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Epistemic justification, rights, and permissibility
Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing (or disbelieving) a proposition serves one of these goals, whereas suspending judgement serves the other, equally important goal. Second, it is in principle always possible to have different epistemic standards for evaluating the evidence for the proposition in question, so that one can have a right to believe (or disbelieve) that proposition and a right to suspend judgement on it. Whereas the first consideration counts in favour of the idea that believing justifiedly is at least sometimes a matter of having an epistemic right, the latter consideration favours the view that believing justifiedly is always a matter of having an epistemic right.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Published version
Journal
Logos and Episteme: an International Journal of EpistemologyISSN
2069-3052Publisher
Institutul EuropeanPublisher URL
Issue
3Volume
3Page range
405-411Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-10-18First Open Access (FOA) Date
2012-10-18First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2012-10-18Usage metrics
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