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Having a concept 'see' does not imply attribution of knowledge: some general considerations in measuring 'theories of mind'
That organisms have a concept 'see' does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on the basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protocol is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an experimenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attribution of knowledge to the experimenter.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Behavioral and Brain SciencesISSN
0140-525XPublisher
Cambridge University PressIssue
01Volume
21Page range
123-124Department affiliated with
- Psychology Publications
Notes
Commentary on Heyes (1998).Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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