Contrastive self-knowledge

Sawyer, Sarah (2014) Contrastive self-knowledge. Social Epistemology, 28 (2). pp. 139-152. ISSN 0269-1728

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In this paper, I draw on a recent account of perceptual knowledge according to which knowledge is contrastive. I extend the contrastive account of perceptual knowledge to yield a contrastive account of self-knowledge. Along the way, I develop a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, regrets and so on) and suggest that a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes implies an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on).

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2013 13:44
Last Modified: 13 Apr 2018 16:43

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