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Propositions, dispositions and logical knowledge

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posted on 2023-06-08, 22:13 authored by Corine BessonCorine Besson
This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I show that this dispositionalist view, and the regress that supposedly motivates it, operate with the wrong picture of what is involved in knowing a logical rule. In particular I show that it gives us the wrong picture of the relation between knowing a logical rule and actions of inferring according to it, as well as of the way in which knowing a logical rule might be a priori.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Published version

Publisher

Bibliopolis

Pages

233.0

Book title

Quid Est Veritas? Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes

Place of publication

Napoli

ISBN

9788870885941

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • No

Legacy Posted Date

2015-08-27

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2016-03-22

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