This article takes a fresh look at reswitching. When two production techniques are compared, reswitching occurs when one technique is more viable than the other at a high interest rate, switches to being less viable at a lower rate, and reswitches to being more viable again at even lower rates. For some, reswitching undermines the foundations of neoclassical economics because it belies the idea of a monotonic relationship between relative capital values and factor price. The reswitching equation is an nth degree polynomial having n roots, implying the existence of n interest rates. Conventional analysis uses one interest rate but ignores the others. We argue that the others should not be ignored because all rates are determined simultaneously, and when one rate shifts, all rates shift. We demonstrate that the Samuelson reswitching model possesses a ‘dual’ expression containing every interest rate, the rates being compressed into a composite, interest-rate variable, thereby establishing a role for interest rates previously thought lacking in use and meaning. The relationship between this composite interest rate and capital value does not exhibit reswitching. The notion of a composite interest rate has implications for economics beyond reswitching.

A controversy in capital theory concerns reswitching. When two production techniques are compared, reswitching occurs when one technique is cheapest at low interest rates, switches to being more expensive at higher rates, and then reswitches to being cheapest at yet higher rates. Some believe this inconsistency undermines neoclassical economics. The time-value-of-money (TVM) equation is at the core of the puzzle. The equation is a polynomial having n roots, implying n interest rates. In most analyses, including reswitching, one interest rate is used and the remaining rates are ignored. This analysis demonstrates that every TVM equation has a ‘dual’ form employing all interest rates. The dual of the reswitching equation explains the puzzle.

The literature suggests that corporate diversification destroys firm value. This value destruction is usually considered to be a consequence of managers' pursuing diversification strategies to benefit themselves rather than to increase firm value. This paper provides evidence that casts doubt on this agency theory-based explanation for corporate diversification. Evidence based on insider trading suggests that managers themselves consider their diversification strategies to be value-increasing. Specifically, it is documented that corporate insiders (directors) purchase more of their firms' shares in the open market when corporate diversification is high. Moreover, insiders purchase more when the level of diversification discount is high, suggesting that they disagree with outside investors' undervaluation due to diversification. It is also found that the market reaction to insiders' purchases is positively related to corporate diversification. This result suggests that outsiders consider the amount of favourable information contained in insiders' purchases to increase with the extent of corporate diversification.

We demonstrate how one can build pricing formulae in which factors other than beta may be viewed as determinants of asset returns. This is important conceptually as it demonstrates how the additional factors can compensate for a market portfolio proxy that is mis-specified, and also shows how such a pricing model can be specified ex ante. The procedure is implemented by first selecting an ‘orthogonal’ portfolio which falls on the mean-variance efficient frontier computed from the empirical average returns, variances and covariances on the equity securities of a large sample of firms. One then determines the inefficient index portfolio which leads to a vector of betas that when multiplied by the average return on the orthogonal portfolio, and which when subtracted from the vector of average returns for the firms comprising the sample, yields an error vector that is equal to the vector of numerical values for the variables that are to form the basis of the asset pricing formula. There will then be a perfect linear relationship between the vector of average returns for the firms comprising the sample, the vector of betas based on the inefficient index portfolio and such other factors that are deemed to be important in the asset pricing process. We illustrate computational procedures using a numerical example based on the quality of information contained in published corporate financial statements

The book provides a rigorous introduction to corporate finance and the valuation of equity. The first half of the book covers much of the received theory in these areas such as the relationship between the risk of an equity security and the return one can expect from it, the effects of leverage (that is, the borrowing policies of the firm) on the return one can expect from the firm’s shares and the role that dividends, operating cash flows and accounting earnings play in the valuation of equity. The second half of the book is more advanced and deals with the important role that "real options" (that is, as yet unexploited investment opportunities) play in the valuation of equity.

The instantaneous return on the Financial Times-Stock Exchange (FTSE) All Share Index is viewed as a frictionless particle moving in a one-dimensional square well but where there is a non-trivial probability of the particle tunneling into the wells retaining walls. Our analysis demonstrates how the complementarity principle from quantum mechanics applies to stock market prices and of how the wave function presented by it leads to a probability density which exhibits strong compatibility with returns earned on the FTSE All Share Index. In particular, our analysis shows that the probability density for stock market returns is highly leptokurtic with slight (though not significant) negative skewness. Moreover, the moments of the probability density determined under the complementarity principle employed here are all convergent -in contrast to many of the probability density functions on which the received theory of finance is based.

With very few exceptions the accepted viewpoint established by (predominantly) US research is that bank operating performance is not improved after merger. In this article we concentrate on European banks and investigate post-merger operating performance for 35 publicly listed bank mergers that were completed between 1992 and 1997. We find that industry-adjusted mean cash flow return did not significantly change after merger but stayed positive. We also find that the merger led to a significant decrease in profitability and capitalisation. Our key finding, in contrast to the US evidence, is that cost-efficiency ratios improved, although the improvement was not large enough to offset the profitability decrease. We also find that low profitability levels, conservative credit policies and good cost-efficiency status before merger are the main determinants of industry-adjusted cash flow returns and provide the source for improving these returns after merger.

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell-offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell-off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share-ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell-off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell-off proceeds. We find that non-executive directors' and CEO's share-ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell-offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell-off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non-executive directors' share-ownership and non-executive representation in the board.

Optimal capital budgeting criteria now exist for a variety of applications when project cash flows (or present values) evolve in terms of the well-known geometric Brownian motion. However, relatively little is known about the capital budgeting procedures that ought to be implemented when cash flows are generated by stochastic processes other than the geometric Brownian motion. Given this, our purpose here is to develop optimal investment criteria for capital projects with cash flows that evolve in terms of a continuous time branching process. Branching processes are compatible with an empirical phenomenon known as `volatility smile. This occurs when there are systematic fluctuations in the implied volatility of a capital project's cash flows as the cash flow grows in magnitude. A number of studies have shown that this phenomenon characterizes the cash flow streams of the capital projects in which firms typically invest. We implement optimal capital budgeting procedures for both the continuous time branching process and the geometric Brownian motion using cost and revenue data for the Stuart oil shale project in central Queensland, Australia. This example shows that significant differences can arise between the optimal investment criteria for cash flows based on a branching process and those based on the geometric Brownian motion. This underscores the need for the geometric Brownian motion broadly to reflect the way a given capital project's cash flows actually evolve if serious errors in valuation and/or capital budgeting decisions are to be avoided.