The puzzle that concerns this research project is that of why even prioritised government policies are not necessarily implemented, either at all or within their allocated time frame. The combined contexts of firstly political and economic transition, and secondly a clash of two distinct policies – economic and environmental – can make it easier to answer this question. The last few decades have seen a growing international drive to reduce the negative environmental impact of economic activity. Government regulations play a pivotal role in this trend, but while their clarity, scope and suitability have been improving across the globe, they often fail to achieve desired outcomes. This is especially true in transitional countries. In the post-Soviet states, industrial development can have significant global consequences, but implementation of environmental protection has often been significantly slower than in more developed countries despite the strong official rhetoric about their importance.

Governments face significant barriers to implementation. To uncover what they are and why they persist, this project draws together interview data from 77 interviews (see Appendix A) from four oil-extracting regions across the post-Soviet space. They are the Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the Russian Arctic; the Republic of Tatarstan in southern Russia; Atyrau, the oil capital of Kazakhstan; and Baku, the capital city and key oilextracting region of Azerbaijan. Implementation gaps and their causes in each region are contrasted to establish the degree of explanatory power of variables derived from inter-regional differences and from prominent literature on public administration and other disciplines relevant to environmental policy and oil.

The first variable investigated is foreign influence, seen as direct and indirect impact of foreign and international NGOs, oil firms and developmental and financial institutions and organisations. The second is state capacity, seen as the quality of domestic regulation and the capacity of executive government structures to enforce it. The last variable explored is that of economic conditions, which takes into account economic sectors and their contribution to government budgets.

The analysis shows that while all variables can have an impact on implementation gaps, they can do so in unexpected ways. Furthermore, although all variables prove to be important for successful implementation, they do not ensure it, working either together or individually. For example, foreign actors can introduce post-Soviet countries to better practices and technologies through norm diffusion, but their equivocal behaviour means that the new norms are not necessarily internalised. Similarly, the quality of regulation and state capacity for enforcement can drive implementation only so far without the political will to channel them appropriately. The variable of economic conditions is the only one that shows a consistent link with the dependent variable, although it cannot explain implementation gaps in all contexts. Comparative analysis does, however, reveal some clear catalysts: implementation appears least successful in contexts of low political stability, with associated levels of corruption, while polluters’ conceptualisation of environmental spending as an investment rather than a cost can help drive implementation.

In June 2016, the United Kingdom’s electorate voted in a referendum to leave the European Union. This article examines ‘Brexit’ from the perspective of British, or English, exceptionalism. It argues that the Leave vote was caused by a number of factors: underlying myths and exceptionalism about the U.K. and its relationship with ‘Europe’; the fallout from the 2007–2008 financial crisis; the austerity policies undertaken in the U.K. since 2010; and the increased migration into the U.K. after the financial crisis, in particular from other EU Member States. The article concludes by arguing that Brexit should serve as an important lesson to listen to all people who feel abandoned by the EU, austerity and globalisation, to hear their stories and perspectives. Only then can we start to think about whether there are shared values and principles which could form the basis for a European politics of the future.

Codes of conduct are used widely in both public administration and industry by organisations seeking to regulate the behaviour of their members and promote adherence to a set of standards. In legislatures, the introduction of codes has gathered pace in recent years, driven either by a perceived need to respond to a corruption scandal or, especially in Eastern Europe, by international efforts to promote democracy and reduce corruption. This article sets out a theoretical case for the conditions in which codes are likely to be effective instruments of regulation. It suggests that a supportive culture of informal institutions is critical but unlikely to prevail in most democratising societies. However, the process of introducing codes may help to create the appropriate conditions.