Sexual_objectification_AnalysisStock.pdf (344.43 kB)
Sexual objectification
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 22:39 authored by Kathleen StockSexual objectification, in the broadest terms, involves (at least) treating people as things. Philosophers have offered different accounts of what, more precisely, this involves. According to the conjoint view of Catherine Mackinnon and Sally Haslanger, sexual objectification is necessarily morally objectionable. According to Martha Nussbaum, it is not: there can be benign instances of it, in the course of a healthy sexual relationship, for instance. This is taken to be a serious disagreement, both by Nussbaum and by recent commentators such as Lina Papadaki. However it isn't a serious disagreement, for the two theories have different aims and methodology, and are not rivals. They both could be apt, simultaneously.
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- Published
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- Accepted version
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AnalysisISSN
0003-2638Publisher
Oxford University PressExternal DOI
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2Volume
75Page range
191-195Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2015-10-05First Open Access (FOA) Date
2017-05-01First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2015-10-02Usage metrics
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