elite leaders was not lost, According to Private Wheeler, commenting on meeting a retired French sergeant following the Battle of Waterloo:

> Since Napoleon's return he had been honored with the Cross of the Legion of Honor. I do not wonder that the soldiers of France are so attached to the Emperor, when the same honors are alike open to all ranks.\(^{22}\)

It was Wellington, the antithesis of the authoritarian leader, who shortly after Waterloo, successfully petitioned the Duke of York for the issue of a general service medal, which was to be the same for all ranks:

> I would beg leave to suggest […] the expediency of giving to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers engaged in the battle of Waterloo, a medal. I am convinced that it would have the best effect on the army; and, if that battle should settle our concerns, they will well deserve it.\(^{23}\)

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the practice of inaugurating institutional awards took off.

> The VC remains the highest award for valour and is open to all ranks.\(^{24}\) Until 1993, the DCM was the next level gallantry award for other-ranks. By contrast, the officers’ equivalent, the DSO, was awarded not only for gallantry but also for service. It

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\(^{20}\) JSP 761, p.1-1  
\(^{21}\) Ibid, p.2-2  
\(^{23}\) Ibid  
\(^{24}\) Appendix 6
is now theoretically available to all ranks for ‘service’ but so far has only been awarded to senior officers. Following its inauguration the DSO almost immediately became associated with status, quickly assuming the moniker ‘Dukes’ Sons Only’. The upper crust were able to win the award for behaving like sabre-toothed tigers in battle or paper tigers on the staff. Awards for gallantry were augmented during the First World War with the introduction of the MC for officers and the MM for other ranks. This was a relatively clean distinction between the officer class and the common soldiery. However, allowance for greater social taxonomy within public service was facilitated in 1917 with the Order of the British Empire The social elite got their GBEs and KBEs, others got CBEs, OBEs and MBEs, whilst the reward for stakhanovites was the BEM. In 1992, the award of this ‘working-class gong’ was discontinued because of its class associations; but reintroduced in 2012. The military branch of the Order pegs status to rank, so the higher honours are normally reserved for OF7 rank and above, MBEs are for all ranks up to OF3 and the Brigadiers, Colonels and Captains get those in between. It is an interestingly futile exercise in social class for civilian recipients to gauge their comparative ‘rank’. Anecdotally, the Order has for many people passed its ‘sell-by’ date because of its associations with Empire and imperialism. However, whatever the award, at whatever the level, the British way of regulating social enhancement, either for gallantry or public service, has been to keep a very tight control. During the First World War monthly quotas for gallantry awards were set and little had changed by 1982. Awards were only granted after being carefully filtered through the hierarchy before eventually being decided by quota-constrained committees. Considering the distinction between awards to officers and other ranks, an


27 JSP 761, p.4A-1

28 Appendix 2

29 The Orders of Merit and Bath also have military divisions

30 Policy is to ‘sound out’ potential recipients before an offer is made so the onus is on rejectees to ‘go public’. John Cleese considered it, ‘silly’ and Benjamin Zephaniah refused because, ‘I get angry when I hear the word “empire”’. Many rejectees appear to come from the arts, politics and journalism, few from sport or business.

31 Holmes, *Tommy*, pp. 582-585
interesting hypothesis has been developed which is worthy of further development. This identified two combat orientations; soldier-saving and war-winning. Whilst war-winning awards gravitated towards officers, according to Blake and Butler’s analysis:

The act of awarding the medal represents an organizational attempt to strengthen, by reward, a latent role structure based on the military ethic and the professional brotherhood. We suggest that soldier saving activities are deemed appropriate for enlisted men. We base our suggestion on the presumed connection between troop morale and in-group loyalties.\(^{32}\)

For many of the soldiers who fought in the Falklands War and were recruited during the 1970s, the first stage in the hierarchy of earned professional distinction was the General Service Medal for service in Northern Ireland.\(^{33}\) It was not a particular mark of gallantry, nor a particular motivator to combat, but a step in a series of ‘career-building’ awards for those on a long-service enlistment. For others, it was a mark of status in the transition from unskilled recruit to being a respected soldier.\(^{34}\) For the career-minded individual, it was important to be able to demonstrate the right sort of experience in terms of the jobs done, performance reports obtained and importantly the service awards accumulated. This has pejoratively been described as ‘ticket-punching’ when the individual did the minimum required to achieve the badge, medal or distinction.\(^{35}\) It seems that the higher the rank the easier this was to achieve. Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly noted that amongst the Falklands War awards:

The names of all the frigates of that resolute D-Day picket line were there, with the Commanding Officers of HMS *Antrim*, *Brilliant*, *Broadsword*, *Ardent*, *Argonaut*, *Plymouth* and *Yarmouth* receiving Distinguished Service Orders and Crosses for their tenacity and leadership during that vicious fight. One cannot help feeling that it’s the job of a CO to do this and that awards should be for doing something truly exceptional. Lower down the pecking order it is apparent that many did excel but got either low grade or no recognition at all.\(^{36}\)

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3.4 The Victoria Cross

Because it is so rarely awarded, the VC has assumed a mythical status in public notions of heroism. Of the 1,355 awards made to date; the first was retrospectively made to Lieutenant C.D. Lucas R.N. on 21 June 1854, and the last was made posthumously on 14 December 2006 to Corporal Bryan Budd of 3 Para. Distribution of the VC by era is shown in Appendix 3.1. This reveals that 85% of all VCs were awarded before 1920 and that it was awarded about 3.5 times more frequently in the Great World War than during the Second World War. Although always an infrequent award, from 1920 until the present day it has proved incredibly rare. Therefore, it is implausible to suggest that it has acted as an appropriate award for individual motivation, its purpose has been substantially symbolic. To perform an observed act of heroism of a VC standard was sufficient only to acquire a lottery ticket for the big prize draw. Of the 182 VCs awarded during the Second World War, it is revealing to understand how the awards were distributed according to branch of service and by rank. Tables attached as Appendix 3 are derived from citations published in the London Gazette. Appendix 3.3 reveals that 56% were awarded to officers; however, there is an interesting divergence according to service. 77% of Airforce and 75% of Navy VCs went to officers, with the naval services showing a clear preference to accord valour to 4-ring captains. By comparison, the imperial armies gave 48% of awards to officers, the highest ranking being to Brig. John Campbell DSO, MC.

More detailed comparison amongst the various branches of imperial service are revealing in terms of the officer/man split. Canada, Australia and New Zealand supported all three services, whilst the contribution of the Indian Army was highly significant numerically and geographically. Ten of the awards to Indian and Gurkha troops were won in North Africa and Italy. The Indian Army was significantly more

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37 CAB/106/320, List of Recipients of the Victoria Cross, War Office (M.S. 3), Jan.1953
38 London Gazette, No. 58182, (15 December 2006), p. 17351
39 Appendix 3.2
40 Appendix 3.3
41 Appendix 3.4
meritocratic than the British Army with officers getting only a third of the awards. The most egalitarian service was the Australian Army, with officers only getting 17.5%. The overall colonial rate was officers 41%, other-ranks 59%.

The authorities were keen to ensure that the 61 VCs awarded to the British Army were distributed fairly, revealing the importance of regimental traditions. A detailed analysis is attached as Appendix 3.5, showing that the medals were spread around 43 regiments. Each of the Guard Regiments picked up at least one each as did twenty-three English regiments, four Scottish and two Welsh. Nine other Corps and non-regional regiments were also represented.

As with much work on combat motivation that emanated from U.S. sources, cultural nuances constructed around national identity, as well as organisational differences such as the regimental tradition, suggest that American arguments were often persuasive without necessarily being conclusive. Building upon the Blake and Butler thesis, a reading of all 182 citations resolves into four distinct award orientations that have been applied jointly or severally. In addition to ‘war-winning’ and ‘life-saving’, it is clear that the British award system ascribed great value to ‘leadership’ and, in a more limited number of cases, ‘endurance’. As Field Marshal Slim put it, ‘We, the British, have our own special courage, the courage that goes on - and endurance is the very essence of courage’.42 It is not surprising that two examples of endurance were displayed by RAF bomber pilots. In addition to his leadership of the Dambusters raid, Guy Gibson was cited for completing ‘170 sorties, involving more than 600 hours operational flying’.43 Similarly, Leonard Cheshire was cited for completing 100 missions, ‘In four years of fighting against the bitterest opposition he has maintained a record of outstanding personal achievement, placing himself invariably in the forefront of the battle’.44

44 *London Gazette*, No.36693, (8 September 1944), pp. 4175-4176
Appendix 3.7 reveals the range of orientations, and by aggregating them in Appendix 3.8, it is possible to get a sense of the most prized. For officers, ‘war-winning’ and ‘leadership’ behaviours were dominant. Although ‘life-saving’ was more relevant to other-ranks, it was marked less significant than ‘war-winning’. Specifically, considering the British Army, Appendix 3.9 reveals that for officers, ‘war-winning’ and ‘leadership’ behaviours remained the dominant characteristics. The relevant differences are revealed by the reduction in the display of ‘life-saving’ behaviours and the marked increase in the ‘leadership’ qualities displayed by NCOs.

Three other analyses strongly suggest careful apportionment to give the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number. Appendix 3.6 shows:

1. how the VC was awarded in each year of the war,
2. how it was apportioned by nationality, and
3. balanced according to the area of campaign and intensity of fighting. It is an interesting factoid to note, given its place in the national mythology, that only one VC was awarded to a Battle of Britain pilot.45

The inescapable fact remains that, during the Second World War in the British army, the award of VCs was biased heavily in favour of officers; unless one accepts a eugenicist argument that the rank-and-file from Australia, India and Nepal were inherently more valourous than their British counterparts. It is more cogent to argue that the public symbolism of the awards was required to fit a social context that was more hierarchical than egalitarian. The awards made following the Falklands War provide an opportunity to assess continuity and change.

### 3.5 Falklands Awards

The list of awards for the Falklands conflict was published in a supplement to the *London Gazette* on 8 October 1982 and contained an
assemblage of public service and gallantry awards. To provide a sense of scale, 29,700 South Atlantic campaign medals were issued:

To qualify, the recipient had to have at least one full day's service in the Falkland Islands or South Georgia, or thirty days in the South Atlantic operational zone, including Ascension Island. Additionally, those who qualified under the first condition were awarded a rosette to wear on the medal ribbon.  

The *London Gazette* revealed that this reduced to a modest 809 awards for personal distinction; 143 went to civilians and 666 to the military, of which 465 were for gallantry. This suggests that only 1.6% of the service participants were demonstrably heroic. Officers picked up 222 of the gallantry awards and other ranks 243. When a weighting is applied to these awards, it emerges that officers got 53%. Given the ratio between officers and other ranks (about one in seven) the inference of the linkage between heroism and leadership becomes evident. The land campaign of the Falklands campaign has been described as a war won by junior NCO’s, riflemen and marines. This was to some extent reflected in the split between Army and Marine officers who got 20% of all gallantry awards, whilst their other-ranks got 33%. The bottom-line was that the ordinary soldiers and marines who did most of the hand-to-hand fighting picked up just 19% of the total awards, with 7% awarded to the Marines and 12% to the Army. Appendix 4.1 demonstrates the grading of the awards was also biased in favour of officers and is evidence that the function of awards was to sustain rank, status and leadership. Appendix 4.2 reveals a further and rather more emotive analysis of both Paratroop battalions, demonstrating who won the medals and who did the dying.

It was arguably inevitable that efforts would be made to apportion awards in a manner that limited inter-service rivalries. So each Battalion/Commando that saw tough fighting got a quota of one DSO for each Commanding Officer; two for the Marines, two for the Paras and one for the Scots Guards. Considering awards of MCs and MMs, the Marines got fifteen, the Paras eighteen, and the Scots Guards five. Perhaps to balance up the two VCs that went to the Paras, the Marines picked up the most MiDs

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47 i.e weighted by the proportion of total awards in each category e.g. level 1 weights at 265, Level 4 at 1.9.
with 58 while the Paras had to make do with 33, and the Scots Guards 12. Appendix 4.3 suggests an awards process that was sadly lacking in substance but obsessed with form.

It is interesting to juxtapose those who received nothing with those that did. It might be a cheap shot to single out Mrs Bardsley, the canteen manageress of the Portsmouth NAAFI who got a BEM, but more serious to question the award of the OBE to Lt. Col. John Rickett, the CO of the Welsh Guards, following the avoidable disaster at Bluff Cove (Chapter 4.2). It has been asserted that Rickett was not personally to blame and that it was his subordinate who refused to disembark troops from the Galahad when vociferously encouraged to do so.\textsuperscript{48} Nevertheless, Rickett had a vicarious liability for the disaster, so the award at this particular time, even if it was Buggins Turn, might be regarded as insensitive particularly as the official guidelines state:

Candidates are selected from the nominations put forward on the basis of achievement, for merit and excellence or exemplary service […] [and] should reveal outstanding services in the fairly recent past.\textsuperscript{49}

It might also be argued that even though the Bluff Cove incident rendered the Welsh Guards unfit for further action, as an elite regiment, they could not be seen to have failed.

The next section will consider the evidence to support the assertion from JSP 761 set out above and investigate the processes by which awards are made and, most importantly, how the significance of rewards is reinforced or undermined.

### 3.6 The Mechanics of the Awards Process

According to the official mantra:

Honours and awards are intended as a means of recognising service of outstanding merit beyond the normal demands of duty. Competition is intense and the qualities required of nominees are extremely high. It is essential that great care is taken in selecting personnel


\textsuperscript{49} JSP 761, p.4-2
to be recommended for honours and awards and that the correct procedures are followed at all times. 

The problem is that historically the ‘great care’ has sustained a cumbersome process. During the Second World War, it was not uncommon for a potential recipient to have been killed before the award was made. The system has also been regarded cynically by the fighting forces because of the perception that all too often the wrong people ended up with the awards. Describing a general’s visit during the First World War, Private Herbert Hall commented:

He said, ‘Did any of you people see anything meritorious?’ There wasn’t a single sound […] We thought it was a very unnecessary question, and, of course, to insult us, they awarded the medals to the colonel’s runner and the senior stretcher-bearer.

The primary stage in the process required a recommendation by a serviceman’s CO. Therefore, the first hurdle to overcome has consistently been any deficiency in the relationship between officer and man. Marshall recounted the gallantry of a Second World War infantry sergeant as reported by his peer group, and queried with his company commander why he had not been decorated. The response was telling:

‘When the fighting started, he practically took command away from me,’ he answered. ‘He was leading and the men were obeying him. You can’t decorate a man who’ll do that to you’.

The second stage was to get the recommendation into the bureaucratic machine. The Falklands War awards were decided upon with remarkable rapidity and were published in the London Gazette four days before the Falklands victory parade held in central London. This parade was noted for its celebration of Margaret Thatcher as the agent of victory; therefore, it is not unreasonable to assert that the speed of the awards process served a political imperative. As Connaughton commented, this placed significant pressure on officers to get their recommendations in:

The Brigade Commander [Julian Thompson] to whom all citations within his brigade went, admits that the matter of Falklands citations ‘irks me to this day’. 3 Commando Brigade were given forty-eight hours to get their citations to divisional headquarters,

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50 JSP 761, p.1-1

51 David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 144

52 Levine, Forgotten Voices of the Somme, p. 115

under pressure from Northwood to expedite submissions. The effect of this was to give Commanding Officers twenty-four hours to comply.\textsuperscript{54}

It is evident that the government considered ‘the greatest satisfaction to the greatest number’ would be achieved by subordinating the interests of the deserving individual by giving priority to getting the symbolic heroes in place for public consumption.

The process of writing up a recommendation risked devaluing combat experience. This is because it was necessary for the recommendation to be written in such a manner as to sell it to the approving committees. As a consequence, the recommendations were prone to being exaggerated or were dependent upon the creative writing skills of the recommender.\textsuperscript{55} According to Maj. Alfred Irwin during the First World War:

\begin{quote}
I recommended Captain Gimsun of the Royal Army Medical Corps, for a Victoria Cross […] General Maxey, who was commanding our division, came up the next day and found me writing up Gimsun’s recommendation, and he told me that it wasn’t sufficiently journalistic, and rewrote it for me, and I think that’s why Jimmy didn’t get it.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

By contrast, the 1982 VC citation for ‘H’ Jones has been criticised because not only did it contain some fundamental errors but also offered a substantially sanitised version of events leading up to his undoubtedly brave, but predictably terminal, intervention in the Battle for Goose Green:

\begin{quote}
As a directing staff Colonel at the Staff College has put it, medal citations are written for the readers of the \textit{Daily Mail}. Others might say \textit{Boy’s Own Paper} would be more in tune with some citations […] A medal citation, in explaining why a soldier should be honoured, states what he did to deserve it and goes some way to explaining the circumstances.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

Therefore, it may be argued that if citations are to be taken with a pinch of salt or laughed off as innocent fabrications, then the awards become pointless if their only purpose has been to propagate and propagandise myths.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{54} Richard Connaughton, \textit{A Brief History of Modern Warfare: The True Story of Conflict from the Falklands to Afghanistan}, (London, Constable & Robinson, 2008), pp. 71-72

\textsuperscript{55} Bourke, \textit{An Intimate History of Killing}, p. 124

\textsuperscript{56} Levine, \textit{Forgotten Voices of the Somme}, p. 135

\textsuperscript{57} Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, \textit{Not Mentioned in Dispatches ...: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green}, (Cambridge, Lutterworth, 2002), p. 130

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid
Recommendations for awards are currently made using Form JPA S004. This is required to be countersigned by up to four superior commanders, ideally to include an officer of at least OF 7 rank, each of whom must add supporting remarks and indicate whether their recommendation is either; very strong, strong, or just a recommendation. As JSP 761 states, ‘the value of these comments to honours committees cannot be overstated’. Some issues arise from this process. Firstly, the lower down the hierarchy a recommended soldier is the more detached he is from the recommenders. A private soldier is unlikely to have had many dealings with his CO and is probably unknown to the CO’s superiors. As one Falklands veteran put it:

The CO [Jones] never really knew me or the rest of us lower ranks; it would be stupid to pretend he did. He never knew me as ‘Spud’ and I certainly never heard him being referred to as ‘H’. 

Secondly, no one making or endorsing a recommendation will want to have their judgment questioned by having a recommendation declined, or for recommending an awardee who turns out to be an embarrassment to the military ethos. Much of this will depend on the relationship between the recommenders, and one might reasonably presume that a formal recommendation for a prestigious award will be supplemented by off-the-record confabulations. JPA S004 is submitted to the AFOAC for their recommendation, then potentially to the MODSHC, who recommend to the HD Committee, before finally seeking regnal approval. It is not surprising that, with all these hurdles and elephant-traps very few awards are made. Holmes assessed the consequences:

Whatever men might say in public about decorations, in private they were eager to discuss them at length […] Many of those who were most vocal had themselves been decorated, and were not concerned on their own behalf. Rather, they agreed […] that ‘the monstrously inadequate distribution of awards to the other ranks’ was a flaw in the British system, and they regretted that there were had not been enough awards available for the brave men they had led.

In the aftermath of the Falklands, Wilsey observed that:

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59 JSP 761, p. 1B1 - 1

60 Nigel Ely, For Queen and Country, (London, Blake, 2003), p. 171

61 The principal Government committee for honours and awards

One senior officer declared that after the war ‘medals’ posed more problems than anything the Argentines had done during it […] The process is inherently competitive and very selective […] It is often argued that Britain is too parsimonious in this matter.63

The evidence of the Falklands awards suggests the use of a quota system and many personal accounts of this war are implicitly critical. David Cooper was the padre of 2 Para and commented:

› Chaundler went on to win the Wireless Ridge battle, said to have been the best planned and executed of the whole campaign […] Despite this, Chaundler as the replacement CO received no official recognition, Chris Keeble, having acted one rank up after the death of ‘H’ Jones, received a DSO, as did the other successful COs. The awards were given on a ration basis. The VC was more or less forced by the press and it seemed to boil down to a DSO to each battalion involved in the fighting. In 2 Para, who gets it, Chris Keeble or the CO, David Chaundler? The whole world knew about Chris.64

The quota system is euphemistically referred to in JSP 761 as the Operational Scale. This recognises that different operations will operate at different intensities, and the precise quota for each operation will be recommended to the Queen by the HD Committee. The anchor point cited in the document is for a ‘low-intensity’ operation with a six-monthly quota of 1:1000 awards at levels 1-3 and 1:400 at level 4.65 The quota for the Falklands War, clearly a high intensity operation, appears to have been set at approximately 1:200 and 1:90 respectively. One other rigid quota concerns the issue of the MSM to senior NCOs who have completed 20 years service with an unbroken standard of conduct. A maximum of 201 can be awarded each year.66 Arguably the ‘conduct’ criterion limits the pool of potential candidates.

Perhaps one of the reasons that the authorities have remained steadfastly frugal resulted from the comparisons made with the largesse of the Americans. US forces underwent a process of rampant award inflation during the Vietnam War and issued over 1.2 million awards for bravery.67 This debasement of awards fell to its nadir in October 1983 when 20,000 US troops invaded the Caribbean island of Grenada and faced minor opposition for only three days. The US military then contrived to award 15,000

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65 JSP 761, p. 2-1
66 JSP 761, p. 5-1
67 Cincinnatus, Self Destruction, p.158; Holmes, Acts of War, pp. 355-356
gallantry and distinguished service awards. A positive aspect of the American system that has no British counterpart has been the issue of unit awards. There are four levels of unit citation that can be made in addition to individual awards, the most prestigious of which is the Presidential Unit Citation. Given the importance of group loyalty to motivation such a development could assuage much of the resentment felt by awards considered deserved by participants but not given. It is a subjective opinion, but obvious candidates would be ‘B’ Company of 3 Para for their efforts on Mount Longdon. It would also resolve the tendency to seek reflected glory from the individual award of a unit colleague. In interview, Maj. Philip Neame, OC ‘D’ Company, 2 Para, rather struggled to find words to justify Jones’ VC citation. He acknowledged that it was written in purple prose and considered that it was a justified award for the battalion’s efforts and that it should be shared. Unfortunately, he did not explain how.

Neame emerges as one of the under recognised heroes of the Falklands War and it has been asserted that he was the victim of army politics. Although he received a MiD, there is a body of opinion that believes he should have been awarded the MC, as did the other two rifle company commanders in 2 Para. Similarly, the vernacular Spanish-speaking, Captain Rod Bell used his unique skills not only at the sharp end, but was also heavily involved in the surrender negotiations at Goose Green and Stanley. According to Southby-Tailyour, ‘A great sadness to many friends was that this brave, calm and dignified officer was to receive no recognition at the end of the conflict’. Most controversially, at least in the minds of his peer group, was the failure to posthumously reward Cpl. McLaughlin. According to L.Cpl. Vincent Bramley:

The apparent lottery system of the Reward system provoked an outrage because of its failings, The news that Corporal Stewart McLaughlin was to receive no posthumous award was greeted with dismay and anger by all the privates, the JNCOs and many SNCOs and officers. Let it be clear that, while no one expected a medal, not even the South Atlantic Medal, official recognition was held in high esteem […] Among the men

References:
69 IWM 17139 - Neame, 1996 [on audio tape]
70 Geddes, *Spearhead Assault*, p. 303
72 Majors Dair Farrar-Hockley & John Crosland
73 Southby-Tailyour, *Reasons in Writing*, p. 208
of 3 Para there remains strong agreement. If a corporal can control for the most part of the night the major part of a platoon in addition to his own section, and do duty beyond his rank throughout a brutal, bloody fourteen-hour battle, that soldier deserves the highest decoration. The reasons for this will be explored below.

Good leadership demanded that morale and motivation, following an exceptional performance, should be consolidated and reinforced. Unfortunately in the aftermath of the Falklands War there were a number of examples where achievement was undermined rather than consolidated. One of the most vociferous critics has been Robert Lawrence, famously the original text author and subject of the film *Tumbledown* (1988), named after the battle where he was seriously injured. Despite his gallantry, he felt that the Scots Guards considered his injuries an embarrassment and his attitude a liability, to the extent that when the film was in production a rumour was propagated within the Scots Guards that Lawrence was a bankrupt drug addict. In the opinion of Lawrence's father, his medal presentation by the Duke of Edinburgh was less than satisfactory, ‘He was still talking to him [the doctor] when he pinned on Robert’s medal, hardly even looking at him’. Graham Carter was a private soldier in 2 Para, only six weeks out of training and heavily involved in the action which resulted in the death of his platoon commander Jim Barry. During his voyage home, he was outraged when his replacement platoon commander told him, ‘he did not think I was Parachute Regiment material’. This was a serious error of judgment given that Carter was to be awarded the MM. At a group level, members of 3 Para have been critical of the unsympathetic treatment they received. The Commanding Officer, Lt. Col Huw Pike, was replaced shortly after the war by Lt. Col Rupert Smith. According to Dominic Gray (MiD), ‘The lads felt he had no respect for Falklands veterans or what they had achieved. I felt I had been shat on from a great height’. Tony Gregory commented:

74 Bramley, *Excursion to Hell*, p. 217
76 *Ibid*, p. 104
77 Historiographically referred to as the ‘White Flag’ incident
78 IWM 13004 - Carter, 1992 [on audio-tape]
I still can remember the new CO’s speech on the parade square. I felt he insulted us. I don’t wish to repeat what he said. It infuriated me. I’ve never forgotten it. To me it summed up the army’s attitude. I feel he said it because people up top wanted us out, but if he said it off his own bat then it’s unforgivable.  

One can detect the stentorian echo of a battery sergeant-major who, when the Armistice was announced in 1918, stated, ‘now the war is over, we can get down to real soldiering’. In both instances, it suggests a blimpish inability or an unwillingness to reframe concepts of recognition, respect and esteem in the light of experience. Kevin Connery (MiD) advised that within a year of the Falklands 60 percent of those who had served in the Falklands had left the battalion. Another Falklands veteran, Mark Eyles-Thomas, suggests that much of this turnover was prompted by the new CO’s unsympathetic attitude and a deliberate strategic intent to refocus the battalion. Smith publicly articulated a desire to rebuild the battalion, ‘he had no time for despondency or veterans with complacent attitudes’ and undertook to ease the demobilisation process of those who wished to leave. Lawrence also suffered a demoralising experience whilst recovering from his physical injuries. On a visit to Chelsea Barracks, his new company commander told him, ‘You know I don’t think its very good for morale for the boys to see you limping around […] I’d hurry up and get out of the camp’.

3.7 Creating Heroes

Myths tend to be more palatable for the public than the unvarnished truth. When it comes to handing out the medals the public wants a positive emotional connection to the process. However, the truth remains that to be a hero it has often been necessary to be brutal and uncompromising in battle. Falklands veteran Major Chris Keeble recounted that:

80 Bramley, Two Sides of Hell p. 309
82 Bramley, Two Sides of Hell, p. 331
83 Mark Eyles-Thomas, Sod That for a Game of Soldiers, (Sevenoaks, Kenton, 2007), p. 239
84 Lawrence & Lawrence, When the Fighting is Over, p. 137
It’s savage gutter fighting. Everything you’ve ever experienced before is nothing like it. It’s basic killing [...] I don’t know any ‘best moments’. The whole affair is one of tragedy. War is a messy, dirty, miserable business, and we should never allow ourselves to go to war.\textsuperscript{85}

However, this was not the message that the government wanted to project after the Falklands War. Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative prime minister, was keen to cement herself as the agent of victory and in the process airbrush the failings of her government for allowing the conditions for war to arise. The victory parade that took place on 12 October 1982 was analogous to a Roman triumph. It was not attended by the Royals and Thatcher was the guest of honour. The parade itself was sanitised as only able-bodied veterans were permitted to parade. Certainly the Keeble view of warfare was not to be allowed to pollute the renaissance of a ‘chivalric discourse’.\textsuperscript{86} Thatcher’s Guildhall speech, discussed below, leant heavily on images of justice, glory and heroism. Philip Smith argued that the war was ‘semiotically valorised as a rational, sensible, legal and professional conflict’, that tapped into a manichean British ritual code, which expressed the British as sacred and the Argentines as profane.\textsuperscript{87} With this construction, it is understandable that the heroes, winnowed out from the approval process for individual accolades, should be able to demonstrate that, despite the circumstances of battle, they remained law abiding, moral and rational.

That the British public recognised the need to support injured servicemen from the Falklands cannot be doubted. The South Atlantic Fund raised over £20 million in public donations; however, Robert Lawrence discovered that it was not beyond the authorities to manage this goodwill to their own advantage:

My new Rover, courtesy of Leyland, was eventually delivered to Chelsea Barracks [...] About a year later when my donation from the South Atlantic fund finally arrived. From it had been deducted £11,500 for the car [...] The incident highlighted [...] The exploitation for publicity purposes that many Falklands casualties faced.\textsuperscript{88}

It has been open to those who received the highest awards to achieve great public prominence. There are currently only three living British recipients of the VC.

\textsuperscript{85} Chris Keeble in Peter Kominsky (dir.), \textit{Falklands War: The Untold Story}, Yorkshire TV, 1987
\textsuperscript{86} David Monaghan, \textit{The Falklands War: Myth and Counter-myth}, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 1998), p. 152
\textsuperscript{88} Lawrence & Lawrence, \textit{When the Fighting is Over}, p. 119
John Cruickshank (aged 91), Bill Speakman (aged 84) and Johnson Beharry (aged 32). Despite having to cope with his own demons, Beharry has negotiated a lucrative £1 million publishing deal for his autobiography and during 2011 began to emerge as a television celebrity.\textsuperscript{89} As a ‘soldier-saving’ hero, he is celebrated in the media and features prominently in public commemorations. Beharry was awarded his VC in 2005, the first since the Falklands War.

The comparative rarity of gallantry medals means that recipients (or their heirs) stand to make significant financial gains from medal sales. At issue is the choice that some recipients are forced to make because medals are awarded in substitution of a financial settlement. In November 2009, Lord Ashcroft paid £1.5 million in a private sale for the VC and bar awarded to Captain Noel Chavasse during the First World War. The Medals had originally been bequested to St Peter’s College, Oxford.\textsuperscript{90} In the same month, Spink & Co. auctioned Flight Lieutenant Bill Reid’s World War II VC for £335,000.\textsuperscript{91} These sales raise moral issues that have yet to be worked through in public discourse. These include the profits made by auctioneers and dealers and the extent to which beneficiaries should make a contribution to the welfare of unsung heroes. Another area of nascent concern relates to the treatment of heroes who are forced to sell through economic necessity. In 2009, Captain Ian Bailey, who served as a corporal in 3 Para during the Falklands War, sold his MM and other campaign medals for £70,000. One can empathise with Bailey’s comment that, ‘it was the second hardest decision I have had to make’. He had to do it because of unemployment caused by his war injuries. The response from the MoD was depressingly predictable. Bailey had contacted the Veterans Minister via his MP for help but was advised to contact a charity. The MoD’s rebuttal was that Bailey already received a tax-free pension.\textsuperscript{92} Falklands veteran CSM Brian Faulkner left the army in 1987 and was beset with money troubles. He sold his DCM for £7,000 to a medal dealer but could not bring himself to tell his

\textsuperscript{89} ‘Johnson Beharry’, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article567882.ece [accessed 14 March 2011]; Dancing on Ice, Produced by Granada Productions

\textsuperscript{90} ‘Ian Bailey’, http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6927245.ece [accessed 10 Mar 2011]


wife. Eventually, he came clean when the medal was auctioned and donated to the National Army Museum. According to Faulkner, ‘If I won the lottery I would buy it back tomorrow and then give it back to the National Army Museum, but at least I would know it was wholly mine again’.  

Of the two posthumous VCs awarded in 1982 one has proved controversial and the other not. Sergeant Ian McKay was widely recognised amongst his peer group as a deserving recipient. The only skeleton in his cupboard being that he was involved in the Bloody Sunday incident. He was identified in the *Widgery Report* as Private T and despite firing two shots in technical breach of the Yellow Card rules, escaped censure. However, this has not achieved much purchase in the public domain. By contrast, Jones’ biographer noted:

> The spirit of a force is its heroes and every story has them. This process is fully worked through in the press reports of the most famous of the 255 British dead, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert ‘H’ Jones.

Some context to the gallimaufry of media coverage about Jones was provided by Falklands veteran Ken Lukowiak, and provides a foundation to deconstruct Jones’ motivations as a hero:

> Hero or lunatic, Colonel Jones was a leader of men […] we read in a British newspaper that the late great Colonel Jones was ‘loved’ by his men, that we tragically mourned his death, that the memory of our dead colonel […] had driven us to Port Stanley and ensured us of victory. Bollocks.

It may be asserted that Jones was ‘needs-motivated’ and is a case study for intrinsic motivation. He was launched into the Falklands War as an existential warrior and had he survived it seems likely he would he have relished the VC as a reinforcement of his own values. Had he survived it is much more debatable whether he would have received one. Whilst not an authoritarian, Jones was a fully paid-up autocrat. This manifested itself in a hubristic solipsism that was the antithesis of achievement-motivated biddability. The Eton educated Jones was the scion of a very wealthy family so had a career choice free

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94 IWM 317 - MSS Private Papers of I. J. McKay


96 Lukowiak, *A Soldier’s Song*, pp. 53-54
from financial worries. That he chose the military would probably have come as a
surprise to his contemporaries. He was an introvert and a loner, never achieved any rank
in the Eton Rifles, eschewed responsibility, did not take to team sports and was
academically uninspiring. (anti-intellectualism has historically been regarded as a
military quality). What he did have was a love for military history that combined with a
passion for the romance of heroism.\textsuperscript{97} However, he was admitted to Sandhurst where he
developed a reputation for being short tempered and hasty.\textsuperscript{98} His lack of diplomacy
became evident whilst adjutant in the Devon & Dorset Regiment because of his inability
‘to suffer fools gladly’. At Staff College the directing staff observed, ‘tact and charm do
not come easily to him’ and, ‘I have talked about his arrogance and tendency to ride
roughshod over others’.\textsuperscript{99} Upon his eventual transfer to take charge of 2 Para:

One senior officer in another parachute battalion observed that there were those in 2 Para
who perceived Jones as being, ‘too spicy, too rich, too extrovert and too
unconventional’.\textsuperscript{100}

Immediately prior to the Falklands War, 2 Para was scheduled to be posted to Belize.
The Anglian Regiment was on standby and should have gone to the South Atlantic, but
Jones cut short a skiing holiday, rushed back to London and pulled strings to get his
battalion in the vanguard:

H would have felt his whole service had been in preparation for this historic moment -
that he personally had a destiny to fulfil. This incorrigible military romantic had dreamt
in a thousand dreams of leading a charge against the Queen’s enemies.\textsuperscript{101}

This was borne out by a conversation with Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour whilst on
board \textit{Norland} during the voyage south:

‘H’ looked at me over a mug held in front of his face with both hands, elbows on the
table. ‘This is my big chance, I’m not going to waste it.’ I asked him what he meant. For
years he had dreamt of leading his Parachute battalion into battle and it was as simple as
that […] he knew what he wanted to do with a clarity and determination I found
disturbing.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{97} Wilsey, \textit{H.Jones VC}, p. 43

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid}, p. 109

\textsuperscript{99} Connaughton, \textit{A Brief History of Modern Warfare}, p. 34

\textsuperscript{100} Wilsey, \textit{H.Jones VC}, p. 188

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibid}, p. 194

\textsuperscript{102} Southby-Tailyour, \textit{Reasons in Writing}, p. 172
That Jones was highly critical of his superiors is evidence of his personality. His response to Brig. Thompson’s tactical delays before Goose Green was, ‘I have waited twenty years to go into action and I am not having some fucking marine preventing me now’.103 Robert Fox the BBC correspondent also reports of the fractious relationship Jones developed with Admiral Woodward.104 More pertinently Jones had a very forceful manner with his subordinates and ran his battalion on ‘restrictive control’ principles that allowed very limited scope for individual initiative. Jones wanted to make every decision, he perceived it to be his battle. To do this successfully, it was imperative for him to maintain a clear perspective of his battle plan. It was his job to maintain dynamic leadership, trust to the fighting skills of his subordinates and deploy them to the best of his ability. As Onasander put it describing the behaviour of leaders:

He who is so stupid that unless he comes to close quarters with the enemy believes that he has accomplished nothing worthy of mention is not brave but thoughtless and foolhardy.105

A leader who exposed himself to danger not only frayed the nerves of his subordinates, rather than motivating them, but also risked getting killed in the process, with potentially disastrous consequences for tactical leadership.106 Whilst Jones cannot be criticised for any lack of physical courage, it can be argued that his inability to delegate reveals an implicit lack of moral courage. A quality according to Field-Marshal Slim that is ‘a much higher and rarer virtue’.107

The narrative of events leading up to Jones’ death have been exhaustively described in books and articles. The important questions in the context of his medal citation are firstly, whether Jones made a decisive intervention and secondly, was the award an effective motivator for his subordinates. The answer to both is a resounding ‘No’. The victory was manufactured by his subordinate Chris Keeble. Keeble’s first step

103 Mark Adkin, Goose Green: a battle is fought to be won, (London, Cassell, 1992), p. 92; Wilsey, H.Jones VC, p. 246
105 Frank Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of the Psychological Factors in War, (London, Leo Cooper, 1978), pp. 84-85
106 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 347
107 Slim, Courage and Other Broadcasts, p. 6
was to turn restrictive-control on its head by introducing a policy of mission-command, which allowed his company commanders freedom of action. His second step was to take stock; as Falklands veteran John Geddes succinctly put it, ‘Never play poker with Chris Keeble’. 2 Para was outnumbered, short of ammunition and on their chin-straps. Keeble, with the assistance of Rod Bell, used a mixture of bluff and persuasion to encourage the Argentinian surrender. It required subtle interpersonal skills that Jones does not appear to have possessed to any meaningful degree. Jones’ VC citation describes *inter alia* that:

The devastating [sic] display of courage by Colonel Jones had completely undermined their will to fight further […] This was an action of the utmost gallantry by a Commanding Officer whose dashing leadership and courage throughout the battle were an inspiration to all about him.

The real test is what his subordinates thought. Their testimony contains little in the way of outright criticism and a strong sense of defensiveness. Given the tight bond of group loyalty and regimental tradition this is to be expected. Therefore, it is necessary to read between the lines, consider what they do not say, and note the absence of any sense of fulsome agreement with the citation.

Both Neame and Crosland confirmed that they knew little about Jones’s attack; it did not make much of an impact, it did not affect morale, and Jones did not achieve a great deal with it. Paul Farrar (OC ‘C’ Company) commented that Jones was prone to periods of ‘blind rage’ and inferred a lack of confidence in his subordinates. He did not communicate his intentions. The evidence suggests that the most defensive of the company commanders was Dair Farrar-Hockley (‘A’ Company). It was during a period where Jones had effectively taken control of ‘A’ Company and undermined Farrar-Hockley’s authority that he was killed. According to Connaughton’s research:

108 Geddes, *Spearhead Assault*, p. 296


110 IWM 14597 - Neame, 1994 [on audio-tape]; IWM 17139 - Neame, 1996 [on audio-tape]; IWM 15742 - Crosland, 1993 [on audio-tape]

111 IWM 15612 - Farrar-Hockley, 1995 [on audio-tape]; IWM 17141 - Farrar-Hockley, 1996 [on audio-tape]
Becoming impatient for a result, ‘H’ required Farrar-Hockley to proceed at a pace the latter did not consider sensible […] ‘H’ saw three men die in the unnecessary attempt to force the pace.\textsuperscript{112}

Farrar-Hockley was ‘staggered’ to discover that Jones had led his own attack, and he did not coordinate with him. He most pointedly avoided direct comment on Jones during the battle and asserted that Jones’ contribution to the battalion occurred during peacetime, when he ensured it was trained to the highest standards. He stated he did not know why Jones died and commented, ‘I would rather that wasn’t part of your business’. Jones’ charge had no effect on ‘A’ Company and news of his death did not spread widely or quickly. The success was down to the soldiers and NCOs. Jones’ bodyguard Sergeant Barry Norman acknowledged that his attack did not achieve a lot, was ‘comic book stuff’, and certainly not his job.\textsuperscript{113} A view shared by medical orderly Bill Bentley, who described Jones as both brave and foolhardy.\textsuperscript{114} Sergeant Blackburn, Jones’s radio operator, considered, ‘It was a death before dishonour effort; but it wouldn’t have passed Junior Brecon’.\textsuperscript{115} It should be noted that all of these comments are expressed in the cultural construction identified by Dawson.\textsuperscript{116}

Fitz-Gibbon argued that Jones was shaped by an authoritarian personality. Based upon Dixon’s tests of authoritarianism this must be challenged.\textsuperscript{117} His ‘needs-motivated’ autocratic personality and inability to delegate put him in a straight-jacket; so that, when he reached the tipping point of his competence to command and desperately needed the support of his subordinates, his moral courage failed and he pushed it away. Where Fitz-Gibbon seemed to be spot-on, was in his assertion that the authorities avoided any detailed examination of the evidence and were instead happy to dissimulate ‘some ripping yarns’.\textsuperscript{118} Whilst his award of the highest honour was

\textsuperscript{112} Connaughton, \textit{A Brief History of Modern Warfare}, p. 58

\textsuperscript{113} IWM 17134 - Norman, 1996 [on audio-tape]; \textit{Falklands War: the Untold Story} [on VHS tape]

\textsuperscript{114} IWM 17138 - Bentley, 1996 [on audio-tape]

\textsuperscript{115} Adkin, \textit{Goose Green}, p. 247

\textsuperscript{116} Graham Dawson, \textit{Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinity}, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 3-4


\textsuperscript{118} Fitz-Gibbon, \textit{Not Mentioned in Dispatches}, p. 131
controversial in some military circles (not least in his battalion) there was no suggestion that he did not deserve something. However, for meeting the needs of the public collective his VC ticked all the boxes.

The manufacture of a Falklands narrative extended beyond the role of Jones. As the American historian Barbara Tuchman, distastefully observed:

No nation has ever produced a military history of such verbal nobility as the British. Retreat or advance, win or lose, blunder or bravery, murderous folly or unyielding resolution, all emerge alike clothed in dignity and touched with glory.¹¹⁹

The fact is that public sentiment allowed little place for heroes who do not conform to the chivalric discourse. This is a blinkered myth. It was Bramley’s book, *Excursion to Hell: Mount Longdon a Universal Story of Battle* (1991) that lifted the lid on atrocities allegedly conducted by 3 Para during the Battle of Mount Longdon, and initiated a police investigation. Bramley did not name names but alleged *inter alia* the execution of PoWs and the desecration of corpses. The consequence was that Bramley faced the threat of prosecution. When its unsavoury secrets were revealed it might be argued that the military and the authorities were quick to close ranks and launch *ad hominem* attacks. According to Lucy Robinson’s analysis:

Bramley’s memoir fits the standard structure of a soldier’s story: his background, his youthful criminality, his post-conflict need for resolution and recovery were used to discredit what he had written.¹²⁰

Integral to British military history in general and regimental tradition in particular, has been the protection and nurturing of reputations. This appeared to be the stance of Field Marshal Lord Brammall who spoke on the issue of Falklands War crimes in the House of Lords:

If there is any doubt about whether a prosecution should be brought, the benefit of the doubt should go to those who risked their lives in the national interest […] In view of the lapse of time and the intense warlike circumstances […] there is bound to be doubt. Should not the benefit of that doubt go to those who went 8,000 miles to risk their lives […] for the benefit of the whole nation?¹²¹

¹¹⁹ John Taylor, ‘Touched with Glory’ p. 30


¹²¹ Hansard, HL Deb 09, June 1994, Vol. 555, cc. 1319-22
It has been suggested that Bramley’s revelations posed a threat to the stellar career ascent of Hew Pike. Pike was the CO of 3 Para in 1982, who by 1992 had been promoted to Major-General, and was eventually to retire in 2001 as a Lieutenant-General. Pike was one of the few veterans to be interviewed under police caution in order to account for his knowledge of the allegations.

Corporals Sturge and McLaughlin emerge as flawed heroes, and their actions reveal something of the true nature of an existentialist warrior. A potential culprit for the prisoner shooting was Corporal Gary ‘Louis’ Sturge; a name that is absent from most histories of the Falklands. During the assault on Mount Longdon Sturge has been described as leading his section with bravery, skill and sustained courage.\textsuperscript{122} He also showed a calming leadership when he interposed in the violent altercation between Lt. Cox and his subordinate Cpl. McLaughlin.\textsuperscript{123} As an immediate reward his Company Commander, Dave Collett MC (‘A’ Company), presented him with a captured .45 pistol. However, Sturge’s fall from grace came when he brought in a wounded prisoner and upon enquiring what to do with him was told, ‘put him with the others’. Sturge then shot the prisoner with his new .45.\textsuperscript{124} For someone who had shown such composure up to that point it raises the important question why Sturge interpreted the order to him in such a dramatic manner. Collett has subsequently described Sturge as a ‘loony’. If such is the case then why reward him with a .45 automatic pistol? However, the truth remains shrouded in an impenetrable fog of war. What is evident from a whole range of sources is the ambivalent attitude towards the Geneva Convention and the taking of prisoners, particularly if this was likely to interrupt ‘momentum’. Journalists describe a lecture given onboard Canberra during the voyage to the islands on the subject of prisoner handling:

> ‘Under the Geneva Convention you are not, I repeat not, allowed to stick a bayonet in a newly captured prisoner,’ explained the instructor, a sergeant in 42 Commando. ‘So what do you do if you capture an enemy trench with a couple of wounded Argies still inside?’


\textsuperscript{123} Bicheno, \textit{Razor’s Edge}, p. 272

‘Shoot their heads off,’ came the reply. ‘Quite right. But remember if there’s a TV crew nearby you’ve got to go through all the first-aid rubbish just as if they were your best mates’. 125

It is unclear whether Sturge was immediately arrested or whether Pike held a summary court martial. It was reported in the *Independent* in 1993 that Maj. Peter Dennison of 3 Para witnessed the shooting with *inter alia* Bramley and Cpt. Mason and did arrest Sturge. He made a written report to his superiors although the MoD subsequently claimed no knowledge of it. 126 By complete contrast, Jennings & Weale asserted that Sturge was recommended for a decoration. 127 Given the public taboo surrounding prisoner killing, it is no surprise that the awards committee felt differently, and no evidence emerges that his peer group was troubled by the omission. In any event, Sturge was transferred to 1 Para where he was awarded the soubriquet ‘Line ‘em up Louis’, and retired 12 years later as a colour sergeant.

The peer group was not so sanguine about Cpl. McLaughlin. As late as 2008 a petition appeared on the No 10 e-petitions website seeking to give him a posthumous award. 128 McLaughlin was part of a counter-culture within 2 Para which has been described as being a ‘green-eyed’ boy. 129 His CSM John Weeks, considered McLaughlin was a poor peacetime soldier but born for battle. He appears to have constructed a military personality around the idea of fighting excellence but a disdain for the established hierarchy. He was an aggressive rule breaker who had done time in Colchester’s military prison. 130 According to Graham Tolson, who claimed to have known McLaughlin quite well, he was ‘a character and a bit of a bully’. 131 During the Battle of Longdon he is alleged to have despatched at least one Argentinian with a

127 Jennings & Weale, *Green-Eyed Boys*, p. 163
129 Jennings & Weale, *Green-Eyed Boys*, p. 1
130 Ibid, pp. 71-72
131 IWM 20697 - Tolson, 1996 [on audio-tape]
Walther P38 pistol that he had illegally acquired from a pub in Liverpool,\textsuperscript{132} not that any criticism has been levelled at him for that. The attack on McLaughlin’s reputation followed his death. He was initially wounded and whilst making his way to the RAP was killed by a shell blast. Lt. Cox, with whom McLaughlin had previously had a falling-out, searched his ammunition pouches for spare food and found a batch of severed ears that McLaughlin had collected as souvenirs.\textsuperscript{133} Someone tipped off the padre who then made the discovery public knowledge.\textsuperscript{134} With that disclosure went any realistic chance of McLaughlin receiving an award. When asked in interview about the ears, Weeks was very defensive, did not want to discuss it, and called it ‘a personal thing’.\textsuperscript{135} For those who wish to stand in judgement of McLaughlin, it should be borne in mind that his behaviour, although extreme, was not exceptional. As his subordinate Kevin Connery put it in describing the mood of frenzy that overwhelmed McLaughlin’s section:

\begin{quote}
All around there was killing and death. There was the acrid smell of battle and the awful smell of death. I was getting closer and closer to it. I was awash with adrenalin, floating, not the same guy at all. All the training was taking over, it was becoming instinctive. The smell of battle and death was being absorbed into my body.\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

There are other accounts of Argentine corpses being despoiled for monetary gain or simply for amusement.\textsuperscript{137} In this context, McLaughlin’s actions might arguably have had a certain savage nobility as he clearly did not do it for booty but, perhaps in the spirit of Woodley, for some other symbolic reason. As Bramley put it:

\begin{quote}
In both world wars the Gurkhas […] cut off heads or ears. It is accepted by the government that the Gurkhas do such things. But in the Falklands it was not only the Gurkhas […] Normal standards of behaviour are left far behind and acts occur that are plainly out of character. It is true that victory is in some cases celebrated by the taking of ghoulish souvenirs. I have no doubt I will not be the last soldier to make these observations.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{132} Jennings & Weale, *Green-Eyed Boys*, p. 125
\textsuperscript{133} *Ibid*, pp. 160-161
\textsuperscript{134} Bicheno, *Razor’s Edge*, p. 228
\textsuperscript{135} IWM 20696 - Weeks, (1996), [on audiotape]
\textsuperscript{136} Bicheno, *Razor’s Edge*, p. 266
The public have tended to react badly to such accounts because they reveal a side of combat behaviour that does not fit with the collective view. The authorities, keen to preserve reputations, have also been prone to denial. In August 2011, it was reported that a soldier from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had, whilst in Afghanistan, collected the fingers of dead Taliban fighters. According to General Sir Richard Dannatt (former CGS who retired in 2009), ‘[…] it’s quite outrageous and I’ve never heard of anything like it before’. ¹³⁹ For a man with such an intimate official and unofficial knowledge of the army, his remark may reflect a certain economy with the truth. More recently video footage of American soldiers laughing whilst urinating on the bodies of dead Taliban reveals that the conflation of frenzy, obscene humour and desecration persists and provokes worldwide condemnation.¹⁴⁰

In spite of his souvenir taking, many of McLaughlin’s peers believed that his bravery should have been rewarded. Weeks considered that, ‘He’d been a tower of strength throughout […] He was an extremely brave man’.¹⁴¹ Eyles-Thomas thought, ‘Cpl McLaughlin was simply beyond belief […] His professionalism was unrivalled and his bravery without constraint’.¹⁴² According to Tony Kempster, ‘On that mountain he was an inspiration to us all. He found his hour’.¹⁴³ Dominic Gray sums up a group sentiment:

I read through the medals and was horrified to see some of the names there, but I was utterly disgusted to see who was not, particularly Stewart McLaughlin, my section corporal, who had been killed. His name wasn’t anywhere. I couldn’t believe it. As far as I was concerned then, and still am now, he was robbed. They robbed a dead man of his rightful recognition.¹⁴⁴

In many ways, McLaughlin and Jones are two sides of the same coin. Although their recruitment into the army and eventual roles exemplify entirely different class

¹³⁹ ‘News Review’, in Sunday Times, 14 August 2011, p. 8


¹⁴² Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, pp. 167-168

¹⁴³ Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, p. 221

¹⁴⁴ Bramley, Two Sides of Hell, pp. 318-319
backgrounds, they share the same essential motivational characteristics. Both were ‘intrinsically-motivated’ and ‘needs-motivated’, and both had cultivated an intense warrior ethos. The essential difference was that not only did McLaughlin make a decisive intervention in his battle but also earned the approbation of his subordinates and peers. By contrast, their composure of memory surrounding Jones is much more nuanced. In the context of awards, it does not require a great leap of imagination to understand why an award to McLaughlin would never be acceptable to the public collective and a deaf-ear was turned to the entreaties of his comrades. Despite the demands of popular culture, real-life heroes do not emerge from combat untainted, and a more realistic appreciation of their motivations is required. The expectation that an awards system would fairly recognise outstanding combat performance was not fulfilled during the Falklands War, instead, and with great haste, a quota system provided a formulaic solution to the political imperative. The substance of effective recognition was abandoned on the islands.
Part 2

3.8 Wind Down, Ceremonial, Resettlement and Resolving Trauma

The motivational impact of formal recognition is central to the ‘after combat’ validation of the fighting experience. Its concomitant is reintegration, and this should be considered as a four-part process:

1. Wind down - covering the immediate period after the combat experience and the first steps of reintegration with civil society.
2. Ceremonial - The public commemoration of battles fought and wars won (defeats and stalemates, such as the Korean War, are seldom celebrated).
3. Resettlement - the process by which combatants embed reintegration with the general public both through continued military service and when leaving the armed forces.
4. Resolving Trauma - dealing with the range of emotional fallout from combat that sits on a continuum from stiff upper lip to full-blown PTSD.

In each of these categories, insufficient allowance has been made for the needs of individuals and small groups; instead they have been submerged into the collective. The post combat experience is all too often a life changing one that needs to be carefully managed. Unfortunately, society in general and the military authorities in particular have been slow to recognise this. The British twentieth century post-combat experience is a long slow march to a yet unreached destination.

3.9 Wind down

Describing the announcement of the Armistice in 1918, Corporal Clifford Lane commented:
There was no cheering, no singing. That day we had no alcohol at all. We simply celebrated the Armistice in silence and thankfulness that it was all over [...] We were drained of emotion, that's what it amounted to.  

For the majority of combatants, throughout the twentieth century, the end of hostilities reflected a profound sense of relief and a massive release of tension. There was no immediate place for celebration or revelry. As Jary recalled from 1945, ‘Reaction to the end of the war, like aggression, increased the further behind the lines one went [...] We had learned too much to indulge in shallow demonstrations’. It has been a common feature of all Britain’s wars that those at arms length or peripheral to the actual fighting have been quick to celebrate; however, because they were unaware of the realities of the combat experience, this inhibited their ability to develop a meaningful sense of empathy with those who had done the fighting. Victory was constructed as a group endeavour in which there was little place for the individual; therefore, a paradox emerges in the manner in which the psychiatric well-being of combatants has been viewed. Ellis explained this by comparing, ‘the mind numbing vastness of the whole military effort’, with the individual ‘sense of inconsequentiality, bewilderment and helplessness’. There has been a strong sense of detachment between those who have fought and those that have not. According to historian and Falklands veteran Hugh McManners:

Being bloodied in combat is an initiation rite, a graduation ceremony for soldiers that has no equivalent in any other walk of life. It affects them for the rest of their days, and separates them from the rest of humanity.

At a group level, there was arguably more of a presumption that the adverse effects of combat were capable of a quick-fix. A discussion of the experiences of the IDF following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War suggested that the American doctrine of forward treatment (a brief period of rest, food and rehydration) successfully resulted in a rapid return to combat duty. Whether this outcome was only effective in the short term and left unresolved issues for the future remains an open question. The extent to

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148 McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 118

which professional intervention was a necessary concomitant of the wind-down process remained unresolved at the time of the Falklands War. Clinical psychiatrist Jonathan Shay argued that, ‘What a returning soldier needs most when leaving war is not a mental health professional but a living community to whom his experience matters’. By contrast Jolly stated, ‘For some reason that I have never yet seen explained satisfactorily, the Army did not even send a field psychiatric team down to the South Atlantic’. However, both were agreed on the power of primary groups to develop their own talking cures. The agency of the primary group derived from the fact that not only did the combatants have a shared experience but also a shared ethos in the way that their emotions had been task-conditioned from their earliest days of enlistment. According to Jolly, ‘[experiences] loosened by the sensible use of alcohol. This was the best form of post-incident “counselling” that there could ever be’. Kiszely took his company to a farm on West Falkland:

> We unwound, and most nights we met for a few beers, had a sing-song, talked about those who had not made it, that sort of thing. As a result, by the time we eventually got back to Britain […] we had got a lot of the battlefield out of our systems.

Both battalions of the Parachute Regiment that served in the Falklands were, for part of their journey home, embarked on MV *Norland* and conducted a wind-down in their own spirited manner. David Brown described how the briefing was to go home, get drunk and forget about it. For him, the wind-down was all too perfunctory and twenty years after the war he still suffered from unresolved PTSD. The catalyst for the Paras was Airborne Forces Day. In a masterpiece of understatement CSM John Richens

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152 Ibid


154 Brown provides an example of MoD largesse. Before embarkation soldiers were given the opportunity to phone home but were charged £10.

155 IWM 23277 - Brown, (2002), [on audiotape]
described it as a sports-day and a wind down with, ‘a few good drinks’. In reality, it was an internecine riot as the rank-and-file of 2 and 3 Para laid into each other:

Why did the riot start? We all agreed overwhelmingly that the brass’s small issue of beer on Airborne Forces Day infuriated most of us because it added to our frustration. We also agreed that the riot had resulted from a massive release of the tension caused by our personal experiences during the war. Our punishment was no drinking for about two days. However, by this time we all had our secret supplies anyway.

The modesty of the punishment may well reflect the expectation of the authorities that trouble was likely, and their sense of relief that they had not embarked the Royal Marines, the Paras oldest adversaries, on the same boat. For some the wind-down experience was enough. Bill Bentley, a medical orderly with 2 Para left the army immediately after the war and resolved his experience into memories of comradeship and exhilaration. He felt he left the army on a real high and referenced lost colleagues as ‘heroic deaths’.

Similarly, Lou Armour stated:

Coming home was great. I was feeling pretty good along with everybody else. I felt great because I had the best compliment you can get if you’ve been in that situation [...] Your lads turning round and telling you that they thought you were bloody good down there, that you’d handled the section well.

It took several years for Armour to come to terms with his experience as evidenced by his emotional reaction on a television documentary. After a pause in the recording he haltingly commented, ‘It’s took me four years to cry about a few dead people’.

The downside of the wind-down process, where there is arguably a place for professional intervention, related to the expectations of homecoming. Myth and tradition and the manner in which the media manipulate them, have had a strong part to play in framing these expectations. In essence, homecoming has often been placed within the romance quest myth. A fantasy was often created around notions of a social debt owed to the victor. The problem was that families did not necessarily share this

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156 IWM 16074 - Richens, (1995, [on audiotape]

157 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, p. 203

158 IWM 17138 - Bentley

159 Michael Bilton & Peter Kominsky, Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, (London, André Deutsch, 1989), p. 239

160 Falklands War: The Untold Story, [on VHS]
fantasy and simply expected life to resume seamlessly.\textsuperscript{161} These unrealistic expectations have been described by Holmes as ‘a perfection of paradise’.\textsuperscript{162} Holmes also asserted that although the soldiers of the Parachute Regiment were keen to get the Falklands War over and done with, their readjustment was ‘relatively easy’.\textsuperscript{163} Emerging evidence would suggest that this needs to be qualified.

David Cooper, the Chaplain of 2 Para, described Airborne Forces Day as ‘quite a party’, although there is no suggestion that he joined in with all the celebrations. He had a qualified view on the role of professional counselling, considering it suitable for some. However, he did recognise that most soldiers struggled to articulate their experiences to family and the wider public which, in turn, led to a sense of divorce from the wider community. A point that Cooper did not grasp was that the role of the professional in these circumstances was to provide the returning serviceman with techniques and reference points around which a meaningful and shareable narrative may have been constructed. Cooper’s own sense of disjointure arose from the demands of some families for repatriation of the dead whom he considered had been properly buried on the Falklands. On arriving home, the Paras were immediately sent on a long leave of several weeks. Cooper thinks that this was a mistake and the battalion should have been kept together for longer;\textsuperscript{164} there is evidence to support this view. The Parachute battalions were disembarked from \textit{Norland} as Ascension Island, and completed their journey home by aeroplane. As one combatant noted:

I looked around the arrivals lounge. Families, at first glance appeared to be enjoying their reunions and tears were flowing everywhere. On closer inspection though, I noticed the lads seemed dazed, confused, and unable to interact comfortably with the people they had known for years. It all seemed so awkward and false.\textsuperscript{165}

In a state of continued confusion, febrile feelings lurched between anger and guilt. Anger often initiated by the jingoistic attitude of, ‘did you kill any Argies?’ and guilt


\textsuperscript{162} Holmes, \textit{Acts of War}, p. 403

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid}, p. 397

\textsuperscript{164} IWM 13419 - Cooper, (1993) [on audiotape]

\textsuperscript{165} Eyles-Thomas, \textit{Sod That}, p. 209
arising not only from survival, but also the sense of a rapid assimilation of experience that transmuted naivety to a grim understanding of the realities of close-combat warfare. Bramley described feeling like an alien and experiencing a strong sense of unreality that manifested itself in anger at the sense of normality of the general public living a normal and untroubled life:

What hit me most was that I really hated the leave at first. It was so fucking boring. There was no way I could relax. If I had been asked to go and do a tour of duty in Ireland I would have gone. More than anything I felt the pinch of no longer having my friends around me. We had been together so tightly over the last few months that it was as if now I had severed an arm.166

Connery described the extended leave period as ‘boring and frustrating because we were still hyped up inside’. He explained that there was no formal debriefing procedure and that essentially they were cast adrift for the leave period. Many sought solace in alcohol with the implicit suggestion that this tested domestic relationships. According to Connery, the divorce rate of Falklands veterans soared during the subsequent years.167 Armour had a similar experience, ‘I didn’t go home for the first few days. I didn’t like all the flag waving […] Strangers would come up and say something stupid like ‘did you kill anybody?’’.168 Lieutenant Alistair Mitchell of the Scots Guards provided evidence that a similar attitude existed within the military:

People in the army who weren’t in the Falklands say to me ‘It must have been a great experience.’ I’m not convinced […] It’s not the sort of thing I’d like to go and do every morning before breakfast, frankly. And I didn’t enjoy it in any sense of the word at all.169

The argument that emerges endorses the Shay/Jolly view that the best means of winding-down from the combat experience was to allow the combatants time to talk it out amongst themselves. However, the military has tended to eschew matters of the mind, and arguably missed a trick in the provision of psychological aftercare. A combination of talking cures within the primary group and a steer from an effective counsellor may have mitigated some of the short term issues of reintegration. What is evident is that the group needed to be kept together until it had a chance to properly wind-down and this, despite the euphemism, probably included the need for a physical

166 Bramley: *Excursion to Hell*, pp. 209-210
167 Bramley, *Two Sides of Hell*, p. 331
168 *Falklands War: The Untold Story*, [on VHS]
169 Bilton & Kominsky, *Speaking Out*, p. 211
release through managed violence. Moran cited a naval surgeon-commander from the Second World War:

Into a bar in Malta walked part of the crew of a destroyer that had recently arrived from Norway, pushing people aside and saying ‘make way for the heroes of Narvik.’ In the bar were members of my ship’s company who had been bombed frequently for six weeks. The battle royal which followed nicely illustrated the elation and aggression of the two crews.\(^{170}\)

Unrelieved aggression has consistently required an outlet. Ferguson gave the example of addictive violence being practiced after the Great War on Irish Republicans by the ‘Black and Tans’ and the ‘Auxies’.\(^{171}\) Following the Falklands War, a Marine from 40 Commando (who had not fought) ominously commented on the voyage back home, ‘God help the IRA when we get back to Northern Ireland. We’ve got a lot of pent up aggression to get rid of’.\(^{172}\) The important point is that if combatants did not have the opportunity to let off steam, aggression may have been externalised, or internalised with the potential to fuel post-traumatic disorders. Whilst the collective may have been keen to commemorate a job well done, the combatant may have been dumped into ceremonials with a strong personal sense of unfinished business.

### 3.10 Ceremonial

Commemorative rituals provide a behavioural template, facilitate grieving, assist in the adaption of those wounded by combat, and can act as a ‘powerful catalyst for change’. Yet the subject of reunion is under researched.\(^{173}\) Television commentators may reverentially extemporise about formal ceremonies being an expression of individual commemoration expressed in a group environment. However, combatants who buy this line of flummery or expect ceremonial to be focussed on their endeavour are likely to be disappointed. Scratch the veneer and public commemorations are exposed as explicitly

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\(^{172}\) McGowan & Hands, *Don’t Cry For Me*, p. 183

political; Establishment events that work to a robust nationalist template of remembrance. As Kevin Foster has argued, this template represents; glory not gore, heroism not destruction, noble sacrifice not the cost of wasted life. The reinvented form of ceremonial that began during the late nineteenth century has been the major driving force in articulating and impelling the memory of a dominant collective, defined by Ashplant et al. as ‘Official Memory’. These memories are refined as carefully selected images and narratives from new wars that are bound to those of the past. They seek to create a compelling narrative that will bind citizens to the state by inviting them to participate in what Benedict Anderson has termed an ‘imagined community’. The sense of nostalgia that is implicit within this narrative is reinforced by a taste for ceremonialism. This is expressed in the anachronistic appurtenances of full-dress uniform, spit and polish, and well-drilled parades. The positive aspect of ceremonial that sustains motivation arises because it not only reinforces self-esteem and group solidarity amongst the armed forces, but also strengthens empathy with the wider public. However, it is also a device for dealing with the fear of insecurity, and encourages procrastination in matters of necessary military management and reform.

Cultural historian George Mosse was explicit about what he termed the ‘Myth of War Experience’; the purpose of the dominant myth has been to ameliorate death during wartime by making it meaningful, legitimate and sacred; in order to make ‘an inherently unpalatable past acceptable, important not just for the purpose of consolation but above all for the justification of the nation in whose name the war had been fought’. Ultimately it persuades future generations that the ultimate price of citizenship, dying for your country, is acceptable. In the aftermath of the Great War,

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179 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, pp. 7-8
the commemoration of war dead required a national centre around which the collective could coalesce. It continued the trend of invented tradition that had developed with ‘particular assiduity’ in the decades before the war. The Tomb of the Unknown Warrior had been constructed in Westminster Abbey, which was too small for public commemorations. It was one reason for the construction of the Cenotaph in Whitehall. Another was the fear that bolshevism might gain a hold in Britain and a new public monument would arouse a spirit of patriotism.

In 1995, official celebrations were held to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of VE Day. During the planning process, official memory excised the contribution of black African troops in Italy and North Africa; consequently they were not to be represented. After protests were voiced, they were granted a rather lacklustre and mediocre recognition. These soldiers were an example of what Winter has termed a ‘Fictive Kinship’, a small group whose shared memory might not fully integrate with the collective and thus be excluded. To gain the visibility, recognition and reward that these groups felt they deserved required a refashioning of the official memory, and this did not come easily. To shift from the margins to the mainstream is often a protracted, contested, conflicted and highly political process, this is because becoming part of the dominant narrative might often have meant forcing change upon another more established kinship group.

The RBL celebrated its ninetieth anniversary in 2011, and it fulfils a dominant Establishment role in the politics of commemoration. Its first President was Field Marshal Douglas Haig and is currently Falklands veteran John Kiszely. It is most associated with the annual Remembrance Day commemorations. During the mid 1970s, the RBL saw off proposals by the Home Office to do away with this annual festival.

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181 Mosse, Fallen Soldiers, p. 95


183 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, The Politics of War Memory, p. 29
successfully resisting ideas to modernise it and make it more relevant.\textsuperscript{184} The RBL has also proven to be selective about participation in its events. The War Widows Association was formed in 1971 as a kinship group campaigning for removal of the tax burden from the war widows’ pension.\textsuperscript{185} It was not until 1982 that the War Widows were permitted on the Remembrance Day parade. Other groups that have struggled for recognition include the Shot at Dawn Campaign that in November 2006 gained a posthumous pardon for soldiers of the Great War executed for military offences.\textsuperscript{186}

As late as 2008 there was a call (as yet unheard) for a campaign medal to recognise the aircrew of Bomber Command who risked a 50% survival rate during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{187} Although there is a plaque in Westminster Abbey honouring Fighter Command; there is none for Bomber Command. The aircrews have been forced to share in what Walzer described as ‘the dishonoring of [Air Chief Marshal] Arthur Harris’.\textsuperscript{188}

In July 1982, the Archbishop of Canterbury led a thanksgiving service after the Falklands War in which he offered up a commemoration for the Argentine dead. British troops tended not to be motivated by demonisation, they fought as professionals and were quick to reconcile with their enemy. So, whilst Robert Runcie’s message may have struck a chord with the British veterans, not so with the government. According to the \textit{Independent} newspaper:

The prime minister was said to be ‘spitting blood’ over the archbishop's ‘unpatriotic’ attitude in playing down the British victory and offering prayers for dead Argentinian soldiers.\textsuperscript{189}

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\textsuperscript{184} ‘Cenotaph Service Almost Abandoned’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1506534/Cenotaph-service-was-almost-abandoned.html, (29 December 2005), [accessed 23 September 2011]
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\textsuperscript{185} http://www.warwidows.org.uk
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\textsuperscript{188} Michael Walzer, \textit{Just and Unjust Wars}, (New York, Basic, 2000), pp. 323-325
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Arguably the group that has struggled most for the full measure of recognition has been those injured in mind or body. Official remembrance has not yet found a comfortable manner in which to juxtapose the myth of glorious death with the all too visible evidence of disfigurement and injury.

The Falklands War experience has been incorporated within the national repertoire of commemoration. An interesting and perhaps telling point is that many of the personal accounts of the war did not integrate formal public commemoration or invest it with a sense of closure, and some testimonies suggest why. Bill Belcher, who was seriously injured when co-pilot of a Scout helicopter, believed that words of commemoration such as ‘hero’, ‘glory’ and ‘sacrifice’ were misused.  

190 At the higher reaches of the pecking order Brig. Thompson commented that:

The homecoming was a marvellous experience in that it showed the appreciation of the country to the young men for what they had done, and I am glad it happened from that point of view […] [people] were perhaps putting the wrong connotation on what had happened, revelling in the fact of victory for the wrong reasons, as if it had been a football match, which it was certainly not.  

191 The bottom end of the chain of command articulated substantially the same sentiment:

It felt somewhat contradictory that people were cheering us as we went to remember our dead but at the same time I cannot deny feeling warmth and pride that people held the Regiment in such high regard.  

192 The essential point is that the formal acknowledgements of Falklands victory accorded with Establishment protocols, not concerned with individual or primary group rehabilitation but cementing the citizen to the state. In 1982, this was undertaken with a calculated intensity that starkly identified the war as a Conservative and Thatcherite victory that marginalised alternative political representations.  

193 Taylor asserted that, ‘The Falklands War was transmuted into the most important British policy event since Suez [and it] changed the zeitgeist in this country’.  

194 Two speeches made by Margaret Thatcher (Appendix 5) provide compelling evidence of this. In the ‘Cheltenham’

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190 IWM 13187 - Belcher, on audiotape, [recorded 1992]
191 Bilton & Kominsky, Speaking Out, p. 230
192 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, p. 230
194 Taylor, ‘Touched with Glory’, p. 18
speech, Thatcher projected herself as the agent of victory and custodian of the national myth. Those who legitimately sought alternative political and diplomatic solutions to the crisis were dismissed as ‘the waverers and the faint-hearts’. Victory in war was explicitly conflated with economic policy and trade union leaders implicitly branded as the enemy. In the briefer ‘Salute to the Task Force’ speech, peremptory expressions of grief and sorrow were subordinated in favour of celebration and triumphalism ending with a Churchillian anaphoric flourish. At the heart of these speeches was the notion that Britain had ‘re-lived’ the Second World War, establishing it as ‘the very essence’ of collective identity. Therefore, it might be argued that the Thatcherite revalidation of war as an effective instrument of foreign policy provided the political foundation for Britain’s subsequent ‘Desert Sands’ campaigns.

In September 1982, Mass Observation initiated a follow up survey (Directive 9) to gauge public reaction to the Falklands commemorations. The 109 respondents only represent a small sample; however, a subjective analysis suggests that: 33.9% expressed unconditional approval, ‘fitting and traditional’ [F191]; 30.3% expressed qualified approval or low interest, ‘People are more concerned with their own problems’ [C118]; and 35.8% expressed outright disapproval, ‘Staged to restore the Tory Government image’ [C12]. One of the more perceptive respondents noted, ‘It seems sad that so few of the wounded were invited’ [A13]. Monaghan asserted that the army and the Establishment were embarrassed about a public display of injury, because to recognise it required ‘calling into question the heroic myths that make wars acceptable’. Bramley’s testimony reveals that this was at odds with the experience of combatants:

I still feel a bit angry that the wounded went unnoticed. A propaganda film on the task force's arrival home showed only the Para and the Marines and a Navy homecoming. Can you remember the badly wounded coming through the gates? I think not. Nobody wants to see the effects of carnage.

Another veteran, Robert Lawrence, interpreted this as a deliberate policy, ‘All family and press were banned from meeting us at Brize Norton. I learned only later, because it

196 Monaghan, The Falklands War, pp. 158-159
197 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, pp. 210-211
appears they didn’t want badly injured people [...] to be seen’. Traumatophobia (fear of injury) was a consistently powerful de-motivator. Stouffer et al. (1949) determined that it was the most significant stressor. In 1982, around 65% of soldiers were most concerned about injury. The perceived failures of the authorities adequately to support the injured (Chapter 3.11) has, through memory composure, the power to modify pre-combat motivations. Since the Falklands War, and particularly as a result of IED injuries incurred during the recent desert campaigns, public representation of combat injury has improved but remains heavily mediated. High-achieving combat paraplegics who run marathons, race boats and adventure to remote places are celebrated as heroes who can overcome adversity; however, those who do not or cannot, remain in the shadows.

3.11 Resettlement

After the First World War, George Coppard was, ‘Demobilised just after his twenty-first birthday, with four and a half years service, picking up a £28 gratuity and handing in his greatcoat for the £1’. Then he was cast adrift to find work in an over-saturated market, ‘It was a complete let down for thousands of men like me, and for some young officers too’. Revealing a multi-generational continuity, Falklands veterans were also to find themselves subject to the caprices of the market. The single mindedness that the Conservative government had applied to winning the war was now turned on the veterans. As Foster argued, ‘In the government’s adherence to the letter of the bureaucratic law, its grudging provision of benefits, and its steadfast refusal to concede moral compensation or recognition’. Compared with the American experience, it is hard to dispute this view. In 1944, the U.S. Government introduced the

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198 Lawrence & Lawrence, *When the Fighting is Over*, p. 52

199 Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, pp. 271-272

200 Peter Bates, ‘An Investigation into whether religion has a place on the battlefield and whether it has any influences on the British soldier’, (unpublished masters dissertation, Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science School of Defence Management, 1995), p. A2-8

201 Holmes, *Tommy* p. 620

202 Foster, *Fighting Fictions*, p. 152
G.I. Bill which provided a range of educational benefits and business development loans to returning veterans.\textsuperscript{203} The Act has been through numerous iterations since 1944 and remains integral to the U.S. Military, recognising that generous educational support for its service leavers is a key incentive to join-up, particularly for those from disadvantaged backgrounds.

British Armed Forces resettlement policy is enshrined within JSP 534.\textsuperscript{204} For servicemen who enlisted before September 2002 leaving the armed forces under a normal discharge, settlement support is only available for those with more than three years service. For service between three and five years, this is restricted to JFO and is limited to preparing a job plan with a consultant, to be used in conjunction with Job-Centres and local ex-service welfare organisations. For those who joined after 2002, the JFO threshold was increased to service between four and six years. Leavers with longer service receive full CTP support that provides career workshops, internal and external training, comprehensive job profiling, support in job applications, and two years post-discharge support. In addition, GRT of between twenty and thirty-five days can be dedicated to resettlement activity. On the face of it, CTP and GRT resettlement provision appears adequate rather than generous until one considers that the average length of service for a combat infantryman is only five and a half years, so most leavers do not get it. This raises a problem of motivation because the purpose of resettlement support is to build up intrinsic motivators that can be applied to civilian life, and to provide the leaver with a focussed sense of purpose about how their military skills can be applied to a new career. Because service life is highly organised, many leavers are cast adrift without anyone to tell them what to do or how to do it. Consequently, many fail to adapt effectively.

There is a serious problem around the number of ex-servicemen who are in prison. Within the last few years, a survey by the National Association of Probation Officers estimated that up to 8,500 ex-servicemen (most of whom are ex-army infantry) are in prison out of a total prison population of around 92,000. The findings were

\textsuperscript{203} The Servicemen's Readjustment Act

\textsuperscript{204} The Tri-Service Resettlement Manual, JSP 534, Issue 2, Apr 04
disputed by the Ministry of Justice and the MoD, whilst the Howard League of Penal Reform thought that the figure was between 3% and 8% of the total prison population, which made it the largest incarcerated occupational group. The sad truth is that no one knows an accurate number or has a gauge of the underlying causes. PTSD, Depression, alcoholism, and return to a combination of poverty and dysfunctional family life have all been put forward as reasons.

Therefore, the question arises as to what has the MoD done to ensure that resettlement provisions are adequate and appropriate.

In 2008, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee reported on a number of key weaknesses. Amongst their key recommendations were:

1. Additional support should be targeted at early service leavers as the MoD was perceived by the Committee to offer resettlement support as a reward for long service to leavers, many of whom did not really need it.

2. Because resettlement support was weak and poorly monitored for early service leavers, the MoD needed to introduce improved quality assurance measures including feedback from leavers.

3. COs have not made it easy for service leavers to obtain resettlement support because of operational pressures. The MoD needs to require COs to give resettlement its necessary priority and attention.

4. The MoD needs to identify why the take up of, and satisfaction with, CTP is lower amongst junior ranks than with officers.

5. Because unemployment is higher amongst early service leavers, the MoD needs to grasp the full extent of the problem and provide more support to those likely to be effected.

6. Some leavers have housing problems, and the MoD should work with local authorities to ensure adequate provision.

7. The MoD has done little to advertise its provision of mental health support to veterans and needs to improve its screening of leavers for potential risks.

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206 HC 351, Ministry of Defence: Leaving the Services, 18 July 2008
These were overt criticisms and were framed around addressing problems that the MoD has allowed to become entrenched for many years. Injured Falklands veterans have been amongst the most vituperative and trenchant in their observations of the MoD. Robert Lawrence’s father, a retired RAF Wing Commander with an insight into the machinations of the MoD commented, ‘I just could not believe my eyes. He was being discharged […] with no guarantee of a pension […] without even a release medical to confirm he was fit enough for discharge’.\textsuperscript{207} Jim Mitchell was also a Scots Guardsman injured on Mount Tumbledown; unlike Lawrence, he reflected positively on the help the regiment has tried to give him. He stayed in the army for four and a half years after being injured, but in a very taciturn interview from 1992, advised that he could no longer hold down a job as his medical condition was becoming progressively worse. He expressed bitterness at being reduced to a number and thrown on the scrapheap by the MoD. It tainted his view of official commemoration as he felt that only Second World War veterans could associate with Remembrance Day. With an awful lot of pushing from his interlocutor, he summarised his Falklands experience as, ‘whole life fucked up on Tumbledown’.\textsuperscript{208} The advice from the vilified Scots Guardsman Philip Williams was ‘Don’t come back injured. You won’t fit the system if you do. They don’t want injured heroes. They simply don’t know what to do with them’.\textsuperscript{209} Jerry Phillips of the Parachute Regiment endorsed regimental loyalty and support but accused the MoD of incompetence and parsimony, commenting that he received no advice whatsoever about his entitlements, and it took him nearly six years to work out how to claim for his war disability. As payments were only made from the date of claim and not the date of discharge, he calculated that the MoD has denied him £32,000, ‘All I get is the cold shoulder and letters full of bullshit and regulations. The government did fuck all to help me and the rest of us’.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{207} Lawrence & Lawrence, \textit{When the Fighting is Over}, p. 135

\textsuperscript{208} IWM 13020 - Mitchell, (1992), [on audiotape]


\textsuperscript{210} Bramley, \textit{Two Sides of Hell}, p. 328
In 1997, Denzil Connick, formerly of the Parachute Regiment, co-founded SAMA 82 with Rick Jolly, the Senior Medical Officer of 3 Command Brigade. Connick believed that Lt. Col. Hew Pike was highly supportive of his injured soldiers despite the intransigence of the rest of the Army. He recalled being interviewed by a well-meaning army officer who was neither qualified nor experienced to offer any support for Connick’s problems (paraplegic with PTSD). It was not until 1994 that he discovered that he was entitled to a pension supplement because no one had told him, ‘The Government doesn’t tell you and doesn’t seem to bloody care’.211 No doubt Connick’s experiences were a key motivator to set up SAMA 82 as a welfare organisation, ‘[…] and ensure that due consideration is given to the interests of all Falkland veterans’.212 It currently has over 1,000 members, for many of whom PTSD is an enduring challenge. In 1997, John Ellis aphoristically commented, ‘The army still has no adequate counselling procedures for disturbed Falklands veterans […] it is yet to devise a decent army boot’.213 In recent years, the footwear has improved, but the unravelling story of the impact of combat on the mind has yet to reach a meaningful conclusion.

3.12 Resolving Trauma

Kellett argued that, ‘Combat motivation can be profoundly affected by casualties, both to the soldier himself, or to his comrades or unit’.214 However, one certainty that emerges from a study of the stress reactions of combat is that it has been massively under-researched both from historical and medical perspectives. Because campaigners have effectively politicised the issue, new areas of research are beginning to emerge. Although PTSD was formally recognised within the medical canon in 1980,

211 Bramley, Two Sides of Hell, pp. 293-297
214 Kellett, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Belenky, p. 224
it took the MoD until 2003, as ‘part of its duty of care’, to commission a study into the psychological welfare of the UK armed forces. Under the aegis of Professors Simon Wessely and Christopher Dandeker from KCL, this three-phase study of over 20,000 service and ex-service personnel is due to complete in 2013. Currently the MoD is keen to report a low incidence of probable PTSD that is not out of kilter with that found in the general population. Whether or not this is a panglossian jumping of the gun remains to be seen, because at present, no one really knows. Reaction to stress is clearly a key factor in combat motivation. However, as a major research project is clearly desirable, it is outside the scope of this thesis to provide anything other than a context for how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have been shaped by the experience of, and attitudes towards, stress reactions to combat. Evidently, such reactions are immediate and/or long-term, whilst attitudes towards such stress sit on a continuum. This ranges from the enduring attitude that stress is either a failure of character, an excuse for malingering or the manifestation of a compensation culture; to the view that substantially all combatants suffer some form of stress reaction, albeit that the majority never report their symptoms, are never properly diagnosed, and develop their own coping mechanisms. Past performance suggests that developing a robust hypothesis will not be easy because the obstacles to be overcome include: a military culture wedded to notions of character and leadership, a mistrust of psychologists, official parsimony and concern about compensation claims, and personal constructions of masculinity abjuring symptoms of mental fragility.

The polarised arguments that, on one hand blamed susceptibility to shell-shock on a deficiency of character, and on the other, a natural reaction to intolerable circumstances, were aired during the Lord Southborough’s special enquiry, convened in April 1920, to investigate the issue. It was evident that many witnesses brought with them jaundiced views concerning the fecklessness of the lower classes as well as


216 ‘Health and Wellbeing’, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/HealthandSafety/Healthresearch/AStudyIntoTheHealthAndWellbeingOfTheUkArmedForces.htm [accessed 26 September 2011]
stereotypical prejudices against Jews and Irishmen.\textsuperscript{217} Charles Wilson (Lord Moran) was also an influential witness. He concluded that, ‘The man who felt no fear […] was hardly to be found in that war, at any rate amongst officers’.\textsuperscript{218} It led him to the conclusion:

\begin{quote}
Courage is will-power, whereof no man has an unlimited stock: and when in war it is used up, he is finished. A man’s courage is his capital and he is always spending. The call on the bank may be only the daily drain of the front line or it may be a sudden draft which threatens to close the account.\textsuperscript{219}
\end{quote}

There was a general view amongst the committee that shell-shock could affect any type of individual. Nonetheless, the notion that all men were vulnerable to shell-shock had its opponents. Some doctors simply dismissed shell-shock as cowardice; whilst Lord Gort\textsuperscript{220} asserted that, because shell-shock was never found in first class units its occurrence was almost entirely a failure of morale that, ‘must be looked upon as a form of disgrace to the soldier’.\textsuperscript{221} His prescription was that discipline and drill would solve the problem provided that officers were trained to master soldiers in the same manner as they mastered horses.\textsuperscript{222}

The conclusions of \textit{Southborough} were predictable in that they advocated better selection and training, and determined that shell-shock should not be an official term (mental illness would be regarded as any other somatic condition unconnected with battle). What the committee failed to do was grasp the essence of the problem. It ducked the issue of causation and left the challenge of compensating the injured, whilst penalising the malingerers, unresolved. It is a position that remains entrenched within

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{218} Moran, \textit{Anatomy of Courage}, p. 4
\bibitem{219} \textit{ibid}, p. XVI
\bibitem{220} Entrenched within the establishment, Gort was responsible for the retreat to Dunkirk in 1940 and was promoted to Field Marshal in 1943
\bibitem{221} Bogacz, ‘War Neurosis’, p. 239
\bibitem{222} \textit{ibid}
\end{thebibliography}
military culture; protect the injured man who had earned his spurs, but reject the man who has not earned any compassion.²²³

At the start of the Second World War, many of the lessons and much of the experience gained during the First World War, had been incorporated within civilian society.²²⁴ However, in the British army there were only six regular officers within the medical corps with any degree of psychiatric training.²²⁵ This suggests that the military mind strongly averred towards Gort’s analysis. Mental breakdown would be prevented by the right sort of selection, training and leadership. This was the view the RAF took about their aircrews; their initial approach was draconian until experience revealed the opposite. The term ‘Lack of Moral Fibre’ was introduced as an attempt deliberately to stigmatise those who temporarily refused to fly. It did not distinguish between exhausted ‘battle hardened’ warriors and terrified recruits with its ultimate sanction of loss of rank, dismissal from the RAF, and transfer to the army. It is no surprise that the highest traumatic casualties were from Bomber Command who underwent sustained periods of passive endurance.²²⁶ In their study of aircrews, Grinker and Spiegel concluded that anyone exposed to combat for a sustained period could develop a war neurosis:

Fear is cumulative, because the longer the individual stays in battle, the more remote appears his chance of coming out alive or uninjured. At one time in one overseas Air Force it was a mathematical certainty that only a few men out of each squadron would finish a tour of duty. The threat is inescapable and ubiquitous.²²⁷

Despite the accumulating evidence, the mistrust of mental health professionals within the armed forces was endorsed at the highest level. In December 1942, Winston Churchill wrote of psychiatrists:

²²³ Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, From Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War, (Hove, Psychology Press, 2005), pp. 51-55
²²⁴ Ibid, p. 48
²²⁵ Ibid, pp. 57-58
²²⁶ Jones & Wessely, From Shell Shock to PTSD, pp. 97-98
I am sure it would be sensible to restrict as much as possible the work of these gentlemen, who are capable of doing an immense amount of harm with what may very easily degenerate into charlataney.228

Therefore, it is not surprising that, during the Second World War, the role of the professional was significantly circumscribed. The military psychiatrist was in effect partially counsellor, but primarily policeman, and this reflected the balance between the use of persuasion and the use of force needed to get soldiers back into fighting ways.229

Part of the persuasion was predicated upon imputing mental collapse as a feminine characteristic.230 The treatment handed down by officers was often also less than sympathetic, some men were not treated as battle fatigue casualties but were instead charged under the Army Act and treated little differently from deserters.231 It was only in the light of the experience of gruelling and sustained fighting that a link was drawn between battle casualties and psychiatric casualties, and empirical evidence to support Moran’s concept of an expendable bank of courage began to emerge. American studies concluded that substantially all soldiers would break down between 200 and 240 days into a sustained period of combat. British research suggested 400 days.232 Gillespie recognised that ubiquity was not an appropriate measure of combat suitability:

The fundamental truth remains that in a fighting force the elimination of the unsuitable man - and he is more often unsuitable for temperamental reasons than by intellectual defect - at the earliest possible stage is all important.233

The impact of the Vietnam War was to play a pivotal role in the understanding and politicisation of PTSD. One conclusion was that once soldiers had been in a frenzied state (Chapter 2.5) they were changed for life and were likely to suffer lifelong psychological injury.234 What the Vietnam experience did not achieve (in Britain at least) was a bridging of the gap between traumatised combatants and the military

228 Richardson, Fighting Spirit, p. 63
229 Bogacz, ‘War Neurosis’ p. 243
231 French, Raising Churchill’s Army, pp. 140-141
232 Ellis, The Sharp End of War, p. 248
234 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, p. 98
authorities. If anything the politics of PTSD have hardened traditional attitudes towards ‘character’ amongst conservatives within the military establishment. It was asserted by Ashplant et al. that:

Social groups suffering injustice, injury or trauma that originates in war have become increasingly prepared to demand public recognition of their experience, testimony and current status as ‘victims’ or ‘survivors’.235

The stereotype of the Vietnam veteran was exploited by opponents of the war who conflated the image of the traumatised veteran with notions of an unjust war. It was not just the Vietnamese who were victims of war, so were the rank-and-file soldiery. As veterans' groups began to embrace the idea that they were victims with rights, there was a curious inversion of primary group theory in that veteran soldiers created stronger political bonds with their fellow ‘vets’ than they ever had with their comrades whilst fighting.236 Harari argued that the soldier-victim has become a political cliché, one manifestation of which was that some veterans’ associations produced surveys claiming, ‘[…] that between 25 and fully 100 percent of Vietnam veterans most of whom never saw combat, suffer from PTSD’.237 If there is a causal link between combat trauma and fighting ‘unjust’ wars then it has yet properly to be identified. The challenge that many pressure groups faced occurred when they disingenuously attempted to gain leverage from events in pursuance of their political objectives, was that the ‘victims’ they purported to support were often discredited or marginalised. This has particularly been the case with PTSD. McManners expressed his contempt at the caucus, he asserted existed within the military, that believed heightening awareness about the psychological impact of combat had produced a ‘generation of weaklings who would sue for PTSD as an excuse not to continue doing their duty’.238

Applying the experience of combat trauma to the Falklands War, Lt. Col. Bob Leitch of the RAMC maintained a study of Falklands veterans and concluded:

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235 Ashplant, Dawson & Roper, *The Politics of War Memory*, p. 3

236 Wessely, ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation’, pp. 280-281


238 McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 401
Everyone is affected to some extent by what happens to them in wars; and those who claim otherwise are either kidding themselves, or suffering from some unnatural and possibly psychopathic lack of human emotion.\textsuperscript{239}

What becomes evident from personal accounts of this conflict is the sense of bifurcation that arose from testimony of officers compared with that of the rank-and-file. Within the officers’ mess of 2 Para, Moran’s observations relating to the ‘bank of courage’ were understood because Cooper, Crosland, and Chaundler have all referenced him,\textsuperscript{240} but arguably in a narrow and short-term sense. Chaundler provided a more fulsome insight when he expressed the belief that courage was readily replenished once away from battle. He also considered that the whole issue of PTSD was overrated and rather quizzically questioned how lasting the effects of combat stress were. In his formulation, counselling was often unnecessary, he had never had it or needed it. Whilst acknowledging there might be certain exceptions, such as the Welsh Guards’ experience arising from the \textit{Galahad} incident, he believed that the people who suffer from PTSD mostly came from unsettled backgrounds, and were in essence hypochondriacs who claimed the symptoms by dint of PTSD being a recognised syndrome. With masterful military meiosis he commented that PTSD is all ‘slightly over done’. Neame bluntly affirmed this view, believing the need for counselling was all nonsense. Under his command ‘one bloke went a bit funny’, but he believed this was part of an attempt to get money out of the South Atlantic Fund. Otherwise, because the battalion was successful, unlike the Welsh Guards, the effects of combat stress were assuaged. He claimed that only three people in the battalion could not come to terms with the fighting; the Second in Command, the Padre, and the Doctor. Rather unfairly, given that they all made decisive interventions, he accused them of being ‘one step away from mud, blood and gore’\textsuperscript{241}. It suggests that the sense of denial derived from Gort’s view that elite units did not suffer from combat stress. It also strikes at the heart of the leadership ideal; a good officer will prioritise the welfare of his subordinates, so a failure to prevent PTSD will be viewed as a failure of leadership. It can also be argued that, officers particularly, have a career-limiting interest in matters of perceived

\textsuperscript{239} \textit{Ibid}, p. 356

\textsuperscript{240} Arthur, \textit{Above All Courage: Personal Stories from the Falklands War}, p.3; \textit{Ibid}, p.212; IWM 14152 - Chaundler, (1994), [on audiotape]

\textsuperscript{241} IWM 14597 - Neame
emotional weakness. Bramley opined that attempting to discuss emotional problems with superior officers would be likely to have elicited a, ‘pull yourself together response’, in the expectation that a character assessment would be made on such soldier as, ‘what a wanker - no further promotion’. 242

Freed from the constraints of military hegemony, the Falklands experiences of ordinary soldiers have provided some idea of what combat trauma is. For Lukowiak, it was the deep sense of shame he later felt because, on thinking he had been injured, his first thought was it would get him out of battle onto a hospital ship. 243 Eyles-Thomas believed that vivid nightmares are stereotypical of post combat experience insofar as, ‘they take over your life and you become a slave to them’. 244 Bramley believed it was impossible to articulate the intensity of feelings, particularly how the death of two of his pals had become ingrained as a whole-life experience. 245 Graham Tolson was a career soldier and served for twenty-one years. His testimony encapsulated these experiences. 246 He recounted how the image of a soldier terribly injured by artillery fire was, ‘etched in my mind for years’, and how the injury to his friend Brian Milne 247 left him with a profound sense of shame and cowardice because, in his mind, he did not do enough to help. After the war, Tolson professed not to have known about PTSD, it was not discussed in the army, and it would have been construed as a weakness. His solution was to suppress his emotions and work obsessively to blot out his memories. Many years later an injury denied him the safety blanket of work and with an advanced sense of paranoia he described getting drunk at a function for officers and Senior NCOs, and taking out his frustrations on an officer. Prevented by a colleague from launching a physical assault, he nonetheless felt he had brought his career to a dishonourable conclusion. Actively contemplating suicide, for the first time he discussed his problems

242 Vincent Bramley, Falklands War Seminar at Sussex University, 30 Jan 2008
243 Lukowiak, A Soldier's Song, p. 65
244 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, pp. 225-226
245 Bramley, Forward into Hell, pp. 211-212
246 IWM 20697 - Tolson
247 Milne stepped on a land-mine, the detonation of which effectively started the Battle of Mount Longdon
with a friend who set him on a long and challenging journey of professional counselling. At the end of this process, Tolson had feelings of pride and bravery, not of cowardice and shame, and had a much more balanced sense of memory and loss.

As Jones and Wessely pointed out, there was a tendency, particularly within elite units, to downplay the existence of battle trauma. The first medical reports following the Battle of Goose Green in 1982 suggested that 2 Para had none at all. 248 To get some objective sense it is necessary to enter the contested field of ‘lies, damned lies and statistics’, where battles still rage. As late as 2003, Holmes was asserting that traumatic casualties were ‘uncommon’ after the Falklands and this evidence derived from a report made in September 2003 to the World Congress of Psychiatry. This stated that, amongst the British forces, only 3.6% suffered from a mental illness and 1.5% from a combat reaction. 249 To provide a context, during the Second World War, psychiatric casualties amongst allied troops ranged between 8% and 54%, peaking at 20% for the British troops enduring the summer fighting in Normandy in 1944. 250 It has been estimated (once the political froth is discounted) that up to 15.2% of Vietnam veterans suffered from PTSD. 251 Uncovering a semblance of truth concerning trauma casualties of the Falklands War remains a work in progress. Not least because, as Weston put it, there was no psychological provision when the troops came home, ‘it is as if the powers at the Ministry of Defence simply shut their eyes to the problem […] not until 1993 did the MoD start to take it seriously’. 252 Each of the services adopted their own approach to PTSD, and ‘[…] very little […] psychiatric material was ever reported on formally, or analysed professionally after 1982’. 253

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248 Jones and Wessely, *From Shell Shock to PTSD*, p. 136


250 Ibid


252 Weston, *Moving On*, p. 212

Five years after the war, Captain Steven Hughes (former MO of 2 Para) and Lt. Col. Stephen O’Brien conducted a widely cited unofficial survey into symptoms of PTSD amongst serving Falklands veterans of 2 and 3 Para, using 1 Para as a control group. 50% of the veterans described suffering some degree of PTSD whilst 22% suffered the full syndrome; only 28% had no symptoms at all. There was no relationship between age, rank, length of service or life events. Of all the veterans surveyed, most had friends killed or wounded and over 85% thought they had probably or definitely killed others. Most of the survey group complained about being inappropriately treated as heroes on their return home, leading O’Brien and Hughes to consider that the inability to relate to the celebratory mood of the general public interfered with the manner in which the veterans were able to assimilate their experiences. The figures are disputed, as are the assertions that more Falklands veterans have committed suicide than the 255 who were killed in action. That PTSD has become a political hot potato is evidenced by the group action brought by over 2,000 British Veterans against the MoD. Weston wrote that their complaint was not about psychological injury but the failure of the MoD to provide the necessary care. In 2003, the court determined that the MoD was not under an obligation to identify PTSD victims:

    It was up to the sufferers […] To put themselves forward for treatment, when the whole macho culture of the military was screaming at them to keep quiet. In documents presented to the court, one general went so far as to suggest that people suffering from psychological illness were a bunch of wets, completely lacking in moral fibre.

If nothing else it demonstrates that despite all the experience gained throughout the twentieth century, in some quarters, military culture has proven impervious to change.

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256 David Walters, ‘Overview of PTSD’ in David Walters (ed), After the Falklands: Finally Ending the Nightmare of PTSD, (Penryn, Ecademy Press, 2007), p. 26; Weston, Moving On, pp. 13-14

257 Of conflict in Northern Ireland, Falklands War, Gulf War and Bosnia

258 Weston, Moving On, pp. 221-224
3.13 Summary

An effective rewards system remains culturally desirable and motivationally important, both for civilians and the armed forces, not just for gallantry but also for outstanding public service. However, the awards provision following the Falklands War was not fit for purpose. It continued a tradition rooted in status and hierarchy. This bias is revealed by an analysis of VCs awarded during the Second World War and the persistence of a quota system to prevent ‘honours inflation’. Although rewards were extrinsically applied, their real power was as an intrinsic affirmation of performance above and beyond the call of duty. Task motivated combatants required a form of recognition as a self-validator that acted fairly because they reacted strongly when the system appeared to fail. There was political advantage to be gained from an alignment with heroism; it created a bond between the state and the public. After the Falklands War, it can be argued that the Authorities took the easy public relations option when they accepted the media myth of heroic apotheosis manufactured around Lt. Col. Jones. The counterpoint was the response of the Authorities to those injured and traumatised, many of whom found that the substantive recognition they needed was in short supply.

Political adroitness is also revealed by the rapidity of the Falklands awards process, and the sanitised public commemoration as explicitly Conservative, with Margaret Thatcher as the agent of victory. For individual servicemen, an effective closure to combat was in many instances a need unfulfilled. In the aftermath of the war, the armed forces rapidly reverted to business as usual. The inadequacy of resettlement provision has been revealed, as has the failure adequately to support the psychological welfare of combatants. Although sixty years separate the Southborough Report and the Falklands War, studies into the impact of PTSD remain a work in progress, not least because of the reluctance in some quarters to recognise the challenge it presents.
Chapter 4 - Morale

The term ‘morale’ lacks a robust definition and is thus ‘loosely used’,¹ but it refers to the personal factors that have influenced combat motivation. However, such factors are not of themselves determinative of motivation. The possible exception to this argument applies to existentialist warriors. The examples of McLaughlin and Jones (Chapter 3.7) and Garrison (Chapter 2.4) suggest that they defined themselves through combat. However, in Chapter 2.4 it was argued that the majority of combatants were not natural warriors. Therefore, it can be argued that in addition to the processes outlined in earlier chapters, other factors have been at work. The seminal nineteenth century theorist Clausewitz stated:

So long as a unit fights cheerfully, with spirit and élan, great strength of will is rarely needed; but once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, things no longer run like a well-oiled machine.²

Morale can be construed as ‘spirit and élan’, whilst motivation keeps the machine working efficiently. The terms ‘morale’ and ‘motivation’ are often conflated and expressed in group terms, but it is a key argument that they should be considered as ‘substantially different concepts’ that bear upon the individual combatant. According to Kellett, ‘Motivation is, in essence, the “why” of behaviour, comprising the influences shaping a person's course of action’.³ By contrast, morale is the spirit with which motivation may be sustained. For this reason, it is no mere sophistry to analyse at an elemental level what these factors have been. Because each individual combatant will have compounded morale factors in different ways throughout the motivational cycle, it is my argument that they should be separately identified. By contextualising morale research around the Falklands War it has been possible to identify a strong sense of continuity throughout the twentieth century.

An alignment of motivation and morale in support of group objectives has been the most powerful impetus towards the desired outcome. Discipline may have been used

to coerce task completion when such tasks opposed personal sensibilities. However, combatants may have had sufficiently high morale and social coherence to act in opposition to organisational goals. Therefore, it is possible to have had high morale combined with a low motivation to combat and vice versa. Morale and motivation clearly overlapped but responded to different forces. As has been discussed in the earlier chapters, motivation has been predicated upon a cycle; however, it is the argument of this chapter that morale has been driven by a hierarchy of needs that demand a distinct analysis. It is evident from a review of the historiography that morale, as a distinct from motivation, is an under-researched area. As the military historian J.G. Fuller noted:

The whole area of morale is pregnant with interest, but historians have been handicapped by the limitations of the available sources […] they all have their shortcomings for the subject. There is relatively little in the great corpus of official papers which bears directly on morale.4

Richardson typically elided morale with motivation. He correctly identified the relevance of individual mental and physical factors but mixed them with ideological and primary group influences which were more properly matters of motivation.5 Marshall, the military sociologist, came close to a definition:

Morale is the thinking of the army. It is the whole complex body of an army's thought; the way that it feels about the soil and about the people from which it springs. The way that it feels about their cause and their politics as compared with other causes and other politics. The way that it feels about its friends and allies, as well as its enemies. About its commanders and goldbricks. About food and shelter. Duty and leisure. Payday and sex. Militarism and Civilianism. Freedom and slavery. Work and want. Weapons and comradeship. Bunk fatigue and drill. Discipline and disorder. Life and death. God and the devil.6

Although he reflected upon the extent to which needs and wants were satisfied, he did not untangle the fact that morale was often necessarily viewed in group terms, whereas needs and wants were essentially individual. Marshall also lumped ‘needs’ together without recognising that they were building blocks, meaning that higher needs could only be satisfied once lower needs had been met. Field Marshal Slim seemed to recognise this, ‘[…] for a man, especially an intelligent man […] his morale must have

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certain foundations […] These foundations are, I think, First Spiritual, then Mental, and lastly Material'. In Slim’s construction, morale contained an implicit hierarchy that demands explicit analysis.

A consequence of morale often being perceived in group terms meant there was a tendency to reduce it to the lowest common denominators. As one soldier commented in 1941, in response to a War Office edict that troops be lectured on the political motivations for war, ‘the average soldier appeared to have only three basic interests: football, beer and crumpet’. However, there is a historical dimension to an effective definition. As Baynes has asserted, social developments during the twentieth century have meant that soldiers have become more sophisticated, better educated and more used to comfort than their forebears. Consequently, greater effort has needed to be taken in matters of morale. Therefore, it is noteworthy from research, that during the first Gulf War:

Soldiers reported that the major contributors to their personal morale were mail; showers; tents; rest areas; hot food; cold drinks; being able to live as squads, crews or platoons in self-improved areas; entertainment; and some free time.

The Falklands experience suggests that morale needs have proved to be consistent, what has changed according to time and context has been the relationship between higher and lower morale needs, and the manner in which they have been expressed and satisfied. Because morale often reflected the exigencies of particular circumstances, the nature of combat has been to suppress higher intellectual needs. Professor Jesse Gray reflected on his own military experience:

The majority of my fellows seemed content with the satisfaction of their natural urges - eating, drinking, and lusting for women. Interests and refinements that transcended these primitive needs, and that I had built up over the years, were rapidly falling away, and I felt that I was becoming simply one of the others.

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What Gray revealed is that he, like Slim, recognised tiers of morale factors that lent themselves to a ‘Hierarchy of Needs’. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to define combat morale by developing such a model, which ranges from basic sustenance through to higher intellectual demands for self-expression and creativity. The Hierarchy of Needs as a series of building blocks was first conceptualised in 1943 by Abraham Maslow. Maslow’s theory remains the foundation of the ‘humanistic’ approach to morale which seeks explicit links between morale/satisfaction and organisational performance. These links can be applied to understanding combat morale within the historical context of the Falklands War. The needs hierarchy is illustrated within the analytical model in Appendix 1. The essence of The Maslovian pyramid is that each tier represents a deficiency need that must be met before the individual can move up a step at a time, finally reaching the top level where the individual has eliminated needs deficiencies and is ‘self-actualised’ to explore the limits of their own potential. As each step is critical to the foundation, a deficiency will cause the individual to regress and (eventually) rebuild. If individuals are thwarted in attempts to step up a tier, then they may place overemphasis on the characteristics of the level at which they are trapped. It should also be noted that some research suggested a class bias to notions of needs: managerial/professional groups tended towards esteem and self-actualisation, skilled occupational groups towards esteem and belonging, whilst the semi and unskilled have been oriented towards belonging and the physiological. This means that morale requirements may emphasise the difference in status between commanders, junior officers and the rank-and-file. The analysis that follows will be to draw upon evidence from the twentieth century to reveal the continuity experienced during the Falklands War.

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4.1 Self-Actualisation

This enables the individual free rein to establish a personal identity. Aesthetic values and self-concepts can be expressed, and these move beyond self-interest. It captures the essence of the needs-motivated soldier, and it is arguably not surprising that such individuals, convinced of the rightness of their position, have struggled for purchase within a conservative and hierarchical culture where a challenge against conformity has often been unwelcome, and survival dependent on high-level sponsorship. Conceptually they have been rare beasts and the twentieth century throws up comparatively few examples. The five following exemplars are not an exhaustive list but reveal something of the nature of self-actualisation. They all applied a keen and creative intellect to effective task completion, were not deflected by a lack of moral courage, and were the antithesis of achievement-motivated conformity. It is noteworthy that only one was a military careerist. T.E. Lawrence emerged as an unorthodox soldier during the First World War. Although our modern understandings are shaped by the romanticised film *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962), in his lifetime his biographer commented, ‘I have attempted a critical study of ‘Lawrence’ - the popular verdict that he is the most remarkable living Englishman, though I rather dislike such verdicts, I am inclined to accept’. During the Second World War Lt. David Stirling usurped the chain of command to form the SAS, and the controversial Maj. Gen. Orde Wingate, a career soldier, who has been described as an exceptional and unconventional genius, put his jungle penetration theories into practice by forming the “Chindits”. In 1939, only two men volunteered for the army as privates and ended the war as brigadiers. Fitzroy Maclean, allegedly Ian Fleming’s model for James Bond, enjoyed a long career as a diplomat, politician and prolific author. During the war, he earned his

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spurs as an envoy for Churchill fighting with Tito and his partisans. His obituary recalled:

Maclean’s unorthodox methods, his refusal to go through channels […] infuriated Special Operations Executive, who felt that he was meddling in areas that were properly theirs. Friendly critics dubbed Maclean ‘the Balkan Brigadier’, ‘the Scarlet Pimpernel’ and even […] ‘Lothario in a kilt’. 19

The other was the controversial politician Enoch Powell, who enjoyed the double distinction of having been the youngest professor in the British Empire (aged 25)20 and, for a short while, the youngest Brigadier in the army (aged 30). Although denied a combat role, Powell excelled at intelligence work and, whilst posted in India, immersed himself in Indian culture, passing interpreter examinations in Urdu and Hindustani. Powell captured the quintessence of self-actualisation within a military culture, ‘The outward trappings of conformity […] are a helpful vehicle towards unique self-expression […] Provided that you conform, you can think anything’. 21

Evidence from the rank-and-file is harder to come by, and where it fleetingly emerges, it has tended to manifest as opposition to organisational goals. In the Great War, the growth of a ‘trench counter-culture’ was observed in which British and German troops attenuated hostilities in favour of their own needs.22 Cincinnatus revealed that during the 1960s, ‘There were GIs in Vietnam with the legend UUUU chalked on their helmets: “The unwilling, led by the unqualified, doing the unnecessary for the ungrateful”’. 23 They used every opportunity to undermine the war-effort. There is no inference of a subversive counter-culture during the Falklands War, instead the evidence suggests that any opposition to formal command structures was shaped around effective task completion.

20 Appointed to the Chair in Greek at Sydney University in 1937
Jones and McLaughlin were exemplars of self-actualisation amongst the Falklands forces. Otherwise, Brig. Thompson had a fractious relationship with London, particularly about the politically-motivated directive to attack Goose Green. Despite his manifest concerns about resources for the battle, he was forced into compliance.\(^{24}\) There was an assertion that a counter-culture emerged in ‘B’ Company of 3 Para although, arguably with the exception of Stewart McLaughlin, this seems to have been more based upon mimicry than self expression.\(^{25}\) It is in the aftermath of the war that some Falklands veterans found a voice when released from military service. Along with those who wrote compellingly of their experiences, it can be argued that veterans such as Jolly, Connick and Weston have created instrumental saliences for their former comrades; those who stayed in the forces have remained constrained. In a taped interview, Brig. Mike Scot (Scots Guards) can be heard being instructed by an unknown source, ‘don’t answer that’,\(^ {26}\) which is not only evidence of morale suppression but also a caution as to the veracity of such primary sources. Looking to the future, in the post-modern world it has been argued by Moskos that the desire for ‘meaningful personal experience’ will become an increasingly important aspect of voluntary military service, possibly replacing more conventional motivations.\(^ {27}\) It is an interesting hypothesis that awaits a quantum of evidence from recent conflicts.

**4.2 Esteem**

Self-esteem aligns comfortably with a high degree of intrinsic motivation. It is built around a sense of professional competence measured by success, achievement, influence, and the exercise of control. A military context provides a highly supportive environment, not only because military culture is hierarchical, but also because it provides a robust framework against which achievement-motivated individuals can self-

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\(^{24}\) Imperial War Museum Archive (henceforth ‘IWM’) 17144 - Thompson, (1996), [on audiotape]

\(^{25}\) Jennings & Weale, *Green-Eyed Boys*, pp. 29-30

\(^{26}\) IWM 13044 - Scot, (1992), [on audiotape]

evaluate. Group loyalties and the regimental tradition have been powerful motivational forces; however, self-esteem inculcated a sense of elitism and superiority that may have elided into rivalry, impaired effective communication, and threatened hubris. It has been the fatal flaw embedded within British service culture which means that to win a shooting war it has first been necessary to call a cease-fire to the internecine personal and political battles being fought for resources and influence. As Sir John Nott put it, ‘The history of the Ministry of Defence […] is the history of the war between the RAF and the Navy’. The Army has not been able to compete on equal terms because the regimental system meant it has been forever divided by its cap badge loyalties.

The Falklands War was fought under the command of Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who controlled three strategic units: a naval battle group commanded by Rear-Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward and responsible for operations at sea; an amphibious group commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp, responsible for ship to shore logistics; and a land forces group, initially commanded by Brig. Thompson and later by Maj.Gen. Jeremy Moore. Issues of personality constructed around relative authority and esteem soon arose. These were to infect the relationship between the strategic leaders and constrain their subordinates. According to Captain Jeremy Larkin of HMS Fearless:

I already knew Admiral Woodward […] and realised it was going to be very difficult building a relationship between him and Brigadier Thompson [a pattern was set] that was to continue to create difficulties throughout the campaign.

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30 Secretary of State for Defence during the Falklands War
32 Ibid, p. 189
33 Fieldhouse also commanded a submarine group and a group tasked with the recovery of South Georgia. Thompson remained in command of 3 Commando Brigade whilst Moore assumed a divisional command following the arrival of 5 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier ‘Tony’ Wilson
According to Captain Hugh Balfour of HMS *Exeter*, Woodward could not be persuaded to leave his aircraft carrier to be briefed on issues the land forces faced.\(^{35}\) BBC Correspondent Robert Fox noted the antipathy between Woodward and ‘H’ Jones and observed that ‘inter-service rivalries have real point’.\(^{36}\) Clapp described a pre-invasion meeting in which Woodward attempted to dominate him and Thompson by making wildly inappropriate recommendations that embarrassed his naval colleagues and infuriated the other staff members present.\(^{37}\) ‘Trust was broken and it would take a long time to repair’.\(^{38}\) There was the suspicion that Brig. Wilson was ‘headline-grabbing’,\(^{39}\) and ‘[…] one not averse to playing cap-badge politics to ensure that his Brigade was first into Stanley’.\(^{40}\) Considering his relationship with top-level command, Maj. Gen. Moore ironically commented:

> I admired my commander in chief’s restraint. Despite having a secure voice link he never attempted to talk to me personally. Once he rang me to explain the likely political outcome of a proposal, and I phoned him with some bad news.\(^{41}\)

At the grass roots, rivalry was laid bare of gentlemanly pretensions. According to Linda Kitson, the official Falklands war artist:

> The rivalry between all the units and regiments horrified me. I had to listen to so much malicious stuff. I know a certain amount of this is necessary, but it had the effect throughout the campaign, of mucking up each other’s operations, when units tried to maximise the glory for themselves, often knowing it would be at the expense of other units.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{35}\) *Ibid*, p. 307

\(^{36}\) McManners, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands*, p. 258

\(^{37}\) *Inter alia* Establishing a stores dump on West Falkland that would have overstretched logistics. Building an undefended airstrip in range of Argentinian air attack. Using **HMS Fearless** as a feint for an attack on the Argentinian mainland to initiate an air battle.


\(^{41}\) McManners, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands*, p. 311

\(^{42}\) *Ibid*, p. 294
The Parachute Regiment referred to every other regiment as ‘crap hats’ and regarded being placed under the command of such soldiers as a humiliation.\textsuperscript{43} As one junior soldier commented:

If it was a choice between a British Para giving his last cigarette to a wounded British crap hat or a wounded Argentinean paratrooper who’s just killed half of his mates, you can bet he would favour the Argie.\textsuperscript{44}

The Paras reserved special opprobrium for the Royal Marines; according to one junior soldier, ‘We had hated each other for years and the rivalry was very apparent’.\textsuperscript{45} Journalists noted that a policy of keeping the Para and Marines separate and mutually antagonistic ‘was fostered lovingly by officers of both’.\textsuperscript{46} Ten years after the war Brig. Pike commented:

Add […] the close comradeship which tough and demanding training breeds in men, and […] the keen rivalry between marine, parachute and Guards battalions, and the result is a formidable collective will to win.\textsuperscript{47}

This sustained a comfortable illusion that all the forces that went to the Falklands were working harmoniously together with rivalry no more than an exposition of the Corinthian spirit. A case-study analysis of the events leading to the sinking of the \textit{Sir Galahad} at Fitzroy on 8 June 1982 demonstrates how a reality encompassing hubristic notions of self-regard, superiority and antipathy, ended in nemesis.

Following the Battle of Goose Green, land forces were augmented by the arrival of 5 Infantry Brigade under the command of Brig. Tony Wilson. Following the sinking of the SS \textit{Atlantic Conveyor}, the Task Force lost all but one of its heavy-lift Chinook helicopters, and it was not until 4 June that a second was brought into use.\textsuperscript{48} One consequence led to a defining memory of the Falklands War as the Paras and Marines of 3 Commando Brigade foot-slogged their way to battle across the north of East Falkland.


\textsuperscript{44} Tony McNally, \textit{Watching Men Burn: A Soldier’s Story}, (Wolvey, Monday Books, 2007), p. 117

\textsuperscript{45} Vincent Bramley, \textit{Forward into Hell}, (London, John Blake, 2006), p. 9


\textsuperscript{48} Bicheno, \textit{Razor’s Edge}, p. 301
Wilson’s brigade, which now incorporated 2 Para, were to pursue the southern overland route to Port Stanley via Fitzroy. Expedient use of the civilian telephone established that the Argentinians had not garrisoned Fitzroy, and armed with this knowledge Wilson improvised a *coup de main*. He commandeered the only Chinook, which had been tasked with moving prisoners and stores between San Carlos and Darwin. Van der Bijl provided a context, ‘Hijackings [are] part of the “can do, must do” culture on which the military thrives’. Necessity may indeed be the mother of invention, but its illegitimate sibling is chaos. Wilson failed to inform 3 Commando Brigade of his actions. Packed with 84 paratroopers, out of its operating area and in daylight, it was assumed that the helicopter was Argentinian. Lt.-Col. Vaux listened to a radio conversation:

> Initially our gunner regimental HQ accepted this as an artillery target [...Their urgent cancellation came after they had checked with Divisional Headquarters. But only a few seconds before the misunderstanding became a tragedy.

On 6 June, a Gazelle helicopter was not so lucky. Again Wilson’s brigade failed to inform Divisional Headquarters of a flight carrying its Signals Officer, believing it had ‘the autonomous right to fly helicopters in its own area’. Unfortunately, no one told the Captain of HMS *Cardiff* who shot it down, killing the four occupants. To compound the mistake the incident was deliberately covered up by the MoD, who only reluctantly revealed the truth in 1986. Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly admitted:

> I should have stood up in the Coroner’s Court right there and then in protest at such a falsehood, but by then I had been […] made aware (in a number of subtle ways) that I was not exactly ‘flavour of the month’ with my professional heads of Branch up in London […] I remained silent, to my eternal regret.

49 Nicholas van der Bijl and David Aldea, *5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands*, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2003), p. 77

50 An offensive operation undertaken at one swift stroke.

51 van der Bijl & Aldea, *5th Infantry Brigade*, p. 80

52 *Ibid*, p. 77

53 The Argentine forces were known to use Chinooks

54 Nick Vaux, *March to the South Atlantic: 42 Commando Royal Marines in the Falklands War*, (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2007), p. 146


The MoD claimed they dissimulated to protect the families. Given that the families had to go to the House of Lords to get the coroner’s verdict changed it rather suggests the family interests were less important to the MoD than maintaining the esteem of military competence.

5 Brigade needed to move the Guards battalions to join the Paras at Fitzroy. The rapid transition of the Guards from public duties to Falklands deployment meant they were unprepared as effective fighting units. The CO of the Welsh Guards, Lt. Col. Rickett, lobbied hard to get his battalion selected, and it should be noted that Jones did the same thing for 2 Para. It is a moot point whether the Queen's Own Highlanders (equipped and trained for winter warfare) or the Royal Anglian Regiment, who replaced 2 Para on their Belize deployment, would have performed as well or better, but there remains the suspicion that Jones and Rickett were better able to exploit their ‘elite’ status to get chosen. As van der Bijl asserted, ‘It still remains to be explained why combat-ready units […] were not selected’. In terms of preparedness and choosing his words carefully, Moore acknowledged that the men of 3 Commando Brigade were harder and fitter, whilst Spicer of the Scots Guards was more to the point, ‘The battalion was completely unprepared for going to war’. Van der Bijl noted in his diary for 2 June:

The guardsmen seemed confused, unfit and anxious […] no one seemed to be in charge and I wondered, again, at the logic of despatching ill-prepared troops to a combat zone.

Wilson rejected as ‘nonsense’ the controversy surrounding the deployment of the Guards, commenting that:

You’ll always get this kind of cap badge rivalry and people who reckon they can do things that other people can’t do. All I can say is that in the army everyone takes the same battle test standards and has to pass them.

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57 van der Bijl & Aldea, 5th Infantry Brigade, p. 13
59 van der Bijl & Aldea, 5th Infantry Brigade, p. 6
60 Nicholas van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1999), p. 190
61 IWM 10482 - Moore, 1988, [on audiotape]
However, events were to expose the difference between theory and practice. Tasked to move the fourteen miles from San Carlos to Darwin, Rickett overestimated the capabilities of his battalion because after twelve hours they had to give up their forced march and return to San Carlos. In Rickett’s words:

It had been my idea to move under our own steam self-contained, now it was the turn of somebody else to give us the support we required to get us forward.64

The obvious comparison is with the Paras and Marines, who quite clearly did manage to reach their objectives; it should also be noted that the Gurkhas marched to Darwin without problem. The failure of the Welsh Guards to complete even a ‘modest “yomp”’, ‘aroused exasperation, even contempt, among 3 Commando Brigade’.65

A plan was developed to move the Guards regiments over two nights (6 - 8 June) using the LPDs HMS *Intrepid* and HMS *Fearless* to get them within range of Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, where they would be transferred to LCUs to complete the landings. The LPD’s had been classified as strategic assets not to be risked in daylight, and these instructions were taken to heart by Captain Dingemans of HMS *Intrepid*. He unloaded the Scots Guards (under the aegis of Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour) into LCUs well short of the planned transfer point, with the result that the guardsman undertook a seven hour journey whilst packed into open boats and in foul weather. The RMO of the Scots Guards described it as the worst night of his life,66 a fact no doubt compounded by being star-shelled by HMS *Cardiff*. It would appear that on the toss of a coin, Captain Harris of HMS *Cardiff* this time decided to check out his targets before attacking them and having done so left them to the elements.67 Clapp asserted that he fully briefed Admiral Woodward,68 and Southby-Tailyour was trenchant in his criticism not only of Woodward for the communication failure, but also of Dingemans, ‘My final words to the Captain were, “I think the whole fucking thing stinks and what’s more sir, I want

64 van der Bijl & Aldea, 5th Infantry Brigade, p. 92
66 IWM 6454, Warsap, 1982, [on audiotape]
67 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault*, p. 305
68 Ibid, p. 295
you to remember this, if we don’t make it”’. He believed Dingemans ‘behaved timidly’ in his ‘disgraceful’ treatment of the 600 Scots Guardsmen. When the Scots Guards eventually landed they were, according to David Cooper, ‘wet, miserable and unhappy and looked like a defeated army’.

The next night the Welsh Guards were to be shipped in HMS Fearless. Unfortunately, the LCUs that had been kept at Fitzroy from the previous night did not make the rendezvous; consequently, some of the Welsh Guards were transferred to RFA Sir Galahad. It transpired that Keeble of 2 Para had commandeered the transports. Under strict orders, the Marine NCO’s had at first resisted the ‘hijack’, but when Keeble threatened them with his pistol they were forced to yield. Maj. Gen. John Frost defended his old regiment, praising Keeble’s style of ‘bluff and rhetoric’; but for Southby-Tailyour it was a ‘despicable performance’. Equally despicable was the performance of some of the Welsh Guards aboard HMS Fearless, who chose to vandalise and rob the kit lockers of the sailors who had vacated their mess-decks to make the soldiers’ journey more comfortable. It caused Moore to wonder whose side they were on. With Sir Galahad moored at Fitzroy in daylight, the private soldiers were running a book on how long it would take to be bombed. Had they realised that Woodward had at this critical time moved the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes eastwards for routine boiler cleaning, and thus restricted the amount of air cover, the odds would probably have shortened. Whilst Southby-Tailyour was responsible for unloading Sir Galahad, and his priorities were to get men and ammunition off rapidly, he faced two insuperable problems. The first of these was another ‘hijack’, this time by Lt. Col.

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69 Blakeway, *The Falklands War*, p. 144
70 IWM 12787, Southby-Tailyour, 1993 [on audiotape]
71 McManners, *Forgotten Voices of the Falklands*, p. 319
73 IWM 12787, - Southby-Tailyour
74 Clapp & Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault*, p. 310
75 IWM 13419, Cooper, (1993) [on audiotape]
Roberts of the Field Ambulance, who pulled rank to offload his vehicles. The second, and most significant, was the refusal of the senior Welsh Guards officer (Maj. Guy ‘Gunner’ Sayle) to disembark. Not only did Sayle argue that his troops were supposed to be taken to Bluff Cove and not Fitzroy, but also that men and ammunition should not be transported on the same vehicle. According to Southby-Tailyour:

I could have got those men off in twenty minutes, no question of that whatsoever and anybody with any professional sense would have taken the advice of the on-the-spot expert, regardless of rank. But unfortunately, I was not wearing the rank of a Lieutenant-Colonel who, as far as I can make out, was the only man he was prepared to listen to.

The Argentine air attack left fifty-one dead, and yet it was a tragedy that could have been avoided with better planning, less arrogance, improved communication, and a sense of self-regard that embraced the needs of others. In his diary for 8 June 1982, van der Bijl provided his summary of the negative concomitants to self-esteem:

Why had 5th Infantry Brigade not learned the lesson [of getting men ashore quickly]? Was it perhaps a desire not to be left out of the action or perhaps the fear that 3rd Commando Brigade would win the non-existent race to Stanley? Men had died needlessly.

Subsequently, 5 Infantry Brigade was reorganised and Wilson, in an apparent denial of a lack of competence, opined that Moore was playing politics and favouring Thompson. According to Wilson:

I think we started to suffer to some extent from what appeared to be a cap-badge rivalry, when it seemed that most of the resources were being allocated to the other brigade. And therefore [we had been] cast in the role of the Cinderella of the Falklands.

Esteem has to be earned and its value comes from being hard won. In the event, Wilson was denied a ticket to the Falklands’ awards ball, being the only senior commander not to receive an honour. He left the military shortly after the campaign. The notion of esteem feeds into the bigger picture of combat motivation, specifically the regimental tradition and the distinctions between command and leadership. By linking esteem with the facets of leadership set out in Chapter 2.3, it may be asserted that Thompson was...

77 Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, p. 299
78 Peter Kominsky (dir.), Falklands War: The Untold Story, Yorkshire TV, 1987
79 Hastings & Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, p. 354
80 IWM 3898, van der Bijl
81 Blakeway, The Falklands War, p. 152
able to combine clarity of command strategy with charismatic leadership. The consequence was that his brigade operated as a cohesive task group notwithstanding the antipathies between the Paras and the Marines. By contrast, the evidence suggests that Wilson was a command careerist whose improvised approach failed to rein in the limited capabilities of his brigade.

4.3 Belonging

Conditional belonging is fundamental to military culture. The power of being accepted within a group, and the intensity of peer group pressure means that the individual can overcome deficiencies in the lower orders of safety and physiological needs, even if group participation imposes additional risks and dysfunctionalities (i.e bullying and/or abuse). This section will investigate two aspects of maintaining belonging within the military group: Firstly, how humour not only acts as a bonding agent as a shared means of communication, but also draws the sting of fear and loss; secondly, how social and task groups are augmented and challenged by family life.

According to Baynes, ‘The impression of men with good morale is one of good cheer’. This does not resolve into a permanent state of humour, but suggests that occasional outbursts of ‘devilment’ and misbehaviour should be viewed positively. It is a truism to assert that military humour is often earthy and robust, and whilst sometimes lacking the sophistication of ‘Cambridge Footlights’, it is nonetheless grounded in Edwardian cultural traits of ridicule and irony. According to J. G. Fuller, British humour possessed, ‘the war-winning quality’. Evidence of continuity is suggested because this brand of humour asserted itself in 1982. According to one officer, ‘Humour and black humour is endemic, without it life can become very tedious’. Such tedium can be deconstructed into four parts: a response to the


84 IWM 20255 - Freer, (2002), [on audiotape]
functioning of military life, as an antidote to fear, endurance of appalling circumstances, and the vicarious pleasure of discomforting rivals and superiors.

The expression ‘hurry up and wait’ describes the military propensity for constant activity whilst occasionally lacking a robust plan. A similar sense is derived from the acronym SNAFU. Frustration caused by constantly changing and contradictory orders that result in much wasted effort, can only be reflected through humour. Describing the run up to Operation Market Garden in 1944 Major Ian Toler commented:

Order and counter-order and the consequent disorder were the order of the day. We spent the whole of one day loading and unloading our gliders - when the order changed for the sixth time that day, we just sat back and laughed. It was a good job we had a sense of humour.85

Many from a non-military background will be able to empathise with humour as a response to organisational inefficiency. However, few outside the uniformed services will have experienced it as an antidote to fear. As one Falklands veteran noted:

The constant humour never ceased to make me laugh […] It was almost certainly a way of masking fear, fear of death itself, or at least the unknown. When I look back now I can only remember waiting with shattering fear, but also the humour that overcame it.86

Richens commented on how the ‘very sick sense of humour’ within the Parachute Regiment was used to deal with problems and injuries, but even this was tested as they watched HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope sinking with people still on board.87 Following the death of colleagues, despite being angry and emotional, soldiers would still use humour as ‘a pressure release valve’. Another junior soldier suggested ‘It’s a British thing, we’re good at taking the piss out of ourselves, and squaddies are better than most’.88 In an adrenalin-fuelled state, humour can seem to the objective viewer as inappropriate, grotesque and bizarre. During the assault on Goose Green, whilst under artillery fire, Ely described how seeing a sheep being blown up invoked much laughter about ovine flying:

86 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, p. 82
87 McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, p. 217
88 McNally, Watching Men Burn, pp. 72-73
I will never forget that most of us turned around and started shouting, ‘Run away! Run away!’ in the tones of the Monty Python team. I was pissing myself laughing - damn good film, Monty Python and the Holy Grail.\textsuperscript{89}

In his seminal survey, Stouffer concluded that humour enabled the combatant to endure the unavoidable, and ‘achieve a kind of distance from their threatening experiences’.\textsuperscript{90} Humour, according to Lord Moran, that used ridicule was a ‘working philosophy’.\textsuperscript{91} This was borne out by Watson who asserted that mockery enabled combatants to formulate a more positive reinterpretation of the environment.\textsuperscript{92} Because it has been easier to control fear when the enemy was reduced to a caricature, the use of pejorative or patronising nicknames to describe them has enjoyed a long tradition. The two world wars produced a rich crop of soubriquets to describe the Germans, whilst during the Falklands war the enemy was generally referred to as Argie, Dago or Spic. The tradition has continued into the Desert Sands era with Islamic opponents referred to (with royal endorsement) as Ragheads\textsuperscript{93} or Terry Taliban.\textsuperscript{94} Besides the immediate risk of death and injury, soldiers had to find a means of coping with the visceral detritus of combat. During the First World War, Corporal Clifford Lane explained how humour inured him to dealing with distended corpses, ‘Every time we trod on him his tongue would come out, which caused great amusement among our people’.\textsuperscript{95} A similarly grotesque experience was observed by Lt. Bates at the end of the Falklands War:

I noticed a group of soldiers who […] were standing around a corpse. They were smoking cigarettes and joking as the dead man was being offered one as well. They claimed that to justify smoking the dead man’s cigarettes they had to offer him one as well.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{89} Nigel Ely, \textit{For Queen and Country}, (London, Blake, 2003), pp. 210-211


\textsuperscript{91} Fuller, \textit{Troop Morale}, p. 144

\textsuperscript{92} Watson, ‘Self Deception and Survival’, p. 253


\textsuperscript{96} Peter Bates, ‘An Investigation into whether religion has a place on the battlefield and whether it has any influences on the British soldier’, (unpublished masters dissertation, Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science School of Defence Management, 1995, p. 40
Whilst civilian sensibilities may be ruffled at these apparent denials of dignity, one interpretation that partially justifies such behaviour is that by reducing the dead to a cipher, humour has consistently become a bastion against emotional breakdown.

Given the importance of hierarchy and group loyalties within the military, it was inevitable that the opportunity for banter with bite would be exploited at every opportunity. A number of Paras recalled an example during the return from the Falklands, that combined both. On board *Norland*, they were assembled to be congratulated by Thompson, who rather misjudged the mood by alluding to a cessation of antipathy between them and the Marines:

‘Fuck off, hat,’ came one shout from the back of the red berets standing bunched together. The abrupt insult only stalled the commander for a few seconds, then he shrugged it off with a broad grin. ‘As I was saying, the red and green have always hated each other and its nice …’. ‘We still fucking hate the wankers too!’ came the next shout. All the officers were looking into the huge crowd of Paras, trying to find the culprits. All the Paras were laughing loudly. ‘Well it seems you still have the humour you’re famous for. It’s great to see that you will be home first and …’ ‘Yeah flying home through the back fucking door,’ came the last shout.97

Unsurprisingly, Thompson did not recall this event in his book *No Picnic* (1985), but would recognise that military humour emerged as a special language that expressed social cohesion, bonded small groups around a task identity, and acted as an antidote to fear. Cohesive groups have been described as surrogate families;98 therefore, it is relevant to explore how they fit with ‘real’ families.

According to Professor Samuel Hynes, ‘For everyone except career soldiers, military service is a kind of exile from one’s own real life, a dislocation of the familiar that the mind preserves as life in another world’.99 It will be recalled that the average period of army service is under eight years (less in the infantry). For many, a family life has embodied a sense of retaining this other world and, whilst it may have challenged

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97 Bramley, *Excursion to Hell*, p. 199


the orthodoxy of tradition and the parsimony of defence budgets, enabling married soldiers to maintain a fulfilling home life has been a contributor to combat effectiveness, made increasingly relevant by changing social expectations. During the Second World War, a study by Ginzberg et al. discovered that men with broken marriages were twice as likely to be poor soldiers, and soldiers with intact marriages were twice as likely to recover from battle fatigue.\textsuperscript{100} A study in 1973 of the IDF, found that soldiers ‘[…] who had stable personal and family lives were less likely than other soldiers to suffer combat-related psychiatric breakdown’.\textsuperscript{101} The military has had to face this rise in social expectations of its potential recruits. This has been driven by recruits from the traditional areas of disadvantage, who have moved away from a ‘work based culture’ to one that is centred around the comforts of home life and consumerism.\textsuperscript{102} Maintaining a family potentially placed the combat soldier in a dilemma of belonging which resolved into two important aspects: firstly, it is necessary to consider the tensions between the military establishment and the soldier who wanted to maintain a family in comfortable and secure accommodation; secondly, the importance of communication between combatants and their families during extended periods of absence.

The late 1960s marked the period when military personnel policy began to shift its social outlook from one of separation towards civilian integration. Much of this was driven by servicemen who ‘welcomed the “civilianisation” of their social lives’.\textsuperscript{103} Therefore, such changes were more a matter of necessity than altruism. Increasingly the desire of service wives to have a stable platform from which they could take ownership of their home life and careers has caused many talented servicemen to leave the armed


forces. The bifurcation between the military and domestic families has thus been regarded as a necessary irritation because of its potential threat to operational efficiency and its undermining of traditional extrinsic motivators. Beevor pointed out that the military has sought to ‘[…] draw in and subject the families under its charge to its authoritarian structures and disciplinary regime’. A substantial body of opinion amongst senior officers wishing to prohibit the marriage of young soldiers has remained, ‘The delusion that soldiers’ lives and aspirations could be determined by imperial ukase has been extraordinarily persistent’. A particular area of stress concerned the quality of SFA. Official policy is currently set out in JSP 464 which states that service personnel are to be provided with ‘satisfactory’ accommodation. However, no definition of ‘satisfactory’ is provided and policy does not recognise quality as a basis for rejection. There are five classes of accommodation for officers and three for other ranks, ranging from five bedrooms and 251 square metres at the top, to 2 Bedrooms and 85.5 square metres at the bottom. It is impossible to discount economics from the provision of accommodation. An unmarried private soldier living in barracks might be expected to share a room with three others, clearly this is inherently cheaper than providing him, if married, with a two-bed flat. The pressure on defence budgets is perhaps a reason why so much accommodation is sub-standard. Beevor asserted that, whilst those at the top have tended not to take housing complaints too seriously, ‘the cumulative effect on those who have to live in the unmodernised variety can be deeply demoralising’. A Falklands veteran, brought up in a mining village in the Rhondda Valley, recalled his first housing allocation:

As we reached the married quarters, grey, bleak and run-down [his wife] looked out of the window and said, ‘Oh, look at those horrible flats over there. Who lives in them, poor things?’

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104 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. xiii


106 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 70

107 JSP 464, Ministry of Defence, DCDS (Pers) Service Conditions & Welfare SP 05.04.04.01, *Tri-Service Accommodation Regulations*, (16 Sep 2010)


109 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 68
‘You and me, love,’ I said and she burst into tears.110

The requirement for servicemen to spend extended periods away from home has been a consistent cause of stress. Ashplant et al. concluded that during the First World War, ‘One of the most corrosive anxieties afflicting soldiers […] was their sense that women at home were not fully committed to their cause’.111 During the Second World War, this was articulated in a suspicion of infidelity. The Army Morale Report for May-July 1942 commented that:

A worry which is constantly sapping the morale of a great part of the Army is due to the suspicion, very frequently justified, of fickleness on the part of wives and ‘girls’.112 If suspicion became reality, and soldiers were ‘bluntly informed […] that they were no longer wanted’ by their partners, the effect was to raise levels of combat anxiety with the risk of breakdown.113 By the time of the First Gulf War, it was perceived amongst the forces that young and recently married soldiers were most at risk. According to research, ‘Rumours of widespread marital breakup and perceptions of increased incidence of “Dear John” letters had negative effects on morale’.114 For most of the twentieth century, post was the only means of family communication, even in the era of global telecommunications phoning home from a combat zone is beset with problems. Maintaining an efficient postal service that delivered good news remained important for sustaining morale. 115 However, one Falklands veteran noted that bad news was a morale-breaker:

You would often see someone standing in the corridors [of Canberra] moaning that he’d had a ‘Dear John’, or some other bad news. For the majority of us, though, the mail was just the boost we needed.116

110 Mike Curtis, CQB: Close Quarter Battle, (London, Corgi, 1998), p. 64
114 Wright, Marlowe & Gifford, ‘Deployment Stress’, p. 295
115 Ibid, p. 292
116 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, p. 10
The Army developed an efficient mass-mail service during the First World War, when it seldom took more than four days to deliver a letter to the Western Front, and has maintained a high standard ever since. This was not only a recognition of the importance of family contact, but also a subtle means of sustaining morale by impressing upon the individual combatant the organisational efficiency of the Armed Forces.\(^{117}\) Reflecting on his role running the postal service during the Falklands War, Maj. Ian Winfield observed, ‘The attitude of the troops when there is no mail is quite astonishing’. Quite literally the messenger was vituperatively blamed, often by experienced soldiers, despite the inevitable problems of delivery. ‘They go off muttering and grumbling and they’re just the same if mail comes in and individually they don’t get any’.\(^{118}\) The reason for this was that correspondence from home was the only means by which a combatant retained some semblance of a private identity. McManners provided an interesting reflection on the military family, ‘Soldiers who didn’t receive any mail would often be given letters by their mates to read - usually with the “sports page” omitted!’\(^{119}\) Another veteran recalled:

> I didn’t get a single letter from my parents in all the time I was away. At the time, I didn’t give it a second thought, but in later years I’ve realised it’s actually quite sad. Knowing someone is at home, who loves and cares about you, helps you to get through things.\(^{120}\)

The downside of contact with home was the possible displacement effect. In combat, the soldier has been conditioned to rely on the primary group for physical and emotional needs, but a regular contact with home, particularly on short missions, meant that group commitment was often conditional.\(^{121}\) Because combatants were powerless to provide patriarchal support and resolve domestic problems, they became anxious, potentially to the point of obsession.\(^{122}\) A Falklands Parachute officer recalled that he:

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\(^{117}\) Holmes, *Acts of War*, p. 88

\(^{118}\) IWM 1267, MSS Private Papers of Major Ian Winfield, *The Posties Went to War: The story of the Postal & Courier Service in the Falklands War*


\(^{120}\) McNally, *Watching Men Burn*, p. 71


\(^{122}\) Grinker & Spiegel, *Men Under Stress*, p. 182
Dreaded the arrival of mail because it reminded him that there he had another persona: in addition to being merely a cog in a military machine and of little individual value, he was also a husband and a father whose death would have devastating consequences.\textsuperscript{123}

Humour and the post combined as a morale booster. Hundreds of women took to writing to members of the Task Force in search of pen-friends. Many enclosed pictures and these were enthusiastically and ribaldly assessed for pulchritude and sexual potential.\textsuperscript{124} However, in many respects the relationship between the surrogate military family and home life were irreconcilable. Robust black humour may have acted as a combat protection, but was not something easily shared with spouses and children, by post or otherwise. That many combatants were unable to find the language to express their combat experience to their families, arguably combined with the domestic pressure of poor quality housing, is reflected in the post Falklands divorce rate.\textsuperscript{125}

4.4 Safety

As was discussed in Chapter 3.10, ‘threats to life and limb’ emerged as one of the key needs deficiencies that those engaged in combat have had to resolve.\textsuperscript{126} Three categories emerged from twentieth century combat experience as integral to meeting safety needs and are well referenced within Falklands testimony: physical, the provision of medical support in case of serious injury; spiritual, embracing religion and/or superstition specifically as a defence mechanism; functional, the ability to rely on equipment to perform as required. The evidence suggests that each of these was linked, so that a deficiency in one was not compensated by a superfluity of another.

Part of the unwritten military covenant is that those injured in battle will receive the best medical support that circumstances permit. The fear of crippling injury, particularly for experienced soldiers, far outweighed the fear of failure or even death.\textsuperscript{127}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Holmes, \textit{Acts of War}, p. 90
\item \textsuperscript{124} Bramley, \textit{Excursion to Hell}, pp. 10-11
\item \textsuperscript{125} Vincent Bramley, \textit{Two Sides of Hell}, (London, Bloomsbury, 20090), p. 331
\item \textsuperscript{126} Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star & Cottrell, \textit{The American Soldier}, pp. 76-77
\item \textsuperscript{127} Holmes, \textit{Acts of War}, p. 142
\end{enumerate}
During the Falklands War Keeble considered, ‘a very efficient and worthwhile casualty care system’ as the ‘principal thing’ to sustain morale.\(^{128}\) McManners took this a step further in his construction of medical provision as a precondition of combat; soldiers would only fight if they believed that when wounded they would be cared for, even if expectations and reality did not coincide.\(^{129}\) Before the twentieth century, battlefield health care was rudimentary, and even minor injuries could result in infection and death. It was during the Great War that the term ‘blighty wound’ entered the unofficial military lexicon. Typically, Corporal Tansley of the York & Lancaster Regiment recalled an experienced old sergeant expressing the desire to receive a non-vital injury on going over the top:

> And he got his wish. He went over just in front of me, and he got one through the knee. He was down right away. Clean, it was clean out. If it was a Blighty - that was lovely!\(^{130}\)

Whilst the desire to avoid a traumatic injury or death was explicit, there was also the implicit expectation that the medical logistics were sufficiently advanced to ensure that the injured party would enjoy a relatively trouble free repatriation and recovery. Whilst no evidence emerges that soldiers in the Falklands War sought out ‘blighty wounds’, traumatophobia was a constant source of stress. As Keeble recalled:

> No, I was not scared of dying. What I was scared of was being physically maimed and returning from this conflict as a vegetable. I did not want to return to my family […] unable to fulfil that responsibility.\(^{131}\)

It was not only the fear of being reduced to a state of vegetative dependency which eroded morale but also the fear of emasculation. As Holmes observed, genital damage, ‘continues to rate highly amongst the most feared wounds’.\(^{132}\) During the Battle of Goose Green:

> The lads watched open-mouthed as Brum pulled his trousers down in the middle of the battlefield and started examining his wedding tackle. It looked like the poor bastard had had his balls shot off.\(^{133}\)

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\(^{129}\) McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 259


\(^{131}\) Bates, ‘An Investigation’, Interview B1-9

\(^{132}\) Holmes, *Acts of War*, p. 182

He hadn’t, but other soldiers did receive serious injuries and the problems of the medical logistics would surely have mitigated any possible desire to suffer a ‘blighty’. Falklands medical care resolved into a three-phase process: immediate treatment by the medical team at a RAP; transfer to the improvised Accident & Emergency centre at Ajax Bay; finally, transport to SS Uganda, a schools-cruise ship that had been converted to a floating hospital. Although Jolly has been able to assert that every wounded serviceman that made it to Ajax Bay survived, it was a claim that flattered to deceive.

The loss of helicopter transport not only compelled the land forces to march to their objectives but also prevented the effective evacuation of injured soldiers, many of whom had to wait many hours or even days to be moved. Even then the resources at Ajax Bay were limited.\textsuperscript{134} Following the \textit{Galahad} incident:

\begin{quote}
It was simply heartbreaking to turn nearly ninety young men away from the Accident & Emergency Department door that they had paid so much to reach, but there was no other way.\textsuperscript{135}
\end{quote}

Jolly unofficially had to call for naval helicopter volunteers to evacuate these soldiers to the \textit{Uganda} as every official request was refused, ‘[…] no helos available today, but maybe tomorrow?’.\textsuperscript{136} This may be another example of the unforeseen consequences of the ‘hijacking’ culture, but it also resonates with a sense of denial and avoidance relating to the broader issue of injury that followed the disaster. The Brigade Commander and the Assistant Director of Medical Services failed to visit Ajax Bay as did any officers from the Welsh Guards. Jolly recalled, ‘I began to wonder whether the \textit{Galahad} incident was such bad news that nobody wanted to know about any subsequent problems related to it’.\textsuperscript{137} It has been speculated that the freezing conditions in the Falklands, in some instances, induced an injury stasis, but the opposite is perhaps more plausible; delayed evacuation, combined with extreme cold and wet, led to the death of the ‘marginal cases’ before they could be treated.\textsuperscript{138}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{134} It operated throughout the campaign in a disused meat-packing plant with two unexploded bombs lodged in the building.
\textsuperscript{135} Jolly, \textit{The Red and Green Life Machine}, p. 167
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 174-175
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid}, p. 173
\textsuperscript{138} McManners, \textit{The Scars of War}, p. 291
\end{flushleft}
Spiritual faith may have acted as a carapace, and the military have consistently excelled at religious ceremonial; however, it may be argued that the substance of spiritual observance is more nuanced. The next stage of this section is to investigate the extent to which combatants sought out supernatural reassurance. As Falklands veteran Lt.Col Peter Bates’ revealed:

All my study and interviews have led me to conclude that it is quite clear that a soldier needs to be totally prepared in every way for all phases of war. Therefore Religion and Spirituality do have a definite place on the modern battlefield. There is a requirement for soldiers to be in a position or environment where spiritual support is readily available.\(^{139}\)

Bates moved beyond the notion of religious faith as a protective carapace and believed that the essence of spirituality was ethical integrity. Although some soldiers possessed this ‘ingredient’, the role of the military chaplain was vital because his authoritative presence reinforced, ‘overtly and covertly’, the need for integrity.\(^{140}\) Successful padres preached a muscular military Christianity. During the Great War, Geoffrey Studdert-Kennedy MC assumed almost mythical status by combining his generosity with cigarettes whilst proselytising the bayonet.\(^{141}\) Cast from a similar mould, David Cooper was 2 Para’s padre during the Falklands. He remains a frequently referenced commentator, and one of the few outspoken advocates for ‘H’ Jones. Along with his pastoral duties, he was an expert shot who trained the battalion snipers. Although recommended for a MC in the strongest terms by both Thompson and Moore, he fell foul of the quota system and had to make do with a MiD. In interview, Cooper commented on the noticeable trend, whilst sailing south on *Norland*, for attendance at his services to increase. He pointed out that most soldiers would not ‘publicly express their fears’. These were not so much of death, but of serious injury and the consequences for their families.\(^{142}\) This was not a false perception because Bates’ survey of Army Chaplains revealed that the demand for spiritual contact increased by

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139 Bates, ‘An Investigation’, p. 49  
140 *Ibid*, p. 18  
141 ‘Woodbine Willie’  
142 IWM 17145 - Cooper, (1996), [on audiotape]
300% during wartime, accounting for over 75% of all soldiers. Speaking from the ranks, Falklands veteran Tony McNally admitted to not being particularly religious, but attended a church service as ‘a case of hedging my bets’. He recalled being surprised at some of the attendees at the service but that his sense of feeling protected and ‘being on the good side in a crusade against evil’ was largely mutual. During the final church service before landing on the Falklands, ‘God was playing to a full house’. Military religion was not overly pious and certainly not ‘high church’. An example from the Falklands that combines this sense of robustness with humour and faith, occurred during the Easter Service on board Sir Percivale:

There were a lot of people standing by enjoying the sunshine. One of the sergeants-major bellowed across to them, ‘Come and get your fucking souls cleansed’ which got us off to a good start.

In the moments leading up to the Battle of Mount Longdon, CSM John Weeks remembered honestly describing to his soldiers the risks that they were all about to encounter, and the outcome they could expect. He encouraged them all to say a prayer and is convinced from his subsequent conversations that most of them did, ‘After the battle I sincerely believe that there is someone who listens to us’.

There are different layers of spirituality and faith in the supernatural extends beyond formal religion. Its concomitant is superstition that often manifested in the possession of lucky charms. Some combatants developed a fatalistic outlook that their future existence was not subject to the caprices of warfare but was either predetermined or subject to the agency of a supernal power. A talisman with the apparent power to bring good luck often became a vital appurtenance. Whilst faith in such charms may appear harmless and have been the subject of humorous banter, at a ‘psychodynamic’ level they may have served to undermine cohesion by displacing faith in the primary

143 Bates, ‘An Investigation’, p. 35
144 McNally, Watching Men Burn, pp. 68-69
145 Ken Lukowiak, A Soldier’s Song: True Stories from the Falklands, (London, Phoenix, 1999), p. 174
146 McManners, Falklands Commando, p. 65
The protective power of the amulet has shown remarkable consistency throughout twentieth century warfare. During the Great War, all soldiers and officers who served in the trenches possessed one. During the Second World War, journalist and author John Steinbeck observed:

The practice is by no means limited to the ignorant or superstitious men. It would seem that in times of great danger and emotional tumult a man has to reach outside himself for help and comfort, and has to have some supra-personal symbol to hold to. It can be anything at all, an old umbrella handle or a religious symbol, but he has to have it.

A similar observation is made of the Falklands War and the perceived power, ‘[…] of amulets and ritualistic patterns of behaviour’. Such rituals may have been individual or collective in nature. Anxiety displaced objectivity amongst even the most rational of people and left a space that superstition and preordination could fill. Steve Hughes, the MO of 2 Para, recalled a powerful premonition, ‘I had this sense of impending doom and became convinced that I was going to die on my birthday. It seemed logical that I should die on that date’. Similarly Lukowiak, who has built a post-Falklands career as an author and war journalist, constructed the memory of the ghost of his aunt appearing on the Goose Green battlefield and beckoning him away from incoming shellfire. ‘One day I shall thank Aunt Letty. It is one of the few certainties I have’.

Whilst it may be argued that an existentialist warrior such as Jones or McLaughlin was entirely self-confident whilst in combat, for the vast majority anxiety, and therefore morale, had to be managed by faith. This meant faith in the primary group, religion, pre-destiny and luck, or uneasy permutations of all three. The alternative was to leave the combatant as a fatalistic outcast where death seemed inevitable, and the future had no meaning.

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148 Grinker & Spiegel, Men Under Stress, pp. 130-132
151 Foster, Fighting Fictions, pp. 95-96
152 Lucy Robinson, Explanations of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Falklands Memoirs: The Fragmented Self and the Collective Body, MSS, p.6
153 Bates, ‘An Investigation, p. 31
154 Lukowiak, A Soldier's Song, pp. 62.63
Along with souvenirs and medals, any piece of military equipment could become a talisman but of more significance was its functional utility. In 1981, an IDF survey cited ‘trust in one’s weapons’ as a key component of personal morale.155 This extended to other items of essential personal equipment. Strachan concluded that training was the ‘qualitative edge’ that resulted in victory in the Falklands. He premised this argument on the basis of the relative number of combatants and the comparability of equipment with the Argentine forces.156 However, the evidence suggests that in many respects the quality of the British equipment was not of a comparable standard; therefore, other aspects of motivation and morale had to compensate. According to Spicer, ‘We were very badly equipped to go into that sort of environment and I think it was only the determination and training of the soldiers that got people through it’.157 In interview, Moore acknowledged that certain items of Argentine equipment were better, but he rather dismissed the acquisition of such equipment by British troops as a magpie characteristic rather than one of necessity.158 Whilst souvenir-hunting was undoubtedly popular, a strong body of opinion asserted that the parsimony of the MoD made the liberation of Argentine equipment a functional necessity. Few of the Royal Marines carried steel helmets and yet these were a vital protection against shelling. Consequently, some were taken from Argentine corpses, whilst others were, ‘in the ruthless pragmatism of frontline logic’, illegally liberated from prisoners.159

Deficiencies in the specification of equipment ranged from the high-tech to the mundane. According to Stewart MacFarlane of HMS Coventry, at the time HMS Sheffield was attacked (and sunk) she was making a satellite transmission, and this meant that the electronic warfare sensors used to detect Exocet missiles were switched off, ‘An MoD “money-saving” measure meant that a set of filters was never installed so ships could do both at the same time’.160 Michael Nicholson, the ITN correspondent,

155 Belenky, Noy & Solomon, “Battle Stress”, in Belenky, p. 15
158 IWM 10482 - Moore
159 McManners, Scars of War, p. 307
160 McManners, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, p. 160
noted that one survivor from HMS *Sheffield* died because his polyester clothing had melted into his skin, ‘[…] naval penny-pinching had done away with the cotton clothing they used to have’. McNally expressed extreme anger that the Rapier air defence missile system could only be operated by him in daylight hours because the DN181 blind radar sighting system had not been issued. Similarly, Weeks asserted that the night sights issued to the Paras were ‘pathetic’ compared with the versions used by the Argentinians. At the most basic level, the two essential items of equipment for an infantry soldier were bundook and boots. The rifles used by British and Argentinian forces were based on a Belgian design, the FN. The Argentinian derivative, the FAL, was capable of fully automatic fire, whilst the British SLR only fired single shots. This economy measure put the British soldiers as a significant disadvantage. However, an ingenious ‘Heath Robinson’ solution had been improvised, by jamming a broken match into the firing mechanism the SLR could be made to fire short bursts. As a cost saving exercise it brings to mind the old proverb, ‘[…] all for the want of a nail’. At the time of the Falklands war, the army had replaced its traditional hobnailed boot with the DMS type. As Rick Jolly opined:

> It was a scandal that the standard-issue Army (and Royal Marines) boot had been designed to an inadequate specification, then built to a low price by different contractors, who cared not a whit as to how these items subsequently performed under arduous conditions.

From the junior ranks, John Geddes was more trenchant, ‘Some of us thought the civil servant who ordered them must have been in the pay of the Soviets’. The problem was that the boots never had the chance to dry out. For many soldiers they became saturated with sea water when they initially landed, and the water was constantly replenished by the sodden conditions in the Falklands. It led to the onset of ‘trench-foot’; a problem many would assume was resolved after the Great War. Describing his experiences during 1917, Lieutenant Burke commented:

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161 *Ibid*, p. 169

162 McNally, *Watching Men Burn*, p. 67

163 IWM 20696 - Weeks, (1996), [on audiotape]

164 Geddes, *Spearhead Assault*, pp. 97-98


166 Geddes, *Spearhead Assault*, p. 132
Trench foot was owing to the mud soaking through your boots and everything. In many cases your toes nearly rotted off. We lost more that way than we did from any wounds or anything.\textsuperscript{167}

Despite advances in technology, it can be argued that Great War boots were actually of better quality than DMS. Practically every primary source from the Falklands War references the inadequacy of footwear. The condition was, ‘Characterised by a dull thumping ache all over the foot, with blueness at the edges’.\textsuperscript{168} It was not an isolated problem because during the Falklands campaign, ‘B’ Company of 2 Para lost fourteen men (around 10\%) incapacitated by trench-foot.\textsuperscript{169} Inevitably the better quality Argentine boots were regarded as legitimate spoils of war, and many pairs were ‘liberated’;\textsuperscript{170} Geddes observed that in the aftermath of the engagement at Goose Green, many of the Argentine dead were not wearing boots.\textsuperscript{171} Regardless of the impact on morale, those not lucky enough to find replacements had to endure the extended marches required of them. It is a testament to the coercive power of group loyalty (Chapter 2.1) that many soldiers, such as Mark Eyles-Thomas, ignored medical advice and remained with their colleagues, ‘I felt I had let everyone down and would be branded a “waste of rations”’.\textsuperscript{172} More disturbingly, some soldiers took to injecting morphine phials into their feet and legs to keep going.\textsuperscript{173} Since the Falklands War, the standard issue army boot has been through a number of iterations but is still extensively criticised. Many servicemen now buy their own commercially available boots, the current favourites being manufactured by Lowa and Altberg.\textsuperscript{174} At a current cost of around £150 per pair, it is perhaps no surprise that they are not standard issue, particularly since many personnel seem happy to make the investment themselves.
4.5 Physiological

Provision for basic needs is the foundation upon which all other morale factors are built. The final section will consider three aspects of physiological morale boosters that not only sustain the body but also assuage the mind: food, emollients (tobacco, alcohol and drugs), and sex. A strand of continuity that extended to the Falklands War was expressed by Gary Sheffield in his examination of the First World War soldier, ‘Regular supplies of food, drink and tobacco, were all important in maintaining the morale of soldiers of all social classes’.175 Although the authorities have made provision for the necessary calories and for the ‘little vices of life’, much of it has been reduced to a form of grudging tokenism, as Ellis observed, ‘A finally frustrating travesty of the “real life” equivalents’.176 However, this has to be balanced by the enduring problem of logistics. During the Falklands War, there were occasions when the combatants had to go hungry just as their antecedents generations earlier.

The quality of military food has been subsumed into the collective myth. However, during the twentieth century, and when the logistics chain was working, it was plentiful if tedious. A minimum of 3,000 calories a day was essential to sustain a soldier in combat, even if did not provide balanced nutrition.177 During the Great War, frontline soldiers were initially rationed at 4,200 calories, whilst their rear-echelon colleagues got 3,472.178 ‘Bully Beef’179 became subsumed into the public consciousness and, although plentiful, its quality was highly variable depending on manufacture. Primary sources are replete with references to the density of hardtack biscuits, the ubiquity of apple and plum jam, and the appalling quality of Machonochie’s tinned stews. One soldier commented, ‘The head of that firm should have been put up against

176 Ellis, *The Sharp End of War*, p. 272
178 Duffett, ‘A War Unimagined’, p. 51
179 From the French *bœuf bouilli* (boiled beef) - tinned corned beef
the wall and shot for the way they sharked us troops’.  

Gunner Alfred Finnegan recalled that complaints about the food prompted an order from GHQ, ‘On opening a tin of pork and beans, soldiers must not be disappointed if they find no pork. The pork has been absorbed into the beans’. During the Second World War, the reliance on bully beef and hardtack ensured that the diet of combatants was consistently monotonous. Occasional attempts to lift morale with something appetising could be counter-productive. During the Battle of Monte Cassino, Lieutenant Bond recalled, ‘During the last four months, whenever there was a big attack, they had been served steak, and they dreaded seeing it come’.

Whilst the logistics of supplying food remained an issue during the Falklands War, improvements in food technology: enrichment, dehydration, and freeze drying, meant that combat rations had improved significantly and offered a variation of menus. Known colloquially as ‘rat packs’ or ‘compo’, an individual 24-hour ration pack contained a combination of tins and sachets of calorie-packed food and beverages. Each pack could be broken down and its contents distributed in pouches and pockets. Food could be warmed, and water boiled, using a hexamine cooker; a small, folding and disposable device on which a mess tin could be balanced and heated using a solid fuel tablet that burned in all conditions. Its downside was that it coated the mess tin with black and glutinous soot. Lukowiak found that the boost to his morale, because of being able to prepare hot food in the most adverse circumstances, was profound:

The chocolate oats I ate that night upon the battlefield of Goose Green were without doubt the most delicious food I have ever had the pleasure of putting into my body.

An arguably intended consequence of eating compo rations was that they caused constipation, and for this reason fresh rations were periodically required. For many combatants this outcome, even if intended, did not arise because of an apparent

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180 Fuller, *Troop Morale*, pp. 59-60
182 Ellis, *The Sharp End of War*, p. 274
183 Lukowiak, *A Soldier's Song*, p. 70
184 McManners, *Falklands Commando*, p. 190
misunderstanding at the beginning of the logistics train. Compo rations came in two varieties: GS (for use in temperate climates), and Arctic. The majority of ration packs supplied to Falklands troops were of the Arctic variety. Although these had the advantage of providing 5,000 calories, they were dehydrated, designed on the assumption that a plentiful supply of snow would be available to rehydrate them. Unfortunately, much of the water on the Falklands was polluted, and each man was rationed to a pint and a half of clean water per day. Consequently, GS Compo became a luxury item. As Armour recalled, it became necessary to use ground water which was black with peat, and attempt to sterilise it. The consequences were inevitable, ‘I never had any underpants on by the time we got to Stanley, and there were quite a few guys like that because of having the shits’. The availability of fresh food was not only important for health but also for morale; captured Argentinian food supplies were consumed with gusto. As Richens explained, the British army rat packs were good, but the solid food they found was better and a morale booster. Bramley described the pleasure of eating fresh bread after two weeks surviving on Arctic rations as ‘impossible to explain’. However, the limited supplies of ‘luxury’ food items tested group loyalties to breaking point and beyond. One soldier expropriated fresh food meant for his group:

We caught Chaderton hiding behind a bush eating a bloody big pile of strawberry sandwiches […] we never forgave Chad’s selfish act. What his eating those sandwiches, meant for all of us, is talked about to this day.

Tensions were similarly raised on Sussex Mountain. Whilst cigarettes (discussed below) were issued to smokers on an either/or basis, non-smokers were issued with chocolate bars. This proved to be contentious as soldiers keen to have a choice of brand were all too ready to get into fights about perceived unfairness of distribution. Another indicator of the fragility of group loyalties.

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185 McGowan & Hands, Don’t Cry For Me, p. 114
186 Bilton & Kominsky, Speaking Out, pp. 236-237
187 IWM 16074 - Richens,
188 Bramley, Excursion to Hell, p. 66
189 Bramley, Forward into Hell, pp. 81-82
190 IWM 17143 - Meredith, (1996), [on audiotape]
Emollients to stiffen sinews and soften stresses have traditionally fulfilled an important military role throughout the combat motivation cycle, not least because of their ability to aid the group bonding process. Access to them sits on a continuum of toleration and perceptions of fairness in availability can test group and regimental loyalties, particularly when the junior ranks are rationed but the seniors are not. The use of alcohol is embedded within military culture, tobacco consumption has tended to mirror social mores, whilst the use of recreational drugs continues to result in draconian penalties. McManners pointed out that ‘The use of alcohol is an institutionalised ritual for all ranks in the British Army; in some units, not drinking is still considered a sign of weakness’.\textsuperscript{191} However, the use of alcohol extended beyond fermenting group loyalties to becoming a necessity. Faced with the boredom of barracks life it is not surprising that alcohol abuse and dependency have consistently emerged as potential problems. Ferguson asserted that, ‘Without alcohol […] the First World War could not have been fought […] ordinary soldiers would get drunk at every opportunity’.\textsuperscript{192} Beer and wine were deemed appropriate for the rank-and-file whilst whisky was the preserve of ‘officers only’. Holmes revealed that during the Second World War, some soldiers would go to desperate lengths to get their alcohol fix:

Some of the more inventive defenders of the Anzio beach-head collected copper wire from crashed aircraft to make stills which produces a savage raisin jack, a welcome alternative to the ‘swipe’ made from after-shave mixed with orange juice.\textsuperscript{193}

The Falklands experience reveals continuities: the popularity of alcohol, rank demarcations, and the inventiveness of soldiers to get extra supplies. Sailing south on Canberra, the bar was constantly packed and drunk dry in a matter of days, with extra supplies having to be brought in. Whisky was banned for the junior ranks although illicit supplies, with the connivance of the ship’s crew, were readily obtained.\textsuperscript{194} With extra supplies on board, the rank-and-file were restricted to two cans of beer per day. The ration was intended to be enforced by issuing each man with photocopied vouchers;

\textsuperscript{191} McManners, The Scars of War, p. 22
\textsuperscript{192} Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War, (London, Allen Lane, 1998), p. 350
\textsuperscript{194} Bramley, Forward into Hell, p. 17
however, these were easily recopied to obtain more. This provides an interesting insight into hierarchical relationships. Firstly, the implicit assumption that, without actual supervision, the Paras’ behaviour could be controlled by such a naive method; secondly, the expectation that they could not be trusted to maintain any sense of discipline. The evidence, from two embedded journalists, is to the contrary:

Drunkenness was never a problem. The soldiers had an ability only to fall over when nobody with pips or crowns on their shoulders was watching. Only one man was caught, charged and fined (£200).

Further evidence from the Falklands emerged of how old soldiers sustained their whisky fix:

How Ron managed to get regular supplies of whisky I will never know, but in the two weeks we had been on the island Ron's hip flask had never run out […] Nothing passed his lips without being flavoured by some of the best double malts Scotland had to offer.

The erroneous expectation that drunken British troops would run amok once the war had been won emerged when the landlords in Port Stanley got together and invented an official ban, ‘Magistrates order. From today, all bars are closed’. The ban was not observed by officers although they were similarly categorised with their subordinates. The nadir of in vino veritas hospitality was reached when Des King, the landlord of the Uplands Goose Hotel, told Chaundler and Keeble, ‘First the fucking Argies, now you lot. When are you going to clear off and leave us in peace?’.

Holmes argued, ‘It is hard to overstate the consumption of cigarettes in both world wars’. This assertion easily extrapolates to include the Falklands. As well as suppressing the appetite of hungry troops, nicotine has a soothing quality. It releases a whole host of positive neurotransmitters that not only increase concentration and alertness but also ameliorate pain and anxiety, and produce a sense of well-being. The mere act of smoking is a manipulative activity that acts as a stress reducer. During the

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195 IWM 17147 - Margerison, (1996), [on audiotape]
196 McGowan & Hands, Don’t Cry For Me, p. 37
197 Eyles-Thomas, Sod That, p. 146
198 McGowan & Hands, Don’t Cry For Me, p. 269
199 Ibid, pp. 273-274
200 Holmes, Acts of War, p. 129
Second World War Lt.Col. John Whitfield, a non-smoker, tried to ban smoking during exercises ‘but discovered it produced an appalling effect on morale’. Thereafter he always ensured his troops had an adequate supply. Despite the logistical problems faced in the Falklands, the troops were well provisioned with cigarettes even if they had to give up the chance of chocolate. One junior soldier observed that:

A lot of Toms took up smoking during the war, they gave it up on the way home after puffing their way through their free issue of a thousand tactical fags.

During the Second World War, amphetamines were enthusiastically issued by British medical officials, but the practice of recreational drug taking is a matter that has focussed the minds of the military establishment since the 1960s. It is not surprising that young men who have acquired a taste for the illicit may wish to continue the practice into their service life. In Vietnam, the American army faced a serious problem that has acted as a warning to the MoD. In 1971, estimates suggested that 50.9% of troops smoked Marijuana and 28.5% had taken opiates. 11,000 servicemen were prosecuted for taking narcotics although it is estimated that only 20% of offenders were detected. Concern about illegal drug taking during the Falklands war was evident to Jolly who smashed hundreds of captured morphine ampoules, ‘There was a mood of happy - even reckless - celebration about, and I certainly wasn't going to take any chances in leaving serious drugs like morphine lying around’. Although there is no substantive evidence of illegal drug taking during the war, it seems that his concerns were not misplaced because Falklands veteran Philip Williams confessed that:

I must have been asked now a hundred times at least what made me take to drugs. Hard drugs, I mean. Not pot. Lots of the guardsmen have the odd puff of that now and again, although I would expect that would be officially denied.

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201 Ellis, *The Sharp End of War*, p. 294
202 Geddes, *Spearhead Assault*, p. 239
203 The Americans thought Benzedrine was too toxic to be issued
204 Holmes, *Acts of War*, p. 251
The problem was not confined to the Scots Guards. Evidence of drug abuse emerges from within the Parachute Regiment, but with the added complication that it was used to self-medicate for the effects of PTSD. According to Corporal Tom Howard:

I’d started drinking heavily and smoking drugs by September 1982 […] The combination provided an escape for me, and in Aldershot drugs were easy to get from people in the army. We smoked hash - even opium, sometimes - in the unit club. I don’t know how we got away with it. I mixed with friends in 2 Para which had the same problems. We all used drugs and drink for the same purpose.207

Current practice is to conduct regular drug testing of personnel. Between 2003 and 2007 the average number of servicemen dishonourably discharged for failing them was 587 per year.208 Assessing the detection rate is entirely speculative but if it approaches the American experience then the authorities face a material problem. The fact that 80% of world opium production is currently estimated to originate from Afghanistan and is accessible to British forces is a statistic presumably not lost on the military establishment.

As Stouffer et al. noted, sex is a traditional military preoccupation because ‘the average young man in our culture does not make a virtue out of sexual deprivation’.209 The military authorities, well aware of this fact, have generally maintained an ambivalent attitude towards carnal urges, and suggestions that bromide was used as an anaphrodisiac in the tea are a myth. Concern has been to maintain operational efficiency by limiting the impact of venereal diseases, often unsuccessfully.210 Although not overly concerned with moral issues, the military authorities have had to contend with occasional outbursts of public prurience, which inhibited the ability for any official provision or control. The essential paradox is that the armed forces have instilled a sense of hyper-masculinity that has been unleavened by any material sense of companionate femininity. As Dixon pointed out, many young men who joined the army did so because of doubts about their physical and/or sexual inadequacy. The army provided a compensatory environment which reassured against such fears and was a

207 McManners, *The Scars of War*, p. 324
208 Hansard, 7 May 2008: Column 912W
209 Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star & Cottrell, *The American Soldier*, p. 79
means of asserting masculinity and assuaging fears of effeminacy. Dixon termed this type of behaviour as ‘butch’. Because the military placed a premium on exaggerated masculinity, the individual not only benefited from it but also had an investment in its cultural continuity. Fears of sexual adequacy have often been exploited ruthlessly during recruit training when it has been made clear to recruits that they will only be regarded as real men once they have successfully completed their training. The combination of latent sexual anxieties and ‘butchness’ of a closed male group led to a set of attitudes that fitted within the construction of a Madonna-Whore complex. Professor Jesse Gray noted that, ‘Anyone entering military service for the first time can only be astonished by soldiers’ concentration [...] upon the sexual act’. Also, military historian and former officer Anthony Beevor commented:

A private soldier tends to classify women in three categories: prozzies, slags and the girl from home whom he’ll marry. They only go with prostitutes when abroad, either ‘because there’s nothing else’, or because they treat it as a form of sightseeing.

Anxieties promoted by participation in combat, or the prospect of it, had the effect of encouraging ‘a special hedonism and lasciviousness’. During the First World War, 416,891 soldiers of the British army were treated for VD. The effect on manpower and resources was significant because treatment of syphilis required around 50 days hospitalisation. The peak was reached in 1918 when 3.2% of British and Dominion forces were admitted to hospital. Half a century later, matters had arguably got worse. In infantry battalions stationed in Germany, the VD rate among junior ranks ran at over 5% and increased substantially following postings to Belize, with its rudimentary approach to regulation and hygiene. Although the authorities have occasionally handed out severe punishments for ‘self-inflicted injuries’, their approach has been

211 Dixon, *Military Incompetence*, p. 213
213 Gray, *The Warriors*, p. 61
214 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 62
215 Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, p. 270
217 Fuller, *Troop Morale*, pp. 75-76
218 Beevor, *Inside the British Army*, p. 34
generally pragmatic when faced with the inevitable. Problems arose when sections of
the public became aroused against military turpitude. During the Second World War,
Montgomery was nearly sacked for supporting official brothels to provide ‘horizontal
refreshment’ for the troops.219 In India the well-run official brothels were shut down
following a burst of moral outrage but this did not prevent the trade. According to
Corporal Bratt (RAMC), ‘Within three weeks every bed in the previously deserted VD
ward […] was full’.220 John Steinbeck was critical of what he saw as public hypocrisy.
Plentiful supplies of condoms were issued to the troops, but ‘[…] it had to be explained
that they were used to keep the moisture out of machine gun barrels - and perhaps they
did’.221

Accounts of sexual shenanigans during the Falklands War are very limited
although this undoubtedly was because of a shortage of willing partners. In the late
1970s, a local courtesan known as ‘the Yellow Submarine’ plied her trade from a
shipping container on the public jetty in Port Stanley, but by the time of the war she had
apparently shut up shop.222 Anecdotally during the voyage south some of the female
crew members onboard the QE2 had relationships with the troops.223 However, the
image projected by the tabloid press was rather different. They inevitably conflated sex
and war, and in the process, reinforced notions of hyper-masculinity and submissive
femininity. The few female personnel on board were characterised as potential sexual
partners rather than military professionals. The Sun reported ‘Sexy capers on the ocean
rave, QE2 cuties fall for heroes’.224 An outburst of Madonna and Whore behaviour
occurred whilst Canberra was resupplying at Sierra Leone. A British family has visited
the Freetown docks to cheer the troops. The teenage daughter of the family was invited
by a married member of 40 Commando to ‘get your kit off and show us your tits’.

219 Brian Bond, The British Field Force in France and Belgium 1939-1940’, in Paul Addison & Angus
Calder (eds), Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, (London, Pimlico, 1997), p. 42
220 Ellis, The Sharp End of War, p. 305
221 Ibid, p. 306
222 Southby-Tailyour, Reasons in Writing, pp. 25-26
223 Simon Weston, Walking Tall, (London, Bloomsbury, 1989), p. 113
224 Lucy Noakes, Mass-Observation, Gender and Nationhood: Britain in the Falklands War, (M-O
Unfortunately, his endearing turn of phrase was televised and earned the opprobrium of wife and family.\textsuperscript{225} The nature of the war on the Falklands meant that most of the available women were too young. A noted example was the daughter of the manager of Port San Carlos settlement, the authorities were required to preempt any unpleasantness by letting the troops know that despite appearances she was only thirteen years old.\textsuperscript{226}

An aspect of hyper-masculinity that links the Great War with the Falklands War has been its aversion to the love that dare not speak its name. The assumption that effeminacy elided into homosexuality meant that practices and characteristics that might be deemed feminine have often been actively discouraged. These included hair length, taboos concerning non-manly pastimes such as interest in art and music, and an aversion to wearing protective equipment (helmets, ear defenders, etc.) In terms of gendering, this included a strong bias against women encroaching into traditional male roles and activities.\textsuperscript{227} Until the ECHR ruling in 1999, homosexuality was prohibited in the British Armed Forces. Before 1984, it was a court-martial offence and thereafter it would lead to administrative discharge. During the twentieth century, this military culture was framed within a carefully delineated construction of personality that tolerated masculine homosexuality but vigorously extirpated any traits of effeminacy. Amongst most personnel, there was a preferred tendency to turn a blind-eye, providing that the serviceman was not blatant and in all other respects one of the chaps.\textsuperscript{228} Joanna Bourke argued that homosexuals could be highly motivated for combat:

By the Second World War, delineating the relationship between homosexual desire and combat had many adherents […] homosexuality had two effects. Unconscious inverts who turned their aggression inwards showed self-sacrificing devotion to their comrades; unconscious inverts who turned their aggression outwards were killers.\textsuperscript{229}

In 1914, Britain’s most famous soldier, the conspicuously ruthless Field Marshal Kitchener, was anecdotally reported as having ‘the failing acquired by most of the

\textsuperscript{225} McGowan & Hands, \textit{Don’t Cry For Me}, pp.48-49

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Ibid}, pp.113-114

\textsuperscript{227} Dixon, \textit{Military Incompetence}, pp. 208-209

\textsuperscript{228} French, \textit{Military Identities}, pp. 132-133

\textsuperscript{229} Joanna Bourke, \textit{An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in 20th Century Warfare}, (London, Granta, 1999), p. 103
Egyptian officers, a taste for buggery’. Maj. Gen. Hector MacDonald was a national hero who committed suicide, apparently on the suggestion of the King, shortly before being court-martialled for pederasty. The Establishment was spared the embarrassment of a court martial and the files were conveniently destroyed. MacDonald was a crofter’s son who had joined the army as a private and risen to general rank, as such he was an outsider and it is suggested that the authorities were not prepared to protect him. By contrast, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck was let off with a high level warning for his homosexual predilections. Following the Wolfenden Report (1957), public attitudes towards homosexuality have become increasingly tolerant. By 1999, 70% of the public believed that homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the armed forces. By contrast, the attitude of the military authorities appeared to have hardened. In 1952, the Adjutant General reported to a parliamentary committee, ‘Once you get it started in a barrack room you get the whole lot corrupted […] just like the vicious type of public school dormitory where vice spreads quickly’. Perhaps personal experience was his reference point; however, it promulgated an attitude that essentially created a chimera that had to be hunted down and rooted out. Statistics are quite revealing, during the Great War, 292 soldiers were court-martialled for ‘indecency’. This was rather less than the number ‘shot at dawn’, despite the attitude from some military psychiatrists, that victims of shell-shock had their ‘latent homosexuality […] brought to the surface by the all-male environment’. Between 1990 and 1995, 363 men and women were administratively discharged, often following witch-hunts that extended well beyond military premises into the private sphere. Following the reforms in 1999, General Sir

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232 Ibid


234 French, Military Identities, pp. 132-133

235 Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 349


Anthony Farrar-Hockley commented, ‘[…] the overwhelming majority of those in military service today find homosexuality abhorrent.’ There was the expectation of mass departures, in the event only one brigadier resigned. Lord West, the former First Sea Lord and Captain of HMS Ardent during the Falklands War, better captured the zeitgeist, ‘I don’t believe it’s got anything to do with how efficient or capable their forces will be - it’s to do with prejudices I’m afraid’.238 In microcosm, 3 Para of the Falklands War encapsulated both sides of the debate. On board SS Canberra, a gay P&O steward was encouraged to make a pass at McLaughlin, for his trouble he was beaten up and McLaughlin tried to stuff him out of a porthole.239 By contrast, journalist Hugh Bicheno recalled that ‘Many members of 3 Para’s tough Mortar Platoon were devout homosexuals: a matter of absolutely no military significance (vide the deadly Spartans).’240 Prior to the war, a platoon member had been court-martialled for homosexuality. He enjoyed some support from his comrades on the basis that he was, ‘a “giver” rather than a “taker”’. According to CSM John Weeks:

He was a male prostitute. He got done for it, but don’t get me wrong, [he] was a very, very hard man. He never interfered with anybody in the battalion, he went up for his weekend as a single guy and did what he wanted to do.241

In terms of morale, the pragmatic approach to the history of military sex suggests that rules have always been regarded as being for the obedience of fools and the guidance of the libidinous.

4.6 Summary

The terms morale and motivation have been used interchangeably, but they are not the same. Although they are very closely linked and interact, it is not sophistry to distinguish between them. Whilst morale needs have shifted in accordance with the


240 Bicheno, Razor’s Edge, p. 219

241 Jennings & Weale, Green-Eyed Boys, pp. 37-38
cyclical framework that drives motivation, they have responded to a different set of forces. This is because motivation comprises the factors that sustain and drive participants in combat whilst morale is the spirit in which it is undertaken. Therefore, it has been possible to have high morale but a low desire to fight or vice versa. Whilst high morale linked to strong motivation suggests the most powerful combination; morale has become dysfunctional if not aligned to organisational goals. The key intervention of this chapter has been to establish a new definition of morale by using an established technique. By applying Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to morale, the tendency to corporatise individuals and perceive their morale satisfaction simply in terms of basic physiological needs, has been discounted. Instead, morale comprises a series of tiers. Once low level morale deficiencies have been met, each individual will require satisfaction of higher level emotional and intellectual demands. The evidence from British twentieth century combat experience, culminating in the Falklands War, suggests a rather patchy approach to morale. Official parsimony and cultural expectations have been strands that had a deleterious effect, particularly for the rank-and-file whose morale requirements have tended to operate in the lower three tiers of the hierarchy. For officers, particularly those who aspired to higher rank, the competitive nature of leadership, elitism, and the need to assert a place in the pecking order, may have meant that satisfying their self-esteem deficiencies led to a lack of cohesion in the command structure. It has been all too easy to ignore deficiencies in morale following victory. Put simply, it was not sufficient to rely on extrinsically managed task motivation, the spirit with which combat was undertaken was a vital concomitant that needs to be properly understood.
Conclusion

The study of combat motivation is as old as Herodotus, yet the range and depth of its historiography reveals it remains topical and demanding of new insights. The purpose of this thesis has been to centre research around the Falklands War of 1982 whilst placing it in its twentieth century context; a period that starts and ends with small volunteer armed forces, but includes the social and cultural legacy of total war when the British population was conscripted and indentured to the logistics of combat. By drawing upon evidence from earlier wars, it has been possible to reveal continuity of combat motivation throughout the twentieth century. This also reveals how media representations of the American experience of war have been subsumed into the British cultural template. There are good reasons to research combat motivation through the lens of the Falklands War, one of which relates to its implications for the British contribution to later ‘Desert Sands’ campaigns. By conceptualising motivation as a cycle, it is revealed that: collective culture informed expectations of combat, participation in combat has often been a transformative experience, and the subsequent composure by combatants that entered the public domain has caused a subtle reshaping of collective culture. Between 1914 and 1982 this cycle reveals significant continuity with two notable exceptions. In 1914, a blast of imperialist ideology inspired around three million volunteers from across the social spectrum into Kitchener’s army, yet less than eighteen months later conscription became necessary. The 1982 watershed revealed the increased politicisation of the post-combat experience. Not only have published Falklands memoirs become ‘a pile a mile high’, but also marked a shift in the nature of military history. Initially the published accounts by journalists and senior officers followed the traditional command strategy analysis; however, after 1997 the ‘rank-and-file’ sought to offer a bottom-up perspective of the realities of warfare. Whilst some of these memoirs were a leap onto the commercial bandwagon, many more were a cathartic response to trauma and/or a desire to expose the shortcomings of the military establishment. Composure of the post-combat experience was inhibited by the way that


2 Ibid
victory in the Falklands was forced into collective culture. The narrative of Margaret Thatcher’s government seamlessly elided the Falklands back to 1945, effectively becoming the last campaign of World War Two. Politically this reinvention enabled the Thatcher government to eliminate any vestige of Butskellism and pursue its dogma of rebranding left-leaning unionists, notably miners, as ‘the enemy within’.3 Not only did this traduce the memory of the Kitchener volunteers and Ernest Bevin’s later cohorts,4 but also their legatees from the industrial working class who provided the bedrock of the Falklands armed forces. The Falklands campaign had little to do with the Second World War; it was arguably the first post-modern war. Applying this term unleashes a range of philosophical arguments; nonetheless, it is a convenient device to describe the evolution of warfare. The argument that the Falklands campaign was a throwback to the Second World War is supported by the nature of the land fighting, and the gendering of combat as a masculine endeavour; however, the following outline of geopolitical considerations, economic retrenchment resulting in reduced defence budgets, and use of advanced military technology, suggest otherwise:

- Geopolitically, peace keeping under the aegis of the UN is a feature of post-modern warfare. Following the Argentine invasion, Britain fought tenaciously to achieve UN Security Council Resolution 502. Whilst the Task Force sailed south, British self-determination was subordinate to the diplomatic efforts of the United States and Peru.5 The self-determining status of the Falkland Islanders was also dispensable. During 1980, the government developed recommendations for a ‘leaseback’ arrangement with Argentina. Although these were never progressed, the provisions of the British Nationality Act 1981 meant that Falkland Islanders were to be downgraded in citizenship status. After the war this potential embarrassment was swiftly removed by the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983.

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4 The inter-war General Secretary of the Transport & General Workers Union, Minister of Labour during WW2 and Foreign Secretary in the post-war Labour government.

Economic considerations meant that the Government was not prepared to sustain a ‘Fortress Falklands’ policy. Cuts to military expenditure proposed in the 1981 Defence Review White Paper required HMS Endurance, the South Atlantic patrol ship, to be decommissioned in April 1982. Also to be decommissioned was the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, whilst Britain’s only other serviceable aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, was to be sold to Australia. Following the Argentine invasion these plans were scrapped. However, the Royal Navy had to rely on the commercial sector to make up the required capacity of the Task Force.

Cutting-edge military technology was deployed under water and in the air. The nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror sank the General Belgrano, and its continued threat kept the Argentine Navy out of action. As enthusiastic purchasers on the international arms market, the Argentine military has acquired five Super Étendard strike fighters and five air-launched Exocet missiles. Exocet missiles destroyed HMS Sheffield and SS Atlantic Conveyor, ‘had the Royal Navy in a blue funk throughout the campaign’, and nearly led to an escalation of the war with a plan to destroy them at their mainland base.6

At a micro-level, victory allowed a complacency to settle over the military establishment, particularly in the way it failed to adapt to the after-combat consequences of such post-modern warfare. This is starkly revealed by the fact that the MoD has taken thirty years properly to address the issue of PTSD (Chapter 3.12). At a macro-level, by suturing collective attitudes to the past, successive governments have been able to reinvigorate warfare as an instrument of foreign policy, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst the Falkland Islanders wanted to be liberated, Iraqis and Afghans have been more resistant to western notions of political restructuring. The consequences for future combat motivation are clearly a work in progress, but an aim of this thesis has been to establish how a fresh understanding of the past might inform the future. It worth speculating that future changes in the way the British armed forces approach combat in

the future will cause pressure for change. The armed forces will become smaller, and more reliant on technology; therefore, recruits will be better educated and include more women. They will demand rewarding careers and the MoD need to improve retention rates. Expansion of reserve forces and the demands placed upon them will need to be adroitly managed. By definition, they want to be part-timers, not existentialist warriors.

Research reveals that a convincing case for combat motivation does not resolve into a few simple tropes and pet theories; it is layered, faceted and nuanced. To provide a research framework that recognises such complexities an analytical model has been developed that breaks down combat motivation into three main components: morale, personal orientations, and the combat cycle; the granularity of these components is then revealed. Although the terms morale and motivation are often conflated, they are different; motivation explains why combatants fight, whilst morale reveals the spirit with which such fighting is undertaken. Chapter Four presented distinct arguments for morale based upon Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. This approach revealed that fighting-spirit cannot be corporatised and sated by simply meeting basic physiological desires; instead, morale has been an individual requirement that step-changed according to circumstances. Discussion of personal orientations has illuminated the various case studies that have been used in evidence in the substantive chapters. The argument is that individual combatants had an attitude towards military service that was shaped by a combination of three orientations, each of which sat on a continuum: intrinsic versus extrinsic, a sense of personal justification that contrasted with outside coercions; needs versus achievement, the attainment of personal standards rather than the approval of others; and existentialist warrior versus jobseeker, the lust to fight compared with the desire for career prospects. The overarching and defining argument that the analytical model sets up is the sense that motivation during combat was informed not only by preconditioning, but also what happened afterwards; therefore, it was not a linear process but a repeating cycle. Consequently, Chapters One to Three explored the before, during and after of combat.
The essence of Chapter One has been to argue for the power of intrinsic motivation as an encouragement to the recruitment of volunteer armies, and as a validation for conscripts who clearly did not have a choice. Fussell's assertion that ‘men will only attack if young, athletic, credulous’ does not stand up to scrutiny; however, there is no doubting that the military preferred young recruits who were malleable and not so intelligent as to be likely to challenge the status quo. At Mount Longdon in 1982, the average age of the twenty-three soldiers killed was twenty-two and included two seventeen year olds. In 2010, around 30% of recruits were aged under eighteen. No academic qualifications were (or are) required to join the infantry rank-and-file, and for potential officers, only a modest academic attainment remains necessary. At the time of the Falklands War, ‘character’ and the ability to ‘fit in’ were prerequisites of the RCB. The result was that 50% of officers came from public schools, despite representing only 6% of their age group.

There is a clear distinction between the motivation to enlist and the motivation to fight. Whilst each recruit had their own reasons for enlisting, there were key features common to most. These included not only the opportunity for adventure and personal development, but also the sense that the job was an honourable calling because it was legitimate and socially useful. Potential officers had the opportunity to exercise management at an early age and exhibit the symbols of personal status within a prestigious organisation. For ordinary recruits, enhanced economic motivations could be discounted. As Janowitz concluded:

For the potential recruit […] a positive attitude is based […] on the fact that the military offers an adequate and respectable level of personal security […] for the enlisted man it offers relatively promising possibilities.8

It has been argued that no-one joined in expectation of high material rewards. During peacetime, the armed services have consistently continued to recruit their rank-and-file from the most disadvantaged social groups who have had limited alternative choices in the unskilled labour market. Pay remains modest, whilst ancillary benefits such as

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housing have been of variable quality. There is a greater expectation that officers will be able to live off their pay; however, in some elite regiments, an additional income remains integral to its social milieu. Despite sharing many of the intrinsic motivations, the middle-classes have found themselves under-equipped socially and economically, and overqualified educationally, to find a natural home in the armed forces. Whilst the role of private education has been consistent in turning out templates for the officer cadre, state education of the rank-and-file has seen a profound shift. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the role of elementary education was to condition pupils to accept their place in the social pecking order and to be biddable servants to the demands of empire. During the last decades of the century, the emphasis had shifted towards anti-militarism; therefore, it can be argued that many ordinary recruits enlisted despite their education rather than because of it.

Popular culture, rather than political ideology, has been the consistent factor in shaping the expectations of military service and warfare throughout the twentieth century because, as research by Grinker and Spiegel revealed, ‘The political, economic or even military justifications [...] are not apprehended except in a vague way’.\(^9\) Books and film have sustained a British brand of militarism that has evolved with a modern shape. The disillusionment oeuvre that emerged after the Great War may have enjoyed a discriminating following; however, according to Fussell, popular war adventure stories:

> […] ascribe clear, and usually noble, cause and purpose to accidental or demeaning events. Such histories thus convey to the optimistic and the credulous a satisfying, orderly, and even optimistic and wholesome view of catastrophic occurrences.\(^10\)

Central to these fictional histories was the celebrated soldier hero who, according to Dawson, ‘has become a quintessential figure of masculinity’.\(^11\) For potential recruits, such soldier heroes transmuted into powerful Kleinian imagos that often inspired enlistment with a wholly unrealistic set of expectations. According to Janowitz, ‘[...] outdated and obscure conceptions of the military establishment persist because civilian

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\(^10\) Fussell, *Wartime*, pp. 21-22

society [...] prefers to remain uninformed'.

It was the role of training to reshape them with vigorously applied extrinsic motivators, and strip recruits (whether officer or otherwise) of their civilian sensibilities. By ingraining successful recruits with new skills, recognition of accomplishment, a strong sense of earned group belonging, and a ‘fit’ with organisational goals, a new set of shared intrinsic values were created. It is perhaps one reason why it has been so difficult for non-members to be fully accepted within military social groups, and why, at a strategic level, military operational groups can be so resistant to changes perceived as threats, even when in the wider public interest. These new intrinsic values were quite capable of being sustained in a hierarchical, and occasionally authoritarian, organisation that restricted personal agency, provided that external rewards were ‘explicitly and legitimately allocated’, and external sanctions were ‘not unexpected and counter-normative within the setting’. Ultimately, pre-combat motivations were predicated upon a tacit consent and a legitimate covenant with the military hierarchy, and the ongoing trend during the twentieth century has seen the replacement of ascriptive control with persuasion and manipulation. Nonetheless, the authorities have liked to keep some big sticks, such as the death penalty, close to hand. Substantially, these have proved unnecessary because offences that challenge the military covenant have been remarkably rare and usually point to a failure of leadership. Minor misdemeanours may have been more plentiful, but official discipline based upon the ‘conduct prejudicial’ coda remains heavily biased in favour of the authorities, who can also rely on unofficial peer-group sanctions for letting the side down.

Chapter Two was founded on the argument that motivation during combat did not operate in isolation and could not be detached from what went on before. Volunteers were motivated to join the armed forces by a sense of intrinsic justification that had been shaped by a common culture. As Fuller asserted, ‘The whole structure of


14 Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, p. 43
prejudices, beliefs and loyalties, which society sets up in the mind of individuals’. To extend the Bartov and Fritz argument towards a coherent sense of ideology in the mind of the British rank-and-file during combat, other than a sense of rightness, is to over-egg the argument. The purpose of this chapter has been to unpick the core elements of motivation during combat: group cohesion, regimental tradition, command and leadership, the role of informal leadership leviathans, and frenzy. The assertion of this thesis is that it is impossible to isolate one element as they were all mutually dependent. Leadership was arguably the most significant element as it was the catalyst of coherence, whilst the regimental tradition served its greatest purpose before combat by extrinsically inculcating a sense of professional belonging and competence.

The arguments surrounding primary group theories reveal the difference between social cohesion and task cohesion. It was task cohesion that was responsible for motivation. Combatants may have formed strong friendships but had to form effective task groups. These had their own informal rules and belonging was conditional upon compliance with them. The sense of belonging that was engendered may have been strong, but friendship remains different from comradeship, although these bonds are still widely misinterpreted. Falklands veteran Curtis stated that during the Battle of Goose Green, ‘I felt totally devastated and gripped by an overwhelming sense of loss. One of my best friends lay 20 yards away, his body covered with a poncho’. However, he was soon back into the thick of it, and was to enjoy a fifteen-year career in the Paras and the SAS, during which time he proved capable of forming new relationships. High casualties may have debilitated social groups, but whilst in combat task groups rapidly reformed. There was little doubt that the regimental tradition invested the Royal Marines and Army regiments that served during the Falklands War with a strong sense of identity. However, the evidence from the world wars, when the regimental system was debased, was that it had little effect on combat motivation. The power of the tradition was to inculcate a sense of mutual confidence, and according to Falklands veteran John Kiszely, ‘[this] must be built long before the times of need and danger

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16 Mike Curtis, CQB: Close Quarter Battle, (London, Corgi, 1998), p. 130
appear’.

Kiszely went on to argue that the regimental tradition imposed a standard of conduct on the battlefield. However, the extent to which it did this was determined by the nature of leadership. Command was not the same as leadership, and the most effective leaders inspired task cohesion linked to formal goals by creating their own personal blend of position power, reward power, consistent values and charisma. If they failed then it is possible that their place would be usurped by a self-appointed leviathan, an existentialist warrior who may have mobilised fighting spirit in alignment with official goals but may also have courted disaster when their personal power outstripped their professional competence. It may be strongly argued that a failure of leadership was responsible for atrocity. Jary maintained that the Second World War did not brutalise any of the members of 18 Platoon, rather it enhanced their sense of humanity. His assertion that, ‘We were not an aggressive generation, a fact which may explain my failure to understand some present day attitudes […] particularly in the Royal Marines and the Parachute Regiment’, rather suggests a reality occluded by nostalgia. It may have been that the Marines and Paras ascribed particular value on ‘aggression’ but it was a quality embedded within the broader regimental tradition. Having been conditioned through training to kill on command, it was no surprise that in the febrile and adrenalin fuelled circumstance of hand to hand combat, survival instincts took over. Reflecting on his experience in Basra whilst in Iraq, Ben Close of the Coldstream Guards commented:

> Training took over […] one round through the windscreen, end of story […] it got so much easier the time after and the time after that […] I was like a time bomb ticking, waiting to go off. I was ready to kill in an instant.

Combat was certainly not a clinical duel of knights, and it was no great surprise that cultivated aggression elided occasionally into frenzy. Leadership may have mitigated the worst instances or encouraged them; however, what has been of more concern is the reluctance of officialdom to admit it and deal with the consequences. As David Smith, a

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18 Ibid.


20 *The Kill Factor*, Prod. Adele Armstrong, BBC Radio 4, Broadcast 20 August 2011, [on iPlayer]
psychologist from the New England Institute of Cognitive Sciences put it, ‘It is in the interests of governments not to be too straightforward about the consequences of killing’. Shay argued that the outcome for the combatants could be profound:

On the basis of my work with Vietnam veterans, I conclude that the berserk state is ruinous, leading to [...] life-long psychological and physiological injury if [the soldier] survives. I believe that once a person has entered the berserk state, he or she is changed forever.

Therefore, understanding how the consequences of combat feed into the cycle of motivation was the subject of the Chapter Three.

The overarching argument of this chapter was that post combat motivation derived from a nexus between the needs of the combatant, military culture, society, and the political establishment. Such motivation comprised two parts: formal recognition, and reintegration back to a peacetime role. The evidence reveals that, in both regards, the expectations of the Falklands forces were not fulfilled. The aim of the first part of the chapter has been to assert that an effective rewards system was and is culturally desirable and motivationally important, both for civilians and the armed forces, not just for gallantry but also for outstanding public service. However, evidence has been presented to reveal that the awards system that recognised endeavour during the Falklands War was not fit for purpose. It continued a long tradition rooted in status and hierarchy; the issue of awards was, just as with VCs of the Second World War, not only biased towards the top, with 53% of gallantry awards going to officers, but also carefully apportioned amongst fighting units. Additional analysis of VC citations revealed that war-winning and leadership rather than lifesaving or endurance were the dominant characteristics of army recipients. The understandable desire to avoid ‘honours inflation’ embedded the quota system in the approval process. This might be reasonable in peacetime, but during a war, it can reasonably be argued that recognition should have been driven by events and not by quotas. The consequence during the

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21 Ibid.


23 Overall 56% to officers (60% in the British Army)

24 In both wars the officer/man ratio was about one in seven
Falklands War was that a massive void is revealed between the 465 service personnel who were recognised and the 29,700 who had to make do with the campaign medal. A number of units (including 3 Para) performed magnificently but had to bathe in the rather dissipated glory of a handful of awards to their peers. After the war, 3 Para also had the indignity of being brought back down to earth by a rather unsympathetic commanding officer, who seems to have rather misjudged the importance of recognition as an adjunct to reward. The truth was that, although rewards were extrinsically applied, their real power was as an intrinsic affirmation of performance above and beyond the call of duty.

‘Needs-motivated’ and ‘intrinsically-motivated’ soldiers required an effective form of recognition as a self-validator. The requirements of an achievement oriented military remain obvious in that an outward display of awards not only gains approval, but also asserts status and improves promotion prospects. The majority of soldiers, particularly other-ranks, tended not question the status quo but did expect the system to operate fairly. The evidence surrounding Stewart McLaughlin suggested they reacted strongly when they perceived the system failed properly to weigh-up courage and frenzy. The support for McLaughlin, notwithstanding his extreme behaviour, must be juxtaposed with the less than fulsome approbation accorded to ‘H’ Jones by his immediate subordinates. It signalled the desirability of a much more realistic attitude from the authorities about the making of a hero. However, there was political advantage to be gained from an alignment with heroism because it created a bond between the state and the public. In the aftermath of the Falklands War, it can be argued that the Government and the MoD not only acted with unseemly haste to link awards with an overtly political victory commemoration but also took the easy public relations option when it accepted the media myth of heroic apotheosis manufactured around Jones. A lesson from the Falklands War was that it was better to offer combatants a fighting chance of official recognition rather than trust to the caprices of self-reward; however, to do this required a much greater understanding of the paradoxical demands of combatant, military establishment, and public collective, implicit within the awards process.
The second part of Chapter Three demonstrated that post-combat motivation
depended upon effective peacetime reintegration, by analysing four aspects of the
process: wind-down, ceremonial, resettlement, and response to traumatic stress.

At the end of the Falklands War, whilst some units improvised a sensible
approach to wind-down by remaining within their task groups and talking out
unrelieved aggression with the judicious application of alcohol, others were not so
lucky. The Para battalions were rapidly transported out of theatre on MV Norland and
assuaged their unrelieved aggression with an internecine riot. They did not have the
benefit of an extended voyage home but completed the journey by air and were
immediately sent on extended leave. Denied the protection of their task groups and any
form of professional counselling, many found themselves detached from their families
and wider society. They had formed unrealistic expectations of homecoming which in
many cases elided into a confrontational mindset.

Little individual comfort could be derived from official commemoration because
post-Falklands ceremonial was the acme of political justification. Margaret Thatcher
was able, with ‘audacious ingenuity’, to transmute her initial government failings over
the Falklands into an overtly Conservative victory. It continued a long British tradition
of drawing a veil over the realities of war, whilst justifying to the public the value of
‘the old lie’ of dying for your country. In 1982, there was little public space for heroic
disfigurement and none at all for glorious mental injury. Since 1921, the shape of
Establishment commemoration has been largely defined by the RBL who have been
adroit at selecting groups worthy of commemoration. The lack of Establishment
sponsorship was evident in the campaign for recognition of those who served in Bomber
Command during the Second World War. Consistently denied a campaign medal, a
measure of official recognition came with the memorial, funded by public subscription,
unveiled on 28 June 2012. Eric Jones, an 89 year old former pilot, captured the

25 Daniel K. Gilbran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, (Jefferson NC,
McFarland, 1998), p. 74
importance of recognition to the task group, ‘It's very definitely too late - so many would have loved to be here. I'm the last surviving member of my crew’.26

Arguments against the sentience of social groups as a prime motivator emerged from the approach to resettlement. Statistics revealed that most personnel were not persuaded by social ties to pursue a long career; however, official resettlement support has been the privilege of the long-serving, a fact that was trenchantly criticised in 2008 by the HCPAC. That many service leavers were ill-equipped for civilian life was revealed by the statistics of ex-servicemen who may, according to the Howard League of Penal Reform, still constitute up to 8% of the prison population. Others have been forced to sell medals, and a strong body of evidence suggested that the MoD applied the letter of the law when it came to benefits and allowances. Moreover, the onus was on veterans proactively to research their entitlements. Such was revealed by the court judgement made against the PTSD sufferers in a group action against the MoD in 2003.

PTSD entered the medical canon in 1980 and has been under-researched; however, a long-term study is currently being conducted at KCL and is due to complete in 2013. The long shadow of Southborough still falls over this topic. There are those in the military who still consider it a weakness of character, or an opportunity to benefit from a compensation culture, or a political bandwagon. The evidence from some of the Falklands commanders was rather disparaging in that they did not consider PTSD much of an issue, arguably because to acknowledge it would be regarded as an implicit criticism of their leadership skills within the framework of military culture. The widely divergent statistics on PTSD provided ample space for traditional views to be sustained. In 2003, at the World Congress of Psychiatry, it was asserted that only 5.1% of combatants had a psychological reaction after the Falklands War. By contrast, earlier research by Falkland veterans Hughes and O’Brien suggested it was as high as 72%. Evidently many Falklands Veterans have suffered in silence, not wishing to express emotions that are still alien to military culture. The litmus test will be the reaction of the MoD once a robust body of evidence emerges.

The final chapter was predicated on the argument that although the terms morale and motivation have been used interchangeably to describe the combat experience they are not the same. Motivation comprised the factors that sustained and drove participants in combat whilst morale was the spirit in which combat was undertaken. Whilst high morale linked to strong motivation suggested the most powerful combination; morale could become dysfunctional if it was not aligned to organisational goals. The key intervention of this chapter has been to establish a new definition of morale by using an established technique. By synthesising Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, first developed in 1943, with evidence relating to morale, it has been possible to discount the tendency to corporatise individuals and perceive morale simply in terms of satisfying basic physiological needs. Instead, morale should be seen as comprising a series of tiers. Once low level morale deficiencies were met, each individual would require satisfaction of higher level emotional and intellectual demands. The evidence from British twentieth century combat experience, culminating in the Falklands War, suggested a rather patchy approach to matters of morale. Official parsimony and cultural expectations were strands that had a deleterious effect, particularly for the rank-and-file whose morale requirements tended to operate in the lower three tiers of the Maslow hierarchy. For officers, particularly those who aspired to a higher rank, the competitive nature of leadership, elitism, and the need to assert a place in the pecking order may have meant that satisfying their self-esteem deficiencies led to a dangerous lack of cohesion in the command structure. The case-study of the events culminating in the Sir Galahad disaster during the Falklands War graphically reveal the consequences. It is all too easy to ignore deficiencies in morale following victory. Put simply, it was not sufficient to rely on task motivation, the spirit with which combat was undertaken was a vital concomitant that needed to be properly shaped around the needs of each individual.

Much of the primary source evidence within this thesis derives from oral and published testimony of Falklands veterans, and the nature and purpose of this testimony has to be placed in context. Hynes noted that after the Great War:
Nearly all of the millions who fought […] died silently or survived, but in either case left no record, because they were poor, inarticulate, unlettered, shy; or because it simply did not occur to write down what had happened to them.27

It is asserted by Harari, that those who did followed a structure which reflects the cycle of motivations around which this thesis is structured, ‘pre-war illusion led men to war, the war shatters these illusions, and the embittered survivors have the ability and duty to disillusion the public’.28 The evidence from the Falklands is not only more nuanced but also revealed a greater propensity of veterans of all ranks to offer personal testimony that has ‘intensely individuated meanings’.29 Memory production from Falklands veterans has become something of a competitive industry often at odds with official histories and commemorations. Two further caveats emerge: the first is that memory production reflects the interplay between selected memories of the past and the current identity of the narrator that have to be reconciled,30 the second is that memories are recomposed as they integrate the testimony of their co-narrators with their own.31 Nonetheless, whilst this may burr the edge of the evidence, the point of it remains targeted and incisive.

30 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend, (Melbourne, OUP, 1995), p. 10
31 Robinson. ‘Soldiers’ Stories’, p. 580
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Appendix 1

[Diagram showing a framework for combat motivation and needs vs. achievement]

- Before Combat: Cultural Hegemony, Punishment, Control & Discipline
- During Combat: Formal Leadership, Logistic, Strategy
- After Combat: Needs vs. Achievement, Cenotaphs, Awards, Resiliency, Trauma

- Moral Factors: Need for Honor, Need for Love
- Self-Actualization: Need to Actualize Potential, Need for Freedom
- Safety: Need for Security, Need for Protection
- Security: Need for Safety, Need for Stability
- Need for Esteem: Need for Respect, Need for Prestige

- Jobseeker vs. Existentialist
- Primary Group Theories & Regimental Traditions

- An Analytical Framework of Combat Motivation
### Appendix 2

**TABLE OF BRITISH ARMED FORCES RANKS**

(Source: WWW.MOD.CO.UK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nato Code</th>
<th>Royal Navy</th>
<th>Royal Marines</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Royal Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OF 10</td>
<td>Admiral of the Fleet</td>
<td></td>
<td>Field Marshal</td>
<td>Marshal of the RAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 9</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 8</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Air Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 7</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Air Vice-Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 6</td>
<td>Commodore</td>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>Air Commodore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 5</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Group Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 4</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Wing Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 3</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Squadron Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>OF 2</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Flight Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF 1</td>
<td>Sub Lieutenant/ Midshipman</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Lieutenant/ 2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>Flying Officer/ Pilot Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Promotion to Admiral of the Fleet, Field Marshal and Marshal of the Royal Air Force is now held in abeyance in peacetime.

2. Originally Sergeant Major General until the early eighteenth century when the name was shortened.

3. In 1922 the rank of Brigadier-General was replaced by Colonel-Commandant and in 1928 this changed to Brigadier. Although this rank remains equivalent to Brigadier-General in many other NATO armies, it is regarded in the British Army as a field rank (i.e. Senior Colonel) rather than the most junior General.

4. In the British Armed Forces this is pronounced ‘Leftenant’, NOT ‘Lootenant’ as in the US Armed Forces.

5. In the Foot Guards the name Ensign is retained, similarly some cavalry regiments retain the name Cornet.
### Other Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nato Code</th>
<th>Royal Navy</th>
<th>Royal Marines</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Royal Air Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>OR9</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>Warrant Officer 1</td>
<td>Warrant Officer 1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regimental Sergeant Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR8</td>
<td>Warrant Officer 2</td>
<td>Warrant Officer 2</td>
<td>Warrant Officer 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Company Sergeant Major</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR7</td>
<td>Chief Petty Officer</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant/Colour Sergeant</td>
<td>Staff Sergeant/Colour Sergeant</td>
<td>Flight Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR5/6</td>
<td>Petty Officer</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Sergeant 5</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR4</td>
<td>Leading Rate</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>Corporal 6</td>
<td>Corporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>Lance Corporal</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR2</td>
<td>Able Rate</td>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Senior Aircraftman / Leading Aircraftman / Aircraftman</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 The Household Cavalry does not use the term Sergeant instead Corporal of Horse is used. The rank above is Staff Corporal or Corporal Major and the rank below Lance Corporal of Horse.

6 Foot Guards use the term Lance Sergeant, and Corporal for the rank below. In full dress uniform a lance sergeant’s insignia comprises three white chevrons, whilst a Sergeant has three of gold. In the Royal Artillery a Corporal is called Bombardier.
## Appendix 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<td><strong>Total to Date</strong></td>
<td>1,355</td>
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<tr>
<td>1856 - 1914</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 - 1920 (First World War)</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-war</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939 - 1945 (Second World War)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1969 (Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (Falklands War)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 - 2006 (Iraq, Afghanistan)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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## Appendix 3.3

### Analysis by Detailed Rank and Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armies</th>
<th>Navies</th>
<th>Airforces</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
<th>Posthumous</th>
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<td><strong>Senior Officer</strong></td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Field Officer</strong></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td><strong>Company Officer</strong></td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Senior NCO</strong></td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Junior NCO/Enlisted</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>182</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
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</table>

Senior Officer = OF 5 & above; Field Officer = OF3 - OF4; Company Officer = OF1 - OF3 (inc)

Senior NCO = OR5 - OR9 (inc); Junior NCO = OR2 - OR4 (inc).

See Appendix 3
## Appendix 3.4

### Analysis by Rank and Branch of Imperial Service

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<th></th>
<th>Armies</th>
<th></th>
<th>Navies</th>
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<th>Airforces</th>
<th></th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<td>OR</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>OR</td>
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<td>British</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>Indian</td>
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<td>3</td>
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### British Army Analysis by Regiment/Corps

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<th>OR</th>
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<td>Scots Guards</td>
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<td>Welsh Guards</td>
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<td>Essex</td>
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<td>Kings Shropshire Light Infantry</td>
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<td><strong>Scottish Regiments</strong></td>
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<td>Gordon Highlanders</td>
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<td><strong>Other Regiments &amp; Corps</strong></td>
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</table>
### Appendix 3.6

#### Analysis by Rank, Service & Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Action</th>
<th>Armies Officer</th>
<th>Armies OR</th>
<th>Navies Officer</th>
<th>Navies OR</th>
<th>Airforces Officer</th>
<th>Airforces OR</th>
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<th>Totals OR</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
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</table>

#### Analysis by Nationality (Place of Birth)

<table>
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<th>Officer</th>
<th>OR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Indian Empire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
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#### Analysis by Region of Action

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Officer</th>
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<th>OR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
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<td>Home Front</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Europe &amp; Greece</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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### Appendix 3.7

#### Total Awards - Award Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>OR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life Saving</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Life Saving &amp; Endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Winning</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>War Winning &amp; Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>War Winning &amp; Life Saving &amp; Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>War Winning &amp; Leadership &amp; Endurance</td>
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<td>War Winning &amp; Life Saving &amp; Leadership &amp; Endurance</td>
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### Appendix 3.8

#### Total Award Orientation - aggregate of factors

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<tr>
<td>Life Saving</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>War Winning</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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<td>Endurance</td>
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### Appendix 3.9

#### British Army Award Orientation - aggregate of factors

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<tr>
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<td>11.8</td>
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<td>War Winning</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46.1</td>
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<td>Leadership</td>
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<td>Endurance</td>
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Falklands Gallantry Awards

### Appendix 4.1

<table>
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<th>Level</th>
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<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 4</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
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### Appendix 4.2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2 PARA - Goose Green</th>
<th>3 PARA Mount Longdon</th>
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<tr>
<td>Medals</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
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<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Corporal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Corporal</td>
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<td>Private</td>
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### Appendix 4.3

<table>
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<td>60</td>
</tr>
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<td>Parachute Regiment</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots Guards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Welsh Guards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>12</td>
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Appendix 5

1982 Jul 3 Sa
Margaret Thatcher Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham

Document type: public statement
Document kind: Speech
Venue: Cheltenham Racecourse
Editorial comments: Embargoed until 1430; extract only. A section has been checked against BBC Radio News Report 2200 3 July 1982 (see editorial notes in text).
Importance ranking: Key
Word count: 1509
Themes: Defence (Falklands War 1982), Industry, Strikes and other union action, Health policy, Pay, Public spending and borrowing, Monetary policy, Transport, Famous statements by MT

Today we meet in the aftermath of the Falklands Battle. Our country has won a great victory and we are entitled to be proud. This nation had the resolution to do what it knew had to be done - to do what it knew was right.

We fought to show that aggression does not pay and that the robber cannot be allowed to get away with his swag. We fought with the support of so many throughout the world. The Security Council, the Commonwealth, the European Community, and the United States. Yet we also fought alone - for we fought for our own people and for our own sovereign territory.

Now that it is all over, things cannot be the same again for we have learned something about ourselves - a lesson which we desperately needed to learn.

When we started out, there were the waverers and the fainthearts. The people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself.

The people who thought we could no longer do the great things which we once did. Those who believed that our decline was irreversible - that we could never again be what we were.

There were those who would not admit it - even perhaps some here today - people who would have strenuously denied the suggestion but - in their heart of hearts - they too had their secret fears that it was true: that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world.

Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history.

This generation can match their fathers and grandfathers in ability, in courage, and in resolution. We have not changed. When the demands of war and the dangers to our own people call us to arms - then we British are as we have always been: competent, courageous and resolute.

When called to arms ah, that's the problem.

It took the battle in the South Atlantic for the shipyards to adapt ships way ahead of time; for dockyards to refit merchantmen and cruise liners, to fix helicopter platforms, to convert hospital ships - all faster than was thought possible; it took the demands of war for every stop to be pulled out and every man and woman to do their best.

British people had to be threatened by foreign soldiers and British territory invaded and then - why then - the response was incomparable. Yet why does it need a war to bring out our qualities and reassert our pride? Why do we have to be invaded before we throw aside our selfish aims and begin to work together as only we can work and achieve as only we can achieve?
That, ladies and gentlemen, really is the challenge we as a nation face today. We have to see that the spirit of the South Atlantic - the real spirit of Britain - is kindled not only by war but can now be fired by peace.

We have the first pre-requisite. We know we can do it - we haven't lost the ability. That is the Falklands Factor. We have proved ourselves to ourselves. It is a lesson we must not now forget. Indeed it is a lesson which we must apply to peace just as we have learned it in war. The faltering and the self-doubt has given way to achievement and pride. We have the confidence and we must use it.

Just look at the Task Force as an object lesson. Every man had his own task to do and did it superbly. Officers and men, senior NCO and newest recruit - every one realised that his contribution was essential for the success of the whole. All were equally valuable - each was differently qualified.

By working together - each was able to do more than his best. As a team they raised the average to the level of the best and by each doing his utmost together they achieved the impossible. That's an accurate picture of Britain at war - not yet of Britain at peace. But the spirit has stirred and the nation has begun to assert itself. Things are not going to be the same again.

All over Britain, men and women are asking - why can't we achieve in peace what we can do so well in war?

And they have good reason to ask.

Look what British Aerospace workers did when their Nimrod aeroplane needed major modifications. They knew that only by mid-air refuelling could the Task Force be properly protected. They managed those complicated changes from drawing board to airworthy planes in sixteen days - one year faster than would normally have been the case.

Achievements like that, if made in peacetime, could establish us as aeroplane makers to the world.

That record performance was attained not only by superb teamwork, but by brilliant leadership in our factories at home which mirrored our forces overseas. It is one of the abiding elements of our success in the South Atlantic that our troops were superbly led. No praise is too high for the quality and expertise of our commanders in the field.

Their example, too, must be taken to heart. Now is the time for management to lift its sights and to lead with the professionalism and effectiveness it knows is possible.

If the lessons of the South Atlantic are to be learned, then they have to be learned by us all. No one can afford to be left out. Success depends upon all of us - different in qualities, but equally valuable.

During this past week, I have read again a little known speech of Winston Churchill, made just after the last war. This is what he said,

> We must find the means and the method of working together not only in times of war, and mortal anguish, but in times of peace, with all its bewilderments and clamour and clatter of tongues.

Thirty-six years on, perhaps we are beginning to re-learn the truth which Churchill so clearly taught us.

We saw the signs when, this week, the NUR came to understand that its strike on the railways and on the Underground just didn't fit - didn't match the spirit of these times. And yet on
Tuesday, eight men, the leaders of ASLEF, misunderstanding the new mood of the nation, set out to bring the railways to a halt.

Ignoring the example of the NUR, the travelling public whom they are supposed to serve, and the jobs and future of their own members, this tiny group decided to use its undoubted power for what? - to delay Britain's recovery, which all our people long to see.

Yet we can remember that on Monday, nearly a quarter of the members of NUR turned up for work.

Today, we appeal to every train driver to put his family, his comrades, and his country first, by continuing to work tomorrow. That is the true solidarity which can save jobs and which stands in the proud tradition of British railwaymen.

But it is not just on the railways that we need to find the means and the method of working together. It is just as true in the NHS. All who work there are caring, in one way or another for the sick.

To meet their needs we have already offered to the ancillary workers almost exactly what we have given to our Armed Forces and to our teachers, and more than our Civil Servants have accepted. All of us know that there is a limit to what every employer can afford to pay out in wages. The increases proposed for nurses and ancillary workers in the Health Service are the maximum which the Government can afford to pay.

And we can't avoid one unchallengeable truth. The Government has no money of its own. All that it has it takes in taxes or borrows at interest. It's all of you - everyone here - that pays.

Of course, there is another way. Instead of taking money from our people openly, in taxation or loans, we can take it surreptitiously, by subterfuge. We can print money in order to pay out of higher inflation what we dare not tax and cannot borrow.

But that disreputable method is no longer open to us. Rightly this Government has abjured it. Increasingly this nation won't have it. Our people are now confident enough to face the facts of life. There is a new mood of realism in Britain.

That too is part of the Falklands Factor.

The battle of the South Atlantic was not won by ignoring the dangers or denying the risks. It was achieved by men and women who had no illusions about the difficulties. We faced them squarely and we were determined to overcome. That is increasingly the mood of Britain. And that's why the rail strike won't do.

We are no longer prepared to jeopardise our future just to defend manning practices agreed in 1919 when steam engines plied the tracks of the Grand Central Railway and the motor car had not yet taken over from the horse.

What has indeed happened it that now once again Britain is not prepared to be pushed around. We have ceased to be a nation in retreat.

We have instead a new-found confidence - born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away.

That confidence comes from the re-discovery of ourselves, and grows with the recovery of our self-respect.

And so today, we can rejoice at our success in the Falklands and take pride in the achievement of the men and women of our Task Force.
But we do so, not as at some last flickering of a flame which must soon be dead. No - we rejoice that Britain has re-kindled that spirit which has fired her for generations past and which today has begun to burn as brightly as before.

Britain found herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back from the victory she has won.

1982 Oct 12 Tu
Margaret Thatcher Speech at the Salute to the Task Force lunch
Document type: public statement
Document kind: Speech
Venue: Guildhall, City of London
Source: Thatcher Archive http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105034
Editorial comments: 1210 MT arrived at the Mansion House for the victory parade. The text is marked "as delivered".
Importance ranking: Major
Word count: 439
Themes: Defence (Falklands War 1982)

My Lord Mayor, ladies and gentlemen

May I thank you for that wonderful applause, but we are here to thank you for what you have done for our country.

And I am proud and honoured to join today with the city of London in its salute to the task force.
Military parades and pageants are part of the distinguished history of the city of London.

And it is right - and the whole nation will feel that it is right - that we gather in the heart of the city of London to honour all those who took part in the Falklands campaign.

And what a wonderful parade it has been. Surpassing all our expectations as the crowd, deeply moved and sensing the spirit of the occasion, accompanied the band by singing "Rule Britannia".
The Falklands campaign was one of the most brilliant achievements of modern times - a triumph of endeavour and skill of planning and imagination.

We owe that triumph to the best, the bravest and the most professional armed services in the world.
We thank you all:- those who are here - the many more who, for reasons of space, could not be here - the 777 valiant young men who were wounded. - the 255 who gave their lives and whose memory will be honoured forever. we grieve for them and we think especially of their families in their sorrow.
We also thank:- those who served in the royal fleet auxiliary - the merchant seamen - the workers in the dockyards and supply depots - the nurses and other volunteers - and those in British industry who made such splendid efforts to ensure that the force was properly equipped and supplied.

My Lord Mayor, this magnificent feat of arms has our unstinted praise. But our thanks go beyond even this. In those anxious months the spectacle of bold young Britons, fighting for great principles and a just cause, lifted the nation. Throughout the land our people were inspired. Doubts and hesitation were replaced by confidence and pride that our [younger generation too could write a glorious chapter in the history of liberty.
As the Reverend Sidney Smith said of our countrymen many years ago: and I re-affirm his words today,

I have boundless confidence in the British character … I believe more heroes will spring up in the hour of danger than all the military nations of ancient and modern Europe have ever produced.

Today we know that is true.

But my Lord Mayor It is not only the people of the Falklands who feel gratitude to the task force. And they will be rejoicing with us today and their hearts will be full. We, the British people, are proud of what has been done, proud of these heroic pages in our island story, proud to be here today to salute the task force. Proud to be British.
## Appendix 6

### British Gallantry Awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medal</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Level 1</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Cross</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Current</td>
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<td>George Cross</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Current</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Conspicuous Gallantry Cross</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>All Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Conduct Medal</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conspicuous Gallantry Medal</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
</tr>
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<td>George Medal</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Current</td>
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<td><strong>Level 3</strong></td>
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<td>Military Cross</td>
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<td>Current</td>
<td>Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Current</td>
<td>Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks</td>
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<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
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<td>Air Force Cross</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Until 1993 to Officers, from 1993 to All Ranks</td>
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<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force Medal</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td><strong>Level 4</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentioned in Dispatches</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>All Ranks awarded retrospectively to 1914</td>
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<td>King’s/Queen’s Commendation for Brave Conduct</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>All Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s/Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service in the Air</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>All Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen’s Commendation for Bravery</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Current</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queens’ Commendation for Bravery in the air</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>All Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>All Ranks</td>
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