Booth, Anthony Robert (2014) Epistemic ought is a commensurable ought. European Journal of Philosophy, 22 (4). pp. 529-539. ISSN 0966-8373

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Abstract

I argue that the claim that epistemic ought is incommensurable is self-defeating. My argument, however, depends on the truth of the premise that there can be not only epistemic reasons for belief, but also non-epistemic (e.g., moral) reasons for belief. So I also provide some support for that claim.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User:	Anthony Booth
Date Deposited:	06 Mar 2013 15:54
Last Modified:	08 Mar 2015 10:36
URI:	http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41112

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