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Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

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posted on 2023-06-09, 15:00 authored by Lukasz Balbus, Pawel DziewulskiPawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, Lukasz Wozny
We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385–393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330–353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Published version

Journal

Economic Theory

ISSN

0938-2259

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Issue

1

Volume

59

Page range

201-243

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2018-09-11

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2018-09-11

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2018-09-10

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