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Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 15:00 authored by Lukasz Balbus, Pawel DziewulskiPawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett, Lukasz WoznyWe study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385–393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330–353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Published version
Journal
Economic TheoryISSN
0938-2259Publisher
Springer VerlagExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
59Page range
201-243Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2018-09-11First Open Access (FOA) Date
2018-09-11First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2018-09-10Usage metrics
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