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Why is belief involuntary - FinalRatio.pdf (236.17 kB)

Belief is contingently involuntary

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journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 00:07 authored by Anthony BoothAnthony Booth
The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot (non-contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs).

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Ratio

ISSN

0034-0006

Publisher

Wiley

Issue

2

Volume

30

Page range

107-121

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2016-01-25

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2017-10-13

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2016-01-25

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