Having a concept 'see' does not imply attribution of knowledge: some general considerations in measuring 'theories of mind'

Leavens, David A (1998) Having a concept 'see' does not imply attribution of knowledge: some general considerations in measuring 'theories of mind'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21 (01). pp. 123-124. ISSN 0140-525X

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Abstract

That organisms have a concept 'see' does not necessarily entail that they attribute knowledge to others or predict others' behaviors on the basis of inferred mental states. An alternative experimental protocol is proposed in which accurate prediction of the location of an experimenters' impending appearance is contingent upon subjects' attribution of knowledge to the experimenter.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Commentary on Heyes (1998).
Schools and Departments: School of Psychology > Psychology
Depositing User: David Leavens
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 15:33
Last Modified: 15 Jun 2012 13:13
URI: http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/13233
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