We lack insight into how firms reduce uncertainty by engaging with trade policy through corporate political activity (CPA), particularly in emerging economies. In this paper, we argue that CPA, as an instrument of nonmarket strategy, is more effective in achieving trade policy outcomes that reduce corporate uncertainty when firms pursue a bimodal approach, lobbying both collectively and individually. Collective actors such as trade associations gain influence through industry legitimacy and expertise, and can enable individual corporate lobbying to benefit from enhanced political capabilities in terms of information gathering, developing legitimacy, and aligning divergent interests. We also find that the bimodal approach is more effective for exporting firms, and when there is government support for an industry. Our empirical analysis is based on survey data of 146 Indian firms, in the context of a changing socio-political era. We contribute to the literature by highlighting the complementarity between collective and private political lobbying in reducing trade policy uncertainty. Overall, we contribute to research on CPA and nonmarket strategy, particularly in the context of emerging economy trade policy.

Much of the debate about agricultural commercialisation offers simplistic, dichotomous comparisons between, for example, large and small-scale farming, or export-oriented and domestic markets. There is often an assumption that there is one ideal type of commercialisation that can be realised through investment and policy intervention. Yet in practice, there are diverse ways that different people engage with processes of agricultural commercialisation along value chains, from production to processing to marketing. This range of pathways will have both risks and benefits for different groups of people, often differentiated by gender. Our research will examine the consequences of different types of commercialisation, contrasting, for example, smallholder, contract farming and large-estate arrangements, and pathways of commercialisation, examining commercialisation over time and the outcomes for different people. A comparative research design, across six countries and between different cropping/livestock systems, will enable the APRA Programme to draw out wider recommendations that will help inform and guide investment and policy decisions around agricultural commercialisation in Africa into the future. In practical research terms, the agenda described above requires that a range of indicators are specified in relation to our five main outcome areas. This document compiles five separate papers, each one reviewing the established literature on a specific outcome area and then providing a justification for the proposed indicators to be applied in the APRA studies.

Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.

How do we understand differences in effectiveness in lobbying for trade policy? To explain lobbying effectiveness, I introduce a new measure into Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850) model of protection-for-sale (PFS). Differences in effectiveness are explained on the basis that some groups make a better case for protection by sending a signal regarding information they possess and that is considered by policy makers before setting trade policies. I begin by estimating a standard PFS model for India using a measure of political organization, a common approach in the empirical literature on PFS. To overcome the need to define such a binary political organization variable, I then use panel data to estimate the new measure of relative lobbying effectiveness. For the most effective sectors, a high output to import ratio translates into higher trade protection; for the least effective sectors, higher output to import ratio translates into lower trade protection. Examining some of the political economy influences on lobbying effectiveness, I find that producing similar goods reduces the positive effect of geographical proximity on effectiveness. Hence, within a sector, firms in close proximity and producing similar goods compete to lobby rather than cooperating or free-riding.

We investigate whether systematic reviews of cost-effectiveness analyses of interventions in low and middle income countries are feasible and useful. To this aim, we systematically review systematic reviews of cost-effectiveness studies and systematic reviews of effectiveness studies. We find 27 systematic reviews of cost-effectiveness studies, predominantly of health interventions. We look at the methodologies employed by these reviews to summarise the results of the original studies and we look at the policy recommendations they provide. We conclude that systematic reviews of cost-effectiveness studies in developing countries are few and that their ability to provide policy recommendations is very limited. The paucity of cost-effectiveness analyses in developing countries and the difficulty to summarise the results of diverse cost-effectiveness analyses in a meaningful way are major problems. We suggest that the collection of cost data along impact evaluations and methodological development in the summary of cost-effectiveness ratios across studies constitute a more promising approach.

Structural change can be both, a cause or a consequence of innovation, while structural change and innovations are usually accompanied by short-term outcomes of social inclusion or exclusion. Inclusion may in turn have an impact on further innovations. Yet, we find little evidence in the literature on the three-way relations between innovation, structural change and inclusion. This paper advances a first exercise in this direction. Given the multidimensionality of each (innovation, structural change, and inclusion), we extract the underlying unobserved common factor structure from various well-known macro indicators. With a structural vector auto regression (SVAR) model for a short panel of developing countries over 13 years, we nd the following main results. First, we con rm the virtuous cycle between innovation and structural change, aligning with existing literature. Second, the strongest result is the positive effect of inclusion on both innovation and structural change, that suggests policy to improve inclusion beyond poverty and inequality. Third, on decomposing the innovation index (formal, firm-level and ICT), we find each related differently to both structural change and inclusion, that suggests specific policy roles in their infl uence on inclusion and structural change.

My thesis explores the political economy of trade protection in India. The first essay
outlines the political economy of trade protection in India. My second essay asks: Has
Protection really been for Sale in India? To answer this question, I use a unique dataset
to explain the political economy of trade protection since liberalisation. The traditional
Grossman and Helpman (1992) (GH henceforth) model of Protection for Sale (PFS henceforth)
is used with a new measure of political organization. I undertake cross-sectional
analysis for several years from 1990-2007 and use the pooled dataset. The third essay
outlines the modified PFS framework that introduces a new measure of lobbying effectiveness
to analyse how heterogeneity in lobbying affects trade protection. The underlying
framework is based on the idea that government preferences or the market structure of the
industry can influence lobbying effectiveness. The empirical evidence provides estimates
on effectiveness and examines its determinants. The fourth essay explores: Is Protection
still for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness? I undertake an estimation of the modified PFS
model against the conventional results presented in my second essay. I examine if differences
in lobbying effectiveness can explain the variation in tariff protection levels across
Indian manufacturing sectors and construct a direct measure of lobbying effectiveness for
Indian manufacturing. Finally, I include additional political factors of importance to Indian
trade policy. The fifth essay asks: Join Hands or Walk Alone? I examine the factors that
affect the choice of lobbying strategy of Indian manufacturing firms for trade policy and
consider the exclusive use of a single strategy, to lobby collectively (Join hands) and lobby
individually (Walk Alone), along with the possibility of a dual strategy i.e. a combination
of collective and individual lobbying using information from a primary survey across 146
firms. The results are new for India and reveal the overall preference of a dual lobbying
strategy.

Structural transformation, economic diversification and logistics are some of the issues explored in this new book from the Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT). The volume's essays use various methodologies to provide new perspectives on the region's growth and prospects. Individual chapters focus on: logistics in Bangladesh and Thailand.

There exists a choice of negotiating the exclusions in tariff liberalization: negative or positive listing. The extent of coverage caters to all sectors/products minus an identified sensitive list under the negative list approach is considered more liberalizing than positive listing with coverage across a specific number of sectors/products selected for preferential treatment. However, as there is no predetermined method of expansion of liberalization content during phase-in periods, it is necessary to compare both methods of negotiating exclusions, as each is perceived as a new policy for stakeholders having corresponding legal, administrative and economic implications.

This article examines corporate scandals of both a financial and nonfinancial nature between 1993 and 2011 which is expressly linked to a firm’s CEO. Findings suggest that in the short run, investors react adversely to such events and that recalcitrant CEOs end up costing their shareholders dearly. Such scandals are more likely to occur among large firms, firms with insiders on the board and where the value of options granted to a firm’s managers is substantial. However, firms with more cash flows are less likely to be mired in such scandals, and their stock returns are less likely to be affected. There is an increase in stock price volatility of affected firms in the days following the announcement of the scandal. A point of respite for investors is the damage being confined to the short run. The stock price performance of the firms affected by the scandals matches the performance of control firms in the long run post-announcement. However, the operating performance of the sample firms is better than their matched counterparts in the years after the scandal. We contribute to the extant literature by considering corporate scandal events that are the doings of a firm’s CEO and not necessarily financially motivated.