Catignani, Sergio (2012) ‘Getting COIN’ at the tactical level in Afghanistan: reassessing counter-insurgency adaptation in the British Army. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35 (4). pp. 513-539. ISSN 0140-2390

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Abstract

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Counter-insurgency, Military Innovation, Afghanistan, British Army
Schools and Departments:	School of Global Studies > International Relations
Subjects:	J Political Science > JZ International relations U Military Science > U Military Science (General)
Depositing User:	Catrina Hey
Date Deposited:	21 Sep 2012 08:42
Last Modified:	21 Sep 2012 08:42
URI:	http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/40782

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