Sawyer, Sarah (2018) Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri. Analysis, 78 (4). pp. 675-681. ISSN 0003-2638

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Abstract

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. The deductive argument Yli-Vakkuri offers, however, depends on premises which are such that, on standard formulations of internalism, they cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously; it does not therefore, constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this paper is to explain why.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Externalism; internalism; mind; mental representation; mental content.
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User:	Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited:	11 Dec 2017 11:24
Last Modified:	15 Oct 2018 13:55
URI:	http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71952

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