Besson, Corine (2012) Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 158 (1). pp. 59-82. ISSN 1573-0883

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Abstract

This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User:	Corine Besson
Date Deposited:	03 Oct 2013 15:57
Last Modified:	13 Mar 2017 11:18
URI:	http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/46570

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