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An economic model of whistle-blower policy
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 16:03 authored by A Heyes, S Kapur“Whistle-blowing” is an increasingly common element of regulatory enforcement programs and one that is encouraged by recent legislation in the United States and elsewhere. We examine how responsive regulators should be to whistle-blower tip-offs and how severe should penalties be for wrongdoers detected in this way. Competing psychological theories as to what motivates employees to become whistle-blowers are operationalized as alternative behavioral heuristics. Optimal policy depends upon the motives attributed to whistle-blowers—which of the theories you subscribe to—but is not in general characterized by maximal penalties nor routine pursuit of complaints, even when pursuit is costless. (JEL K42, K32)
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationISSN
8756-6222Publisher
Oxford University PressExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
25Page range
157-182Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2013-10-11Usage metrics
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