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An economic model of whistle-blower policy

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 16:03 authored by A Heyes, S Kapur
“Whistle-blowing” is an increasingly common element of regulatory enforcement programs and one that is encouraged by recent legislation in the United States and elsewhere. We examine how responsive regulators should be to whistle-blower tip-offs and how severe should penalties be for wrongdoers detected in this way. Competing psychological theories as to what motivates employees to become whistle-blowers are operationalized as alternative behavioral heuristics. Optimal policy depends upon the motives attributed to whistle-blowers—which of the theories you subscribe to—but is not in general characterized by maximal penalties nor routine pursuit of complaints, even when pursuit is costless. (JEL K42, K32)

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

ISSN

8756-6222

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Issue

1

Volume

25

Page range

157-182

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2013-10-11

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