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Regulating altruistic agents
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 15:31 authored by Anthony Heyes, Sandeep KapurAltruism or ‘regard for others’ can encourage self-restraint among generators of negative externalities, thereby mitigating the externality problem. We explore how introducing impure altruism into standard regulatory settings alters regulatory prescriptions. The optimal calibration of both quantitative controls and externality taxes is affected. It also leads to surprising results on the comparative performance of instruments. Under quantity-based regulation, welfare is increasing in the propensity for altruism in the population; under price-based regulation, the relationship is non-monotonic. Price-based regulation is preferred when the population is either predominantly altruistic or predominantly selfish; quantity-based regulation is preferred for cases in between.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Canadian Journal of EconomicsISSN
0008-4085Publisher
Blackwell PublishingExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
44Page range
227-246Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2013-10-11Usage metrics
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