Besson, Corine (2010) Understanding the logical constants and dispositions to infer. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 5. pp. 1-24. ISSN 1944-3676

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Abstract

Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an alternative account according to which understanding a logical constant is not to be understood dispositionally, but propositionally. I argue that this account is not inconsistent with intuitively correct manifestations of understanding the logical constants.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Logical Constants, Understanding, Dispositions to Infer
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Depositing User:	Corine Besson
Date Deposited:	25 Aug 2015 15:31
Last Modified:	16 Sep 2017 13:48
URI:	http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/56258

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