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Logical knowledge and Gettier cases

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 15:58 authored by Corine BessonCorine Besson
Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Published version

Journal

Philosophical Quarterly

ISSN

0031-8094

Publisher

Blackwell

Issue

234

Volume

59

Page range

1-19

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2013-10-03

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2013-10-03

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