Seth, Anil K (2016) Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out. Animal Sentience, 2016 (020). ISSN 2377-7478
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Abstract
Do fish consciously feel pain? Addressing this question, Key (2016) asks whether the neural mechanisms underlying conscious pain reports in humans can be identified in fish. This strategy fails in three ways. First, non-mammalian consciousness — if it exists — may depend on different mechanisms. Second, accumulating neurophysiological and behavioural evidence, evolutionary considerations, and emerging Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering obliges us, via the precautionary principle, to accommodate the possibility of its existence where doubt remains.brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering obliges us, via the precautionary principle,to accommodate the possibility of its existence where doubt remains.
Item Type: | Article |
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Schools and Departments: | School of Engineering and Informatics > Informatics |
Research Centres and Groups: | Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science |
Subjects: | R Medicine > RC Internal medicine > RC0321 Neurosciences. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry |
Depositing User: | Marianne Cole |
Date Deposited: | 03 Oct 2016 13:05 |
Last Modified: | 13 Mar 2017 11:35 |
URI: | http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/63671 |
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