Sawyer, Sarah (2019) Concepts, conceptions and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis. ISSN 0165-0106

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Abstract

Content externalism implies first, that there is a distinction between concepts and conceptions, and second, that there is a distinction between thoughts and states of mind. The implications require us to rethink the nature of self-knowledge. In this paper, I argue for the partial-representation theory of self-knowledge, according to which the self-ascription of a thought is authoritative when it is based on a conscious, occurrent thought in virtue of which it partially represents an underlying state of mind. The model of self-knowledge I provide accommodates the distinction between concepts and conceptions and the distinction between thoughts and states of mind, and it also offers a middle path between absolute epistemic security on the one hand, and scepticism about first-personal self-knowledge on the other.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Self-knowledge; concepts; conceptions; externalism; thoughts; representation; self-ignorance; epistemic warrant.
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User:	Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited:	07 Feb 2019 09:26
Last Modified:	20 Mar 2019 12:39
URI:	http://srodev.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/81800

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