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Kripkean counterpart theory
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 00:34 authored by Murali RamachandranDavid Lewis's counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought and in some eyes, unwelcome consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent distinctness. Contingent identity follows for free. The theory is Kripkean in that the counterpart relation is in a sense stipulated rather than grounded on similarity, and is such that no object has more than one counterpart at a world. This avoids a number of objections Fara and Williamson have recently levelled against counterpart theory generally; their other objections are addressed by enriching the theory with special quantifiers and actuality operators.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Polish Journal of PhilosophyISSN
1897-1652Publisher
Philosophy Documentation CenterIssue
2Volume
2Page range
89-106Pages
18.0Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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