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Subjective Externalism Theoria ID THEO-OA-2107-023 REVISED November FINAL.pdf (304.1 kB)

Subjective externalism

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posted on 2023-06-09, 08:53 authored by Sarah SawyerSarah Sawyer
In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the conceptual space for subjective externalism, according to which the correct attribution of thought content to an individual is essentially constrained by her nonrepresentational relations to objective manifest properties in her wider reality.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Theoria

ISSN

1755-2567

Publisher

Wiley

Issue

1

Volume

84

Page range

4-22

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2017-11-16

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2019-11-16

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2017-11-16

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