This article discusses “mathematization of the world” as it was elaborated by Edmund Husserl who focuses on the figure of Galileo and his rediscovery of the heliocentric system in the seventeenth century. The author argues that the latter event became definitional not only for the formation of ideal objectivity but for a wide spectrum of relations between natural sciences and the life-world. Umberto Eco provides a literary exemplar of this thesis, demonstrating that idealization of the physical body carried out by Galileo found its match in the Aristotelian telescope invented to create ideal subjectivity.

A widely accepted explanation of the dramatically high rates of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa appeals to a supposedly distinct model of sexual partnering, referred to as ‘multiple concurrent partnerships’ or ‘concurrency.’ We discuss two problems with the concurrency explanation, and argue that it does not contribute to understanding the unusual rates of HIV infection in the region. We argue that there is no single ‘concurrency hypothesis,’ and the term ‘concurrency’ is imprecise and does not pick out an explanatorily distinct form of sexual behavior.

This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them meanings. The paper ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about the semantics of empty natural kind terms.

This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.

Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. In this book I develop a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning.

Adorno's late work has often been compared to negative theology, yet there is little serious discussion of this comparison in the secondary literature. In most of the existing discussions virtually nothing is said about negative theology, as if it is obvious what it is and what the parallels with Adorno's ideas are. The truth is that negative theology is not self-evident, and neither are the parallels with Adorno at all obvious. To find out what they are would require a detailed account of both. In this article I shall make a start in this direction

It has seemed to some compelling that construing imagining in relation to fictional events as imagining being aware of those events provides a good explanation of our emotional responses to them. Call this ‘the argument from affective response’. Versions of this argument have been advanced by Kendall Walton and Jerrold Levinson. A more localised version of it, with respect to pornography, is that construing imagining in relation to events represented in pornography as imagining being aware of them provides a good explanation of subsequent arousal. Compelling as this may seem, I argue that it is false. I start by making some distinctions between different kinds of imagining de se, and then focus on the claim that there is a connection between emotional engagement with fiction and implicitly imagining de se, making it more precise in the light of various plausible considerations. I then turn to the case of pornography, examining and rejecting three possible arguments for a necessary connection between imagining, from the inside, being aware of represented events (that is, implicitly imagining de se), and being aroused by them. Since versions of these arguments might equally be applied to affective response to fiction more generally, I take it that I have thereby gone at least part way to undermining the argument from affective response

This paper defends a cognitivist account of the point of music as an art, according to which the point of music is to put us in a position of being right about the world. Such a view faces two objections: first that it requires all music to represent the world; secondly, that it makes the appreciation of music too dispassionate and disengaged. I consider what I take to be the two best arguments against the view that all music represents the world, and argue that they are uncompelling, before arguing that a representational view presents the best account of the meaning of music. And I argue that we can deal with the worry that a cognitivist view makes the appreciation of music too dispassionate by recognizing a particular kind of representation, one which involves a kind of impersonation, and in the case of music requires the listener to make herself part of the medium of representation.

This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical.

Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ‘–tivity gap’ claims that physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ claims that physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic (non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the intrinsic. After refining the case for Primitivism, I consider the compelling reasons for rejecting Primitivism in favour of Physicalism. The challenge posed by the Problem of Consciousness is to resolve this antinomy between Primitivism and Physicalism.

In Chapter 2 I consider standard responses to the problem. The failings of these positions lead me to introduce three criteria that an adequate response must satisfy. I reject the view that Primitivism can be salvaged, and hold that a satisfactory response to the problem must protect Physicalism. I reject standard ‘Type-A’ responses according to which there is no epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and argue that a satisfactory response cannot deny the manifest reality of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, I reject ‘Type-B’ responses according to which the epistemic gap does not entail ontic distinctness. I hold that if Physicalism is true, the entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts must be knowable a priori for an epistemically ideal subject.

Chapter 3 evaluates a non-standard Type-A response to the Problem of Consciousness which promises to satisfy all three criteria. According to Stoljar’s Epistemic View (EV), consciousness only seems inexplicable in physical terms because we have a limited conception of the physical. I argue that EV should be supported iff two demanding challenges can be met: the Relevance Condition requires adequate reason to believe that unknown physical properties could address the –tivity gap and the –trinsicality gap. The Integration Condition requires adequate reason to believe that there is a specific blind-spot in our current conception of the physical that is plausibly occupied by properties that perform the requisite explanatory role. To satisfy these conditions, the advocate of EV must make positive claims about the content of our proposed ignorance.

In Chapter 4 I argue that EV stands or falls with the plausibility of the Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (RIH). According to RIH, we have no concepts of the intrinsic properties of physical entities, and those intrinsic properties are integral to the physical explanation of consciousness. I argue that we are indeed conceptually ignorant of intrinsic physical properties. I also argue that RIH meets the Integration Condition, and goes some way to satisfying the Relevance Condition. RIH plausibly undermines the –trinsicality gap by showing that some physical properties are intrinsic, though they are beyond our current conception. The apparent gap is then an illusion resulting from the fact that all known physical properties are extrinsic. RIH fails, however, to address the –tivity gap. I conclude that no version of EV can offer a full response to the Problem of Consciousness.

In Chapter 5 I explore an entirely different kind of response to the Problem of Consciousness. Representationalism claims that consciousness is explicable in terms of intentional properties, and that intentional properties are explicable in terms of physical properties. I argue that standard Representationalist proposals are unable to account for the qualitative character of conscious states, and diagnose this failure in terms of the –trinsicality gap. However, the prospects for a Representationalist account of subjective character are more promising. Specifically, Kriegel’s Self-Representationalism holds that a mental state is a phenomenal state in virtue of suitably representing itself. I argue that this proposal plausibly addresses the –tivity gap.

RIH and Self-Representationalism each deal with one of the two apparent conceptual gaps between the physical and the phenomenal, but not the other. In Chapter 6 I develop a hybrid proposal that combines the best of both positions. The ‘Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis’ (NRIH) claims that a mental state is a phenomenal state at all in virtue of suitably representing itself, and has its qualitative character in virtue of the intrinsic physical properties involved in its implementation. I expand this claim and defend it against a number of potential criticisms. I also explore the relationship between its two components, suggesting that they are each founded on a common epistemic insight. I argue that NRIH successfully addresses the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps and, moreover, that it provides a compelling account of why consciousness appears to be inexplicable in physical terms. I conclude that NRIH offers a powerful response to the Problem of Consciousness that successfully undermines the case for Primitivism. Furthermore, I conclude that NRIH has substantial advantages over competing attempted responses, and offers the best possible way of capitalising on the insights of EV and Representationalism.

To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas.

Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing (or disbelieving) a proposition serves one of these goals, whereas suspending judgement serves the other, equally important goal. Second, it is in principle always possible to have different epistemic standards for evaluating the evidence for the proposition in question, so that one can have a right to believe (or disbelieve) that proposition and a right to suspend judgement on it. Whereas the first consideration counts in favour of the idea that believing justifiedly is at least sometimes a matter of having an epistemic right, the latter consideration favours the view that believing justifiedly is always a matter of having an epistemic right.

Adorno's saying that ‘art is the promise of happiness’ radiates into every corner of his work from his aesthetic theory to his critical theory of society. However, it is much misunderstood. This can be seen from the standard answer to the question: in virtue of what formal features do art works, according to Adorno, promise happiness? The standard answer to this question suggests that the aesthetic harmony occasioned by the organic wholeness of the form realized in the artwork contrasts with and throws into relief the antagonistic nature of society. The trouble is that this answer is flatly incompatible with Adorno's historicism and central components of his aesthetic modernism, including his critique of classicism, and his negativism. I propose a re-interpretation of Adorno's thesis that art is the promise of happiness that overcomes these difficulties.

Beth Lord, Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to Deleuze, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 214pp., $89.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780230552975.

Reviewed by Paul Davies, University of Sussex.

The study makes a claim for a critical cosmopolitanism situated in daily performances and encounters of difference in Athens. In the wake of mass migration and economic crisis, the contemporary urban environment changes, creating new social spaces where identities and cultures interact. Festivals are seen as sites of creative dialogue between the Self, the Other and local communities. Festivals are examples of those new spaces where different performances of belonging give rise to alternative social imaginations. This study explores the emotional, cultural and political aspects of cosmopolitanism with the latter leading to the formation of an active civil society. As such, it seeks to evidence cosmopolitanism as an embodied, everyday practice. The research thus extends the current field by locating its empirical lens in a specific milieu.

Empirical analysis of grounded cosmopolitanism anchored in behavioural repertoires redefines ubiquitous polarities of margin and centre, pointing towards social change in Athens. Fieldwork was conducted in Athens over eighteen months, comprising of building communities of participants involved in three festivals, including both artists and organisations. Research methods included observation and participation in the festivals, which were photographically documented for research visual diaries. Semi-structured
interviews formed the core of the fieldwork. The approach allowed access to experiences, feelings and expressions through artworks, embodying ‘third spaces’.

In the milieu of rapid social change, as urban localities transform as a result of economic and social crisis, the need for redefining politics emerges. The case studies explore how change in a celebratory moment can have a more sustainable legacy encouraging active citizenship. The analysis highlights the value of a model of cosmopolitanism in action, positing that transformation of the social and political must be local and grounded in everyday actions if it is to engage with promises of alternative futures.

This thesis argues for a move beyond the division of contemporary western experiences
into separate social and political spheres. This includes a comparative study of the theories
of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault alongside historical and contemporary examples in
support of the relevance of their theories and that of this thesis.

The synthesis between Arendt and Foucault made here corrects the respective weaknesses in each theory by using the strengths of the other. Furthermore, this synthesis informs a move beyond the social and political referred to above. The critique of sovereignty, the defence of plurality and the critique of instrumental reason are shown here as the most important parallels between the two thinkers and the central ways that people in contemporary western society are disempowered. This thesis argues for a reconsideration of these issues in order to redress this disempowerment.

The thesis also looks at the major divergence between the two thinkers which is shown to rest on their respective treatment of the social and political. This argument rejects the Arendtian argument for the separation of the social and political to favour Foucauldian resistance located on and within the everyday experiences of western individuals. This shown to be political action rooted in the social aspects of the individuals' lives and stands in opposition to the claims of Arendt regarding the social. However, this retains the political
strengths of her vision.

The synthesis of the strengths of both theorists alongside the ultimate rejection of the Arendtian separation of the social and political that this Foucauldian resistance exemplifies is concluded as constituting a move beyond the social and political to have more relevance, meaning and ultimate empowerment for individuals because it more accurately reflects the realities of their everyday lives.

What is it to occupy a first‐person stance? Is the first‐personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? In this book a new way to address those questions, drawing inspiration from theories about the self in first millennial India, is formulated. These philosophers do not regard the first‐person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature not that of scientific naturalism but rather a liberal naturalism non‐exclusive of the normative. A wide range of ideas are explored: reflexive self‐representation, mental files, and quasi‐subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. This book argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self‐presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first‐person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.

In an increasingly multi-religious and multi-ethnic world, identity has become something actively chosen rather than merely acquired at birth. This book essentially analyzes the resources available to make such a choice.

Looking into the world of intellectual India, this unique comparative survey focuses on the identity resources offered by India’s traditions of reasoning and public debate. Arguing that identity is a formation of reason, it draws on Indian theory to claim that identities are constructed from exercises of reason as derivation from exemplary cases. The book demonstrates that contemporary debates on global governance and cosmopolitan identities can benefit from these Indian resources, which were developed within an intercultural pluralism context with an emphasis on consensual resolution of conflict.

This groundbreaking work builds on themes developed by Amartya Sen to provide a creative pursuit of Indian reasoning that will appeal to anyone studying politics, philosophy, and Asian political thought.

In a series of recent articles, Robin Jeshion has developed a theory of singular thought which she calls ‘cognitivism’. According to Jeshion, cognitivism offers a middle path between acquaintance theories—which she takes to impose too strong a requirement on singular thought, and semantic instrumentalism—which she takes to impose too weak a requirement. In this article, I raise a series of concerns about Jeshion's theory, and suggest that the relevant data can be accommodated by a version of acquaintance theory that distinguishes unsuccessful thoughts of singular form from successful singular thoughts, and in addition allows for ‘trace-based’ acquaintance.

This paper considers, and rejects, three strategies aimed at showing that the KK-principle fails even in most favourable circumstances (all emerging from Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits). The case against the final strategy provides positive grounds for thinking that the principle should hold good in such situations

“Being with oneself in the other” is Hegel’s famous definition of freedom, and, I argue, it
is also the key topic of his entire Science of Logic. Hegel’s Logic is an ontological analysis of the underlying relational structure of everything: the structure of thinking as much as the
structure of the world. Hegel proposes at the beginning of the Logic that this structure
must display the form of “being with oneself in the other”, i.e. consist in a relation of
identity and difference between a totality and its elements. After presenting the different
forms of “being with oneself in the other” developed in the Logic, I will offer a new
interpretation of the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History in the light of my
interpretation of the Logic. This serves to show how exactly Philosophy of Right is the
exposition of the existence of freedom and how it is grounded in the Logic. While the
connection between Hegel’s Logic and social philosophy has often been taken to have
authoritarian and anti-individualist implications, I will show that this is not the case and
that this connection instead highlights the republican aspects in Hegel’s theory

This thesis constitutes a critical intervention in contemporary research on terrorism. It seeks to address the problems resulting from a reductive understanding of terrorism and from a predominant concern with terrorism after 9/11. For this purpose, this thesis charts and critically engages certain watershed moments in the history of terrorism since its emergence in the French Revolution. The aim is to show that terrorism is not a historically constant and readily identifiable form of violence but a variable element in a wider context of power relations.

The discourses of terrorism examined in this thesis show that conceptions of terrorism are tied to and function within a wider context of changing political interests and an evolving modern economy of power. I show that there are reasons for the different meanings and roles of terrorism across time and between societies, and that these reasons shed light on larger social, political, cultural or economic developments. It is in this context that particular discourses of terrorism help to legitimate political and legal regimes and allow for the selective exclusion of individuals, groups and ideologies from the political realm.

I argue that a historically grounded and theoretically thorough analysis of terrorism can provide important insights into how the state has been able to sustain itself by incorporating and mobilizing different types of power. By way of a genealogical study of terrorism, my project attempts to map these forms of power as well as their dependence on various frameworks that are used to legitimize violence, to dismantle legal norms, and to expand power in the name of freedom and democracy. This thesis thus not only responds to the epistemological, methodological and temporal limitations of contemporary terrorism scholarship but is also of practical political relevance.