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Psychoanalysis of a minimal agent
The Secretary problem is studied with minimal cognitive agents, being a problem that needs memory and judgment. A sequence of values, drawn from an unknown range, is presented; the agent has only one chance to pick a single value as they are presented, and should try to maximize the value chosen. In extension of previous work (Tuci et al. 2002), Continuous Time Recurrent Neural Networks (CTRNN) are evolved to solve the problem, and then their strategies are analyzed by relating mechanisms to behavior. Strategies similar to the known optimal strategy are observed, and it is noted that significantly different strategies can be generated by very different mechanisms that perform equally well.
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Publication status
- Published
Publisher
MIT PressPublisher URL
Pages
8.0Presentation Type
- paper
Event name
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living SystemsEvent location
Winchester, UKEvent type
conferenceISBN
9780262750172Department affiliated with
- Informatics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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